 |
|
 ost
experts consider the probability of a large-scale chemical attack with a
military-grade agent (such as
sarin) to be fairly low,
given the current limits on terrorists' ability to manufacture and
deliver such agents. Nevertheless, the ability to conduct assassinations
and small-scale attacks with chemical agents already exists, as does the
possibility of inflicting mass casualties through attacks on or sabotage
of chemical manufacturing plants. Accordingly, government officials must
be more proactive in reducing the risks of an attack and preparing to
reduce the severity the consequences.
With respect to response management,
greater emphasis and funding should go to the training and equipping of
local and state first responders, particularly
Hazmat teams, to improve
their capabilities for crowd decontamination, medical triage, and
treatment of large numbers of casualties. In addition, federal assets
such as antidote stockpiles and rapid-response teams should be better
coordinated, rationalized, and streamlined, with the aim of providing
more timely support to state and local authorities. Improving the
security of chemical plants and the transportation infrastructure will
require cooperative efforts by government and the private sector.
|
|
|