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Excerpted from the Inventory of International Organizations
and Regimes 2001 published by the CNS International Organizations and Nonproliferation
Project. A complete PDF copy of the 2000 edition of the Inventory is available in the Publications section of the NTI website.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Opened for signature: 1 July 1968.
Entered into force: 5 March 1970.
Duration: Indefinite. Twenty-years after the entry into force of the NPT,
at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, held in New York at the United
Nations, from 17 April to 12 May 1995, States Parties agreed without a vote
"that the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely".
Number of Parties: 187 states.
Depositories: Russia, UK, and
U.S..
Obligations:
- for NWS - not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist, encourage, or
induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them;
- for NNWS - not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices from any transferor, and not to manufacture or acquire
them;
- for NNWS to place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear
activities under IAEA safeguards;
- for all parties - to facilitate and participate in the exchange
of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and
- for all parties - to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
Verification: NNWS are to conclude agreements with the IAEA
for safeguards to be applied on all source or special fissionable materials in
all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such states. Such
agreements are to be concluded with the IAEA, individually or together with
other states, and enter into force within 18 months after their accession to the
Treaty.
Other major provisions: the right of any group of states to conclude
regional treaties to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories; the convening of review conferences every five years (six review
conferences have been held: in 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and
2000).
The NPT was accompanied by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
255 (19 June 1968) on security assurances to NPT NNWS. On 11 April 1995, the
five nuclear-weapon states through UN Security Council Resolution 984 issued
harmonized negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states parties
to the NPT.
After 2000 RevCon
The successful outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was generally
acknowledged and attempted to be built upon during the third part of the 2000
session of the conference on Disarmament (07 August to 22 September 2000) and
the UN First Committee of the 55th UNGA (02 October to 03 November
2000).
The overwhelming majority of participating states welcomed the 2000 RevCon
outcome and sought to have the UNGA welcome and reaffirm the Conference's
Final Document. The New Agenda coalition, in particular, urged that what had
been agreed at the 2000 RevCon should be brought before the UNGA "with a
view to it being adopted by the United Nations as a whole."
In introducing resolutions at the UN First Committee, some countries,
namely Japan, went beyond the NPT language calling for negotiations on a ban on
fissile material production to be concluded by the year 2005, a moratorium on
fissile material production, and setting out a target date of 2003 for the
CTBT's entry into force. (Summaries of the 2000 Resolutions are available
in the UN chapter.) However, some countries namely China, Russia, and France are
reluctant to go beyond the language of the 2000 RevCon's Final Document.
2000 Review Conference
The 2000 NPT Review Conference was convened at United Nations Headquarters
from 24 April to 19 May 2000, with 157 of 187 States Parties participating. One
state not party, Cuba attended as an observer. Palestine was also granted
observer status; 141 research institutes and non-governmental organizations
attended as observers.
The bureau of the Review Conference comprised inter alia: President
Abdallah Baali (Algeria) and Secretary-General Hannelore Hoppe (Chief, WMD
Branch, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs).
The 33 Vice-Presidents were: Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon,
Canada, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania,
Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal,
South Africa, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.
Main Committee I: Chairman Camilo Reyes (Colombia), Vice-Chairmen: Jean
Lint (Belgium) and Vadim Reznikov (Belarus); Subsidiary Body 1: Clive Pearson
(New Zealand). Main Committee II: Chairman Adam Kobieracki (Poland),
Vice-Chairmen: Suh Dae-won (Republic of Korea) and Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana);
Subsidiary Body 2: Christopher Westdal (Canada). Main Committee III: Chairman
Markku Reimaa (Finland), Vice-Chairmen: Igor Dzundev (The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia) and Hamid Baidi Nejad (Islamic Republic of Iran).
Drafting Committee: Chairman André Erdös (Hungary); Vice-Chairmen:
Fayza Aboulnaga (Egypt) and Pedro Villagra-Delgado (Argentina); and Credentials
Committee: Chairman Makmur Widodo (Indonesia); Vice-Chairmen: Ion Botnaru
(Moldova) and Wernfried Köffler (Austria). The Conference appointed
representatives from the following States parties as members of the Credentials
Committee: Chile, Greece, Morocco, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.
The 2000 Review Conference held 16 plenary meetings together with several sessions
of informal consultations. On 19 May - in real time, on 20 May - the Conference
adopted a Final Document by consensus.
Nuclear Disarmament: The Conference agreed on the following practical
steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Paragraphs 3
and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament": (1) the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications,
without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes,
to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT; (2) a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test
explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that
Treaty.; (3) the necessity of negotiations in the CD on a non-discriminatory,
multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995
and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament
and nuclear non-proliferation objectives - the CD is urged to agree on
a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations
on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years; (4) the
necessity of establishing in the CD an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate
to deal with nuclear disarmament - the CD is urged to agree on a program of
work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body; (5) the principle
of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related
arms control and reduction measures; (6) an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon
states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading
to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI;
(7) the reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in
the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective
international control; (8) regular reports, within the framework of the NPT
strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of
Article VI and Paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling
the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996; and
(9) the further development of the verification capabilities that will be required
to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the
achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
In the Conference's review of Article VI, the
nuclear-weapon states agreed to the following steps toward nuclear disarmament
in a way that promotes international stability and the principle of undiminished
security for all:
- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear
arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities
and the implementation of agreements;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on
unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and
disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of
nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies;
and
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon
states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear
weapons.
Safeguards: The Conference reaffirmed the fundamental
importance of full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant
safeguards agreements. The Conference reaffirmed that the IAEA is the competent
authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute
of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards
agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations
under Article III, Paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference emphasized that nothing should
be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. States parties that
have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the
Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting
evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions
and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
The Conference considered that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that
States are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards
agreements and assist States to demonstrate this compliance. It stressed that
the nonproliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential
for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a
vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference
stressed that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be
universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been
achieved. The Conference reiterated the call by previous conferences of the
States parties for the application of IAEA safeguards to all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in
accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty. The Conference
noted with satisfaction that, since 1995, 28 States have concluded safeguards
agreements with IAEA in compliance with Article III, Paragraph 4, of
the Treaty, 25 of which have brought the agreements into force.
The Conference reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards should regularly be assessed
and evaluated. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further
strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards
should be supported and implemented. It also reaffirmed that the implementation
of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to Article III,
Paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification
by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declaration so
that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from
declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities. The Conference also fully endorsed the measures contained in the
Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
(INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in
May 1997. The safeguards-strengthening measures contained in the Model
Additional Protocol will provide IAEA with, inter alia, enhanced
information about a State's nuclear activities and complementary access to
locations within a State.
The Conference recognized that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on
document INFCIRC/153 have been successful in their main focus of providing
assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited
level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities. The Conference noted that implementation of the measures specified
in the Model Additional Protocol will provide, in an effective and efficient
manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material
and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures are now being
introduced as an integral part of the IAEA's safeguards system.
The Conference noted, in particular, the relationship between the
additional protocol and the safeguards agreement between IAEA and a State party
as set out in Article I of the Model Additional Protocol. In this regard,
it recalled the interpretation provided by the IAEA secretariat on 31 January
1997 and set out in document GOV/2914 of 10 April 1997 that, once concluded, the
two agreements had to be read and interpreted as one agreement.
The Conference noted the high priority that the IAEA attaches, in the
context of furthering the development of the strengthened safeguards system, to
integrating traditional nuclear-material verification activities with the new
strengthening measures and looks forward to an expeditious conclusion of this
work. It recognized that the aim of these efforts is to optimize the combination
of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA in order to meet the
Agency's safeguards objectives with maximum effectiveness and efficiency
within available resources.
Furthermore, the Conference noted that credible assurance of the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities, notably those related to enrichment
and reprocessing, in a State as a whole could permit corresponding reduction in
the level of traditional verification efforts with respect to declared nuclear
material in that State, which is less sensitive from the point of view of
non-proliferation.
The Conference recognized that measures to strengthen the effectiveness and
improve the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to providing
credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared
activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities must
be implemented by all States parties to the NPT, including the nuclear-weapon
States.
Middle East: The States Parties also reaffirmed the
Resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 NPTREC, and in its review of
its implementation:
- The parties called on Israel by name to accede to the treaty for the
first time in the NPT's history, as it is the only state in the region not
to have done so. The Conference recalled that operative Paragraph 4 of the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East "calls upon all States in the Middle
East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as
soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." The Conference noted, in
this connection, that the report of the United Nations Secretariat on the
Implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.2000/7)
states that several States have acceded to the Treaty and that, "with
these accessions, all States of the region of the Middle East, with the
exception of Israel, are States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference welcomed the accession of these States and
reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the
placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in
realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle
East."
- All States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the
States of the Middle East, are to report on the steps that they have taken to
promote the achievement of "a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as
well as other weapons of mass destruction" at the 2005 Review
Conference.
- Bearing in mind the importance of full compliance with the NPT, the
Conference noted the statement of 24 April 2000 by the IAEA Director-General
that, since the cessation of IAEA inspections in Iraq on 16 December 1998, the
Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's
compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The
Conference further noted that the IAEA carried out an inspection in January 2000
pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA during which the
inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to
safeguards (low enriched, natural and depleted uranium). The Conference
reaffirmed the importance of Iraq's full continuous cooperation with the
IAEA and compliance with its obligations.
South Asia: The Conference deplored the nuclear test
explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in 1998. The Conference
declared that such actions do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon state
status or any special status whatsoever. It also called on India and Pakistan to
abide by Resolution 1172 (1998) and to implement a series of confidence-building
measures, including moratoria on further testing and fissile material production
for weapons. Furthermore, the Conference called upon all states parties to
refrain from any action that may contravene or undermine the objectives of UNSCR
1172. The Conference noted that India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on
further nuclear testing and their willingness to sign and ratify the CTBT, and
it urged them to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states, and to place
all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference
urged both countries to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons, pending the conclusion of a treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear explosives.
DPRK: The Conference noted with concern that, while the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains a party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA continues to be unable to verify the
correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made
by the DPRK and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion
of nuclear material in the DPRK. The Conference looked forward to the
fulfillment by the DPRK of its stated intention to come into full compliance
with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which remains binding and in force.
The Conference emphasized the importance of action by the DPRK to preserve and
make available to the IAEA all information needed to verify its initial
inventory.
Universality: The Conference reaffirmed the long-held commitment
of parties to the Treaty to universal membership and noted that this goal had
been advanced by the accession to the Treaty of several new States since the
1995 Review and Extension Conference, thereby bringing its membership to 187
States parties. The Conference reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty in establishing
a norm of international behavior in the nuclear field. The Conference called
on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby
accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their
nuclear activities. These States are Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. In this
context, the Conference welcomed the signature by Cuba of the protocol additional
to its safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The Conference particularly urged
those non-parties to the Treaty that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities
- India, Israel and Pakistan - to take similar action, and affirmed the important
contribution this would make to regional and global security.
Strengthened Review Process: The States Parties also agreed
to measures to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process as
follows:
- Three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, normally for a duration
of 10 working days each, should be held in the years prior to the review
conference. A fourth session, would, if necessary, be held in the year of the
review conference;
- Specific time should be allocated at sessions of the Preparatory
Committee to address "specific relevant issues." Subsidiary bodies
for this purpose can also be established at Review Conferences;
- The first two sessions of the PrepCom would "consider
principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of
the Treaty, as well as its universality";
- Each session of the PrepCom should consider specific matters of
substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and NPTREC Decisions 1
and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the
outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the
operation and purpose of the Treaty;
- The Chairpersons of the PrepComs will carry out consultations in
preparation for the subsequent meeting;
- The PrepComs are to factually summarize their results and transmit
them to the next meeting. The last PrepCom meeting before the Review Conference,
should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing
recommendations to the Review Conference and should decide on its procedural
arrangements; and
- A meeting should be allocated to non-governmental organizations to
address each session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review
Conference.
In addition, the final document contained well over 100 paragraphs dealing
with other aspects of the treaty, such as strengthened safeguards, compliance,
the authority of the IAEA in implementing safeguards and technical assistance
cooperation, effective physical protection of all nuclear material, the highest
possible standards of nuclear safety, efficacy of and transparency in export
controls, the safe transport of radioactive materials, radiological protection
and radioactive waste management, conversion of military nuclear materials to
peaceful uses, nuclear-weapon-free zones, non-recognition of any new
nuclear-weapon states, and universal adherence to the treaty.
Other significant developments at the 2000 Review Conference included:
Joint NWS statement: A joint statement was issued by the five
NWS on May 1. The 23-paragraph document covered nuclear disarmament,
non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear energy, and safeguards.
The statement referred to their "unequivocal commitment" to
fulfilling their NPT obligations and to the ultimate goals of a complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament. The
statement also noted that none of the nuclear-weapon states targets nuclear
weapons at any other state. It reiterated their view that, in accordance with
the treaty, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon states,
and stressed that the two countries should implement UN Security Council
Resolution 1172. The NWS statement also called for the preservation and
strengthening of the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a
basis for further strategic offensive reductions. Furthermore, the statement
referred to negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), but placed
it in the context of an agreed work program for the CD.
New Agenda Coalition: Among the NNWS, the New Agenda Coalition
(NAC) - a grouping of states that cuts across traditional regional associations
and includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and
Sweden - played a dominant role in putting forth disarmament proposals and in
directly negotiating the text on disarmament with the nuclear-weapon states.
The coalition proposed identifying "areas in which" and "means through which"
future progress should be sought on nuclear disarmament. A key demand of the
coalition was for the NWS to "make an unequivocal undertaking" to totally eliminate
their nuclear arsenals and to "engage in an accelerated process of negotiations"
during the upcoming 2000-2005 review period. In addition, the coalition called
for early and interim steps: including, adaptation of nuclear postures to preclude
the use of nuclear weapons; dealerting and removal of warheads from delivery
vehicles; reductions in tactical nuclear weapons leading to their elimination;
greater transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories;
and irreversibility in removing excess fissile material from weapons programs
and in all nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms reduction, and nuclear arms control
measures. They also promoted an appropriate subsidiary body in the CD with a
mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament and the rapid negotiation and conclusion
of legally binding security assurances for NNWS party to the treaty.
The full text of the Final Document can be found at http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/finaldoc.html
Preparatory Committee 1997-1999
The 1999 PrepCom took place from 10-21 May in New York. It was chaired by
Ambassador Camilo Reyes-Rodriguez of Columbia and was attended by 119 States
Parties. Israel and Cuba attended as observers, as well as more than 60 NGOs. In
addition to discussing the implementation of 1995 Principles and Objectives, the
PrepCom also considered proposals concerning the expected outcome of the Review
Conference. The Committee reached agreement on the provisional agenda for the
Review Conference, the allocation of items to the three main committees, the
office bearers of the Conference, the draft rules of procedure for the
Conference, as well as the estimated costs of the Conference and the schedule of
the division of costs.
The 1998 session of the PrepCom took place from 27 April - 8 May in
Geneva and was chaired by Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland). The session was
attended by 97 countries, 2 observers (Brazil and Israel) and 76
non-governmental organizations. The Committee continued the process of reviewing
the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the
Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference. Specific time was also allocated for discussions on three issues:
security assurances for parties to the NPT; the resolution on the Middle East;
and a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
UNGA Resolution 51/45 A of 10 December 1996 took note of the decision of
NPT parties to hold the first session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for
the 2000 NPT Review Conference at UN headquarters in New York from 7-18 April
1997. The PrepCom was attended by 149 countries under the chairmanship of
Ambassador Pasi Patokallio (Finland). Brazil, Cuba, Israel and Pakistan
participated as observers. 113 non-governmental organizations also attended. The
Chairman issued a statement recommending that time be allocated at the second
session for discussion and consideration of proposals concerning security
assurances, the resolution on the Middle East and a convention banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) was convened at
United Nations Headquarters from 17 April to 12 May 1995, with 175 of the then
179 states parties taking part. Ten states not parties attended as observers, as
did 195 NGOs. The bureau of the NPTREC comprised: President Jayantha Dhanapala
(Sri Lanka); Secretary-General Prvoslav Davinic (Director of the UN Center for
Disarmament Affairs); 33 Vice-Presidents (Algeria, Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Congo, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Norway, Peru,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United
States, and Venezuela); Main Committee I: Chairman Isaac Ayewah (Nigeria),
Vice-Chairmen: Richard Starr (Australia) and Anatoli Zlenko (Ukraine); Main
Committee II: Chairman André Erdös (Hungary), Vice-Chairmen: Enrique
de la Torre (Argentina), Rajab Sukayri (Jordan); Main Committee III: Chairman
Jaap Ramaker (Netherlands), Vice-Chairmen: Yanko Yanes (Bulgaria), Gustavo
Alvarez Goyoaga (Uruguay); Drafting Committee: Chairman Tadeusz Strulak
(Poland); Vice-Chairmen: Nabil Fahmy (Egypt) and Pasi Patokakallio (Finland);
and Credentials Committee: Chairman Andelfo Garcia (Colombia); Vice-Chairmen:
Alyksandr Sychou (Belarus) and Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes (United States).
The 1995 NPTREC held 19 plenary meetings together with several sessions of
the informal "President's Consultations". On 11 May, the
Conference adopted without a vote a package of three decisions, comprising:
Decision 1 (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4) on "Strengthening the review process for
the Treaty"; Decision 2 (NPT/CONF.1995/L.5) on "Principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament"; and Decision 3
(NPT/CONF.1995/L.6) on "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons". The Conference decided thereby "that, as a
majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension,
in accordance with Article X, Paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue
in force indefinitely". The NPTREC also adopted draft resolution
(NPT/CONF.1995/L.8) on the Middle East, as orally amended, without a vote, as
resolution 1, sponsored by the three NPT depositary states.
Decision 1 on a strengthened review process for the Treaty
(largely based on Canadian and South African suggestions) specified
that:
- review conferences should continue to be held every five years and
that the next such conference should be held in the year 2000;
- beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) should meet
for 10 working days, in each of the three years prior to the review conference,
and if necessary, a fourth PrepCom may be held in the year of the review
conference;
- the purpose of the PrepCom would be to consider principles,
objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty,
as well as its universality, including those identified in decision 2, and to
make recommendations thereon to the review conference, as well as making
procedural preparations;
- the present structure of the three Main Committees should continue
and the question of overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee
should be resolved in the General Committee;
- subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main
Committees; and
- review conferences should look forward as well as back, identify
areas for further progress in the strengthened implementation of the
Treaty.
Decision 2 on principles and objectives for nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament covered seven substantive areas to promote the
full realization and effective implementation of the Treaty that included
inter alia:
- furthering universal adherence to the Treaty;
- promoting nuclear nonproliferation without hampering the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy;
- pursuing nuclear disarmament, in particular a "programme of
action" on: (i) completion by the CD of a universal and internationally
and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996, and pending the entry into
force of a CTBT the nuclear weapon states should exercise utmost restraint; (ii)
immediate commencement and early conclusion of a non-discriminatory and
universally applicable fissile material cut-off treaty; and (iii) determined
pursuit by the NWS of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by
all states of general and complete disarmament;
- endorsing the establishment of internationally recognized NWFZs, on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, as enhancing global and regional
security, especially in regions of conflict such as in the Middle
East;
- noting the security assurances under UNSC Res. 984, and calling for
an internationally and legally binding instrument on such assurances;
- requiring full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding
commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as
a necessary precondition for new supply arrangements for nuclear materials and
technology; and
- promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with
Articles I, II, and III of the NPT, and promoting transparency in nuclear
related export controls.
On the basis of a draft resolution on indefinite extension co-sponsored by
Canada and 103 other cosponsors, as well as Decisions 1 and 2, the NPTREC in
Decision 3 agreed without a vote that "as a majority exists among States
party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with
Article X, Paragraph the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely".
In the Resolution on the Middle East, cosponsored by the
three NPT depositary states to secure the concurrence of the Arab states parties
to indefinite extension, the Conference inter alia:
- endorsed the Middle East peace process and recognized its
contribution to a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other
weapons of mass destruction;
- noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and called upon all states with unsafeguarded
facilities to place them under full-scope IAEA safeguards;
- called upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so
to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear
facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards;
- called upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in
appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the
establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of
mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems,
and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this
objective; and
- called upon all States party to the NPT, and in particular the
nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost
efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a
Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems.
The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs maintains a web-site with resources
on the NPT meetings: http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/index.html
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