CWC: Pledges and Successes |
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Costs and Benefits of Membership. The most fundamental restriction placed upon member states is that they do not develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, or use chemical weapons. However, the CWC also imposes constraints on the transfer of chemical agents among states. Member countries may not transfer schedule 1 and schedule 2 agents to non-member countries. Furthermore, member states must request an end-use certificate from non-member states if they are transferring schedule 3 agents. Members bear the considerable costs of setting up a national capability to monitor the chemical industry's activities and prepare the two national annual declarations required under the CWC. In return for agreeing to these restrictions, member states receive several benefits. Upon membership, states are eligible for assistance from other member states in developing their civilian chemical industries. Member states are also eligible for OPCW technical and financial assistance with chemical research. In extreme circumstances, member states may also receive aid to destroy CW or CW facilities in order to meet the treaty's most fundamental requirements (Russia, for example, has received CW dismantlement aid from many states). Finally, all CWC members pledge to aid those who have been attacked or threatened by chemical weapons. Successes. One of the major successes of the CWC has been its near-universal membership. As of July 2008, 184 countries have joined the CWC, leaving only six states which have signed but not ratified the treaty (including Israel), and seven others who have neither signed nor ratified the treaty (including Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria).
Due in large part to its near-universal membership and unprecedented verification and enforcement mechanisms, the CWC has made significant progress in reducing or eliminating CW stockpiles and destroying, converting, and inactivating CW production facilities:
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Further Reading:
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Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.