SORT and START I Verification Measures

SORT Verification Issues. Although SORT has already entered into force, many observers have noted that the implementation of the treaty will likely pose certain challenges. These challenges include agreeing to a definition of "strategic nuclear warheads" and determining what verification mechanisms are available to the two parties.  The SORT treaty does not include any new or independent verification measures; rather, it relies upon the verification protocols of the START I treaty, which is officially observed as still binding between the two parties. Critics note that one of the biggest drawbacks to SORT’s reliance upon START I for verification is that the later will expire in 2009, while SORT doesn’t expire until 2012. That means that unless START I is extended or a new treaty that adequately addresses the need for verification is signed by 2009, there will be a three-year gap when implementation of SORT will be unverifiable.

START I Verification Measures. The Joint Statement between Russia and the United States, states that START I provisions "will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed." START I verification measures allow each country to utilize any accessible "national technical means" of verification, and provide for inspections at declared or suspect facilities in order to authenticate each country's declarations of its weapons and facilities. START I also requires several other types of confidence-building measures, including notification to the other side of weapons testing and open displays of some types of missile launchers. However, as with all previous treaties, the facility and limited delivery vehicle inspections provided for in START I do not include actual warhead inspections, allowing each country to protect the secrecy of its classified warhead designs.

Proponents Say No Additional Verification is Needed. Through START I's re-entry vehicle on-site inspections clause, both sides are permitted to observe the number of warheads on selected strategic systems. This provision should enable them to confirm  statements that warheads have been removed from their delivery vehicles under SORT. Although START I expires in 2009 and SORT will continue until 2012, proponents argue that there will be ample time to extend START I's verification provisions or to make other arrangements to permit confirmation that Russia and the United States are complying with SORT. Likewise, the decision of each party to enter into SORT and to limit their nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads each was based upon each country's own assessment of its strategic needs, not on how many operationally deployed warheads the other side retains at any given time. Therefore, it may not be necessary to negotiate additional ways to ensure compliance with a provision that is meant to enhance each country's own interests.

Parties to SORT could also verify implementation by voluntarily providing additional transparency measures as their warheads are being separated from their launch-vehicles to confirm that they are being removed from operational status, and where possible, that those warheads are being dismantled and destroyed. The lack of enhanced verification procedures allows for greater flexibility in the implementation of the treaty and reduces the future potential for conflict over treaty compliance. After all, proponents argue, SORT and the Joint Declaration are recognized by both Russia and the United States as symbols that the antagonistic relationship between the two sides that existed during the Cold War is over.  

Opponents Say Stronger Verification is Required. While START I's re-entry vehicle clause allows for inspections of deployed launch vehicles, it does not provide any method to verify the status of non-deployed warheads, which could plausibly be kept nearby for swift redeployment. The START I provision also includes inspection limits of two inspections per year at any one facility, with a total of 10 re-entry vehicle inspections permitted per year.

Because SORT does not dictate a progressive timetable for warhead reduction, the last three years might prove to be a critical time period in which many—or even most—of the Russian and U.S. warheads are removed. However, if no verification protocols specifically tailored to the implementation of SORT are agreed upon by that time, there would be a three-year gap during which compliance with the treaty could not be confirmed.

Although SORT was negotiated and signed in an atmosphere of good relations between the United States and Russia, the international security environment comes with no guarantees for the future. Agreeing upon further verification protocols will only enhance and support the continuance of the good faith upon which the treaty is based.