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A Primer on WMD
Curbing WMD Proliferation

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Reducing the Risks Posed by Large Nuclear Forces

 
 
Produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Updated March 2007

Source: U.S. Navy

Strategic Nuclear Arms Control. The United States and the former Soviet Union, having realized that the nuclear arms race was spiraling out of control, entered into a series of strategic nuclear arms control agreements beginning in the late 1960s. The first of these agreements were the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) (officially known as the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). In 1979, a new treaty, SALT II, was signed but did not enter into force. Subsequent arms control agreements built upon the successes and failures of the SALT negotiations. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the 1993 START II codified deep reductions in the arsenals of both countries. START II did not enter into force, however. Russia linked the entry into force of this agreement to the continued existence of the 1972 ABM Treaty. When the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, Russia terminated participation in START II.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new global security environment, which led Russia and the United States away from detailed, formalized treaty negotiations. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) is a result of this new direction.

Large Nuclear Forces. Proponents of strategic arms control and disarmament contend that the nuclear arsenals built by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War far exceed what is needed to ensure U.S. and Russian security today. In 2005, these nuclear arsenals include, for each side, several thousand warheads on long-range (strategic) delivery systems. (Analysts estimate that the United States has about 5,966  strategic nuclear warheads, while Russia has 4,732  strategic warheads.) Maintaining nuclear arsenals vastly in excess of actual needs is costly. It increases the danger of accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it conflicts with the obligations of the United States and Russia under Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to end the nuclear arms race and to negotiate a treaty in good faith on disarmament.  While several strategic arms control treaties were concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the continued practice of deploying large nuclear arsenals calls into question the commitment that the nuclear powers have to upholding the NPT.  

Further Reading:

CRS, Amy Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda"
White House, "Presidents Bush, Putin Sign Nuclear Arms Treaty"
Arms Control Association, The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
Richard A. Davis, "Nuclear Offensive Arms Reductions - Past and Present"
BASIC, "Fact Sheet: Comparison of U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaties"
NTI, Victor Mizin, "The Treaty of Moscow"
Center for Defense Information, "Likely Nuclear Arsenals Under SORT"
CRS, Amy F. Woolf, "Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty"
Arms Control Today, Nikolai Sokov, "The Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agenda After SORT"
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Briefing Book on the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty


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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.