Preventive and Preemptive Actions

Preemptive Military Action. In wartime, one strategy is to try to destroy enemy WMD before the weapons can be used. This strategy is known as preemption. Successful preemptive actions are very difficult to execute, however, because countries developing WMD are hiding their activities more effectively than ever before. They are also protecting their WMD facilities against attack by building them deep underground, making them harder to destroy.

Two enemy strategies are particularly hard to counter. One is to place missiles carrying WMD on special trailer-trucks, known as mobile launchers. This tactic allows missiles to be kept in hiding until just before they are launched. The other is to place WMD facilities and storage areas in bomb-resistant underground bunkers. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq used mobile launchers for its short-range Scud missiles. None of these missiles, however, is believed to have carried WMD. The United States was not able to destroy a single Iraqi Scud on the ground, although it devoted much effort to the task, and many Iraqi missiles were launched against Israel and Saudi Arabia from these mobile launchers. Iraq also placed its command centers and other special military assets in hardened underground bunkers. The United States developed especially powerful conventional bombs to attack these targets and destroyed many of them.

Osiraq Building in Iraq After 1981 Israeli Bombing
Source: nuclearweaponarchive.org/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html

Preventive Military Action. In peacetime, one military strategy to counter WMD proliferation is to engage in preventive military actions against a state believed to possess or to be developing WMD. The primary goal of preventive action is to eliminate any WMD or facilities related to WMD within the country before the outbreak of hostilities, and if necessary, to remove the hostile regime and replace it with a more moderate government that will be less likely to pursue WMD.

Proponents of the concept of preventive military action claim that the strategy brings two benefits. First, it eliminates the WMD program in the target country. Second, it will lead other states to realize that developing WMD programs might invite a similar attack. This will, it is argued, dissuade them from developing such weapons in the first place.

Opponents note that preventive war may produce the exact opposite result, and that some states might decide that WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, are necessary to deter other states from attacking and disarming them. For example, in a surprise attack in June 1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor south of Baghdad. However, this attack appears to have been counterproductive as a nonproliferation measure. While the Israeli attack temporarily slowed Iraq's nuclear capabilities, it spurred the Iraqi leadership to start a full-fledged nuclear weapon program. After the attack, Iraq devoted many more resources to nuclear weapons research and spread out and hid its nuclear facilities. Despite a crash-program to develop a workable nuclear device by 1991--around the same time-frame of the first Gulf War--Iraq was ultimately unsuccessful in its quest to be a nuclear power.

The 2003 U.S.-led invasion in Iraq, undertaken to prevent Iraq from pursuing alleged WMD programs, apparently did not discourage WMD programs in North Korea or Iran. North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in October 2006, and Iran has built up its uranium enrichment capacity despite UN and U.S. sanctions. Also, as no WMD have been found in Iraq, the invasion, costly in terms of both lives lost and money spent, does not appear justified on the grounds of preventing WMD proliferation.

Despite the questionable record of preemptive military action as a nonproliferation tool, in September 2007, the Israeli military bombed a large building in Syria that was assumed to be a nuclear reactor being constructed with North Korean assistance. Syrian officials have denied that the Israeli warplanes destroyed a building that harbored WMD-related activities. The bombing created many controversies for the governments involved, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The use of military force to deal with WMD threats has so far not been widely employed. The primary reason for this is because the burden of proof to establish that another state's WMD-activities constitute an "imminent threat" that requires a resort to force entails political costs. For example, the United States claimed its actions in Iraq were an enforcement of United Nations Resolution 1441. No comparable resolutions require Iran or North Korea to disarm or to submit to weapons inspections, although both countries have been sanctioned by the UN Security Council for activities that could be related to development of nuclear weapons, and North Korea has agreed to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for international aid. The United States would, therefore, find it difficult to cite international law to justify military actions against those countries.

Further Reading:

	The Nonproliferation Review, James Wirtz and James Russell, "U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption"
	CRS, Richard Grimmett, "U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force"
	CNS, Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, "A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences"
	WMD Insights, Richard Weitz, "New Insights about 2007 Israeli Air Strike in Syria"
	Arms Control Today, Leonard Spector & Avner Cohen, "Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime"
	CATO Institute, Jeffrey Record, "Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation"
	Center for Defense Information, Steven Welsh, "Preemptive War and International Law"
	Arms Control Today, Hans Kristensen, "The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge"