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Updated April 2006
Full-Text Document
Improving Nuclear Materials Safety at the Institute of Nuclear Physics - Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Section I: Where is the Facility and Why Were MPC&A Improvements Necessary?
Section II: Improving the Security of Nuclear Materials at INP
Central Alarm Station (CAS) Upgrades
LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR
Introduction
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the international community faces a common threat. It is the possibility that nuclear weapons materials, technology and knowledge will illegally cross state borders and accelerate the weapons acquisition efforts of terrorist groups or rogue states. The consequences of these vulnerabilities for international security are alarming and potentially devastating. These materials are the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. The greatest danger in this respect is presented by weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) that are vulnerable to theft or diversion. An international nuclear proliferation crisis would result if they were smuggled into an aggressive state. Stolen nuclear material could also be used to carry out a nuclear terrorist attack against any target in the world. In contrast to the limited damage caused by the World Trade Center bombing, a terrorist nuclear device could destroy several New York City blocks and cause fatalities in the tens of the thousands. In response to this threat the United States Department of Energy created the Russia/NIS Nuclear Material Security Task Force. The objective of the Task Force is to assist other nations in improving the material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) for weapons-usable nuclear materials on their territories. Under the auspices of this program, U.S.-supported MPC&A cooperation is taking place at more than 40 locations in Russia, the Baltic States and the Newly Independent States (NIS). The Republic of Uzbekistan is one of the Newly Independent States which has significant nuclear material quantities in use or in storage. The Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP), Tashkent, Uzbekistan is the third location in the former Soviet Union and Baltic States at which site-wide NIPC&A improvements have been completed. This brochure describes the MPC&A systems and equipment installed by the Russia/NIS Nuclear Material Security Task Force at INP to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials. Section I: WHERE IS THE FACILITY AND WHY WERE MPC&A IMPROVEMENTS NECESSARY?
The Institute of Nuclear Physics is located in a remote, wooded area approximately 30 kilometers outside of Tashkent. Founded in 1956 as part of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, INP has a staff of 2,200 people that monitor the operations of a 10 megawatt research reactor. Often described as the largest facility of its kind in Central Asia, INP has an ambitious program to become the primary nuclear research and isotope production facility for the region. Today, the facility maintains fresh and irradiated nuclear fuel storage facilities to support continued reactor operations. Under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAFA) guidelines, facilities that store or process significant amounts of direct-use nuclear materials must protect against theft by both an external threat, such as a terrorist group, or an internal threat, such as a site employee. Protecting fresh and spent fuel stored at INP was identified as a primary nonproliferation concern. The main objective of physical protection upgrades at INP is to protect the reactor complex which consists of the administration building which contains the reactor control room and the reactor building which also houses the spent fuel storage pool. In June 1995, the IAEA convened MPC&A specialists from Australia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States to review MPC&A needs at INP. Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance in the areas of material control and accounting (MC&A), while the L.K. and the U.S. agreed to provide physical protection upgrades (PP). After the Department of Energy obtained budget authorization in September 1995, contracts with INP personnel were initiated for the design of a physical protection system and the purchase and installation of equipment. Working in collaboration with donor states, facility upgrades were completed in August 1096. The MPC&A improvements at INP represent a significant accomplishment in U.S.-Uzbekistan cooperative efforts to reduce the risk of unauthorized use, theft or diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials. The improved security of nuclear materials at INP also represents a success in efforts to reduce the global threat of nuclear proliferation. SECTION II: IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AT INP
Physical Protection Physical protection systems provide the capability to detect, delay and respond to adversarial acts, including attempts at theft and sabotage. Physical protection enhancements at INP include four main components: delay barriers, entry control systems, an alarm assessment system and an enhanced communications system. Before these systems could be installed site preparation activities had to be completed in order to maximize the effectiveness of sensors and cameras that encircle the reactor complex. For instance, a 10 meter-wide clear zone was established around the perimeter of the reactor complex by removing vegetation and discarding or relocating objects. In addition, windows at the ground level that were readily accessible from the exterior of the building were permanently covered with security grills. Physical protection also involves restricting and delaying movements around and within critical areas and designating doors as primary access points. In the main building lobby entrance, a grilled door was installed to control entry. In addition, the main doors to the lobby entrance, reactor control room and the reactor building were equipped with magnetic card readers and keypads, magnetic door locks, balanced magnetic switches (which detect the opening of a door) and request-to-exit switches (which allow authorized exit without activating an alarm). If an intruder or unauthorized personnel attempts to enter restricted areas through these entry points, the alarm system will be triggered and a signal transmitted to the central alarm station for assessment and response. In addition, the (fresh fuel storage vault was reconfigured as a room-within-a-room, requiring two authorized personnel to be present with lock codes before the magnetically locked door can be opened. Other doors utilize entry control systems that use secure card systems, personal identification numbers, and administrative controls. Interior intrusion detection sensors were installed at all critical areas within the facility. A video surveillance camera was installed in the reactor building to monitor movement and operations. Finally, hand-held and walk-through SNM and metal detectors installed in the main building entrance enable security personnel to detect the unauthorized movement of radioactive materials. Central Alarm Station (CAS) Upgrades
In addition to sensor systems, general area surveillance was achieved with the installation of video cameras and a video display system. In order to monitor these inputs, INP was provided with a new Central Alarm Station (CAS). The CAS, located adjacent to the main building foyer, houses the alarm annunciation system, access control system and alarm monitoring system. DOE technical experts initiated several security modifications designed to harden the CAS against attempts at forced entry. These modifications included replacing the main entrance door and hardening the windows. The door is now controlled by means of a magnetic card reader and keypad. Only authorized personnel with an access control card and code can enter into the CAS. In addition, a bullet-proof observation window was constructed to provide the guard force with a clear view of the entrance hall. The CAS, manned 24 hours a day, monitors numerous security, fire and safety sensors. These sensors have been installed at various locations to alert security personnel in the CAS should a secured door, window or other area be compromised. Displays in the CAS indicate the status of all sensors. Monitors provide the capability to view selected areas within the facility. From the CAS, security personnel have the capability to respond to an alarm and direct a response force to an area of concern. Hand-held radios and other protective gear were provided to the INP guard force to improve their performance of normal and emergency response procedures. Material Control & Accounting
Another essential component of nuclear material security is material control and accounting (MC&A). The fundamental objective of MC&A is to provide current information as to the nature, status and location of all nuclear materials within a facility. MC&A tools include computerized accounting systems, measurement systems, reporting systems and containment and surveillance systems. Prior to cooperation in this area, INP recorded nuclear material locations, movements and transfers in a notebook. The Institute had no capability to measure the fuel items on-site. Material transfers were accepted verifying only the serial number on the fuel assembly, not its specific contents. As part of our cooperation, a fresh fuel measurement system was provided to enhance INP's capability to measure the isotopic composition of the fresh fuel items in the inventory. In addition, Australia provided the INP with a personal computer-based material accounting system and accounting software which enables personnel to accurately track the movement of nuclear materials, prepare general ledgers and inventory change reports. To enhance the effectiveness of safeguards measures, tamper indication devices (TID) were provided to prevent unauthorized access to storage containers. E-Type seals replaced the wax seals the facility formerly used. Training
The Department of Energy provided several MPC&A training courses for INP officials. These courses provide hands-on training in U.S. approaches and methodologies to physical protection system design and analysis and equipment maintenance and use. In addition, INP guard force personnel received equipment and training. These MPC&A training activities markedly enhance the overall security posture of the facility by providing an interface between the protective force, physical security systems and material control and accounting systems. "As a result of the cooperative efforts between the Uzbekistan Institute of Physics and the U.S. Department of Energy, the nuclear material at this facility has been rendered more secure." Statement made at ceremony marking the completion of MPC&A upgrades at Tashkent. Stanley T. Escudero, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Section III: Conclusion
Uzbekistan and the United States have made impressive progress in collaborative MPC&A efforts over the past two years. Installation of improved physical protection systems such as hardened doors and windows, nuclear material detectors and personnel access controls has markedly enhanced the security of nuclear materials at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Great progress has also been made in building relationships between Uzbek and U.S. officials and technical experts. MPC&A improvements at TNP demonstrate the successful strategy of the Russia/NIS Nuclear Material Security Task Force. Similar MPC&A upgrades have now been completed at nuclear facilities in Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus. The Department of Energy is using this strategy at over 40 locations in Russia, the NIS and the Baltic States to secure nuclear materials and reduce the dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. For additional information, contact
Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of Energy
(202) 586-2102
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
