This page provides a chronology of nuclear weapons-related developments in Ukraine. This page has been archived in 2007, however it will be updated as needed. For more information on Ukraine's development of nuclear energy, see current updates of Fuel Cycle Developments and Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Developments. For archived information on nuclear weapons-related developments, also see Nuclear Chronology 1991-1999 and START Reductions Chronology.

6 July 2008: UKRAINE'S DEFENSE MINISTER COMMENTS ON COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER CLAIMS
Ukraine’s Defense Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov dismissed speculation that Ukraine had kept a small number of nuclear warheads, Interfax reported on 6 July. Instead, he noted that Ukraine could have taken more advantage of its nuclear status than it did. "Alas, we gave [the nuclear arsenal] away rather clumsily. If we had been as smart as we turned now, Ukraine could have benefited," he said. Yekhanurov made the statement at the celebration of the sixteenth anniversary of the Ukrainian Navy, which took place in Sevastopol.
["Ukraine could have benefited from nuclear status – defense minister," ITAR-TASS, 6 July 2008; Open Source Center Document CEP20080706950093.]{Entered 08/08/2008 AL}

26 June 2008: UKRAINE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER QUESTIONS NUCLEAR WARHEAD RETURN
On 26 June 2008, chief of the Crimean party branch of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Leonid Grach, reportedly asked Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko to address Internet claims that Ukraine had disregarded its denuclearization commitments in 1995 by hiding several warheads for a future contingency instead of surrendering them to Russia. Grach stated that calls, made on 22 February 2008 by members of the pro-Yushchenko political party Pora, for Ukraine to regain its nuclear status prompted his concern. [1] Jane’s quoted former Security Service Ihor Smeshko as saying that Grach’s letter was meant to "discredit [Ukraine] throughout the world community." The country "did not have the ability to hide such weapons and the [Secret Service] never contemplated such a measure," Smeshko concluded. [2]
Sources:
[1] Vladimir Starostin, "Ukraina utaila yadernoye oruzhiye? Tak utverzhdayet narodnyi deputat Leonid Grach," Stolichnyye Novosti, 8 July 2008; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.
[2] "Ukraine: Letter to Yushchenko," Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 4 August 2008. {Entered 08/08/2008 AL}

26 February 2008: NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COUNCIL MEMBER DISMISSES CALL TO RENUCLEARIZE
Responding to statements made by members of Ukraine's political party Pora on 22 February 2008, which called on Ukraine to return to the "nuclear club," Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council Secretary Raisa Bogatyreva indicated that "there can be no return to this issue." Instead, that is a need to think about "how to incorporate Ukraine into a security system that could ensure its security at a level enjoyed by the nuclear powers," Bogatyreva stated. [1] Ukraine’s former Defense Minister Aleksander Kuzmuk reportedly similarly dismissed the call to acquire nuclear weapons, arguing that a return to Ukraine’s nuclear past was impossible. [2]
Sources:
[1] "Ukraine cannot regain nuclear power status - national security and defense council secretary," Interfax, 26 February 2008; Open Source Center Document CEP20080226950456.
[2] Jacob Quamme, "Ukrainian parliamentarian calls for renuclearization," WMD Insights, April 2008, www.wmdinsights.org/I24/I24_RU1_UkranianParliamentarian.htm]
{Entered 08/08/2008 AL}

22 February 2008: PROTESTERS CALL FOR A NUCLEAR SHIELD
On 22 February 2008, activists from Pora, a small political party supporting Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko and members of the Our Ukraine-National Self-Defense coalition, held a protest outside the Russian Embassy in Kiev. The protest was reportedly triggered by the recent statements made by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. Putin was quoted as saying that were Ukraine to agree hosting a NATO base on its territory, Russia would consider targeting missiles at the country. "We think that the nuclear threats of the Kremlin should receive an adequate answer – Ukraine must return to the 'nuclear club,' since Russia practically annulled guarantees of security, which she gave in 1994," a Pora press release stated. Pora’s leader Vadislav Kaskiv indicated that he would raise the issue in Ukraine’s parliament, Verkhovna Rada.
["Piket posolstva Rossii v Kieve: Ukraina trebuyet vernut yadernyy status," IA Novyy Region – Krym, 22 February 2008; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 08/08/2008 AL}

19 February 2008: POLLING SHOWS HALF OF UKRAINE’S POPULATION AGAINST REGAINING NUCLEAR STATUS
A poll conducted by the Kiev Gorshenin Institute of Management Issues reportedly indicated that 49.7 percent of Ukraine's population was against the country reacquiring its nuclear status. About 31 percent of respondents supported the hypothetical, while 19 percent could not answer the question. When prompted on their support of Ukraine’s 1993 decision to denuclearize, 46 percent of respondents indicated that the Ukrainian government made the correct decision, while approximately 36 percent stated that the decision was incorrect. About 1 percent responded "other," and 16 percent stated that the question was "difficult to answer." The margin of error was plus or minus 2.2 percent. The poll was conducted from 7-18 February 2008 in 129 of Ukraine’s localities.
["Pochti polovina grazhdan protiv vozobnovleniya Ukrainoy statusa yadernogo gosudarstva – opros," UNIAN, 19 February 2008; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com.] {Entered 08/08/2008 AL}

9 August 2002: RUSSIAN WARSHIP CHECKED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NTV reported on 9 August 2002 that the Russian warship Samum, which was transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Black Sea Fleet, was inspected by Ukrainian naval officers, including Ukrainian Navy Commander Admiral Mykhaylo Yezhel, for nuclear weapons upon its arrival in Sevastopol. Ukrainian officers were accompanied by Russia's Chief of the Naval Main Staff Admiral Vladimir Kravchenko, according to whom the instructions on conducting the inspection were issued at the presidential level of both countries. Ukrainian officers inspected the ship's missile tubes, and found them empty.[1] Samum is a Project 1239 Sivuch missile corvette, a 1,260t warship whose main armament is eight 3M80 Moskit [NATO designation SS-N-22 'Sunburn'] anti-ship missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear payloads.[2] [CNS note: Russian warships have not carried tactical nuclear weapons since 1992 as a result of the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev tactical nuclear weapon initiatives.]
Sources:
[1] NTV Television, 9 August 2002; in "Russia: Samum missile hovercraft deployed to Black Sea carries no nuclear weapons," FBIS Document CEP20020809000289.
[2] A.S. Pavlov, Voyennyye korabli SSSR i Rossii 1945-1995 (Yakutsk, 1994), p. 100. {Entered 10/23/2002 MJ}

12 February 2001: JOINT ICBM PRODUCTION NOT ON UKRAINE-RUSSIA SUMMIT AGENDA
On 12 February 2001 Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a joint statement in Dnipropetrovsk (the location of the Pivdenne Design Bureau and Pivdenmash, which formerly designed and produced ICBMs) on expanding the two countries' aerospace cooperation. The joint statement addressed, among other issues, cooperation on producing space launch vehicles and transport aircraft.[1] According to Pivdenmash General Director Yuriy Alekseyev, the issue of resuming ICBM production in Ukraine was not on the agenda due to Ukraine's non-nuclear status and to technical difficulties. At the same time, Alekseyev stated that Pivdenmash specialists have been helping Russia maintain its R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] and RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel'] ICBMs.[2] Alekseyev's remarks echoed earlier statements made by the US Ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual. Commenting on the upcoming meeting between Putin and Kuchma, Pascual stated that it would be impossible for Ukraine to cooperate with Russia on ICBM production without contravening the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pascual also met with the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary, Evhen Marchuk, who denied the possibility of cooperation with Russia in this field.[3]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 12 February 2001; in "Russia, Ukraine to expand cooperation in aerospace field," FBIS Document CEP20010212000161.
[2] Mikhail Melnik, ITAR-TASS, 12 February 2001; in "Russia: Putin tour of Yuzhmash said to have no bearing on US missile defense system," FBIS Document CEP20010210000025.
[3] "Posol SShA na Ukraine schitayet nevozmozhnym sotrudnichestvo Kieva i Moskvy v proizvodstve mezhkontinentalnykh ballisticheskikh raket," Interfax, 3 February 2001. {Entered 5/7/2001 MJ}

13 November 2000: KUCHMA SAYS UKRAINE WILL NEVER BECOME A NUCLEAR STATE
In a discussion with students at Kiev State University's International Relations Institute on 13 November 2000, President Kuchma stated that Ukraine will never become a nuclear state. He added that Ukraine's decision not to pursue nuclear status was for economic rather than political reasons. Nuclear weapons require infrastructure and economic resources that Ukraine does not possess. Furthermore, the expertise and technology to build nuclear weapons is from Russia, not Ukraine. Kuchma explained that for these reasons Ukraine was compelled to forego nuclear weapons.
[UNIAN, "Ukraina nikogda ne budet yadernym gosudarstvom - Prezident," No. 46, 13-19 November 2000.] {Entered 2/14/01 RG}

15-16 March 2000: ELEVEN SU-24 BOMBERS DELIVERED TO CRIMEA, SECOND GROUP MAY FOLLOW
At a meeting in Kyiv held on 15 and 16 March between Oleksandr Byelov, the deputy secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, the Ukrainian-Russian commission in charge of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) presence in Ukraine agreed to several proposals which may clear the way for the delivery to Crimea of 11 Su-24 fighter-bombers [NATO name 'Fencer-D'], the second such group to be sent to Ukraine.[1,2,3] Since 19 January 2000, 11 Su-24 bombers, meant to replace older Su-17s [NATO name 'Fitter'], have been delivered to the Gvardeyskoye airbase near Sevastopol.[3,4] Although the Su-24 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), lieutenant-general Valeriy Yurin, commander of the BSF air force, stated that all equipment pertaining to TNWs had been removed from the aircraft and that the alterations were inspected by Ukrainian experts before the aircraft left Russia.[5] A fourth session of the commission will meet in Moscow in the final quarter of 2000.[3]
Sources:
[1] Serhiy Zhurets, "Friendship one on one. Moscow and Kiev continue the negotiation battles around the Russian Fleet," Den, 16 March 2000, pp.1,3; in "Ukraine: Black Sea Fleet issue viewed," FBIS Document CEP20000320000254.
[2] Raisa Stetsyura, ITAR-TASS, 16 March 2000; in "Ukraine allows transfer of Russian bombers to Crimea," FBIS Document CEP200003316000220.
[3] Olha Tanasiychuk, "A Meeting on the Roadstead," Kievskiye vedomosti, 22 March 2000; in "Ukraine, Russia Praise Fleet Talks," FBIS Document CEP20000323000133.
[4] ITAR-TASS, 19 January 2000; in "New Sukhoi Jets Fly to Russian Naval Base in Crimea," FBIS Document FTS20000119001822.
[5] ITAR-TASS, 18 January 2000; in "Nuclear Equipment Removed from Russian Aircraft," FBIS Document FTS20000118001777. {Entered 3/31/2000 GD}

	Updated August 2008