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Tajikistan
nuclearnuclear

Updated August 2009

Introduction
redline

Tajikistan emerged from a devastating civil war (1992-1997) as one of the poorest countries in the region. The country's geographic location, porous borders, and a robust drug trade raise concerns about the potential for illegal transit of materials that could contribute to weapon of mass destruction programs. Tajikistan does not produce or possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

на русском (in Russian)

 Mar. 12, 2009

Nuclear

Tajikistan never had Soviet weapons on its territory. Today, its leadership expresses commitment to disarmament and prevention of WMD proliferation, stating that they are a fundamental foreign policy tenet. Dushanbe acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1994 and has been an IAEA member state since 2001. During the Soviet era, uranium ore from deposits in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan was milled into yellowcake at the Vostochnyy Rare Metal Industrial Association (Vostokredmet), previously known as the Leninabad Mining and Chemical Combine, in Chkalovsk. The uranium for the first Soviet nuclear bomb tested at Semipalatinsk in August 1949 was produced at Chkalovsk. The Argus nuclear reactor, a research reactor designed to run on 21% enriched uranium, was completed in 1991 in Dushanbe, but was never loaded with fuel. In 2007, Tajikistani officials reportedly asked the IAEA to dismantle the reactor. While Tajikistan has no operational nuclear reactors, there are strong radiation sources on Tajikistani territory that were used for industrial applications in the Soviet era.

Tajikistan has been a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) since 1998, and has signed the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Tajikistan joined four other Central Asian States--Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--in signing a treaty creating a Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) on 8 September 2006.

See Tajikistan Nuclear Profile

Biological

There is no evidence to suggest that Tajikistan produces or possesses biological weapons. Tajikistan is a member of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

Chemical

There is no evidence to suggest that Tajikistan produces or possesses chemical weapons. Tajikistani officials have stated that though Tajikistan does have the capability to produce chemical and toxic substances for industrial purposes, Dushanbe has not and will not produce chemincal weapons. Tajikistan is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Missile

Tajikistan does not possess ballistic missiles and lacks the industrial capability to produce them. However, some reports indicate that a Soviet-era plant in the city of Taboshar once manufactured solid-propellant rocket motors for Soviet strategic missiles.

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CNS This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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