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Updated February 2010
Introduction
Constrained by limited resources, Syria has nonetheless shown interest in and taken steps to acquire chemical weapons, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles. Syria is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has a Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, Damascus faces unresolved allegations that it may have illicitly built a plutonium production reactor at Al-Kibar, and is currently under IAEA investigation. Syria has allegedly received direct assistance from Russia (and formerly the Soviet Union), China, Iran, and North Korea in developing its WMD and ballistic missile programs. Syria's primary motivation for pursuing unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles appears to be the Israeli threat, as Israel has superior conventional military capabilities and is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons.[1]
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Nuclear
Syria signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1969. Seeking to expand its nuclear capabilities, Syria has vigorously pursued external assistance since the 1980s, including reactor and technology transfers from states such as Argentina, China and Russia.[2][3] These efforts, however, produced few tangible results. It was not until 1991 that the Chinese began to construct Syria's first research reactor at Dayr Al Hajar (or Der Al-Hadjar). The SRR-1 30KW miniature neutron source reactor went critical in 1996 and is not large enough to be of proliferation concern.[4] However, in September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed a building in northwestern Syria that U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials claim was a plutonium production reactor. The Syrian government denies these allegations; however, a February 2009 IAEA report revealed that inspectors found traces of uranium and graphite particles at the Al-Kibar site, calling Damascus's explanation of the site's purpose into question. The agency continues to request access to Al-Kibar and related documents, but has been rebuffed by Syrian officials.[5] As of March 2009, the IAEA investigation remains inconclusive.
Biological
There is very limited open-source information regarding Syria's biological warfare (BW) capability. German and Israeli sources have asserted that Syria possesses Bacillus anthracis (which causes anthrax), botulinum toxin, and ricin. However, there is no reliable evidence to the effect that Syria has the capability to weaponize these or other agents. Syria has a pharmaceutical infrastructure that could support a limited BW program, and it engages in trade of dual-use equipment and goods with companies in Western Europe, Russia, and North Korea that could support such a program. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968 and signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on April 14, 1972, but has not yet ratified it.
Chemical
Syria is suspected of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare (CW) capabilities in the Middle East. Syria's initial CW capability was provided by Egypt prior to the October 1973 war against Israel. Since then, Syria appears to have acquired an indigenous capability to develop and produce chemical weapons agents including mustard gas and sarin, and possibly also VX nerve agent. Chemical weapons agents have been produced since the 1980s at facilities located near the Hama, Homs, and Al-Safira villages in the Aleppo region. However, Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for some dual-use equipment and for the precursor chemicals critical to CW agent production. In recent years, Iran has been identified as a major supplier of Syrian requirements for CW-related supplies. Syria signed an agreement with Iran in 2005 that specifies, among other things, the provision of training and technical assistance to Syrian scientists and technicians and the construction of five chemical pilot plant facilities for developing and producing precursor chemicals. Syria possesses large numbers of Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads. However, the Syrian military supposedly discontinued its efforts to arm short-range missiles with chemical warheads following a mishap in mid-2007. In addition to its chemically-armed Scud missiles, Syria is believed to possess a significant tactical CW capability in terms of artillery shells and rockets filled with chemicals.
Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, but is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, Syrian officials have shown interest in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) since 2004, having met its Director-General on several occasions and attended OPCW seminars and conferences. In the absence of information on the motivations behind these actions the significance of these developments remains unclear. However, they may be the first signs of an impending change in Syrian policy on chemical weapons, or more likely, an attempt to relieve international pressure on Syria by suggesting that a change is being considered.
Missile
Syria's missile program began in the early 1970s and has grown in tandem with Syrian chemical weapons (CW) development. Damascus possesses one of the largest arsenals of ballistic missiles in the region, composed of hundreds of Scud-derived missile systems. [6] Syria relied on Soviet technology transfer to build its program, and imported FROG-7, Scud-B, and solid-fueled Scarab SS-21 missiles from the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. [7] In the 1990s, Iran provided Syria with technical assistance for solid-fueled rocket motor production, while North Korea supplied it with equipment and technical assistance for liquid-fueled missile production. Syria reportedly purchased 150 Scud-C missiles from North Korea in 1991. [8] Demonstrating its continued commitment to expanding its missile capabilities, Syria tested a North Korean 700 km-range Scud-D in September 2000, reportedly testing another Scud-D in January 2007. [9] However, Syrian efforts to establish an indigenous production capability have so far failed, forcing Damascus to rely on continued imports from countries such as North Korea and China to sustain its program. Syria expressed interest in purchasing the Russian Iskander missile as early as 2004, but has so far been unable to acquire this surface-to-surface missile. Reports also indicate that Syria has been trying to purchase modern air-defense systems, such as the S300-PMU 2 Favorit and the Pantsyr S-1, from Russia. [10] Damascus is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
