Syria today possesses one of the most sizeable arsenals of ballistic surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and long-range artillery rockets in the Middle East. Syria's missile and long-range rocket systems are capable of delivering conventional and possibly unconventional warheads to many of its regional neighbors, including Israel with whom Syria has long maintained acrimonious relations.

Syria's motivation for past missile procurement efforts and more recent missile development programs derive mainly from regional threat perceptions, especially Syria's longstanding state of de-facto war against Israel. Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons and sophisticated chemical and biological weapon programs. Israel also maintains a conventional weapon capability that is clearly superior to that of Syria, a fact demonstrated repeatedly during the numerous armed conflicts which have erupted between the two nations since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In addition, Saddam Hussein's years as leader of neighboring Iraq also provided an important source of regional instability for Syria, as the Hussein regime's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems were long coupled with aggressive tendencies toward neighboring countries. Moreover, US announcements critical of the current Syrian government increased after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. This—in combination with the formidable US presence that is currently stationed next door in Iraq—enhances Syria's intra-regional threat calculation and consequently motivates its missile proliferation activities.

Current intelligence suggests that Syria possesses 18 FROG-7 (Free Rocket Over Ground) missiles and launchers, that carry a 550kg warhead up to 70 kilometers, and at least 36 SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) short range (70km, 482kg payload) tactical ballistic missiles. [1] [2] Furthermore, Syrian Coastal Defense Force is believed to deploy about eight to twelve batteries of SS-C-1B Sepal (450km range, 1000kg payload) and SS-C-3 Styx (90km range, ~500kg payload) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) on outdated Osa I/II Patrol Missile Boats docked at the port of Latakia and on mobile launchers along the coast. [3] [4]
The large majority of Syrian SSMs is comprised of Scud short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The number of Syrian Scud Bs (310km range, 1000kg payload) is generally estimated to be around 200, while the number of Scud Cs (500km range, 500kg payload) is believed to be ranging from 50 to 120. [5] [6] [7] [8] Finally Syria also possesses an unknown but small number of Scud D missiles (700km range), and overall around 24-36 Scud launchers. [9] [10] [11] Syria is now able to produce Scud B and C ballistic missiles indigenously, and is thought to be able to equip Scud Cs with VX nerve gas cluster bomblet warheads. [12]
The Syrian Armed Forces deploy their roughly 260-330 SSMs in four brigades, one equipped with SS-21 Scarabs, one with Scud Bs, another with Scud Cs, and one with the FROG 7 rockets. The Scud D variants have recently been introduced into the existing Scud brigades. [13] [14]
Finally, Syria’s missile arsenal is complemented by a brigade of domestically produced long range 220mm and 302mm artillery rockets, with a range of 36 kilometers for the former and 115 kilometers for the latter [15] [16]
Israeli sources also claim that Iran recently supplied Syria with a large number of C-802 Noor anti-ship cruise missiles, an Iranian produced variant of the Chinese YJ-82 ASCM. [17] [18]
Some of the primary proliferation concerns deriving from Syria’s missile capabilities are:

• Syria’s large arsenal of missiles existing together with the ongoing hostility towards its well equipped neighbor Israel, presents the very real possibility of a heated conflict with a potentially devastating missile exchange.
• Syria’s indigenous capability to produce liquid-fueled missiles, using both locally manufactured and imported parts which continues to progress.
• The willingness of nations (e.g. North Korea, China, Iran, Russia) to provide Syria with materials and expertise to advance the development of its solid propellant rocket motor.
• Syria’s possible capability to deploy chemical weapons combined with the very real likelihood that regional concerns might drive Syria to pursue longer range delivery systems.

Sources:

[1] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[2] Alex Fishman, “The Syrian Quick Move Nightmare,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 8 April 2007, Open Source Document KPP20070408754002.
[3] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[4] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” (rough draft), Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2000, <http://www.middle-east-info.org/league/syria/syriawmd.pdf>.
[5] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[6] Alex Fishman, “The Syrian Quick Move Nightmare,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 8 April 2007, Open Source Document KPP20070408754002.
[7] Michael Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons Programs,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 September 2007. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2664>.
[8] Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries, Congressional Research Service, updated 26 July 2005.
[9] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[10] Michael Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons Programs,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 September 2007. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2664>.
[11] Arye Egozi, “Danger Underground,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 30 April 2007, Open Source Document KPP20070430741004.
[12] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[13] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[14] Alex Fishman, “The Syrian Quick Move Nightmare,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 8 April 2007, Open Source Document KPP20070408754002.
[15] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[16] Michael Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons Programs,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20 September 2007. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2664>.
[17] Alex Fishman, “The Syrian Quick Move Nightmare,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 8 April 2007, Open Source Document KPP20070408754002.
[18] “Iran Providing Syria New Missile Boats, Hundreds of Missile,” Channel 2 Television, Open Source Document KPP20070507735013, 7 May 2007.
[19] Wisconsin Project, "Syria: Missile Development," The Risk Report, Vol. 3, no. 2, March-April 1997. http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/syria/missiles.html
[20] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and
Prospects of War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 August 2007.
[21] SS-21 SCARAB (9K79 Tochka), Federation of American Scientists,
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/ss-21.htm>.

	Updated June 2008