Very little open source information exists on the topic of Syrian biological warfare (BW) activities. The bulk of open source references to Syrian BW activity consist of unclassified statements by U.S. or Israeli government officials, most claiming that there are reasons to believe that an offensive BW program exists in Syria. In contrast to discussions of Syrian chemical warfare (CW) capabilities, no details are provided supporting the BW assertions, either due to concern for protection of sources and methods or, perhaps, due to a simple lack of information. As a consequence, most discussions on this topic are confined to repetition of official assertions or extrapolations based on assessments of Syrian dual-capability industry and political motivations. Such an analysis is limited to educated conjectures of maximum capability. Furthermore, official statements regarding suspicions of the existence of such a program do not in themselves constitute confirmation of a weapons program's existence. It should also be noted that although the existence of a defensive biological weapons research capability would suggest interest—and expertise—in the field of biological weapons, it does not imply or confirm the existence of an offensive biological weapons program. Capability does not unequivocally equate to action. Finally, Syria is an authoritarian state surrounded by perceived enemies, so it makes efforts to conceal its military activities and capabilities, especially those associated with its strategic programs. Official intelligence gathering is probably incapable of providing a complete, or conclusive, picture of Syrian WMD programs, especially in the case of the BW program, which appears to be limited to research.

History

Syria signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) in April 1972. Since that time, Syria has refused to ratify the BWC and has given no indications that it might change its position. For several decades, Syria has expressed a generalized opposition to WMD. At the same time, Syria has supported the right of any state to adopt those measures that it deems most appropriate to securing itself against outside threats—a position that has in the past been interpreted as representing a political cover for the development of WMD.

Syria appears to have acquired a limited defensive capability against biological weapons in the early 1970s, a result of receiving modern Soviet land warfare systems such as tanks and armored personnel carriers that included NBC protective equipment as standard equipment.[1] It is unclear whether the Syrian protective capability against the use of biological weapons has improved significantly since. In the absence of an indigenous production capability, it is likely that there has actually been a decline in the Syrian capability for defense since the late 1980s because of the inability to obtain replacements for the aging or obsolete equipment.

Since the late 1980s, Syria has undertaken a sustained effort to increase its national capabilities in the pharmaceuticals and bio-technology fields. This has involved the establishment of a number of joint-venture companies and the construction of approximately 12 pharmaceutical factories. These facilities produce for domestic and export markets. It is possible that their construction and operation has resulted in the transfer to Syria of skills and technologies relevant to a BW program.

Allegations of an active offensive BW program cite the primary Syrian biological weapons facility as being located at the Damascus-based Scientific Research Council, where anthrax, cholera, and botulism developed by the Biological Research Facility are produced.[2] In 1992, an additional facility in the Syrian coastal town of Cerin was identified as being responsible for biological weapons production.[3] Since that time, open sources have preferred to refer to the probability that Syria is developing biological weapons and have tended to avoid definitive statements.

Status

There are no clear indications that Syria currently possesses offensive or defensive biological weapons programs. There is a hypothetical technical and scientific potential to research, develop, produce, and deploy biological weapons. It is probable, though undemonstrated, that limited research into biological weapons is undertaken by Syrian military scientists. As in many countries, it may only be to identify defensive needs and possible offensive military applications. Claims that Syria has weaponized botulinum toxin and ricin are dubious given the profound difficulties associated with transforming these agents into useful weapons.[4] Research on anthrax may be undertaken in support of efforts to improve the productivity and limit the vulnerability of Syrian agriculture to this disease, which is endemic to the region. Such research could be used to conceal a military program and may be the source of cautious claims that Syria is attempting to weaponize anthrax. If anthrax has in actuality been developed and deployed as a weapon, it is possible that Syria would seek to employ bomblet technology such as that allegedly developed for the dispersal of CW agents.[5] However, on the basis of present knowledge, any conclusions about weaponization or deployment modes must be speculative.

Public statements by Western intelligence agencies concur in describing Syria as possessing a limited biotechnical capability that would require significant outside technical assistance before it could undertake large-scale production and weaponization of BW agents. At the same time these reports generally maintain that Syria is engaged in an ongoing BW R&D effort that has not yet resulted in weaponization. Occassional assertions that Syria has weaponized and deployed biological agents or toxins are unsupported by facts and probably reflect political goals more than technical analyses. In the absence of new revelations, it is impossible to support or refute allegations that Syria has an active BW program. It is equally difficult to make any claims regarding military or strategic aspects of this alleged program in the absence of more information.

Key Sources:
[1] John W. Finney, "Abrams cites Intelligence Gained from Soviet Arms in Mideast," New York Times, 15 February 1974, p. 4.
[2] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm>.
[3] "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6.
[4] "Syria's Secret Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2 May 2003, <http://www.janes.com>.
[5] Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.

	Updated August 2008