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Updated August 2008
Saudi Arabia: Missile Overview
Saudi Arabia possesses approximately 36CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, purchased from China in the mid-1980s. Although the missiles were originally designed by China to carry a nuclear payload, they were modified to deliver conventional warheads before being transferred to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has pledged that it will not arm the missiles with unconventional payloads. The missiles are outdated and relatively inaccurate, yet Saudi Arabia does not appear to have purchased newer, more accurate missiles.
History
In 1986, Saudi Arabia purchased approximately 36CSS-2 "East-Wind" intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. Analysts contend that the Saudis turned to China for the missile systems after the United States refused to sell them short-range Lance ballistic missiles in 1985.[1] The United States was reluctant to sell Saudi Arabia missile systems that could be used to strike Israel. Although the missile systems are semi-mobile they are very large, with each weighing approximately 70 tons. [2] In China, CSS-2s are deployed with nuclear warheads. However, the version sold to Saudi Arabia was specifically modified to carry special, large conventional payloads. Because of a high circular error probable, analysts projectthat the modified CSS-2s would not be accurate enough to hit areas more specific than a general urban or industrial target.[3] This speculation often serves as evidence that Saudi Arabia was interested in developing nuclear weapons since the CSS-2s would be largely inaccurate when coupled with conventional warheads.[4]
Saudi Arabia has not publicly offered a rational explanation for the missile purchase. However, Thomas Lippman and Anthony Cordesman contend that prestige - and not a desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction - probably motivated Riyadh to procure the missiles.[5] Saudi Arabia may have been trying to compete with other Middle Eastern countries, including Iran and Iraq, which already possessed ballistic missile technology. Several other neighboring states, including Yemen and Israel, possess surface-to-surface missiles.
The United States did not learn of the CSS-2 purchase until 1988, and became concern regarding Saudi's intended use for the missiles.After Israeli officials suggested that they might destroy the Saudi missiles in an air strike to ensure that Saudi Arabia did not develop nuclear weapons, U.S. officials pressuredthe Saudis to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to assuage Israeli fears. The Saudis agreed to sign the treaty in 1988 in exchange for keeping the missiles. King Fahd also sent the United States a written pledge that Saudi Arabia would not couple nuclear or chemical payloads to the missiles, and would not use the CSS-2s to carry out first-strike attacks.[6]
Current Status
Saudi Arabia deploys their CSS-2 missiles in two battalions: on the Al-Kharj air base, south of Riyadh, and at the As-Sulayyil Oasis, southwest of Riyadh.[7] The missiles are armed with conventional warheads, and are purportedly targeted on Iranian cities.[8] One-third of the weapons are intendedto be kept on constant alert, although Cordesman estimates that the number of CSS-2s that are operational at any given time is probably lower.[9] Chinese technicians still operate the missiles, with Saudi officials overseeing their deployment.[10]
Saudi Arabia is not developing other ballistic missile systems, and lacks the capacity to develop long-range ballistic missiles domestically. Although the Saudis have modified the CSS-2s to improve their accuracy, the missiles are still outdated and relatively inaccurate when compared to ballistic missile systems possessed by other countries. For this reason, Cordesman suggests that Saudi Arabia may be interested in purchasing more advanced missile systems - perhaps from China or Pakistan.[11] However, no publicly available evidence suggests that Riyadh is attempting to purchase such systems as of July 2008.
Key Sources
[1] Raid Quati, "GCC to
Develop Civilian Nuclear Energy," Arab News, December 11, 2006, http://www.arabnews.com.
[2]
Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century, London:
Praeger, 2003, 324.
[3] Cordesman
2003, 326.
[4] John Pike,
"Missile Proliferation: Saudi Arabia," Federation of the Atomic
Scientists, http://www.fas.org.
[5] See Lippman 2004, 111 - 114; Cordesman 2003, 324.
[6] Pike 1996.
[7] Cordesman 2003, 325.
[8] Pike 1996.
[9] Cordesman 2003, 324.
[10] Ibid., 325.
[11] Cordesman 2003, 327.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
