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Updated October 2009
Nuclear Overview
South Korea first became interested in nuclear technology in the 1950s but did not begin construction of its first power reactor until 1970. Changes in the international security environment influenced South Korea's decision to begin a nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s. Under significant pressure from the United States, Seoul abandoned the program and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in April 1975. In 1981, South Korean engineers produced five test fuel rods using depleted uranium. The fuel rods were placed in a research reactor and irradiated between July and December 1981. The spent fuel rods were removed and scientists conducted experiments in hotcells to extract 0.3 grams of plutonium. The South Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) claimed that this experiment was conducted by "a small group of scientists to analyze the chemical characteristics of plutonium." These experiments were not revealed to the public until the summer of 2004 when South Korean nuclear facilities would soon be subject to more detailed inspections under the Additional Protocol, which the National Assembly ratified in April 2004.
In the summer of 2004, South Korean scientists were also revealed to have conducted laser isotope separation experiments to enrich about 0.2 grams of uranium. Both the plutonium extraction and uranium enrichment experiments were in violation of Seoul's safeguards commitments, but the government has been cooperating with the IAEA to account for these violations and to ensure there are no violations in the future.
During the June 2008 IAEA Board of Governor's meeting, a "broader conclusion" was drawn that all nuclear material in South Korea had been placed under safeguards and remained in peaceful nuclear activities. South Korea is currently operating a total of 20 nuclear power reactors that provide for almost 40 percent of its total electricity. Furthermore, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has plans to construct and begin commercial operations of 8 additional units by 2015.
Despite South Korea's extensive nuclear energy infrastructure and technological base, South Korea does not possess any independent means of enrichment or reprocessing. While its legal validity remains ambiguous, South Korea is politically constrained by the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula whereby both Koreas promised to forego developing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In November 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea would not "manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons." Two months later, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula . However, both sides have failed to implement its provision for a bilateral inspection regime. North Korea has since declared the agreement is no longer valid and has furthermore tested nuclear explosive devices in October 2006 and May 2009.
South Korean officials have long expressed a keen interest in establishing a closed nuclear fuel cycle but strong U.S. opposition has served as a key constraint. Nevertheless, in light of the projected expansion of nuclear power in South Korea and the problem of mounting spent fuel, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been conducting research on dry pyroprocessing technology. KAERI officials say that it aims to start "engineering-scale" pyroprocessing by 2016.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
