1990
A company called Lifestyle Management is established at Lyttleton. It allegedly functions as an SADF front company, specializes in biogenetics (including genetic engineering), and does secret research for ARMSCOR/Denel (a large South African defense firm). Among the company's directors are Dr. Philip Mijburgh, clinical psychologist Johannes Jacobus Koortzen, and Dr. Brian Davey, all former SF members.
—Klaas de Jonge, "The Chemical Warfare Case," The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, pp. 14-15, <http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html>.

1990
Members of the World Apartheid Movement (later the World Preservationist Movement), a transnational South Africa-based right-wing movement headed by Koos Vermeulen with links to foreign terrorist and far right groups, are suspected of planning to use CW and BW to kill large numbers of blacks and assassinate cabinet ministers.
—Vrye Weekblad (30 November 1990) and Rapport (18 November 1990), both cited by Johann van Rooyen, Hard Right: The New White Power in South Africa (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 96-7, 199.

February 1990
The South African government lifts the bans on the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and several other organizations opposed to apartheid.
—Chandré Gould and Peter I. Folb, "The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 19.

26 March 1990
After being briefed on Project Coast by Surgeon-General Knobel and others, President F. W. de Klerk orders that no more lethal chemical agents should be produced by Project Coast, but does not prohibit the continued production of irritating and incapacitating agents.
—Chandré Gould and Peter I. Folb, "The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 15; Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>.

October 1990
The Defence Council decides that the research on, and weaponization of, CR [a riot control agent], BZ [a psychoincapacitant], MDMA ["Ecstasy"], and methaqualone ["Quaalude"] derivative should proceed.
—Chandré Gould and Peter I. Folb, "The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 15.

1991
The Chief of Staff (COS) Finance and COS Intelligence begin looking into some of Basson's financial activities, in particular those related to Merton House and Aeromed Services. The CMC is aware of these internal investigations. In the end, the investigators accept Basson's explanations of the irregularities.
—Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>.

October 1991
Thor Chemical Company representative Alan Kidger reportedly arranges for the delivery of 2 metric tons of yellow mercuric oxide to the home of Barry Pithy, one of the directors of Delta G. This oxide can supposedly be used as a "building block" for red mercury, allegedly a key component in a new type of battlefield mini-nuke. The shipping and payment are handled secretly, and the delivery is paid for in cash. Less than a month later, Kidger is murdered and dismembered. It later emerges that Delta G had regular business dealings with Kidger. [Note: according to most experts, a substance called "red mercury" with the capabilities ascribed to it by Hounam and McQuillan does not really exist. Indeed, the extravagant claims about "red mercury" may have been linked to a series of sting operations set up by various intelligence services to keep tabs on persons interested in trafficking in sensitive, dangerous materials.]
—Peter Hounam and Steve McQuillan, The Mini-Nuke Conspiracy: Mandela's Nuclear Nightmare. The Hidden Story behind the Red Mercury Killings (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), pp. 157-8; compare Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 116-17, note 193. For red mercury as a scam, see United States, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Materials Protection and Emergency Cooperation, Special Report: Scams in the World of Nuclear Smuggling (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 2000 [May 1997]), pp. 3-7. For its alleged use in intelligence stings, see "Red Mercury is Back in Business," Intelligence Online 424 (29 February-13 March 2002), p. 3.

Late 1991-Early 1992
Basson asks Theron if he and Phaal will help him disseminate poisoned beer in the Eastern Cape. Theron agrees and goes to Basson's office to get a dozen Black Label beers. Theron and M. M. Engelbrecht bring the poisoned beers back to Theron's office at Centurion Security. In January Basson asks Phaal to give those beers out by the taxi stands in the Eastern Cape and the Transkei. He agrees. Theron transports the beers, but a scheduled meeting on the road between Jeffreys Bay and Cradock doesn't take place because Phaal wishes to avoid Theron. Theron then tosses the contaminated beers out along the roadside.
—Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), p. 200, 248; Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 21, Phaal testimony.

16 January 1992
The SADF reportedly tests an unspecified CW agent – possibly BZ – by bombing Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) troops from a pilotless observer aircraft near Ngungwe on the Mozambican border, killing at least 5 and injuring 10 others. It then blames the CW attack on the ANC and sends in a team consisting of Basson, Dr. Lourens, Dr. Brian Davey, and other colleagues from SAMS' 7 Medical Battalion Group to "investigate." Basson, Brigadier Van Wyck, and Colonel At Nel are the alleged masterminds of the attack. A small unmanned aircraft had supposedly first been tested at Komatipoort airport, and the poison used had been manufactured and stored at Protechnik, one of the many Coast-linked companies. The US and UK both subsequently issue a diplomatic protest (demarche) to South Africa.
—United Nations, Report of the Investigations into the Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in Mozambique (New York: United Nations, 1993); John Yeld, "SADF bombed Frelimo in chemical weapons test and blamed ANC," The Cape Argus (6/17/98); Paul Fauvet, "Mozambican claims on 1992 chemical attack now appear correct," The Star (6/17/98); see also Dr. Jan Lourens, testimony at TRC hearings, 8 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw2/html>; Klaas de Jonge, "The Chemical Warfare Case," The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, pp. 6-12, <http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html>; and U.S., Department of State, "Recent Chemical Weapons (CW) Use Allegations – Africa," 9 March 1992 memo (declassified).

8 April-September 1992
Samuel Bosch, a friend of Basson's and the manager of a bank in which Basson had previously set up both his personal accounts and those of the Wisdom Group, transfers 31.2 million rand in SADF funds into the foreign accounts of private individuals. He is given Treasury Orders for these amounts.
—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 16, testimony of Bosch.

October 1992
The CMC approves the speeding up of all international procurement activities in anticipation of South Africa's signing of the new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
—Chandré Gould and Peter I. Folb, "The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 15.

20 October 1992
$360,000 of Coast funds are transferred into an account of the P&S company. The money is then recorded in the P&S cashbook as being for the "sale of technology" to Firm Licenspolychim, 11 Minskaya Street, Moscow. Originally, this money had allegedly been earmarked for the purchase of a peptide synthesizer.
—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 16, testimony of Bosch.

November 1992
Reverend Emmanuel Chinkwita Phiri, Acting General Secretary of the Christian Council of Malawi and a member of the Malawian Public Affairs Committee, picks up one of his suits at the dry cleaners. At a meeting with a United Nations technical team, he feels a burning sensation around his neck and shoulders. He goes home, where the burning persists, his heartbeat quickens, and he develops a fever. He is taken to a hospital, where he receives treatment and gradually recovers. He suspects that his clothes were impregnated with poisons, but there is no independent confirmation of this.
—Klaas de Jonge, "The Chemical Warfare Case," The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, pp. 20-21, <http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html>.

December 1992
Reverend Phiri again suffers burning sensations while visiting Kenya as a delegate of the Christian Council of Malawi. He suspects that he has once again been poisoned by contaminated clothing, just as Reverend Chikane had been. There is no independent confirmation that poisoning occurred.
—Klaas de Jonge, "The Chemical Warfare Case," The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, p. 21, <http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html>.

December 1992
A "top secret" report prepared by the NIS accuses elements of the SADF of being involved in a host of illegal and "dangerous" activities, such as carrying out covert "false flag" operations, CCB-sponsored assassinations, CBW attacks, and targeted poisonings. Among the components directly implicated in these activities are the Reconnaissance Directorate of the SF [the entity overseeing the elite Reconnaissance regiments], the Terrorism Section of the Directorate of Covert Collection, the GS2 intelligence section of the South African Army, Basson's 7 Medical Battalion Group, elements of the SAP, and members of a so-called Binnekring ("Inner Circle"). Several important individuals are also singled out as key participants in these illegal actions, including Basson, General Liebenberg, General C. P. van der Westhuizen, Colonel At Nel, Colonel Mielie Prinsloo, and Colonel H. A. P. Potgieter. [Note: although no specific details are provided about the nature and composition of this phantom Binnekring, it appears most probable that the term refers to interlinked individuals "in the know" who formed parallel chains of command within various covert state structures, including Project Coast itself.]
—RSA, National Intelligence Service, "Staff Paper prepared for the Steyn Commission on Alleged Dangerous Activities of SADF Components," December 1992.

December 1992
After being apprised of the conclusions of the Goldstone Report and briefed by General Pierre Steyn on illegal "Third Force" and Coast activities, President De Klerk dismisses 23 senior military personnel, including Basson and 19 DMI officers and operatives, from active service in the SADF. Basson leaves the Permanent Force on 31 March 1993, but is immediately rehired to tie up loose ends on Project Coast, including the recovery of SADF funds stolen by duplicitous Croatian government personnel in connection with an alleged methaqualone purchase.
—Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 8 July 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw18/html>; Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), pp. 279-80. For the NIS report upon which General Steyn based his briefing, see RSA, National Intelligence Service, "Staff Paper prepared for the Steyn Commission on Alleged Dangerous Activities of SADF Components," December 1992, as well as the entry above.

2 December 1992
President De Klerk officially announces the end of apartheid in an address to Parliament, initiating a seismic political change in the history of South Africa.
—James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History – In Search of a Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 273.

12 December 1992
ANC leader Nelson Mandela is released from prison after 27 years. He advocates reconciliation rather than revenge, thereby facilitating the ongoing transformation of South Africa from an apartheid state to a democratic state. [Note: several doctors working with Basson later claimed that he had intended to contaminate Mandela's medication with thallium prior to the activist's release. If the right dosage was applied, the victim would appear to have an outbreak of meningitis or encephalitis. Basson insists that he and his staff intended to protect Mandela from a possible assassination attempt by younger, more radical ANC leaders, and in that context had to consider poisonings. Compare Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, testimony at TRC hearings, 9 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw4/html>; and Dr. Wouter Basson, testimony at TRC hearings, 31 July 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw?/html>.]
—James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History – In Search of a Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 274

Late 1992-1999?
The Office of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) initiates a protracted investigation of Basson's financial activities. The investigation uncovers an extraordinarily intricate web of overseas front companies and accounts established by Basson and his foreign collaborators, including his Florida business partner, attorney David A. Webster. The most important of these entities is the Wisdom Group and its far-flung components. All of these front companies and secret accounts were ostensibly created in order to disguise the SADF's involvement in the procurement of embargoed materials and to funnel SADF payments to various discreet providers via intermediaries, but the OSEO concludes that a number of Basson's overseas financial transactions were instead made for his personal benefit.
—H[ennie] J. Bruwer [OSEO auditor], Projek Coast: Forensiese Ondersoek, 10 November 1999; Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>; Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, weeks 9-13, testimony of Bruwer.

1993
Basson's wife Anna Versluis asks Bosch to store several "heavy, sealed drums" at his home following Basson's arrest in Switzerland. The drums are returned to Basson prior to his 1997 arrest in South Africa.
—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 17, testimony of Bosch.

7 January 1993
Defence Minister E. Louw, Surgeon-General Knobel, Colonel Ben Steyn, and Basson decide to record all technical and scientific information related to the CBW program onto magnetic band/optical band storage discs and then destroy the paper copies. The company selected to perform this task is Data Image Information Systems, owned by Dr. Philip Mijburgh. Mijburgh is the nephew of former Defence Minister Malan and also the Managing Director of Delta G Scientific. One year later Basson tells Knobel that the process has been completed and the documents destroyed. 13 CD-ROMs full of scanned material are placed in a succession of safes to which Knobel, Steyn, and De Klerk have key combinations. [Note: trunks full of Coast documents were later recovered at the home of Basson's friend Samuel Bosch and in a storage unit. See the April 1995, 29 January 1997, and 10 May 1997 entries below.]
—Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), p. 253; Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 8 July 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw18/html>.

14 January 1993
South Africa signs the CWC.
—Chandré Gould and Peter I. Folb, "The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 15.

27 January 1993
Basson supposedly supervises the destruction of various Coast-manufactured chemicals in conformity with the strictures of the new CWC. 18 blue plastic drums of methaqualone, 73 metal drums of MDMA, white metal drums of cocaine hydrochloride, small plastic containers of dimethyl amphetamine, 21 green metal drums of a BZ derivative, 4 paper drums, and 2 cartons are flown out over the Atlantic Ocean, 150 sea miles from the coast and south of the Agulhas Plateau, where they are "deactivated" and dropped into the sea. Small samples from these containers are reportedly brought to SAP headquarters for identification and certification.
—Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>.

1 March 1993
Colonel Ben Steyn replaces Basson as Project Officer for Coast.
—Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>.

22 June 1993
New Defence Minister Johan Coetzee approves the manufacture of a water cannon rigged to apply CR teargas, but orders the termination of the CR foam project.
—Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>.

1 August 1993
Delta G Scientific is acquired by the Sentrachem Group, whose constituent firms are National Chemical Products, Kolchem, SASOL, and the Synthetic Rubber Company. [Note: this purchase is presumably a result of the decision to privatize Coast facilities.]
—G. C. Gerrans, "Historical Overview of the South African Chemical Industry, 1896-1998," Chemistry International 21:3 (May 1999), p. 76; see also Peter Hounam and Steve McQuillan, The Mini-Nuke Conspiracy: Mandela's Nuclear Nightmare. The Hidden Story behind the Red Mercury Killings (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 159.

24 September 1993
Surgeon-General Knobel gives a briefing to the National Intelligence Service (NIS) about Coast, and assures his audience that the Defence Minister authorized the program. Shortly thereafter Knobel becomes aware of allegations about Coast abuses.
—Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 12 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw14/html>.

October 1993
Dr. Jan Lourens expresses his concerns about the murder devices he has been manufacturing at RRL to Knobel. Knobel claims that these matters aren't related to Coast and says that he doesn't want to hear about them, but does report Louren's charges to General Liebenberg, by then SADF chief. Liebenberg tells Knobel not to pay any attention to the allegations, even though he previously/later warned Lourens that he wanted his "toys" back.
—Dr. Jan Lourens, testimony at TRC hearings, 8 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw2/html>; Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>.

February 1994
De Klerk is briefed by Knobel, Defence Minister Louw, Dr. Scholtz, and NIS Counter-Espionage chief Mike Kennedy about the "unofficial" aspects of the CBW program, including its offensive weapons and abusive Third Force activities.
—Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 18 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw15/html>.

8 December 1994
Protechnik Laboratories Manager Philip Coleman "tells visiting foreign diplomats and reporters that his company makes small quantities of CW agents such as mustard gas for research into CW protective measures." The managing director of Armscor, the state arms agency--which purchased Protechnik in September 1994--announces that Protechnik will "play an active role in the South African implementation of, and adherence to, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and says South Africa has no stocks of chemical weapons."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 27 (March 1995), p. 21.

27 February 1995
Niel Knobel, the surgeon-general of the South African National Defence Force, denies the charge by unidentified U.S. intelligence sources "that South African still possesses chemical and biological weapons and that Libya is recruiting South African scientists associated with them." He asserts that South Africa "destroyed all lethal, incapacitating and irritating chemical and biological agents in 1993."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 28 (June 1995), p. 17.

2 March 1995
While accepting the credentials of Libya's first ambassador to his country, South African President Nelson Mandela comments, "We believe that some of the experts who were involved in [the CBW] programme in South African are visiting Libya...without the knowledge or consent of the government of this country.... We have in our discussions especially with representatives of the United States and Britain explained that we have no such programme now and that a defensive chemical and biological weapons program was terminated in January 1993. We have no connection with any country, including Libya, in regard to chemical and biological weapons programmes."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 28 (June 1995), p. 17.

April 1995
Former Delta G managing director Mijburgh moves six trunks full of material, including important Coast documents, from Basson's house to the home of Basson's friend Samuel Bosch. At the time Basson is allegedly visiting Libya. Bosch is not apprised of their contents or provided with keys to their padlocks.
—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 8, defense attorney cross-examination of Knobel, and week 17, testimony of Bosch.

Mid-1990s
As RRL is being closed down, many company records and stocks of substances are destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Some of RRL's cantharidin [a type of "Spanish Fly" aphrodisiac that Basson claimed was used to produce blisters similar to those caused by mustard] is applied to tissues [?] with slogans on them and handed out to unwary youngsters at End Conscription Campaign meetings. Cantharidin is not only an irritant, but is also highly toxic to the kidneys.
—Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, testimony at TRC hearings, 9 June 1998, <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw4/html>.

15 May 1996
The Public Accounts Committee of the South African Parliament seeks an explanation "why the South African National Defense Force [(SANDF)] had written off Rand 21.8 million when closing down 'Project B', also known as 'Project Coast'" in 1993 following South Africa's signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Jan Swanepol, head of Office for Serious Economic Offences, testifies to the committee regarding an alleged "$1.6 million payment made in 1992 by the apartheid-era government into an account in Croatia for a sanctions-breaking consignment" of methaqualone." [Note: see December 1992 entry.]
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 32 (June 1996), p. 36.

10 June 1996
South African Justice Minister Dullah Omar announces that the "Cabinet has authorized that the secrecy of Project Coast be lifted" and has requested the director of the Office for Serious Economic Offenses "to continue with the investigation here and overseas."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 33 (September 1996), p. 20.

21 August 1996
South African Defence Forces chief General Georg Meiring "declines to disclose certain particulars" of Project Coast to the Public Accounts Committee investigating financial improprieties associated with the project, on the grounds that doing so would constitute a "a serious breach of security." He testifies that the $1.6 million in missing state funds had been intended by purchase chemicals from Croatia via a foreign agent, "but the deal had gone sour and the agent and the money vanished."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 33 (September 1996), p. 34.

22 January 1997
Basson, Mijburgh, and Bosch fly to Namibia and visit the Libyan embassy there. Basson meets with his Swiss business partner, Dr. David Chu, and also reportedly with various Libyan and East German intelligence operatives.
—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 18, defense attorney cross-examination of Bosch.

29 January 1997
Basson is arrested by South African Narcotics Bureau (SANB) officers in a sting operation while trying to transfer 1,000 capsules of MDMA to drug dealing informant Grant Wentzel in exchange for 60,000 rands in Pretoria's Magnolia Dell Park. Subsequent police searches of the homes of Basson and Bosch turn up the six trunks containing key Coast documents that were supposed to have been destroyed years before. [Note: in 1989 Wentzel was accused by the US government of participating in a scheme to provide unspecified "high-tech equipment" to the USSR, along with Organochem (a Coast procurement front company) director Jerry Brandt. See Peter Hounam and Steve McQuillan, The Mini-Nuke Conspiracy: Mandela's Nuclear Nightmare. The Hidden Story behind the Red Mercury Killings (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), pp. 160-1. Wentzel later testified that Basson had been involved in international procurement and sales activity, including arms trafficking with Libya, Pakistan, and possibly Iraq. He did not mention WMD in this context. See Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 3, Wentzel testimony.]
—Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), English translators' introduction, p. iii; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 276-7, 279-81.

27 February 1997
The Office of the President holds a press conference in Cape Town regarding the situation of Dr. Wouter Basson, who is "on bail pending a court hearing on 4 April" and in the protective custody of the intelligence services. Cabinet Secretary Jekes Gerwel clarifies that Dr. Basson was rehired by the South African Defence Forces as a specialist medical consultant "in order to maintain control over his activities and movement, and to retain his specialist knowledge."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 35 (March 1997), p. 42-43.

10 May 1997
Attorney Ernst Penzhorn of Sunnyside provides NIA officers with two more [Basson?] trunks full of documents. These contain classified documents related to the SADF and Project Coast, including the main front companies and associated companies, as well as personal documents and foreign currency (including a single Libyan bank note). Among these documents are 205 reports related to 177 biological research projects.
—Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 8, testimony of NIA officer.

June-July 1998
TRC holds hearings in Cape Town on South Africa's secret CBW program.
—South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report (London: MacMillan, 1999), vol. 2, p. 510.

8-12 June 1998
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) conducts public hearings in Cape Town on the country's former CBW program, rejecting "the government's request that the proceeding be held behind closed doors." The TRC rules against Dr. Wasson's plea "that his testifying could compromise his defence against the criminal charges he is facing" and orders him to provide evidence when the hearings resume on 18 June 1998.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 41 (September 1998), p. 28.

15 June 1998
The South African government issues a statement regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings on CBW, asserting, "In response to media queries about the apartheid regime's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programme, Government wishes to clarify that this programme has been terminated, and that the material for offensive purposes in government storage has been destroyed. This was done in cooperation with countries which possess expertise in matters relating to these programmes; and in full compliance with relevant international treaties."
--"Statement on TRC Hearings on the CBW Programme (Issued by Government Communications--GCIS)," ANC Daily News Briefing (16 June 1998), <http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/1998/news0616>.

18 June 1998
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) reconvenes its public hearings on South African's CBW program, but Dr. Basson does not testify as anticipated, "having applied to the High Court for protection against the TRC demand that he should."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 41 (September 1998), p. 30.

July 1998
In reaction to the revelations about South Africa's CBW program at the TRC hearings, the British police and Security Service (MI5) reopen investigations into the deaths of six anti-apartheid activists in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s. The goal is to determine whether any of these seemingly natural deaths were actually clandestine murders.
—Michael Evans, "South Africa may have ordered British deaths," London Times (14 July 1998), p. 7.

7-8 July 1998
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) again resumes its public hearings on South African's CBW program, which are then "adjourned indefinitely pending the outcome of Basson's plea to the High Court" to overrule the TRC's demand for his testimony.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 41 (September 1998), p. 35.

27 July 1998
The South African High Court dismisses Wouter Basson's application requesting the Court to overturn the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's order that he testify in the Commission hearings on Project Coast.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 41 (September 1998), p. 38.

31 July 1998
Wouter Basson testifies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In contradiction to the testimony of many of his subordinates at Project Coast, he claims that the program "had no offensive capabilities."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 41 (September 1998), p. 39.

29 October 1998
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission presents its final report to South African President Nelson Mandela. The five-volume report includes the Commission's analysis and findings regarding apartheid-South Africa's CBW program. The report states: "Despite the fact that the South African CBW programme during the period under review has now been exposed as showing gross aberrations of intent, discipline, actions, command structures, financial dealings and professional relationships, it was highly regarded within the military, which considered it a successful programme....One of the astonishing aspects that emerged in the hearings was that the professionalism, competence and mystique of the programme were stripped away by the evidence of the very people who participated in it. The hearings revealed a nepotistic, self-serving and self-enriching group of people, misled by those who had a technical grasp of what was happening. They conducted work they deemed to be scientific, but which was underpinned by ideas, suggestions and hypotheses that were bizarre and incompetent." Its analysis concludes, "Inevitably, the CBW programme achieved little of value or of common good. Enveloped as it was by secrecy, threats and fear, opportunism, financial mismanagement, incompetence, self-aggrandisement, together with a breakdown in the normal methods of scientific discourse, the results were paltry. Tens, even hundreds, of millions of rands were squandered on ideas that had no scientific validity. At best, the programme succeeded in producing for manufacture analogues of CR and BZ incapacitants, and in making local arrangements for protective clothing for troops against mass chemical and biological attack. At worst, the programme had criminal intent."
--"Special Investigation into Project Coast: South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme," Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Vol. 2, Chapter 6c), (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998), <http://www.stanford.edu/class/history48q/Documents/
EMBARGO/2chap6c.htm>.

1 February 1999
The Public Accounts Committee of the South African Parliament announces it will begin "investigating possible discrepancies in the evidence on the apartheid government's CBW programmes which the SA National Defence Force had presented to it and to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission."
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 43 (March 1999), p. 36.

24 March 1999
Dr. Wouter Basson, former head of apartheid-South Africa's CBW program Project Coast, is indicted in Pretoria Regional Court on 64 charges, including 16 of murder, 11 of conspiracy to murder, 6 relating to the illegal possession and trade in drugs, and 24 of theft and fraud.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 44 (June 1999), p. 34.

24 March 1999
The South African National Assembly's Standing Committee on Public Accounts "adopts a report noting that evidence on Project Coast laid before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appeared to contradict evidence that the committee had received from former [South African National Defence Forces] SANDF chief Georg Meiring and surgeon-general Neil Knoble." A committee assigns a researcher to look into the matter.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 44 (June 1999), p. 34.

4 October 1999
The state's criminal case against Basson begins in the Pretoria High Court. He is charged with 64 counts, including 12 for murder, 7 for conspiracy to murder, 3 for attempted murder, 4 for assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and others for fraud and drug trafficking. The murder charges include allegations of human experimentation and the elimination of enemies of the state with drugs. All of these offenses allegedly took place while he served as Project Officer for Coast. Judge Willi Hartzenberg dismisses several of the charges at the very outset of the trial for different reasons, among which is that several crimes that Basson allegedly committed outside of South Africa are covered by the 1989 Namibian amnesty.
— Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999); Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, weeks 1, 2.