In the mid-1970s, Pakistan embarked upon the uranium enrichment route to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility; and as early as 1989-1990, the United States concluded that Islamabad had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device. Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient amounts to build 30-50 fission bombs. Various estimates put Pakistan's nuclear warheads at between 60-120 weapons.[1] Islamabad conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, shortly after India conducted its own weapon tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state.

Pakistan is in the process of expanding its nuclear complex through a new plutonium production reactor and a new chemical separation facility.[1] (In 1998, Pakistan commissioned the Khushab research reactor, which is capable of yielding 10-15kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually.) The construction of its first commercial scale nuclear reprocessing plant will likely increase its weapons-grade plutonium production capability.[3] Thus, Islamabad appears to be expanding and diversifying its nuclear weapons capability through the plutonium route in its quest for secure second-strike capability against India.[4]

According to the United States, China helped Pakistan by providing nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance. Reports in 2006-2007 stated that China and Pakistan have conducted negotiations on the sale of six nuclear reactors to Islamabad, no formal agreement had been announced as of mid-2008.[9] Meanwhile, the Chinese-assisted 325 MW Chashma nuclear power plant, will be completed by 2010.[14]

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is centered on a minimum deterrent , and it has repeatedly eschewed a no-first use policy. Its nuclear posture is primarily aimed at deterring a conventional Indian attack.[5] Islamabad has not yet formally issued its nuclear doctrine, although there have been attempts in at least one instance by a senior military official to define the threshold of nuclear use.[6]

Islamabad has put in place a command and control system centered around the National Command Authority (NCA), which is the main nuclear decision-making body and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which controls the country's nuclear weapons and facilities.[15] The NCA is headed by the President of Pakistan. The SPD, which acts as the secretariat of the NCA, also oversees the Armed Strategic Force, which consists of the strategic commands of the army, navy, and air force.[7] Reports in 2007 indicated that since 9/11, there has been significant cooperation between Islamabad and Washington on securing Pakistan's nuclear facilities.[8]

In December 2007, through an ordinance, the NCA was formally and legally established, although it had been in existence since 2000.[16]

Command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the broader security of the country’s nuclear program have been in the spotlight with the uncovering of the proliferation network run by A.Q. Khan and concerns over the impact of political instability and terrorism on nuclear security. Islamabad has disclosed measures it has taken in recent years to strengthen physical security of nuclear weapons and installations.[17] Additionally, Pakistan has also put in place more stringent export control mechanisms, such as the 2004 Export Control Act and the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate exports of nuclear, biological, and missile-related products.[12]

Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Regarding the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Pakistan has expressed its opposition because of its insistence that the FMCT cover reduction of existing stocks of fissile materials (to prevent a permanent gap vis-a-vis India), and because of its backing for a verification framework.[10]

Pakistan is a member of some multilateral programs such as the Global Initiative on Combating Nuclear Terrorism. It has also been involved in the U.S. government’s Secure Freight Initiative through the stationing of systems at Port Qasim in Pakistan to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials.[11]

At the same time, Islamabad has been critical of the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement and has sought a similar arrangement for itself, which has been turned down by Washington. It has pushed for criteria-based changes in the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to enable Pakistan to be eligible for similar treatment. But despite these reservations, including concerns over India’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Islamabad joined in the approval of the agreement by the board of governors of the agency in August 2008.[18]

Key Sources:
[1] “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 71-74, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/. According to one Pakistani expert, Islamabad now possesses 80-120 warheads, see Thomas E. Ricks, “Calculating the Risks in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, December 2, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com.
[2] “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007.”
[3] Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “Pakistan Nuclear Reprocessing Plant May Yield Weapons-Grade Plutonium-Kyodo,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, May 7, 2007, Lexis-Nexis.
[4] Dean Nelson, “Pakistan Upgrades Nuclear Arsenal,” The Times, July 30, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk.
[5] Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2007, pp. 4-5, http://www.npec-web.org.
[6] See statement by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, in “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network – Centro Volta, January 2002, pg. 5, http://lxmi.mi.infn.it.
[7] “Pakistan Sets up Tri-Command Nuclear Force: Officials,” Yahoo News Asia, August 9, 2006, http://asia.news.yahoo.com.
[8] David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com.
[9] Khaleeq Kiani, “27 pacts signed with China: N-cooperation discussed: Aziz,” Dawn, April 18, 2007, http://www.dawn.com; “Pak-China technical Level Talks on Nuke Power Sharing Underway,” Press Trust of India, December 21, 2006, Lexis-Nexis; Farhan Bokhari & Jo Johnson, “Chinese Soft-Pedal on Nuclear Aid for Pakistan,” The Financial Times, November 25, 2006.
[10] Shireen M. Mazari, “The FMCT Threat,” The News, August 8, 2007, http://thenews.jang.com.pk.
[11] “Radiation Detection Testing Underway at Two Foreign Sea Ports,” Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, April 11, 2007, http://www.dhs.gov.
[12] “Pakistan Joins Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Establishes Strategic Export Control Division,” International Export Control Observer, June/July 2007, pg. 3, http://www.cns.miis.edu.
[13] Kenneth N. Luongo & Naeem Salik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, December 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org.
[14] “Excellent Safety at all Atomic Power Plants: Musharraf,” The Hindu, December 18, 2007, http://www.hindu.com.
[15] See Khalid Banuri & Adil Sultan, “Managing and Securing the Bomb,” The Daily Times, May 30, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk.
[16] “Musharraf promulgates ordinance to establish NCA,” The Daily Times, December 14, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.
[17] See Michelle Marchesano, “Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan,” Partnership for Global Security, Conference Report, April 2008, http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org.
[18] “UN Endorses India-US Nuclear Pact,” The Australian, August 4, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au.

	Updated August 2008