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Updated September 2009

Chemical Overview
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Pakistan has had no publicly known chemical warfare (CW) program in the past. Pakistan has also signed and ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and remains a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in good standing.[1] Pakistan is self-sufficient in the production of chemicals such as sulfuric acid, caustic soda, soda ash, and chlorine. However, it relies on imports for most of the raw materials and intermediates for dyes, pigments, paints, varnishes, pesticides, plastics, and fertilizers.[2] Although Pakistan likely has the technical capability to produce choking, blood, blister, and nerve, agents for use in chemical warfare, the Pakistani government is legally committed to refrain from developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons.

Information concerning Pakistan's alleged CW programs during the 1980s and 1990s is limited, conflicted, and fragmentary. In 1997, the Indian newspaper Indian Express citing European intelligence documents alleged that Pakistan had a well developed CW program dating back to the late 1970s. According to the Express, possible Pakistani chemical weapons included blistering, nerve and blood agents. The report cited Pakistan's imports of large quantities of dual-use chemicals such as phosphorous compounds and arsenic and the absence of their use in civilian chemical industry as indirect evidence of a CW program. Pakistan's imports of gas masks, respirators, and chemical and biological weapons—protection suits were also linked to the pursuit of chemical or biolgical warfare capabilities.[3] However, despite suspicions, there is no positive proof in open-source literature of an offensive Pakistani CW program.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union also alleged that Pakistan had armed insurgents battling the Soviet forces in Afghanistan with cartridges and grenades containing toxic chemicals.[4] Although information regarding the agents supplied to Afghan insurgents by Pakistan is limited, the alleged chemical weapons confiscated from insurgents in Afghanistan were found to contain CS or "tear gas," an agent not restricted by the CWC. Although the CS grenades were produced in the United States and not Pakistan it is not clear that U.S. ever intended to supply these items to the Afghan insurgency.[5] Other allegations involving the possible use of CW agents center on the plane crash in August 1988 that killed then Pakistani Army Chief of Staff and President, General Zia-ul-Haq. Some experts believe that the saboteur/s used a nerve agent similar to VX to incapacitate the pilots of the plane carrying Zia.[6] However, the identity and motivations of the perpetrator/s of the alleged assassination, if known to the Pakistani or U.S. government authorities, have never been made public.

In the mid-1990s, the Afghan government accused Pakistan of supplying the Taliban militia with chemical weapons.[7] However, the charge remains unsubstantiated. Similarly, during 2002-2003, Indian military officials expressed concerns that Pakistani backed insurgents battling the Indian security forces in Kashmir might have obtained chemical weapons such as poisonous gas or other neurotoxic substances.[8] However, these allegations also remain unsubstantiated. In other instances, Kashmiri insurgents were alleged to have apparently substituted guns with syringes to inject poisonous substances into their victims.[9] In 1998, Indian police officials reportedly seized two kilograms of cyanide and the anesthetic flouthene from Sikh separatists in the state of Punjab. The Punjab police officials subsequently identified the Pakistani military's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate as the source of the chemicals and alleged that the arrested militants intended to poison the water supply or to target a military or paramilitary base in the country.[10] However, there is no independent evidence to support the Indian officials' assertions.

Subsequent to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, evidence surfaced that senior Pakistani nuclear scientists Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed may have helped Al-Qaida develop concepts for the aerial dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents.[11] In 2002, Pakistani police also unearthed chemical laboratories belonging to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a militant Islamic group with links to Al-Qaida, in the port city of Karachi. Investigations revealed that the group was preparing to produce poisonous gases for a possible terrorist attack.[12] However, these problems point to the involvement of non-state actors; and do not suggest state complicity in developing chemical weapons.

Despite suspicions that Pakistan may be pursuing a clandestine CW program, the charges and allegations have never been proven. In 1999, the Pakistani government announced a mandate for all domestic chemical producers to "furnish details of the chemicals" imported for use in Pakistan.[13] Following this, in October 2000, the government promulgated a law to prohibit the development, production, and use of CW. The above laws were made in pursuance of the CWC, which Pakistan ratified in 1997.[14] Since 1997 the OPCW has conducted a number of regular inspections of industrial facilities engaged in the production of Scheduled Chemicals, none of which have resulted in publicly discussed irregularities.[15] In 2008, Pakistan was re-elected to the OPCW's Executive Council, a seat which it has continuously held since 1999.[16]

Sources:
[1] State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, www.opcw.org.
[2] Prospects of Chemical Industry in Pakistan, Ministry of Industries & Production, Government of Pakistan, www.eac.gov.pk.
[3] Manvendra Singh, "Pakistan still building up lethal chemical weapons," Indian Express, 10 July 1997, www.expressindia.com.
[4] "Subversive Operations from Pakistan," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 September 1980; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[5] "Pravda on President Carter's Zig-Zag Tracks of a Hare," Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union for Abroad," 19 April 1980; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 April 1980, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[6] Edward Jay Epstein, "Who Killed Zia?" Vanity Fair, September 1989; archived at, www.edwardjayepstein.com.
[7] "Afghan minister says Taliban used Pakistani chemical weapons," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 7 October 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 October 1996, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[8] "Indian Army Officer: Terrorists in Kashmir Reportedly Possess Chemical Weapons," Times of India, 1 May 2003; in FBIS Document: SAP20030501000001, (September 2003).
[9] "Militants swap guns for poison in Kashmir," Sify News, 24 June 2003, headlines.sify.com.
[10] "Pakistan's ISI planned mass poisoning in India, says official," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 6 September 1998; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 September 1998, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[11] Douglas Franz and David Rohde, "A Nation Challenged: Biological Terror; 2 Pakistanis Linked to Papers on Anthrax Weapons," New York Times, 28 November 2001, www.nytimes.com; B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Pakistan Denies Link Between Scientists and Al Qaeda," Hindu, 29 November 2001, www.hinduonnet.com; Tom Walker, Stephen Grey, and Nick Fielding, "Bin Laden's Camps Reveal Chemical Weapon Ambition," The Sunday Times, 25 November 2001, www.timesonline.co.uk.
[12] "Karachi labs hint at terrorists trying to acquire chem weapons," Press Trust of India, 19 September 2001; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 September 2001, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[13] "Government to monitor toxic chemical use in Pakistan," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 27 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 February 1999, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[14] "Pakistan promulgates law against chemical weapons," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 October 2000; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 October 2000, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[15] B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Chemical Weapons Inspectors Visit Plant in Pak.," Hindu, 1 May 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 May 2003, www.lexis-nexis.com; "UN Chemical Weapon Inspectors End Tour of Pakistani Fertilizer Plant," Financial Times Information, 20 June 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 June 2003, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[16] "The Executive Council," OPCW website, www.opcw.org.

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CNS This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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