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Updated September 2009
Biological Overview
Although Pakistan has been accused of conducting research into biological warfare (BW) since the early 1990s, it is not widely suspected of either producing or stockpiling biological weapons.[1] However, it is generally believed that Pakistan has a well developed biotechnology sector that would be capable of supporting limited BW-related research and development if its government elected to pursue such a program.[2] In 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense stated that Pakistan "had the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting research and development relating to biological warfare," and "was conducting research and development with potential biological warfare applications."[3] But the U.S. government has not presented any evidence to corroborate its assertions.
The Pakistani government insists that it has never developed, produced, or stockpiled biological weapons or agents and that an offensive BW program is not part of the country's defense matrix. Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, and ratified it in 1974.[4] Since then, Pakistan has remained a vocal advocate for the success of the BTWC. During the various BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistani representatives have urged more robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the treaty, and, as part of the non-aligned group of countries, have made the case for guarantees for states' rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for purposes of scientific research.[5]
In the wake of Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear tests, the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed sanctions on a large number of government, quasi-government, and private sector entities suspected of participating in Pakistan's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related delivery programs. In the process, the U.S. government also imposed sanctions on chemical and biological facilities on suspicion that they might be involved with chemical warfare and BW programs. These four entities were: the Center for Advanced Molecular Biology, Lahore; Karachi CBW Research Institute; Karachi CW & BW Warfare R&D Laboratory; and the National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, Faisalabad.[6] Although sanctions against these entities have since been lifted U.S. companies considering trading with them are required to obtain specific license approval on a case-by-case basis for all items contained on the U.S. Commerce Control List.[7] At present there is no independent evidence to suggest that any of the above four institutes were or are engaged in offensive BW programs. However, it is likely that at least two of these entities are engaged in defensive BW research that might, depending on the level of effort, provide a basis for an offensive program in the future if an appropriate decision were made.[8]
Sources:
[1] Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment, August 1993, www.wws.princeton.edu; Proliferation Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2001, www.fpc.state.gov.
[2] Proliferation Threat and Response, January 2001.
[3] Biological Weapons Proliferation, Canadian Security Intelligence Service website, June 2001, www.csis-scrs.gc.ca.
[4] "Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements," United Nations Institute for Disarmament, http://disarmament2.un.org.
[5] Rissanen, Jenni, Left in Limbo: Review Conference Suspended on Edge of Collapse, the Acronym Institute, February 2002, www.acronym.org.uk.
[6] "Rules and Regulations," Federal Register, November 19, 1998, v. 63, 223, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.
[7] The Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, www.access.gpo.gov.
[8] Simply on the basis of their names it is reasonable to presume that the Karachi CBW Research Institute and the Karachi CW & BW Warfare R&D Laboratory
are engaged in CBW related work of a defensive nature. Any offensive program associated with these centers would violate Pakistan's treaty obligations.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
