The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the official name of the North Korean regime, has an active nuclear program and has twice tested nuclear explosive devices. North Korea also has deployed short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles and reportedly possesses significant CBW stocks. Pyongyang withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January of 2003. It is not party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) or the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The DPRK tested its first nuclear explosive device on 9 October 2006 and its second 25 May 2009. North Korea has also conducted numerous missile tests, including a series of cruise missile tests immediately following the May 2009 nuclear test, and medium and intermediate-range ballistic missile tests on numerous occasions since 1993. After a July 2006 test of the DPRK's long-range Taepodong 2 (also referred to as the Paektusan-2), the United Nations passed a resolution condemning the test and mandating Pyongyang to not test again. In what was seen as defiance of UN resolutions passed after the 2006 missile test, on 5 April 2009, North Korea once again tested a long-range missile, claiming it was a satellite launch.
The April 2009 launch of the three-stage rocket was seen as a technical failure with the first stage splashing down in the water between the Korean peninsula and Japan and the remaining stages, along with payload, falling into the Pacific Ocean. Although recent tests have shown the limitations of North Korea's missile program, concerns remain over the DPRK's ambition for an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, particularly due to its nuclear aspirations and its role as a leading exporter of ballistic missile technology.
The Six-Party Talks between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States began in 2003 to quell North Korea's nuclear ambitions. In 2007, two agreements were reached which called for the DPRK to shut down, seal and disable its nuclear facility at Yongbyon in exchange for a total of one million tons of heavy fuel oil. North Korea also agreed to provide a "complete and correct" declaration of all its nuclear facilities. On 26 June 2008, North Korea handed over its nuclear declaration and the disablement process at Yongbyon was reportedly nearing completion. However, further tensions about verification of North Korean disablement led to a breakdown in the talks. After the UN Security Council condemned the North Korea's April 2009 missile test, Pyongyang stated that it would no longer take part in the Six-Party Talks and that they were not beholden in any previous agreements related to the talks. This was soon followed by their second nuclear weapons test.
By the fall of 2009, international pressure was increasingly placed on Pyongyang—particularly by China and the United States—for resumption of the Six Party Talks process. In December 2009, U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth visited North Korea to explore the renewal of the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang called for the lifting of UN-imposed sanctions before returning to the Six-Party Talks, a request that was refused by the United States and the other Six-Party Talk participants. In January and February 2010, diplomatic activities increased significantly, and hopes were raised that North Korea could rejoin the process in the near future.
North Korea has conducted two nuclear weapon tests. On
9 October 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear device at 10:35AM (local
time) at Mount Mant'ap near P'unggye-ri, Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyong
Province. The yield from this test appeared to be less than 1 kiloton; North
Korea was reportedly expecting at least a 4 kiloton yield, possibly indicating
that the North Korean nuclear program still had a number of technical hurdles to
overcome before it had a usable warhead. In reaction to the test, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1718 placing sanctions on North Korea.
On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. North
Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that Pyongyang had
carried out the nuclear test, and that it "was safely conducted on a new
higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its
control." Initial estimates from the U.S. government showed the test
causing seismic activity equivalent to a magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter Scale
and located close to the site of the first nuclear test in 2006. Early estimates
pointed to a possible yield for the test of between 4 and 8 kilotons; while this
is stronger than the first test, some analysts still questions the viability of
Pyongyang's nuclear warhead design.
Pyongyang's nuclear infrastructure started taking shape in the 1950s with North Korea conducting
research on radioactive isotopes for use in industry, agriculture, and medicine
at the newly established Academy of Sciences. In 1961, the DPRK began
construction of the Yongbyon-kun
nuclear energy research complex, which was completed in 1964. The Soviet
Union provided a small research reactor at the site in 1965, and Pyongyang
subsequently expanded the complex and built a number of new facilities,
including a large plutonium reprocessing plant (Radiochemistry Laboratory).
North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
in 1985 but did not submit to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections until May 1992.
A crisis unfolded in 1993 in which North Korea refused to give IAEA inspectors access suspect waste sites. The Agency
asked the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to authorize special ad hoc
inspections. In response, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from
the NPT on 12 March 1993. Following intense bilateral negotiations with the
United States, Pyongyang agreed to "suspend" its withdrawal. North Korea agreed
to allow the "continuity of safeguards" on its present activities, but refused
to allow inspections that could verify past nuclear activities.
On 21 October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework
in which the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program and allow IAEA
inspections. In return, the United States, Japan, and South Korea would provide
North Korea with a light-water power plant and heavy oil to replace energy lost
by loss of its graphite reactor. However, discrepancies between North Korean
declarations and IAEA inspection findings indicate that North Korea might have
reprocessed enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons.
In December 2002, Pyongyang lifted the freeze nuclear program and expelled IAEA
inspectors. On 10 January 2003, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT
and on 10 February 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured nuclear
weapons. To diffuse the crisis, Beijing hosted the Six-Party Talks aimed at the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. On 19 September 2005, the North Korean
delegation to the Six-Party Talks signed a "Statement of Principles" whereby
Pyongyang agreed to abandon all nuclear programs, return to the NPT and restore
IAEA safeguards in exchange for a U.S.-provided light-water reactor. Despite
this "Statement of Principles", the Six-Party Talks process was put on hold for
over a year. A key issue holding back the talks was a disagreement over
financial sanctions placed by the United States on businesses working with North Korea.
During this period of stalemate, Pyongyang tested its first
nuclear device. After the 2006 nuclear test, Beijing worked behind the scenes to
get North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. They were able to bring the
parties back together in December 2006. On 13 February 2007, the six parties
agreed to an "Action Plan" in which North Korea would shut down its nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for heavy-fuel oil aid. On 14 July 2007, the
IAEA confirmed the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear facilities. In October 2007, the
six parties agreed to a second phase Action Plan which called for North Korea to
disable its key nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and to submit a full declaration
of its entire nuclear program by 31 December 2007—a timeline that was not met.
In June 2008, North Korea submitted its long-overdue nuclear declaration, and, in an effort to demonstrate its commitment to the denuclearization process, destroyed the cooling tower of its 5 Mw(e) experimental reactor at Yongbyon. The six parties then resumed negotiations to map out a verification plan. However, continued tensions about verification of North Korean disablement led to a breakdown in the talks. After the UN Security Council condemned the North Korean 2009 missile test, Pyongyang stated that it would no longer take part in the Six-Party Talks and that they were not beholden in any previous agreements related to the talks. This was followed within a few short weeks with their second nuclear test.
See North Korea Nuclear Profile
Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987, it is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons program. Defectors from the DPRK and the defense agencies of the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) generally agree that the country began to acquire a biological weapons capability in the early 1980s. However, open-source information on the DPRK's biological weapons program varies considerably, so it is difficult to know of its true state. Perhaps the most authoritative analysis was made in 2006 by the ROK's Ministry of National Defense (MND), which estimates that the DPRK possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of biological agents including the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.[1] However, heightened concerns regarding DPRK 's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, as well as its ongoing program to export weapons and related dual-use equipment, have overshadowed international considerations of whether the DPRK adheres to the BWC.[2]
See North Korea Biological Profile
The DPRK's chemical weapons agent production capability is estimated to be 4,500 metric tons per year; its military appears to have concentrated on acquiring mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-type chemical agents. Reports indicate that DPRK has approximately 12 facilitieswhere raw chemicals, precursors, and actual agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major storage depots for chemical weapons. Pyongyang also has placed thousands of artillery systems—including multiple launch rocket systems that are particularly effective for chemical weapons delivery—within reach of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Seoul. DPRK has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[3]
See North Korea Chemical Profile
North Korea began its missile development program in the 1970s and tested an "indigenous" Scud-B ballistic missile in April 1984. In its short-range arsenal, Pyongyang has produced the 500km-range Scud-C, the 800km-range Scud-D, and the KN-02 which is an upgraded version of the Russian SS-21 "Scarab" with slightly longer range, about 100 to 120km.
In its medium and intermediate-range arsenal, North Korea has the 1,300km-range missile known as the Nodong (Rodong) which it initially tested in1993 (500km) and again in 2006. North Korea has deployed
about 175-200 Nodong missiles.
North Korea has also tested anti-ship cruise missiles numerous times since 1994. The North Korean missile identified as the AG-1 is based on the Chinese CSSC-3 'Seersucker. Anti-ship cruise missiles tests on 25 May and 7 June 2007 are believed to have been either the KN-01 or Chinese-made CSSC-3 'Seersucker'.
In August 1998, North Korea flight-tested the two-stage Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1), an 1800km range missile, in a failed attempt to place a small satellite into earth orbit. In its second stage, it flew over the main Japanese island of Honshu and landed in the Pacific Ocean after traveling 1,380 km. North Korea further tested the Taepodong-2 (Paektusan-2) on 5 July 2006 and 5 April 2009. The Taepodong-2
potentially has inter-continental range. However, the system failed in the 2006 test after about 40 seconds of flight. The 5 April 2009 launch—which the DPRK called a satellite launch—was also seen by many as a technical failure, with the multistage rocket crashing into the Pacific Ocean without the detachment of the second and third stages and its payload.
North Korea is a major exporter of missile technology. North Korea has exported missiles, missile components, and technology to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. United States and Spanish naval forces intercepted a North Korean ship in December 2002 loaded with Scud missiles, but then allowed the ship to proceed to deliver the missiles to Yemen. In late January 2004, North Korea and Nigeria reportedly agreed to a missile deal, but Nigeria backed out of the agreement in early February under U.S. pressure.
North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
See North Korea Missile Profile
Sources:
[1] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, www.mnd.go.kr; Pak Tong-sam, "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, in OSC document FTS19990121001655.
[2] "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments," prepared by the U.S. Department of State," 1 January 2001, www.state.gov; "Actual Problems of Chemical Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Convention after the First Review Conference," Masaryk University (Brno), 12 April 2005, in OSC document GRY20070108000026.
[3] Yi Kyo-kwan, "NK Report — North Korea Finishes Deploying Chemical Weapons in Forward Units," Choson Ilbo, 05 November 2002, in OSC document KPP20021105000236; "Defector Describes Various DPRK Arms Factories," Kin Seinichi no Himitsu Heiki Kojo (Tokyo), 25 November 2001, in OSC document KPP20021009000119; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Program," in North Korea's Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, p.56, www.iiss.org.
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Updated March 2010 |
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