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North Korea has conducted two nuclear weapon
tests, and is believed to have enough fissile material for approximately 10
weapons. The first test came on 9 October 2006, at 10:35AM (local time) at Mount
Mant'ap near P'unggye-ri, Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyong Province. The Korean
Central News Agency announced that the test was conducted at a "stirring time
when all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in the
building of a great prosperous powerful socialist nation." The North Korean
nuclear test did not, however, produce a significant yield. The yield from this
test appeared to be less than 1 kiloton; North Korea was reportedly expecting at
least a 4 kiloton yield, possibly indicating that the North Korean plutonium
program still had a number of technical hurdles to overcome before it had a
usable warhead. In reaction to the test, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 1718 placing sanctions on North Korea.
After the October 2006 test, North Korea
became reengaged in the Six-Party Talks process aimed at ending Pyongyang's
nuclear program. In 2007, North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear facilities
and give a complete accounting of all its nuclear programs. In June 2008 North
Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear activities and destroyed the
cooling tower in its Yongbyon reactor; in response Washington moved toward
lifting some sanctions on Pyongyang and removing the regime from the list of
states sponsor of terrorism on 11 October 2008. The Obama administration
announced 3 February 2010 its intention to keep North Korea off the list.
However, the six parties stalemated over U.S. and North Korean disagreement on a
verification plan for the DPRK disablement, and have yet to resume.
On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted its
second nuclear test. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced
that Pyongyang had carried out the nuclear test, and that it "was safely
conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology
of its control." Initial estimates from the U.S. government showed the test
causing seismic activity equivalent to a magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter Scale
and located close to the site of the first nuclear test in 2006. Early estimates
pointed to a possible yield for the test of between 2 and 8 kilotons, with about
4 being most likely. While this yield is stronger than the first test, some
analysts still questions the viability of Pyongyang's nuclear warhead design,
although, others see it as evidence that the North has been working toward a
low-yield weapon all along.
Background
North Korea first became embroiled with
nuclear politics during the Korean War. Although nuclear weapons were never
used, U.S. political leaders and military commanders threatened their use to end
the Korean War on terms favorable to the United States. In 1958, the United
States deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time, and the
weapons remained there until 1991. North Korean government statements and media
reports often cite a "nuclear threat from the United States," and continue to
claim that the United States has about 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.
There are different schools of thought on the
motivations behind Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Those who believe North
Korea is a revisionist state that is dissatisfied with its place in the current
international structure argue that Pyongyang's nuclear aspirations are motivated
by a need to create a serious external threat. This school of thought has ample
evidence to support its claims: North Korea's initiation of the Korean War, acts
of terrorism, forward-deployed military forces, a constitution that states that
the DPRK is the sole legitimate government for all of Korea, and Korean Workers'
Party bylaws calling for a "completion of the revolution in the south."
On the other hand, some analysts believe
North Korea is a state satisfied with the status quo and that it seeks peaceful
coexistence with South Korea and the international community. Proponents of this
school of thought often argue that Pyongyang's nuclear motivations are defensive
in nature and designed to deter external threats to North Korea. Evidence to
support this argument includes the 1972 North-South Joint Communiqué; the
1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation
between North and South Korea (the so-called "Basic Agreement"); the 1991 Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; the 2000 summit
meeting between the leaders of North and South Korea; the Agreed Framework with
the United States; and reunification proposals that would recognize "two
systems" for the North and South.
Regardless of North Korean motivations,
Pyongyang's record of exporting ballistic missiles and missile production
technology have raised concerns that North Korea may also be willing to sell
nuclear materials, technology, or even complete nuclear weapons to state or
non-state actors.
Early Program
In the early 1950s, North Korea began
establishing the institutional base to train personnel for its nuclear
development program. The Atomic Energy Research Institute was established along
with the Academy of Sciences in December 1952, but the nuclear program did not
begin to take-off until North Korea established cooperative agreements with the
Soviet Union. Pyongyang signed the founding charter of the Soviet Union's Joint
Institute for Nuclear Research in February 1956, and began to send scientists
and technicians to the USSR for training shortly thereafter. In 1959, North
Korea and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear
energy that included a provision for Soviet help to establish a nuclear research
complex in Yongbyon-kun, North Pyongan Province.
In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided
extensive technical assistance while North Korea constructed the Yongbyon
Nuclear Research Center, which included the installation of a Soviet IRT-2000
Nuclear Research Reactor and other facilities. The small research reactor has
been used to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel. The cabinet and the
Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the
nuclear facilities, but ultimate control of the program and decisions over
weapons development belonged to then-North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. The
program appeared to begin as a peaceful one, but the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
may have prompted North Korea to initiate a dedicated nuclear weapons program.
Indigenous Development
Although the beginnings of the development of
North Korea's nuclear weapons program were bolstered by relevant assistance from
Moscow, and to some extent Beijing, North Korea's program developed largely
without significant foreign assistance. This was in part due to suspicions that
the North Korean leadership had about the long-term reliability of the Soviet
Union and China. While Kim Il Sung appreciated Soviet and Chinese support during
the Korean War (1950-1953), he had expected more help, particularly from the
Soviets, and he was dissatisfied that the war ended in a stalemate. In 1961,
Pyongyang signed "treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance"
with both Moscow and Beijing, but Kim ultimately questioned the credibility of
these alliances. Kim was particularly doubtful of Moscow's alliance commitment
after Khrushchev backed down during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Soon after the
missile crisis was over, the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee adopted
policies to strengthen the military and to implement import-substitution
programs to reduce dependency on arms imports. There are also reports that Kim
Il Sung asked Beijing to share its nuclear weapons technology following China's
first nuclear test in October 1964, but Chinese leader Mao Zedong refused.
Shortly thereafter, North Korean relations with China began to deteriorate.
In the late 1960s, North Korea expanded its
educational and research institutions to support a nuclear program for both
civilian and military applications. By the early 1970s, North Korean engineers
were using indigenous technology to expand the IRT-2000 research reactor and
Pyongyang began to acquire plutonium reprocessing technology from the Soviet
Union. In July 1977, North Korea signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with
the IAEA and the USSR that brought the IRT-2000 research reactor and a critical
assembly in Yongbyon-kun under IAEA safeguards. The Soviets were included in the
agreement since they supplied the reactor fuel.
The early 1980s was a period of significant
indigenous expansion, which included uranium milling facilities, a fuel rod
fabrication complex, and a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, as well as research and
development institutions. The early 1980s also marked the beginning of high
explosives tests that are required for the triggering mechanism in a nuclear
bomb. By the mid-1980s, Pyongyang began construction on a 50MW(e) nuclear power
reactor in Yongbyon-kun, while expanding its uranium processing facilities. Some
of the technology and equipment acquired during this period had dual-use
applications for a uranium enrichment program that was suspected, though not
revealed until 2009.
North Korea's energy concerns make nuclear
energy a legitimate rationale for nuclear power, and Pyongyang explored the
acquisition of light water reactor (LWR) technology in the early to mid-1980s.
This period coincided with the expansion of North Korea's indigenously designed
reactor program, which was based on gas-graphite moderated reactors similar in
design to the Calder Hall reactors first built in the United Kingdom in the
1950s. In the early 1980s, Pyongyang was also exploring the acquisition of light
water power reactors, and agreed to sign the NPT in December 1985 in exchange
for Soviet assistance in the construction of four LWRs.
In September 1991, President George Bush
announced that the United States would withdraw its nuclear weapons from South
Korea, and on 18 December 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea
was free of nuclear weapons. North and South Korea then signed the "Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," whereby both sides
promised to "not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or
use nuclear weapons." The agreement also bound the two sides to forgo the
possession of "nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." The
agreement also provided for a bilateral inspections regime, but the two sides
failed to agree on its implementation.
North Korea finally signed an IAEA safeguards
agreement on 30 January 1992, and the Supreme People's Assembly ratified the
agreement on 9 April. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea provided an
"initial declaration" of its nuclear facilities and materials, provided access
for IAEA inspectors to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial
declaration. Six rounds of inspections began in May 1992 and concluded in
February 1993. Pyongyang's initial declaration included a small plutonium sample
(less than 100 grams), which North Korean officials said was reprocessed from
damaged spent fuel rods that were removed from the 5MW(e) reactor in
Yongbyon-kun. However, IAEA analysis indicated that Korean technicians
reprocessed plutonium on three occasions - 1989, 1990, and 1991. When the Agency
requested access to two suspect nuclear waste sites, North Korea declared them
to be military sites and therefore off-limits.
1994 Crisis and the Agreed Framework
After the IAEA was denied access to North
Korea's suspect waste sites in early 1993, the Agency asked the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) to authorize special ad hoc inspections. In reaction,
North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993.
Under the terms of the treaty, withdrawal is not effective until 90 days after
giving notice. Following intense bilateral negotiations with the United States,
North Korea announced it was "suspending" its withdrawal from the NPT one day
before the withdrawal was to become effective. Pyongyang agreed to "suspend" its
withdrawal while talks continued with Washington, but claimed to have a special
status in regard to its nuclear safeguards commitments. Under this "special
status," North Korea agreed to allow the "continuity of safeguards" on its
present activities, but refused to allow inspections that could verify past
nuclear activities.
As talks with the United States over North
Korea's return to the NPT dragged on, North Korea continued to operate its
5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun. By the spring of 1994, the reactor core was
burned up, and the spent fuel rods had to be discharged. On 14 May 1994, Korean
technicians began removing the spent fuel rods without the supervision of IAEA
inspectors. This action worsened the emerging crisis because the random
placement of the spent fuel rods in a temporary storage pond compromised the
IAEA's capacity to reconstruct the operational history of the reactor, which
could have been used in efforts to account for the discrepancies in Pyongyang's
reported plutonium reprocessing. The administration of U.S. President Bill
Clinton announced that it would ask the UNSC to impose economic sanctions;
Pyongyang declared that it would consider economic sanctions "an act of
war."
The crisis was defused in June 1994 when
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Il
Sung. Carter announced from Pyongyang that Kim had accepted the broad outline of
a deal that was later finalized as the "Agreed Framework" in October 1994. Under
the agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze its gas-graphite moderated reactors
and related facilities, and allow the IAEA to monitor that freeze. Pyongyang was
also required to "consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and remain a party
to the NPT. In exchange, the United States agreed to lead an international
consortium to construct two light water power reactors, and provide 500,000 tons
of heavy fuel oil per year until the first reactor came online with a target
date of 2003. Furthermore, the United States was to provide "formal assurances
against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S."
Collapse of the Agreed Framework
While the Agreed Framework froze North
Korea's plutonium program for almost a decade, neither party was completely
satisfied with either the compromise reached or its implementation. The United
States was dissatisfied with the postponement of safeguards inspections to
verify Pyongyang's past activities, and North Korea was dissatisfied with the
delayed construction of the light water power reactors.
After coming to office in 2001, the new Bush
administration initiated a North Korea policy review that was completed in early
June. The review concluded that the United States should seek "improved
implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea's
missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean
conventional military posture." From Washington's perspective, "improved
implementation of the Agreed Framework" meant an acceleration of safeguards
inspections, even though the agreement did not require Pyongyang to submit to
full safeguards inspections to verify its past activities until a significant
portion of the reactor construction was completed but before the delivery of
critical reactor components.
There were also concerns about North Korea's
suspected highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which is a different path to
produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the summer of 2002, U.S.
intelligence reportedly discovered evidence of transfers of HEU technology
and/or materials from Pakistan in exchange for ballistic missiles. Later, in
early 2004, it was revealed that Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan had
sold gas-centrifuge technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran. Compared to
plutonium-production facilities, the HEU production facilities that North Korea
was suspected of developing are difficult to detect.
In October 2002, bilateral talks between the
United States and North Korea finally resumed when U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly visited Pyongyang. During
the visit, Kelly informed First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu and Vice
Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan that Washington was aware of a secret North Korean
program to produce highly-enriched uranium (HEU). The U.S. State Department
claimed that North Korean officials admitted to having such a program during a
second day of meetings with Kelly, but North Korea later argued that it only
admitted to having a "plan to produce nuclear weapons," which Pyongyang claimed
was part of its right to self-defense.
The United States responded in December 2002
by suspending heavy oil shipments, and North Korea then retaliated by lifting
the freeze on its nuclear facilities, expelling IAEA inspectors monitoring that
freeze, and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003.
Initially, North Korea claimed it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons,
and that the lifting of the nuclear freeze was necessary to generate needed
electricity.
New Crisis and the Beginning of the Six-Party Process
In the spring of 2003, U.S. intelligence
detected activities around the Radiochemisty Laboratory, a reprocessing facility
in Yongbyon-kun, that indicate North Korea was probably reprocessing the 8,000
spent fuel rods that had been in a temporary storage pond. In September 2003, a
North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that North Korea had completed the
reprocessing of this spent fuel, which would give North Korea enough plutonium
for about four to six nuclear devices. In January 2004, a delegation of invited
U.S. experts confirmed that the canisters in the temporary storage pond were empty.
In April 2003, a multilateral dialogue began
in Beijing with the aim of ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
Initially trilateral in format (China, North Korea and the United States), the
process expanded to a six-party format with the inclusion of Japan, Russia and
South Korea. The first round of the six-party talks began in August 2003.
According to reports, North Korean diplomats stated at the talks that Pyongyang
had "no choice but to declare its possession of nuclear weapons" and "conduct a
nuclear weapons test." The North Korean delegation, however, reiterated that
Pyongyang would be willing to dismantle its nuclear programs if the United
States "changed its hostile policies, stopped obstructing North Korea's economic
growth, and aided the energy needs of North Korea." Six months later, in
February 2004, the second round of talks were held and a third round were held
June 2004. However, tensions between the parties - particularly the United
States and North Korea - meant the talks stalled for over a year, restarting in July 2005.
While the six-party process stagnated, North
Korea shut down its 5MW(e) reactor in April 2005 and removed the spent fuel. The
reactor had been operating since February 2003, so it could have produced enough
plutonium for 1 to 3 devices. However, it would take a few months for North
Korean engineers to extract the plutonium from the spent fuel rods. In September
2005, satellite imagery indicated that the reactor had begun operations once again.
"Statement of Principles" and Breakdown in Talks
On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of
six-party talks concluded and the six parties signed a "Statement of Principles"
whereby North Korea would abandon its nuclear programs and return to the NPT and
IAEA safeguards at "an early date." The United States agreed that it has no
intention of attacking North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons, and
Washington affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. The
parties also agreed that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula, which prohibits uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing, should be observed and implemented.
Although hailed as a breakthrough by some
participants, the viability of the "Statement of Principles" were immediately
brought into questions by North Korean and U.S. actions. One particularly
sticking point was the extent to which different parties interpreted the
agreement's provision of light water reactors to North Korea. While Pyongyang
argued that the six-party statement had allowed for LWRs, Washington countered
that this was not guaranteed under the statement and would only come after North
Korea had dismantled its current nuclear program. Shortly after the agreement
was signed in Beijing, the U.S. government announced that it was sanctioning
Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a Macao based bank, for assisting North Korea with
illegal activities including counterfeiting U.S. currency. North Korea demanded
that the sanctions be lifted or Pyongyang would not carry-out its part of the
September 2005 agreement. Due to these, and other disagreements, the Six-Party
Talks stalemated and the "Statement of Principles" remained dormant for over 18 months.
Nuclear Tests and Resumption of Talks
The nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula
continued to deteriorate throughout 2006, reaching a low point in October when
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. Immediately following the test,
the UNSC imposed sanctions on North Korea. After intense diplomatic activities
by the Chinese government and others involved in the six-party process, the
parties met again in December 2006 after a hiatus of more than a year. However,
these talks ended without any sign of progress.
In what appeared to be a breakthrough in the
negotiations, the six parties in February 2007 agreed on the "Initial Actions
for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" whereby North Korea agreed to
abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and return to the
NPT and IAEA safeguards, in exchange for a package of incentives that included
the provision of energy assistance to North Korea by the other parties. The
agreement also established a 60-day deadline during which North Korea was to
shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon-kun under IAEA
supervision. In addition, the United States agreed to release the approximately
$25 million in North Korean assets held at the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia.
However, the BDA part of the February deal again became a sticking point; much
of the international financial community, concerned about possible legal
ramification of dealing with a bank that was technically still under U.S.
sanctions, refused to take part in the transfer of the funds. The issue was
eventually resolved when a Russian bank agreed to transfer the funds in June 2007.
After the February 2007 agreement, the North
Koreans extended invitations to IAEA officials opening the door to
re-establishing its relationship with the agency since expelling IAEA inspectors
in December 2002. In March 2007, an IAEA delegation headed by Mohamed ElBaradei
visited Pyongyang and met with North Korean officials to discuss the
denuclearization process. In July 2007, North Korea began shutting down and
sealing it main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon-kun under IAEA supervision.
Further progress was made in the Six-Party
Talks when the parties adopted the second "action plan" that called on North
Korea to disable its main nuclear facilities and submit a complete and correct
declaration of all its nuclear programs by 31 December 2007. While disablement
activities on North Korea's three key plutonium production facilities at
Yongbyon-kun-the 5MW(e) experimental reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory
and the Fuel Fabrication Plant-progressed, North Korea failed to meet the
31 December deadline to submit its declaration. Sharp disagreements over North
Korea's past procurement efforts that support the development of a uranium
enrichment capability and controversies surrounding suspected North Korean
nuclear cooperation with Syria proved to be the key sticking
points.
Almost six months past the deadline, on 26
June 2008, North Korea submitted its much-awaited declaration. While the
contents of North Korea's declaration have not been disclosed to the public,
various media reports claimed that the declaration failed to address its alleged
uranium enrichment program or suspicions of its nuclear proliferation to other
countries, such as Syria. Despite problems with the declarations, the Bush
administration notified U.S. Congress that it was removing North Korea from the
U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and also issued a proclamation lifting
some sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Following the U.S.
government's action, North Korea demolished the cooling tower at the Yongbyon
reactor which was broadcasted by the international media. However, North Korea
announced in late August 2008 that they restored the nuclear facilities in
Yongbyon-kun and barred international inspectors from accessing the site.
Pyongyang also criticizing the United States for delaying the removal of North
Korea from the list of state sponsors of terror.
On 11 October 2008, the United States
dropped North Korea from the terrorism list after reaching a deal in which North
Korea agreed to resume the disabling of its nuclear facilities and allow
inspectors access to the nuclear sites. The six parties then resumed
negotiations to map out a verification plan in Beijing in December 2008. These
negotiations focused on ways to verify the disabling of North Korea's nuclear
program, including taking nuclear samples. However, the negotiations failed to
reach an agreement on a verification protocol and the issue remains stalled.
After a dispute over rocket
launches in March 2009, North Korea kicked out IAEA and U.S. inspectors and
began to rebuild the Yongbyon reactor for the purpose of reprocessing plutonium
from the spent fuel rods, going back on its previous promises at the Six-Party
Talks. Yongbyon-kun's reactor has yet to achieve completion despite some
media report to the contrary. According to satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe
taken on 23 August 2009, no attempts had been made to reconstruct the cooling
tower or of other ventilation.
After the North's 25 May 2009 nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council
released Resolution 1874; in response Pyongyang announces that "the
processing of uranium enrichment will be commenced."
After the UN sanctions that
followed the 2009 "satellite" launch, the DPRK indicated that they
did not plan to return to the Six-Party Talks and that they were not bound by
agreements made earlier through this forum. By the fall of 2009, international
pressure was being increasingly placed on Pyongyang-particularly by China
and the United States-for resumption of the Six Party Talks process. In
December 2009, U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth visited North Korea to
explore the renewal of the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang called for the lifting
of UN-imposed sanctions before returning to the Six-Party Talks, a request that
was refused by the United States and the other Six-Party Talk participants. In
January and February 2010, diplomatic activities increased significantly, and
hopes were raised that North Korea could rejoin the process in the near
future.
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Updated February, 2010 |
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