| Year/Date |
Exporter |
Item(s) |
Remarks |
| 1947-50 |
USSR |
Uranium and monazite mining expertise |
|
| 1950s |
USSR |
Education in nuclear physics |
Ch’oe Hak Kŭn, a future minister of Atomic Energy and Industry, studies in the USSR. |
| 1952 |
China |
Nuclear expertise |
Suspected; China sends specialists to North Korea to “collect radioactive material.” |
| 1956-1990s |
USSR |
Education and training |
Over 300 North Korean scientists study nuclear physics in the USSR. |
| January 1958 |
USSR |
Nuclear expertise |
The USSR helps establish the “Atomic Weapons Training Center” in or near Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province. |
| 1960s |
USSR |
Hot cells |
|
| 1960s |
USSR |
IRT-2000 Research Reactor |
|
| 1960s-early 1970s |
USSR |
Training in plutonium reprocessing techniques |
|
| 1964 |
China |
Technical assistance in surveying uranium deposits |
|
| 1964 |
USSR |
Nuclear expertise |
USSR assists in the establishment of the Nuclear Research Complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. |
| May-June 1965 |
USSR |
0.1MW critical assembly |
|
| Mid-1960s |
Austria and France |
Nuclear equipment |
Reported by defector Ko Yŏng Hwan in 1991. |
| Late 1960s |
USSR |
25 Mev Betatron |
|
| 1968 |
USSR |
0.1MW critical assembly |
|
| Early 1970s |
USSR |
Technical assistance in constructing an isotope processing facility |
|
| July 1972 |
Canada |
Nuclear expertise |
Dr. Kim Kyŏng Ha, “a famous atomic bomb specialist,” goes to North Korea from Canada, allegedly to work on nuclear weapons. |
| 1974 |
China |
Nuclear training/expertise |
|
| Mid 1970s |
IAEA |
Nuclear reactor/equipment data |
Ch’oe Hak Kŭn, representative to the IAEA, copies information from IAEA library. |
| Mid 1970s-1989 |
Romania |
Unspecified nuclear assistance |
Probably limited assistance because Romania had limited experience and was pursuing Canadian CANDU technology. |
| 1976 |
France |
Two IRIS-50 computers |
|
| March 1977 |
China |
Nuclear expertise |
|
| 1980s |
West Germany via Pakistan |
Uranium enrichment technology |
Suspected |
| 1980s |
West Germany via India or Pakistan |
Two electron beam furnaces and two “laboratory furnaces” |
Suspected |
| 1983 |
Russia |
ICBMs |
|
| 1986-87 |
West Germany |
US-origin zirconium |
Suspected |
| 1987 |
West Germany via East Germany |
Small annealing furnace |
Suspected |
| 1988-89 |
Japan and Europe |
Gas centrifuge technology |
Suspected |
| 1989 |
West Germany |
Technical assistance |
One or two German technicians are reportedly in North Korea in 1989. |
| 1989 |
IAEA |
Assistance in locating uranium deposits |
|
| 1989-91 |
USSR |
Nuclear expertise and reactor designs |
|
| 1990 |
West Germany |
Technical assistance |
An “official” from the German firm Leybold is reportedly in North Korea in 1990. |
| 1990s-2002 |
Pakistan
|
Uranium enrichment technology |
Suspected |
| 1990s |
Iran |
Unspecified nuclear assistance |
Suspected |
| 1991 |
USSR |
Nuclear expertise |
|
| Early 1990s |
USSR |
Technical assistance in constructing a nuclear cyclotron |
|
| July 1992 |
Russia and Ukraine |
Nuclear expertise |
North Korean officials observe nuclear explosions in order to test indigenously produced explosion monitoring equipment. |
| October 1992 |
Russia |
Nuclear expertise |
Prevented; Over 60 Russian nuclear specialists are stopped at the Sheremetyevo-2 Airport near Moscow before departing to North Korea. |
| December 1992-March 1993 |
Unknown
|
Nuclear equipment |
|
| 8 December 1992 |
Russia |
Nuclear expertise |
Prevented; Special Forces arrest 36 “senior weapons scientists” as they attempt to travel to North Korea. |
| 1994 |
Kazakhstan; unspecified central Asian countries |
Uranium-235, plutonium-239, osmium-187, cesium-137, strontium, and 70-80 documents on nuclear technologies |
Suspected |
| Mid-August 1994 |
German citizen |
Up to 2.5mg of plutonium |
Prevented; it is unclear whether North Korea is the intended importer or exporter of the plutonium |
| Late 1990s |
Pakistan |
Gas centrifuges |
Suspected |
| Late 1990s |
Democratic Republic of Congo |
Uranium ore |
Suspected |
| Mid-1999 |
Japan |
Two frequency converters (uranium enrichment technology) |
Delivery is unconfirmed. |
| Late 1999 |
Russia |
Radioactive material traveling by train |
Prevented; in October 1999, Russian authorities detain several trains because of detected amounts of radiation. The trains regularly traveled from Russia to Nasŏn, North Korea. |
| 2001 |
Russia |
Nuclear expertise (20 Russian nuclear scientists) |
|
| 2001 |
Kazakhstan |
32kg of highly enriched uranium |
Suspected |
| December 2002 |
Chinese firms |
20 tons of tributyl phosphate (TBP) |
On 9 December, the Washington Times reported that US intelligence has discovered that North Korean government agents had approached several Chinese companies to acquire TBP, but subsequent reports on 17 and 20 December started that North Korea had actually received 20 tons of TBT. |
| July 2002 |
Pakistan |
Nuclear technology |
Suspected |
| July 2003 |
Japan (via Taiwan) |
Oil-diffusion pump, oil-rotary pump |
A July 2007 IAEA inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities, including the Yongbyon complex, confirms the presence of this Japan-origin equipment. Details of the export from Japan are subsequently uncovered during a June 2008 police raid in Sagamihara. |
| 2004-2006 |
Japan |
Machining centers |
Suspected (identified during a police raid in Hiroshima). Machining centers are dual-use machine tools that can be applied to the component-level manufacturing of uranium enrichment centrifuges. |
| 2007 |
Taiwan |
Industrial filtering device |
Alleged to have occurred in early 2007, based on an investigation of a Taiwanese import-export firm by Taiwan's Justice Ministry. According to the Justice Ministry's Investigation Bureau, the device may have applications suitable for the extraction of plutonium. Additionally, the Bureau indicates that there is evidence that North Koreans received operational and maintenance training in Taiwan. |