This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
Kim Il Sung expresses the desire to place a satellite in orbit at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 28-29; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missile Seen Posing Risk to U.S.; Rocket Might Reach Alaska, Hawaii," Washington Times, 16 September 1998, p. A1.
North Korea obtains information from Syria on missiles, missile technology and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Syria provides "access" to the 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) SRBM, P-35 Redut (SSC-1b Sepal) cruise missile, P-20 Rubezh-A (SS-C-3 Styx) anti-ship missile, solid-fuel motor technology, and the DR-3 Reys UAV.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 32.
North Korea begins mass production of the Nodong missile, with a capacity of 30-50 missiles a year. It appears that North Korea will be looking to test the missile in Iran, Libya or Syria.
—Kim Yong Il, "Puk Nodong 1 Ho Missile Yangsan—Chaknyŏnputo 30-50 Ki Saengsan," Joongang Ilbo, 17 May 1995, <http://www.joins.com>.
North Korea begins construction of a missile bases at Yongnim-kun, Chagang Province, and at Sangnam-ri, Hŏch'ŏn-kun, South Hamgyŏng Province. The bases will be capable of launching either Nodong or Taepodong missiles, or both.
—Kim Min Sŏk, "Pukhan Missile Kiji Kyesok Chŭngsŏl," Joongang Ilbo, 6 March 2001, p. 8, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea reportedly begins construction on three "Scud" missile bases near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). [Note: Considering the timing of the construction, the bases may be for Nodong and or Taepodong missiles.]
—Kim Sŏng Gŏl, "'Pukhan'gun Chŏ''yŏk Chŭnggang'/Kukpangbu Palp'yo," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 13 August 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reports that North Korea has indefinitely postponed the sale of Nodong intermediate-range ballistic missiels (IRBMs) to Iran. The report does not reveal when the contract was cancelled.
—Ron Kampeas, "Report: North Korea Cancels Scud-D Sales to Iran," Associated Press, 4 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "'Puk Scud Iran P'anmae Ch'wiso'/Israel'chi Podo," Chosun Ilbo, 6 January 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
North Korea's Korea Central News Agency reports that Air Force Commander Cho Myŏng Rok is leading a delegation on a visit to Iran. While the report does not mention the purpose of the visit, Western and Arab sources speculate that the two countries will engage in intense discussions about possible Nodong-1 test launches in Iran. Diplomatic sources also speculate that the North Koreans will likely visit military and nuclear facilities. [Note: The North Korean delegation remains in Iran until mid-February.]
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 February 1994, in "Military Delegation Reportedly Returns form Visit to Iran," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Japanese police raid Anritsu Corp., Yokohama Machinery Trading Co., and one other Japanese company on suspicion of having sold spectrum analyzers to North Korea via China in 1989. The spectrum analyzers could be used to improve the precision of missile targeting and the accuracy of the Nodong-1. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) denies allegations that North Korea had imported spectrum analyzers from Japan, stating, "The so-called export of a spectrum analyzer is an utterly groundless fabrication against the DPRK." KCNA adds that it was impossible that spectrum analyzers were imported via a third country, and "preposterous" that it might be used in a the development of a ballistic missile.
—Terry McCarthy, "Japanese Hi-Tech in North Korean Missiles, Independent (London), 15 January 1994, p. 13; Michiyo Nakamoto, "Japan Police in Export Raid: Machinery Sales to N. Korea May Have Breached CoCom Rules," Financial Times, 15 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; David E. Sanger, "Tokyo Raids Seek to Halt Aid for North Korea on Missiles," New York Times, 15 January 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Japan Firms May Have Sold Missile Gauges to N. Korea," Daily Yomiuri, 15 January 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "3rd Nation Used to Ship Goods to North Korea?" Daily Yomiuri, 15 January 1994, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "North Korea Missile Deal Cover-Up Seen," Daily Yomiuri, 16 January 1994, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Lee Sŏk Ku, "Nodong 1 Ho Pupum Ilche Chupasubunsŏkki Chunggukkŏch'yŏ Milsu Ch'ujŏng," Joongang Ilbo, 15 January 1994, <http://www.joins.com/>; "North Korea Raps Japan Over Police Search," Agence France Presse, 19 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
The Japanese newspaper Tokyo Shimbun cites a Russian Pacific Fleet senior officer as saying that Russia has contracted with North Korea for the sale of 10 Golf II-class submarines.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 18 January 1994, in "Analysts Say Russian Submarines Sold to DPRK Can Carry Missiles," JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994, pp. 45-46; Hong Sŏng Kyun, "Pukhan Toip Rŏ Chamsuham/Koch'ŏlyong'inya Shilchŏn'yong'inya," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 31 January 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The Russian Defense Ministry denies the Tokyo Shimbun report regarding the Golf II-class submarine sale to North Korea and refuses to comment on the type of submarines involved or conditions of the contract. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry acknowledges the deal to South Korean embassy officials in Moscow with the assurance that the submarines are being sold for scrap only.
—Yonhap News Agency, 18 January 1994, in "Analysts Say Russian Submarines Sold to DPRK Can Carry Missiles," JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994, pp. 45-46; Hong Sŏng Kyun, "Pukhan Toip Rŏ Chamsuham/Koch'ŏlyong'inya Shilchŏn'yong'inya," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 31 January 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Western defense analysts in Moscow say that Russia is selling 10 ballistic missile-capable Golf II-class submarines to North Korea. The analysts maintain that North Korea could install modified Nodong-1 missiles on the submarines. Although the Russian navy insists that the submarines will be dismantled under Russian military observation, Western analysts believe that North Korea may cannibalize the submarines for parts and that knowledge of these submarines will help it to improve its own submarine technology. According to the New York Times, the purchase is for 40 submarines, mostly 20- to 30-year old diesel models in the NATO class "Foxtrot." Some experts believe the submarines may be used for spare parts. [Note: The concern that North Korea might use the submarines as a launch platform for its ballistic missiles is not as farfetched as it may at first appear. The first Soviet submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-N-4 Sark, was a Scud derivative, and was originally deployed on Golf-class submarines. A Scud-C may be adaptable to an SLBM role, but, at 15.5 meters in length, the Nodong-1 is one meter longer than the SS-N-4 and would not fit in a Golf launch tube without modification. The modification referred to may be a shortening of the missile, which would also shorten the range of the missile. It is not unreasonable to assume that North Korea may have had access to SLBM technology as the precursor to the SS-N-4, the R-11FM, was transferred to China in December 1959. China still uses the Golf-class submarine as an SLBM training and test platform. Additionally, it should be noted that the Russian scientists recruited in late 1992 were from the Makeyev Design Bureau, which is responsible for the design of all modern Russian SLBMs.]
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 18 January 1994, in "Analysts Say Russian Submarines Sold to DPRK Can Carry Missiles," JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994, pp. 45-46.
The Japan Defense Agency issues a report on reconnaissance satellites following a secret study that began in October 1993. The report recommends that Japan put five-seven reconnaissance satellites into earth orbit.
—Kim Hyo Sun, "Ilbon 'ChŏngCh'alwisŏng' Ch'ujin," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 17 August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Chŏn Hyŏn Il, "Il, Chŏngch'alwisŏng Poyu Kŭkpich'ujin/Pangwich'ŏng, Pimilgyehoek Surip," Segye Ilbo, 17 August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
CIA director James Woolsey tells the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that North Korea would probably resort to its MiG-23 aircraft as a nuclear weapon delivery system, rather than the Nodong-1 missile.
—Kyodo News Service, "CIA Chief Says N. Korea Would Use MiGs for Nuke Attack," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology releases a report that claims the circle of equal probability (CEP) value of the Nodong is between two and four kilometers.
—Lee Kyŏng Hyŏng, "Nodong 1 Ho Myŏngjungdo 'Sujun'iha'/MIT-Rŏ Kwahag'wŏn Yŏn'guwŏn Punsŏk," Taehan Maeil, 28 January 1994, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The South Korean daily Hankook Ilbo reports that North Korea possesses 12 to 18 Nodong-1 missiles and is developing the Nodong-2. The report says the Nodong-1 was "developed from the former Soviet Union's surface-to-surface Scud missile developed in the 1980s and that the Nodong was reportedly deployed last year."
—Yi Sang Won, Hankook Ilbo (Seoul), 28 January 1994, p. 5, in "Press Overview of Deployment," JPRS-TND-94-005, 25 February 1994, p. 42; Lee Sang Wŏn, "Patriot Nodong 1 Ho Kyŏkch'u Kanŭnghalkka," Hankook Ilbo, 28 January 1994, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, denies allegations made by the Japanese weekly Shukan Bunshun regarding an alleged top secret Russian report. The Shukan Bunshun report claims that Russian nuclear and missile scientists have assisted North Korea in the development of nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles. But Kolesnikov says that the report's alleged issuing authority, the Center for Military Strategic Analysis at the Russian General Staff, does not exist, although the General Staff does have a "center for military strategic studies." Kolesnikov lists further discrepancies within the report, including the form used, the index number cited, the incorrect placement and terminology of the security classification, and, finally, the use of a serial number originating with the USSR Council of Ministers (a numbering system not used since 1991) rather than one used by the Ministry of Defense.
—Radio Moscow, 29 January 1994, in "Participation in DPRK Nuclear Program Denied," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, p. 15; Pavel Felgengauer, "North Korea Has No Nuclear Bomb. The Publication in Shukan Bunshun Is Based on a Hoax. There will be No Official Investigation in the General Staff," Segodnya (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 1, in FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, pp. 15-16; Viktor Litovkin, "Russian Chief of General Staff Describes Piece in Japanese Weekly as 'Nonsense'," Izvestiya (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 3, in "Army Chief on Missile Document," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, pp. 16-17; "General Staff Secret Report a Brazen Fake," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 28 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/; Alexander Golts, "'General Staff's Secret Report' Is Crude Forge," Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, Russian Press Digest, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korean Air Force Commander General Cho Myŏng Rok, heading a 29-member delegation of military and nuclear experts, returns from Iran, where, according to the Paris-based Al-Watan Al-Arabi, "new agreements to intensify military and nuclear cooperation" were reached. Western and Arab diplomatic sources believe that the testing of the Nodong-2 in Iran was also discussed and that the delegation visited the Iranian missile test site at Sharoud. Some analysts believe Iran wants to purchase up to 150 Nodongs.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 February 1994, in "DPRK Military Delegation's Iran Visit Reported," JPRS-TND-94-007, 23 March 1994, pp. 27-28; "N. Korea's Air Force Chief Visits Iran for Closer Ties," Washington Times, 25 February 1994; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 25; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 190; Ed Blanche, "North Koreans Visit Iran To Step Up Military Cooperation," Associated Press, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
US intelligence satellites detect a new "missile simulator" [hardware mock-up] at the Sanŭm-dong R&D facility in Pyongyang. The mock-up has been designated Taepodong-2, and appears to be a two-stage missile with the first stage resembling the Chinese CSS-2. The dimensions of Taepodong-2 indicate that its range could be as great as 3,500km. Also spotted is a second two-stage missile that has been designated Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1), which is believed to have a Nodong-1 first stage and a Scud-B or -C second stage. South Korean and US intelligence officials believe that, considering the missile's potential range, the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) may be the "Nodong-2." The majority view among analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and CIA is that the missiles have been developed indigenously; a minority within the DIA contends that China may have assisted in the development of the missiles. The two missiles are named after the location of their development in North Korea.
—Barbara Starr, "N. Korea Casts a Longer Shadow with TD-2," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 March 1994, p. 1; R. Jeffrey Smith, "CIA Confirms North Korea's New Missiles," Washington Post, 18 March 1994, p. A24; Yu Yong Won, Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 20 March 1994, p. 4, in "Reporting on Status of Missile Development," JPRS-TND-94-008, 1 April 1994, pp. 12-13; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 28; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 293, 295; Yu Yong Wŏn, "Puk Shinhyŏngjidaeji 'Taepodong12ho' [sic] Saqjŏnggŏri 2Ch'ŏn ~ 3Ch'ŏn5Baek km," Chosun Ilbo, 20 March 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea conducts a static test of a liquid-fuel engine at Musudan-ri (Taepo-dong), the location of North Korea's largest missile engine test facility. There are reports that the test is related to the Taepodong program.
—Barbara Starr, "North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 June 1994, p. 10; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 28.
The daily Tokyo Shimbun reports that Russia, under pressure from the international community, has halted the delivery of decommissioned Russian submarines to North Korea.
—Yi Sok-ku, Joongang Ilbo, 3 February 1994, p. 6, in "Russia Allegedly Stops Delivery of Submarines to DPRK," JPRS-TND-94-005, 25 February 1994, p. 51.
Vladimir Kumachev, a senior official of Russia's Institute of National Security and Strategic Studies, states that, "according to information that we have received, North Korea has nuclear warheads." Kumachev adds, "We know they have carried out tests in certain African countries under totalitarian regimes." He maintains that Russia still has approximately 15 experts in North Korea working in the civil nuclear industry. According to Kumachev, in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union sent 10 conventional missiles to North Korea, and that additional shipments were sent via third parties such as Iraq. He also claims that North Korea indigenously produced transporter erector launchers (TELs).
—Agence France Presse (Paris), 14 February 1994, in "Russian Defense Official Says Pyongyang 'Has Nuclear Weapons'," JPRS-TND-94-006, 16 March 1994, p. 11-12; "'Puk Ajusŏ Haek Missile Shilhŏm'/Ro Chŏnmun'ga," Chosun Ilbo, 15 February 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
Iran's Revolutionary Guards commander General Mohsen Rezai denies that Iran would ever allow North Korea to test missiles on Iranian territory. He states, "We are very sensitive to having our soil and military facilities used by foreigners. Iran will never opt for such cooperation no matter how friendly the countries are."
—"General Rezai Denies DPRK To Test Missiles In Iran," Tehran Times (Tehran), 24 February 1994, pp. 1, 14, in JPRS-TND-94-006, 16 March 1994, pp. 27-28; Agence France Presse, 24 February 1994, in "Iranian General Denies DPRK Testing Missiles in Iran," JPRS-TND-94-007, 23 March 1994, p. 28.
Japan’s Seishin Enterprise Co. reportedly sells jet mills and machinery to measure particle size to a machine company affiliated with the pro-Pyongynang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Choch’ŏngnyŏn). The machine company then reportedly transfers the equipment, valued at approximately $1 million, to North Korea aboard the Mangyongbong-92, a North Korean vessel that regularly transports cargo and passengers between North Korea and Japan. Jet mills are used to grind materials into a fine powder using compressed air. Jet mills have commercial applications in the pharmaceutical industry, but they are also used to make solid fuel for ballistic missiles, and thus are MTRC-controlled items. According to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, Seishin Enterprise Co. also delivers other machinery necessary for making solid fuel for ballistic missiles, including equipment to measure particle size, a dryer for powdered material, and a centrifuge for blending powdered material. [Note: On 12 June 2003, Japanese police arrested the president of Seishin Enterprise Co. for selling jet mills to Iran. However, by the time Japanese authorities learned of the 1994 transfer to North Korea, the statute of limitations on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law had expired.]
—“Seishin Syachora 5nin Taiho Iranni Gunjitenyohinyusyutu,” Saneki Shimbun, 12 June 2003, <http://www.sankei.co.jp/>; Kyodo World Service, 14 June 2003, in “Japan: Police Say Seishin Suspected of Selling Solid-Fuel Equipment to DPRK,” FBIS Document ID JPP20030614000061; “Seishin Jet Mill Sale ‘Aided’ N. Korea; MPD Investigation Uncovers Exports of Missile-Development Equipment in 1994,” Daily Yomiuri, 13 June 2003, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Pentagon spokeswoman Kathleen de Laski, commenting on reports of North Korea's development of the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2 two-stage missiles, states, "We have been aware that North Korea has been developing a follow-on missile to its Scud program," but it is "too early to speculate on when or if it could become operational." She refers to the Taepodong as "a weapon of the future."
—Barbara Starr, "North Korea Grasps at the Stage beyond Nodong 1," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 March 1994, p. 18.
Henry Sokolski, a nonproliferation specialist and former Bush administration Pentagon official, states, "A staged missile is a more ambitious proposition than anything North Korea has attempted so far." He outlines some of the difficulties inherent in missile staging, including engines with greater thrust to weight ratios, high-speed turbo pumps to feed clustered engines, sequencing system for stage separation, staging mechanism, airframe design, an advanced digital guidance system, and a reentry vehicle.
—Barbara Starr, "North Korea Grasps at the Stage beyond Nodong 1," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 March 1994, p. 18.
Russia expels five North Korean nationals from Moscow for "showing too much interest in nuclear components."
—Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Shops for Nuke Technology in Russia," Washington Times, 5 July 1994, pp. A1, A8.
US officials confirm that North Korea is building two new medium-range missiles. DOD Spokeswoman Kathleen deLaski said the missiles are in the "early stages of development" and are only in the "concept stage." The Pentagon is downplaying the development of the missiles, designated the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2, but US lawmakers are concerned that the reports are "understated."
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korean Conduct in Inspection Draws Criticism of U.S. Officials," Washington Post, 10 March 1994, p. A34; "Talk of New North Korean Missiles is Downplayed by Pentagon," Aerospace Daily, vol. 169, no. 50, 15 March 1994, p. 397.
CIA Director R. James Woolsey confirms the existence of North Korea's Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2 IRBMs in a speech given at a CIA conference discussing the origins of the agency. Woolsey comments, "These new missiles have yet to be flown, and we will monitor their development, including any attempts to export them in the future to countries such as Iran." He remarks that these missiles could threaten major portions of East Asia and the Western Pacific, "and if exported to the Middle East, could threaten Europe as well." Woolsey says that North Korea has not yet exported any Nodong missiles to countries in the Middle East.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "CIA Confirms North Korea's New Missiles," Washington Post, 18 March 1994, p. A24; Bill Gertz, "N. Korea Builds New Missiles," Washington Times, 19 March 1994, p. A3; Chŏng Hae Yong, "Puk Sae Missile 2 Chonggaebal/CIA Kukchang, Kongshikhwagin," Chosun Ilbo, 19 March 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>; "Puk ShinHyŏng Missile Kaebal—Mi CIA Kukchang Hwagin," Joongang Ilbo, 19 March 1994, <http://www.joins.com/>.
A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman states, "The report of the Wall Street Journal that China had possibly provided advanced missile technology to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is totally groundless."
—"China Denies a Transfer of Data to North Korea," Wall Street Journal, 18 March 1994, p. A7.
During bilateral talks between the two Koreas, North Korean delegate Pak Yŏng Su says, "Seoul is not very far from here. Seoul can be turned into a sea of fire. We will match dialogue with dialogue, and war with war."
—Cho Min Ho, "'Seoul Pulbada Toel'gŏt' Puk Tanjang Kŭg'ŏn/Nambuk 8 Ch'a Shilmujŏpch'ok P'anmunjŏm P'yojŏng," Segye Ilbo, 20 March 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Backs Maneuvers In S. Korea," Washington Post, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Will Urge U.N. To Plan Sanctions for North Korea," New York Times, 20 March 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Norman Kempster, "U.S. to Urge Sanctions for N. Korea," Los Angeles Times, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; David Usborne, "North Korea 'Ready for War'," The Independent, 20 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
The Clinton administration decides to ask the United Nations to get prepared to impose economic sanctions against North Korea. According to the Washington Post, the United States will ask for a Security Council vote on a resolution calling for complete access to North Korea's nuclear facilities. The administration also decides to reinstate joint military exercises with South Korea. North Korea has said it will consider economic sanctions an act of war.
—Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Will Urge U.N. To Plan Sanctions for North Korea," New York Times, 20 March 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Backs Maneuvers In S. Korea," Washington Post, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Norman Kempster, "U.S. to Urge Sanctions for N. Korea," Los Angeles Times, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; David Usborne, "North Korea 'Ready for War'," The Independent, 20 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
According to Pentagon officials, a deployment order is signed directing the movement of up to six Patriot missile batteries from Ft. Bliss, Texas, to South Korea as a defense against North Korean ballistic missiles. The missiles are to be moved by sea from a US West Coast port.
—Bill Gertz, "U.S. Offers No Carrot to N. Korea on Patriot Missiles," Washington Times, 23 March 1994, p. A4.
South Korean President Kim Young Sam places the South Korean military on high alert in response to a North Korean delegates remark that North Korea could turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." Kim is scheduled to leave for Japan and China tomorrow.
—Terry McCarthy and Teresa Poole, "Seoul Forces Put on Alert as Tension with North Grows, The Independent, 23 March 1994, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; John Burton and George Graham, "S. Korean Forces Go on Alert as N-Plant Row with North Grows," Financial Times, 23 March 1994, p. 24, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; T.R. Reid, "North Korea Warns of 'Brink of War'," Washington Post, 23 March 1994, p. A23, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Steven Greenhouse, "Christopher Says U.S. Stays Firm on Korea, But Pledges Diplomacy," New York Times, 23 March 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Korean People's Army (KPA) Sgt. First Class Lee Ch'ung Guk, who defected to South Korea on 18 March 1994, states in a Seoul news conference that North Korea has enough chemical weapons to kill everyone in South Korea. Lee served as a "calculator" at the "Counter-Nuclear and Atomic Analysis Center" of the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau under the KPA General Staff.
—Shin Chong Su, "'Puk Maengdokhwahangmugi Namhansŏmbyŏl Kanŭng'/Kwisunyongsa Lee Ch'ung Kuk Ssi Hoegyŏn," Kukmin Ilbo, 23 March 1994, p. 18, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kim T'ae Kyun, "'Puk, 4 Kaegijisŏ Hwahakmugi Saengsan'/Haengmugi Kaebal Wallyohandŭt," Taehan Maeil, 23 March 1994, p. 22, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/ >; Kim Dong Ho, "Puk Chŏnjaengbunwigi Kojo/4 Ch'ŏnman Salsanghal Hwahangmugiboyu/Kwisun Haekpudaejungsahoegyŏn," Joongang Ilbo, 23 March 1994, p. 22, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman denies reports that Israel is engaged in secret talks with North Korea concerning missile sales to Iran. However, reports claim that Israeli diplomats met with senior North Korean officials several weeks ago in Beijing. The contacts supposedly began about two years ago, and Israel is said to be proposing to "help raise about $1 billion among American Jewish businessmen for civilian projects in North Korea."
—Udi Segal, "Allegations of 'Secret' Contacts with DPRK on Missiles to Iran," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 22 March 1994, in JPRS-TND-94-008, 1 April 1994, p. 34.
North Korean print and broadcast media denounce the resumption of joint US-South Korean military exercises, and the US decision to deploy Patriot missiles in South Korea as "pushing the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war." North Korea continues to condemn the steps taken by the United States as unnecessarily aggressive and promises "to answer dialogue with dialogue and war with war."
—Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 22 March 1994, in "Order Termed 'Provocative'," FBIS-EAS-94-056, 23 March 1994, p. 10; "Step To Drive Situation Into Extremes," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 23 March 1994, in "'Grave Threat' Noted," FBIS-EAS-94-056, 23 March 1994, p. 10-11; Peter Goodspeed, "Korean War of Words Heats Up Amid Gravest Crisis in 40 years," Toronto Star, 24 March 1994, p. A2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Terry McCarthy and Teresa Poole, "Seoul Forces Put on Alert as Tension with North Grows, The Independent, 23 March 1994, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman denounces the US decision to deploy Patriot missiles to South Korea as a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and "an open aggressive act to threaten the DPRK militarily." The spokesman also refutes the US claim that the Patriot is a purely defensive weapon. He states that the Patriot can be modified into an offensive weapon, and "it is known to everyone that its target can be changed by the kind of warhead it is tipped with."
—Korean Central Television (Pyongyang), 28 March 1994, in "North Korean Foreign Ministry Statement Denounces Patriot Missile Deployment," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
The Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) detains three North Korean embassy employees for attempting to acquire samples of new Russian weaponry.
—NTV (Moscow), 31 March 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-063, "Foreign Espionage in Russia Viewed," 1 April 1994, pp. 10-11; Lee Chang Hun, "Rŏ, Puk Oe'gyo'gwan 3 Myŏngch'epo/Ch'ŏmdanmugi Kuipkido...Ch'ubangga'nŭngsŏng," Hankook Ilbo, 2 April 1994, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Kim Il Sung cancels a May 1994 meeting in Beijing with Chinese President Jiang Zemin designed to improve relations between the two countries. The cancellation is seen as a sign of North Korea's displeasure with China's lack of support in the United Nations regarding nuclear inspections.
—Bruce Cheesman, "Kim Cancels Visit to Peking," The Times, 8 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry [MITI] requests that Russia send a special representative to North Korea to monitor the scrapping of decommissioned Russian submarines. The Japanese government threatens to block the deal, which was arranged by the Japanese trading company Toen Shioji, if North Korea does not allow Russian monitoring. The 12 Russian submarines in question are reportedly rust-eaten and semi-submerged.
—Vasiliy Golvnin, ITAR-TASS, 27 April 1994, in "Japan Urges Control of Submarine Scrapping," FBIS-SOV-94-082, 28 April 1994, p. 23.
North Korean Foreign Ministry delegation led by Pak Chung Kuk travels to Iran and Pakistan.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.
North Korea's ambassador to India, Cha Song Chu, tells the Yonhap News Agency that, "Our nuclear arms, if developed, would be primarily designed to contain Japan." Cha also says that North Korea would not target South Korea or mainland United States with any future nuclear missiles, and repeats North Korea's assertion that it will not build such weapons. Japanese military commentator Kensuke Ebata notes, however, that, "The first obvious target for these missiles [Nodong-1] are the US bases in Japan...Such an attack would serve two purposes: to take out their primary enemy forces in a preemptive strike and serve a warning to Japan."
—John Burton, "North Korea in Nuclear Warning to Tokyo," Financial Times, 7 April 1994, pp. 1, 14; Bruce Cheesman, "Kim Cancels Visit to Peking," The Times, 8 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
South Korea's cabinet forms a crisis unit to deal with the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.
—Bruce Cheesman, "Kim Cancels Visit to Peking," The Times, 8 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
The Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun, citing South Korean sources, reports that North Korea has targeted some of its surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) at China. The South Korean sources, which allegedly received the information from Chinese intelligence, claim that Scud-C missiles launched from several North Korean missile sites could strike industrial centers in the northeastern China.
—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Targets Missiles Against China, Paper Says," Japan Economic Newswire, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Im Yŏng Sŏn, who defected to South Korea from the North Korean People's Army, says that North Korea is building a large missile base near the Chinese border. Im says the base is being built close to the border to discourage attacks from South Korea or the United States out of the fear that collateral damage could spill over into Chinese territory. Im also says about 5,000 people have been committed to the construction project in "Chunggangjin," Chagang Province to finish it by next year. [Note: There are references in the press calling the site both "Chunggangjin" and "Chunggang," but the correct location is Chunggang-kun, Chagang Province.]
—"Chagangdo Chunggangjin Dŭng Chungguk Kukkyŏng/Puk, Missile Kiji Kŏnsŏlchung," Chosun Ilbo, 9 April 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>; "Puk, Chunggukkukkyŏng'e Missile Kiji/Naenyŏn Wan'gong/Tongbuk3sŏng-Pukkyŏngdo Sajŏnggwŏn'e," Taehan Maeil (Seoul Shinmun), 9 April 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Paul Beaver, publisher of Jane's Defence Weekly, in an interview for a Japanese feature television program entitled "Areas of Dispute in the World," reveals that North Korea and Iran have agreed to establish a Nodong-1 missile production facility in Iran under the code name "Ronda-68." [Note: The "Ronda-68" project referred to is probably the Tondar-68 project.]
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 11 April 1994, in, "DPRK, Iran Reportedly Agree to Build Missile Plant," JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 47.
US government sources say North Korea is developing two new missiles, the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2, with estimated ranges between 2,000km and 6,000km. The missiles have significantly longer ranges than the Nodong, and have two stages.
—"New North Korean Missiles Would Have Ranges of 2,000-6,000 km," Aerospace Daily, vol. 170, no. 15, 21 April 1994, p. 118; O Yong Hwan, "Puk Shinhyŏng Missile Taepodong 1.2 (sic) Ho Sajŏnggŏri 6 Ch'ŏn km Talhae," Joongang Ilbo, 24 April 1994, <http://www.joins.com/>.
The Israeli Home Front Commander Major General Ze'ev Livne states that Syria is continuing to acquire Scud missiles and launchers from North Korea. He further notes that missiles launched from Iran would pose a more difficult operational dilemma for the Home Front Command.
—Qol Yisra'el (Jerusalem), 27 April 1994, in "General: Syria Buying Scud Missiles in North Korea," FBIS-NES-94-082, 28 April 1994, p. 41.
US intelligence discovers preparations for a missile test at Musudan-ri. The preparations are believed to be for a Nodong test, but activities suddenly stopped without explanation.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 22; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 186.
Korean People's Army (KPA) Sgt. Lee Ch'ung Guk, who defected to South Korea on 18 March 1994, states in a Tokyo news conference that North Korea has the technology to mount chemical, but not nuclear, warheads on Scud missiles, and further states that "Missile bases located in Myŏngch'on-kun and Hwadae-kun of North Hamgyŏng Province have Okinawa and Guam within their shooting range." Lee also states that missiles based in Chagang Province are targeted at China. Lee served as a "calculator" at the "Counter-Nuclear and Atomic Analysis Center" of the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau under the KPA General Staff. In a later personal interview, Lee claims he has no special expertise in ballistic missiles. [Note: Lee did not mention missiles during his news conference in Seoul on 22 March 1994.]
—Interview with Lee Ch'ung Guk by Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies senior research associate, 7 April 2001, Seoul; "Chemical-Armed Scuds Said Aimed at Okinawa," Washington Times, 29 April 1994, p. A15; "N. Korea's Scuds Said Capable of Carrying Chemicals," Japan Economic News Service, 28 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
US intelligence imagery detects North Korean efforts to conceal the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2 mock-ups at the San'ŭm-dong missile R&D facility.
—Barbara Starr, "North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 June 1994, p. 10.
A US reconnaissance satellite notes movement of containers to a missile test site on North Korea's East Coast. The satellite also detects the installation of a launcher and the erection of a "giant shelter pad against propellant jets," as well as significant North Korean naval activity. [Note: At this time, North Korea appears to be preparing for two separate missile tests: a static test-firing of the Taepodong-2 first stage and a test-launch of the Nodong-1. The "giant shelter pad" may be an indication of a static test, while the TEL sightings and naval activity are possible signs of a flight test.]
—Shunji Taoka, Aera, 13 June 1994, in "Demonstration of Military Power Will Adversely Affect Negotiations with the United States," FBIS-EAS-94-111-A, 13 June 1994, p. 17; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 28.
Yŏ Man Ch'ŏl, a former captain in the North Korean security forces who defected to South Korea in March 1994, states that he had heard of test firing of multi-stage missiles in North Hamgyŏng Province. In a subsequent interview, Yŏ says that he traveled to Hwadae-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province for an artillery firing exercise, but the exercise was cancelled. He clarified that he never heard of "multi-stage missile" exercises.
—Interview with Yŏ Man Ch'ŏl by CNS analyst Daniel A. Pinkston, 9 April 2001, Seoul; Teresa Watanabe, "Most N. Koreans on Brink of Starvation, Defector Says; Far East: Ex-Security Officer Describes Rapidly Waning Support for Regime," Los Angeles Times, 3 May 1994, p. A6;
According to a Jane's Defence Weekly report, US intelligence officials believe that North Korea's Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2 missiles are too large to be transported by missile launchers available to North Korea. North Korea is believed to have two transporters of sufficient size to carry the missiles in sections, but this method of transport would necessitate reassembly and launch of the missile from a fixed launch site.
—"Taepo Dongs 'Cannot Be Moved Whole'," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 May 1994, p. 1.
NBC Television in the United States reports that a Russian intelligence satellite has collected imagery of the North Korean secret missile testing facility at Taepo-dong (Musudan-ri). The report says there are three launch facilities at the site, a rocket test stand, and black marks from a failed Nodong-1 test. The facility also has a missile assembly area, a repair or maintenance facility, and a "wharf" for tracking rocket flight paths.
—Kyodo News Service, "Russian Satellite Snaps N. Korean Missile Site, TV Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Rŏ Wisŏng, Puk Missile Kiji Ch'walyŏng/Taepodong Iltae," Chosun Ilbo, 11 May 1994.
An official at the Russian Defense Ministry states that the Ministry has made several requests to North Korea for a Russian expert to be present at the dismantlement of decommissioned Russian submarines, but North Korea has not yet assented. Western sources in South Korea say that "as they [North Koreans] reject a Russian expert's presence, there is the strong possibility that they may recycle the submarine for military purpose[s]."
—Yonhap News Agency, 13 May 1994, in "DPRK Rejects Monitoring of Submarine Dismantling," FBIS-SOV-94-093, 13 May 1994, p. 17.
According to an unidentified military source in Tokyo, a US reconnaissance satellite observes "crane trucks" at a North Korean missile base and vessels assembling at a port on North Korea's east coast. These movements indicate that North Korea might be preparing for a missile launch. The military source is quoted on 27 May as saying the satellite detected the movements about one week ago.
—"US Warns Japan Pyongyang May Test-Launch Missile," Daily Yomiuri, 29 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Foils Efforts to Halt Its Nuclear Plans," New York Times, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Alison Smale, "IAEA: No Agreement Reached With North Korea, Team Returning," Associated Press, 28 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Pu Chi Yŏng, "Puk, Sae Missile Shilhŏm'umjig'im/Ilchibodo/Mi Chŏngch'alwisŏng'i Pal'gyŏn...Il'e T'ongbo," Chosun Ilbo, 29 May 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Hwang U Yŏn, "'Puk Shinhyŏng Missile/Shihŏmbalsa Chunbi'/Ilch'ibodo, Mi Wisŏngjaryo Il T'ongbo," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 29 May 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Former UK Royal Navy Captain Richard Sharpe, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, claims that the launch tubes on the Golf-class submarines purchased by North Korea from Russia could be adapted for other weapons. The Russian navy decommissioned the Golf submarines in 1990. However, a South Korean Foreign Ministry official says the submarines have had their weapon systems removed and are obsolete; therefore, they are unusable for offensive purposes. The official indicates that the submarines were purchased for scrap and that of the 12 submarines contracted for, only one has been delivered. Commenting on the state of the equipment on the submarines, Toen Trading Company executive Ariyoshi Shibata states, "Everything is left as it is. Nothing is removed." This suggests that the weapon systems may not have been removed as stated by the South Korean official. In a related development, the ITAR-TASS news agency reports that Russia is reserving the right to sell weapons to North Korea. A Russian governmental official is quoted as saying that as long as there are no international sanctions, "Russia...has the right to ship to North Korea purely defensive systems of armaments and spare parts."
—Richard Sharpe, Jane's Fighting Ships 1994-95, (Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey: 1994), p. 9; "World Datelines," San Francisco Examiner, 23 May 1994, p. A12; "Seoul Says Subs Sold to North Are Harmless," Washington Times, 24 May 1994, p. A15; "S. Korea Denies N. Korean Submarine Claim," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Official: Russian Subs Bought by North Korea Have No Military Use," Associated Press, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
A Japanese government source states that the United States has been aware that North Korea is preparing for a missile test. North Korea tests a Silkworm anti-ship missile (ASM) on 31 May 1994.
—"Puk Silkworm Missile Tonghaesŏ Palsa Shilhŏm," Joongang Ilbo, 1 June 1994, <http://www.joins.com/>.
It is revealed that US reconnaissance satellites have detected transporter erector launchers (TELs) operating near the North Korean coast and ships have been assuming positions off the coast, both of which may indicate preparation for an upcoming Nodong-1 test-launch. Another test of the missile would contribute to the validation of the Nodong-1's flight characteristics. The activities are first observed about one week earlier.
—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Foils Efforts to Halt Its Nuclear Plans," New York Times, 29 May 1994, pp. 1, 6; Paul Mann, "Korea Watch," Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 140, no. 25, 20 June 1994, p. 19; "Puk, Sae Missile Shilhŏmumjigim/Ilchibodo/Mi Chŏngch'alwisŏngi Palkyŏn Ile T'ongbo," Chosun Ilbo, 29 May 1994, <http://www.chosun.com/>.
The Japanese daily Yomiuri Shimbun, quoting Japanese military sources with knowledge of North Korea's movements acquired from US reconnaissance satellites, reports that trucks, launchers, and other vehicles assembling at the site suspected of being readied for an upcoming Nodong test-launch. Additionally, naval vessels are reportedly very active in North Korea's east coast ports, possibly to assist in determining the impact point of a tested missile. The sources indicate that North Korea may be planning the test to take advantage of the "warm seasonal weather conditions in the East Sea," not out of "any political intention of influencing nuclear negotiations."
—Yonhap News Agency, 28 May 1994, in "DPRK's Possible Missile Launching Reported," FBIS-EAS-94-104, 31 May 1994, p. 47.
According to US and Japanese intelligence sources, North Korea test-fires a new anti-ship missile (ASM) from Wŏnsan Harbor on North Korea's east coast. The missile has been modified to extend its range from about 85km to 160km and is launched at a barge in the Sea of Japan, but it misses the target. One Pentagon official states that North Korea is believed to have been developing the missile over the last 18 months and that it is a low-flying subsonic cruise missile, which appears to be a derivative of Chinese and Russian systems. Japan Defense Agency and Foreign Ministry officials indicate that the missile is an upgraded Silkworm (HY-2) missile. Makoto Momoi, former head of the Japan Defense Agency's Defense Research Institute, states, "Since the test-firing was conducted in the open sea with proper warnings, I see a clear political motive with the things going on in New York."
—Michael R. Gordon, "North Korea Tests Cruise Missile Designed to Sink Ships," New York Times, 1 June 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Ian Brodie and James Bone, "Sanctions Threat to North Korea Grows," The Times, 2 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kevin Rafferty, "N. Korea Tests Missile and West's Nerve," The Guardian (London), 2 June 1994, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "Sanctions Strategy Plotted With Japan, South Korea," Associated Press, 3 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Steve Komaraw, Bill Nichols and Judy Keen, "N. Korea's Actions Draw U.S. Concern," USA Today, 1 June 1994, p. 4A, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Test-Fires Silkworm Missile, Daily Yomiuri, 2 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Pu Chi Yŏng, "Puk Silkworm Missile/Tonghaesŏ Palsa Shilhŏm," Chosun Ilbo, 2 June 1994, <http://www.chosun.com/>; "Puk Silworm Missile Tonghaesŏ Palsashilhŏm/Mi Kukpangbu, Kangnyŏngmeshijiyong Punsŏkto," Joongang Ilbo, 1 June 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Syria conducts a second flight test of the Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 18-19.
North Korea delivers either Nodong components or a small number of complete missiles to Iran.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 25.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin informs South Korean President Kim Young Sam that Russia no longer feels bound by the 1961 treaty in which the Soviet Union pledged to defend North Korea in case of hostilities.
—Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Shops for Nuke Technology in Russia," Washington Times, 5 July 1994, pp. A1, A8.
Sergei Stepashin, chief of the Russian counter-intelligence service, reveals that three North Korean nationals have been detained in Primorskoye territory, which is near the Russia-North Korea border, on suspicion of attempting to acquire nuclear weapons components.
—Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Shops for Nuke Technology in Russia," Washington Times, 5 July 1994, pp. A1, A8; "Puk, Rŏ Haekkisul Milsuip Kido/Missile P'oham 3 Kŏn Taesagwan Chikwŏn 3 Myŏng Ch'epo," Chosun Ilbo, 6 July 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
A US government official states, "The North Koreans have a reputation for exporting every weapon they've ever produced. If the North Koreans put a missile with a nuclear warhead on the world market, that's the ultimate nightmare scenario." US officials say that Iranian officials have been present for recent missile tests, including the test of an anti-ship cruise missile. The tests are said to be "sales demonstrations" for the Iranian observers."
—Bill Gertz, "N. Korea as Nuclear Exporter?" Washington Times, 8 June 1994, pp. A1, A9.
Robert D. Walpole, deputy director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, states, "North Korea is the world's largest proliferator of ballistic missiles." According to Walpole, North Korea may sell the Nodong missile, which has a range of about 600 miles, to Iran and possibly to Libya.
—Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Hopes to Break a Pattern," Washington Post, 14 June 1994, p. A1.
Modifications are currently underway at the Taepo-dong (Musudan-ri) rocket test stand facility in North Korea. These modifications are believed to be preparations for a static test of the Taepodong-2 first stage engine. There are several vehicles at the site, and it is anticipated that "new auxiliary tanks" will soon arrive there.
—Barbara Starr, "North Korea Missile R&D gains New Pace," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 June 1994, p. 10.
US intelligence sources report that, due to inadequate indigenous test facilities, North Korea might test-fire the Nodong-1 missile in Iran within 6 to 12 months. One analyst says, "Testing facilities don't exist for a full-range test in North Korea." The sources claim that Iran is interested in acquiring both the Nodong-1 and -2 missiles.
—Martin Sieff, "N. Korean Missiles May be Tested in Iran This Year; Pyongyang Seeks to Avoid Increasing International Criticism," Washington Times, 16 June 1994, p. A13.
According to Japanese intelligence, Choch'ongnyŏn, the 250,000-member General Association of Korean Residents in Japan covertly purchases equipment for North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. If sanctions on North Korea resulting from the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula are imposed, Japan will be forced to "shut down the money and technology pipeline" between Choch'ongnyŏn and North Korea. But one Japanese government official admits that Choch'ongnyŏn could continue to send cash and cargo to North Korea via third countries.
—Edward W. Desmond and Hiroko Tashiro, "Kim Il Sung's Money Pipeline," Time, 13 June 1994, p. 27.
US analysts believe that North Korea may now be dependent upon imported ball bearings for military needs. Shortages of steel, coal, and electricity have affected production, and using lower quality commercial ball bearings could adversely affect the performance of armour, aircraft, and missiles.
—"Economics Could Undermine North Korean Capability," Jane's Defence Weekly 25 June 1994, p. 15.
Japan's Mainichi Shimbun reports that, according to a Japanese government source, North Korea will conduct a second flight test of the Nodong missile on 7 June 1994. The Japanese official claims that a US reconnaissance satellite has detected a fuel truck and a crane assembly for a missile launch in northeastern North Korea. However, no launch takes place.
—Lee Sok Ku, "Nodong 1 Ho To 7 Il Shilhŏm," Joongang Ilbo, 1 June 1994, <http://www.joins.com/>; "Puk, Ittan Missile Palsashilhŏm," Segye Ilbo, 2 June 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea test-fires a second upgraded version of the Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missile (ASM) over the Sea of Japan. A senior Pentagon official confirms the test. [Note: This test follows the first test that was conducted on 31 May 1994.]
—"Another N. Korean Missile Test Confirmed," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 3 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Japan Confirms Second N. Korean Missile Test," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Barry Schweid, "Sanctions Strategy Plotted With Japan, South Korea," Associated Press, 3 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Pukhan Silkworm Missile/1 Il'edo Shihŏmbalsa/CNN Pangsong Podo," Hankook Ilbo, 4 June 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "'Puk Nodong 1 Ho 10 Illae Palsa'/Il Pangwich'ŏng," Donga Ilbo, 4 June 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Puk, Silkworm Missile Ddo Palsashilhŏm," Chosun Ilbo, 4 June 1994, <http://www.chosun.com/>; "'Puk Nodong 1 Ho 10 Illae Palsa'/Il Pangwich'ŏng," Donga Ilbo, 4 June 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Han Ch'ang Ŏn, North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, confirms the test of an anti-ship missile (ASM) on 31 May 1994, and states, "This was just an exercise, a normal, usual exercise." [Note: There were two flight tests—one on 31 May and one on 2 June 1994.]
—"N. Korean Envoy Confirms Missile Tests," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; KBS-Radio (Seoul), 6 June 1994, in "North Korea's UN Envoy Confirms Missile Test," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Silkworm Missile Shilhŏm/Puk 'T'ongsanghullyŏn' Chujang," Chosun Ilbo, 7 June 1994, <http://www.chosun.com/>.
While talking to reporters at Kiev Airport after a visit to Ukraine, North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam states that his country will continue its missile testing and that North Korea has "the will and sufficient capability to defend itself from sanctions." He further states, "Missile launches occur in any country regularly. We don't understand why there is so much noise about it now."
—KBS Radio Network (Seoul), 9 June 1994, in "Foreign Minister Seeks Renewed Dialogue with USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "N. Korea Warns South of Devastation if War Starts," Reuters, 9 June 1994, in Executive News Service, 9 June 1994; "West Fears Devastation of New Korean War," Press Association, 9 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "'Puk Missile Shilhŏm Kyesok'/Kim Yŏng Nam Oegyobujang," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 10 June 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
In a report to the South Korean National Assembly, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Byŏng T'ae states that since early March 1994, North Korea has been preparing to test-fire a 1,000km-range ballistic missile. He says that the missile is the Taepodong (Paektusan-1), an upgraded version of the Soviet Scud missile. Rhee states, "The North is continuously developing strategic weapons."
—"Seoul Says N. Korea Preparing To Test New Missile," Reuters, 9 June 1994, in Executive News Service, 9 June 1994.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) quotes an unnamed North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as stating that North Korea would not supply arms, such as aircraft, tanks, and tactical missiles, to separatist forces in southern Yemen, as had been rumored. According to KCNA, the official dismisses the rumors as "utterly groundless" and claims that the rumors are meant to influence the nuclear situation in Korea by isolating North Korea in the international arena.
—"DPRK FM Spokesman Refutes Reports About 'Arms Deal Contract' With Southern Yemen," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 11 June 1994, in "Spokesman Denies Yemeni Arms Contract Report," FBIS-EAS-94-113, 13 June 1994, p. 20, "North Korea Denies Yemen Arms Deal," United Press International, 12 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Korean Central News Agency, 11 June 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denies Arms Deal Contract Report," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Japan's Defense Agency Director General Atsushi Kanda tells the Diet Budget Committee "it is impossible to defend against the Nodong-1 once it reaches operational status. We believe it necessary to have a large-scale defense system such as the TMD [theater missile defense]."
—"Japan to Join US Missile Shield," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 June 1994, p.10; "Kanda Says Defenses Inadequate to Ward Off N. Korean Attack," Daily Yomiuri, 15 June 1994, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Lee Dong Kwan, "Puk Missile Kaebaltaeŭng/Il 'Pangwimang' Chŏkkŭk Ch'am'yŏ/Pangwich'ŏngjanggwan Palghyŏ" Donga Ilbo, 15 June 1994, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
A US intelligence satellite detects a North Korean engine test for the Taepodong-1 [Paektusan-1] and Taepodong-2 missiles at the Taepo-dong [Musudan-ri] missile testing facility.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 295; Yu Yong Wŏn, "Puk Taepodong 1-2 Ho Punsashihŏm/6 Wŏl Chungsun," Chosun Ilbo, 1 July 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau tells the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, "North Korea has in the past delivered Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs, primarily to Iran and Syria. We're concerned about press reports and other intelligence that they might, at some point, sell the Nodong missile—with a much longer range than the Scud-B and -C."
—Martin Sieff, "N. Korean Missiles May Be Tested in Iran This Year; Pyongyang Seeks to Avoid Increasing International Criticism," Washington Times, 16 June 1994, p. A13.
Joseph Bermudez, an analyst of North Korean military and intelligence affairs, states that US intelligence expects a test-firing of the Nodong-1 missile "any day now."
—"North Korea OKs Nuclear Freeze for Talks," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 23 June 1994, p. 1A, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Missile Shihŏmbalsa/Puk Kot Chaegaehalchido," Joongang Ilbo, 17 June 1994, P. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
The Washington Times, citing US intelligence sources, reports that North Korea may test its Nodong-1 ballistic missile in Iran within the next 6 to 12 months.
—Martin Sieff, "N. Korean Missiles May Be Tested in Iran This Year; Pyongyang Seeks to Avoid Increasing International Criticism," Washington Times, 16 June 1994, p. A13; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Puk, Iran'sŏ Rodong 1 Ho Shihŏm Kanŭngsŏng/Mi Washington Times Podo," Chosun Ilbo, 17 June 1994, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Shin Sang In, "Puk, Shinhyŏng Nodong 1 Ho Shilhŏmgyehoek/Bba'rŭmyŏn 6 Kaewŏlhu Iran'sŏ Shilshi," Segye Ilbo, 17 June 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
A 1994 posture statement prepared for Rear Admiral Edward Shaefer, director of US naval intelligence, says that the Nodong missile will likely be equipped with a nuclear warhead by the year 2000, although this may be achieved as early as 1995.
—Barbara Starr, "No Dongs May Soon Be Nuclear, Warns USN," Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 June 1994, p. 1.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin states that North Korea has delivered Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Syria, as well as the means to produce them. According to Rabin, the Syrian missile arsenal poses a much greater threat to Israel than the Iraqi missile attacks during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, and could potentially make Israel's Gulf War experience seem like "a children's game."
—Moshe Zak, "Just a Slip of the Tongue," Jerusalem Post, 27 June 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Clyde Haberman, "Peace Pact With Syria Needed to Prevent War, Says Rabin," New York Times, 25 June 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Interesting Proposal' Made to Syria – Peres," Mideast Mirror, vol. 8, no. 119, 23 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Karin Laub, "Rabin: Arab World Still Poses a Military Threat to Israel," Associated Press, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; "'Pukhan Scud Kisulto Syria'e Such'ul'/Rabin Israel Ch'ongni," Chosun Ilbo, 24 June 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
According to the Moscow-based Komsomolskaya Pravda, "... some of our scientists no longer need to risk and negotiate border checkpoints in order to work on the North Korean nuclear program. They sit at home and send their calculations to Pyongyang by computer mail, which it is not yet possible to monitor."
—Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Shops for Nuke Technology in Russia," Washington Times, 5 July 1994, pp. A1, A8.
Kim Il Sung dies of heart failure at the age of 82. Kim's death comes during a period of bilateral negotiations with the United States to freeze the North Korean nuclear program, and shortly before a summit meeting with South Korean President Kim Young Sam that was scheduled to begin on 25 July 1994. His son Kim Jong Il later succeeds him as leader of North Korea.
—James Sterngold, "Death Adds a Dangerous Uncertainty to the Warming With U.S.," New York Times, 9 July 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Kim Il Sung, N. Korea's Longtime Leader, Dies," Los Angeles Times, 9 July 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Kim Il Sŏng Chusŏk Samang/Ŏje Saebyŏk Kapchagi/Pukhant'ŭkpyŏlbangsong," Kukmin Ilbo, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Hŏ Nam Chin, "Kim Il Sŏng Samang/Nambukchŏngsanghwoedam Musan/P'yŏngyangbangsong 'Ŏje Saebyŏk Shimgŭn'gyŏngsaeg'ŭro'," Joongang Ilbo, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Dr. Taeho Kim, "Kim Jong-il—North Korea's New Leader," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1994, pp. 421-424.
North Korean defector Kang Myŏng Do claims that North Korea has five nuclear weapons and plans to build an additional five weapons. Kang said that North Korea was using the negotiations to stall while it built missiles to deliver the weapons. Kang, who is allegedly the son-in-law of North Korea's Premier Kang Sŏng San, indicated that he had acquired his information from a "senior official at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex." Kang says he met the official at the wedding of the official's son and that the official revealed the information after they had been drinking alcohol. Kang also says that North Kroea will announce that it has nuclear weapons after it produces about 10 bombs. This announcement comes only one week before North Korea is scheduled to meet with US officials in Geneva to discuss the North Korean nuclear program. [Note: Kang's credibility is very suspect.]
—James Sterngold, "Defector Says North Korea Has 5 A-Bombs and May Make More," New York Times, 28 July 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Terry McCarthy, "Defector Reports N. Korea Has Five Nuclear Bombs," Independent (London), 28 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Park Ch'an Ku, "Kwisun kang Myŏng Do-Cho Myŏng Ch'ŏl Ssi Kijahoe'gyŏn Ilmun'iltap," Taehan Maeil, 28 July 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Kim Hyŏng Ki, a spokesman for South Korea's Ministry of Unification, states that the claims of North Korean defector Kang Myŏng Do have "not been supported by solid proof." Kang claimed that North Korea has five nuclear bombs and plans to build five more.
—Zeno Park, "S. Korean Intelligence Agency Under Fire for Defector's Five-Bomb Claim," Agence France Presse, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Associated Press, "Defector's 'Secrets' Downplayed; Seoul Says Claims N. Korea Has 5 A-Bombs Unproven," Phoenix Gazette, 29 July 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; John Burton, "Seoul Doubts N-Bomb Claim," Financial Times (London), 29 July 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "No Proof That Pyongyang Has Nuclear Weapons, Seoul Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "IAEA Dismisses Defector's North Korea Nuclear Arsenal Claim," Agence France Presse, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korea has an exercise in the deployment of indigenously modified transporter erector launchers (TELs) for the Nodong. The TELs have been modified from Scud-B/C TELs by extending the length of the body and axle. Military reconnaissance satellites detect the Nodong TELs in March 1997. Later in 1997, seven Nodong missiles with TELs are discovered deployed about 100km north of Pyongyang.
—Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chonjaeng (Seoul: Somundang, May 1999), pp. 288-289.
Egypt's Al-Ahram newspaper quotes an Israeli radio broadcast as saying that North Korea has reached an agreement with Iran for the sale of Nodong-1 missiles. The report says that the United States provided this information to Israel, but the number of missiles is not revealed.
—"Rodong 1 Ho P'anmae/Puk, Iran'gwa Hap'ŭi," Chosun Ilbo, 5 August 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
Xiandai Bingqi (Modern Arms), a monthly journal published by the China Arms Industry No. 210 Research Institute (Zhongguo Bingqi Gongye Di 210 Yanjiusuo), reports that the Nodong-1 is more accurate than Soviet Scuds, and that the Nodong is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead or VX nerve agent. The article also reports the Nodong that was flight tested in May 1993 only flew 500km because North Korea wanted to conceal its true range, which Xiandai Bingqi estimates to be 800-1,000km.
—"'Nodong 1 Ho Haekt'an Chokchae'/Chungguk Kunsajŏnmunji," Chosun Ilbo, 12 August 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
A North Korean delegation, led by chairman of the North Korean State Commission of Science and Technology, travels to Pakistan.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.
Former President Jimmy Carter receives a letter from Kim Jong Il thanking Carter for visiting Kim Il Sung, and giving his word that he will carry out all the promises his father had made.
—KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 10 August 2001, in "ROK's KBS-1 TV Interviews Former US President Carter on Korean Issues," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010811000003.
Joseph Bermudez, during a seminar at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs at the Korea National Defense University, says that North Korea will be able to deploy the Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) in 1996, and the Taepodong-2 in 2000. He also says that North Korea will be able to deploy the Nodong-1 in 1995, and says that US intelligence claims they can be armed with nuclear warheads by 2000.
—Yu Yong Wŏn, "Puk Taepodong 1 Ho 96 Nyŏn Shilchŏn Paech'i/Yŏng Kunsa Chŏnmun'ga," Chosun Ilbo, 2 September 1994, <http://www.chosun.com>.
Japanese Defense Minister Tamazawa Tokuichiro tells Japan's Diet that the Japan Defense Agency is interested in having reconnaissance satellites for obtaining defense information.
—Pae In Chun, "Il 'Chŏngch'alwisŏng Toip Kŏmt'o'/Pang'wichŏngjanggwan Palghyŏ," Donga Ilbo, 3 September 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
A US federal immigration judge orders the deportation of Dr. Lee Jong Hun from the United States. Lee, an aerospace scientist and Canadian citizen, had worked at the Johnson Space Center in Houston for a NASA contractor from 1990 to 1992. Lee had previously worked at the NASA/Ames Research Center in Mountain View, California during the 1980s. The ruling was based upon the fact that Lee, a specialist in aerothermodynamics, had contact with scientists who were members of Choch'ongnyŏn in Japan, and that Lee has a younger brother living in North Korea. Lee visited North Korea about 15 years ago to attend his brother's wedding. Lee claims his last contact with the group of Choch'ongnyŏn scientists was in 1980, and that all the information he shared with them was in the public domain. The judge's ruling was also based upon secret FBI information, but no concrete evidence of espionage activities was presented in court.
—Jeff Urban, "Judge Orders Suspected N. Korean Agent Deported," Houston Chronicle, 24 September 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
The National Unification Board submits a report to the National Assembly on North Korea's security threat. According to the report, North Korea is able to produce about 100-150 Scud-C missiles a year and has been able to do so since 1987. The missiles are said to have a range of 500km. Pyongyang conducted a successful flight test of the Nodong-1 in 1993 and is currently developing the Nodong-2 (range of 1,500-2,000km), the Taepodong-1 (range of 2,000km), and the Taepodong-2 (range of 3,500km). North Korea is also developing chemical and biological weapons and reportedly has about 1,000 tons of them. There are eight chemical weapons production plants, six storage facilities, and three biological research institutes in North Korea. Pyongyang reportedly began to invest in chemical and biological weapon infrastructure in the early 1960s, and is said to have been conducting experiments on political prisoners.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 26 September 1994, in "Seoul Reports Pyongyang's Scud Missile, Chemical Weapons Production," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Park Che Kyun, "Puk Haekchaeraemugi Tongshigaebal/T'ong'ilwŏn Kukkamjaryo," Donga Ilbo, 27 September 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Puk 'Scud C' Nyŏnbaek 50 Ki Saengsannŭngnyŏk/Saenghwahangmugi Ch'ŏn t...Saengch'eshilhŏm Shilshi," Donga Ilbo, 27 September 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "'Puk'e Saenghwahangmugi Ch'ŏn Ton/Chŏngch'ibŏm'e Saengch'eshilhŏmkkaji'/3 Dan'gyejŏnjaengjunbi Kuch'uk," Hankook Ilbo, 27 September 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Ku Sŏng Chae, "Puk Hwasaengjŏllyŏk Segye 3 Wi/'Scud' Yŏn Paek 50 Ki Saengsan/T'ong'ilwŏn Kukkamjaryo," Chosun Ilbo, 27 September 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
In response to the South Korean National Unification Board's report of 26 September 1994, the Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang denies that North Korea has been increasing the range of its missiles and exporting them to the Middle East. The news agency also calls the allegations of North Korea producing chemical and biological weapons, and conducting experiments on prisoners, "sheer fabrications."
—North Korean Central News Agency [sic], 1 October 1994, in "KCNA Denies Pyongyang Producing Missiles, Chemical-Biological Weapons," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
A reconnaissance satellite captures three Nodong-class missiles being assembled at an assembly site 25 miles north ofIran. According to an unidentified US official, the Iranian Nodong program with North Korea was halted in 1994 due to financial problems. This suspension was only temporary, and preparations for full-scale production and deployment of the Nodong continue.
—"U.S., Israel, Clash over 'Dual Containment'," Iran Brief, 5 December 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
The South Korean Defense Ministry releases its Defense White Paper 1994-1995. The report says North Korea is capable of producing 100-150 Scud missiles a year, and that North Korea has exported missiles to Iran. According to the ministry, North Korea has successfully developed and test-launched the Nodong-1 with a range of 1,000km, and is developing the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2.
—The Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1994-1995 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1994), p. 71; Robert Karniol, "ROK Assesses North's Nuclear Capabilities," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 October 1994, p. 6.
In testimony before the South Korean National Assembly, General Kim Dong Chin, chief of the South Korean Army General Staff, says that North Korea has moved a Scud missile brigade with 27 missiles towards the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Kim also says that North Korea has about 1,000 tons of chemical weapons.
—Im Ŭn Sun, Chang Hwa Kyŏng and Yang Kwŏn Mo, "Puk 20 Kae Kundan/Shilchŏnhyŏng Paech'i/Scud 27 Ki Chŏnbang Ch'ugabaech'ido," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 5 October 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
In testimony before the US Senate, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau says that in recent high-level talks with North Korea, the United States has requested that North Korea stop its missile exports. Pelletreau also says that North Korea has been providing technology and exporting Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran and Syria. [Note: High-level bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue began on 8 July 1994, but the talks were postponed only hours later after the delegations received the news of Kim Il Sung's death. The talks resumed on 5 August 1994.]
—Chin Ch'ang Uk, "Missile Tae'oepanmae/Mi, Puk'e Chungjich'okku/Kowigŭp Hoedamsŏ," Joongang Ilbo, 5 October 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee Kyŏng Hyŏng, "Pukhanje Scud Chungdongsuch'ul Chedong/Mijung Missile Kŭmsuhyŏpchŏng'ŭi Taebuk Yŏnghyang," Taehan Maeil, 6 October 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
The United States and North Korea sign the Agreed Framework in Geneva. According to Flight International, which cites a "senior US DIA official, the agreement includes a secret clause that suspends the delivery of 150 North Korean Nodong missiles to Iran.
—"Iranian Missile Deal with N. Korea Falters," Flight International, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korea delivers Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C) cluster warheads to Syria. Syria conducts another test firing of the Hwasŏng-6, but with a conventional warhead.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 19.
Joseph Nye, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, tells Jane's Defence Weekly that the United States will begin discussing with North Korea limitations on its Nodong and Taepodong (Paektusan-1) ballistic missile programs.
—Barbara Starr, "The Jane's Interview," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 December 1994, p. 32.
Zaire concludes a $100 million deal for the delivery of 18 Scud-C missiles from North Korea. The terms of the deal reportedly call for North Korea to deliver the missiles within the next 12 months. Half of the price appears to have been paid, but analysts believe the missile are probably actually destined for a third country.
—Le Point (Paris), 28 January 1995, p. 19, in "More on Reported Sale of Missiles to Zaire," FBIS-EAS-95-025, 7 February 1995, pp. 21-22.
Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Gur says that North Korea and Iran may be jointly producing "long-range" missiles that could strike Israel. Gur also says, "We know the Iranians are in contact with North Korea to purchase and produce together a missile that can reach the range of 1,300km, maybe a little farther." [Note: Gur is referring to the Nodong or, as it is known in Iran, the Shehab-3.]
—"Gur: Iran May Be Making Long-Range Missiles," Jerusalem Post, 8 December 1994, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Iran Denies Missile Cooperation With North Korea," Reuters, 19 February 1995, in Executive News Service, 20 February 1995.
News reports quote Robert Gallucci as saying that the United States would refuse to establish full diplomatic relations with North Korea until the latter stops exporting ballistic missiles and pulls its troops back from the border with South Korea.
—Richard Larma, "News; World Briefings," Chicago Sun-Times, 13 December 1994, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says that North Korea has equipped Iran and Syria with 500km-range Scud-C missiles and that North Korea, with Iranian financing, was developing the 1,300km-range Nodong missile.
—David Makovsky and news agencies, "Rabin: Iran Helping N. Korea Develop Long-Range Missile," Jerusalem Post, 16 December 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Michael Sheridan, "Israel and Syria Move Closer to Peace Deal," Independent (London), 16 December 1994, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Associated Press, "Rabin: Earlier Talks With N. Korea over Missiles Were 'Major Mistake'," Jerusalem Post, 18 December 1994, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Iran Helping North Korea Develop Surface Missile With 1,300km Reach—Rabin," Mideast Mirror, vol. 8, no. 243, 15 December 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says it was a mistake to hold talks with North Korea in Beijing last year in an effort to persuade North Korea to stop missile exports to the Middle East. He says that instead of trying to solve the problem, "North Korea tried to fool Israel. Rabin reveals that North Korea demanded $1 billion to stop the sales, and he claims that Iran has provided North Korea with hundreds of millions of dollars to produce missiles with longer ranges. [Note: The talks were held in June 1993.]
—"Rabin: Earlier Talks with N. Korea over Missiles Were 'Major Mistake'," Jerusalem Post, 18 December 1994, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korea delivers at least four Hwasŏng-6 transporter erector launchers (TELs) to Iran. The TELs may have been delivered by air, and there may have been a Nodong mobile erector launcher (MEL) with the shipment.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 18, 25; Tony Capaccio, "North Korea Has Transferred Mobile Scud Launchers To Iran," Defense Week, 1 May 1995, pp. 1, 14; Barbara Starr, "Iran Gets 'Scud' TELs from North Korea," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995, p. 5; Paul Mann, editor, "CIA Disclosures," Aviation Week and Space Technology," vol. 142, no. 19, 8 May 1995, p. 19, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
