This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
Iran takes delivery of an unspecified number of Scud-C missiles and launchers as part of a deal with North Korea. According to the report, this shipment is in addition to about 250 Scud-B missiles that North Korea supplied to Iran before the Gulf War. [Note: The delivery in question may have been from the ship reported in late October 1992. The name of the ship was not provided in the report.]
—Jerusalem Israel Television Network, 9 February 1993, in "North Korean Scud-C Missiles Delivered," JPRS-TND-93-006, 5 March 1993, pp. 13-14.
Russia withdraws six nuclear experts from North Korea.
—Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), 20 September 1993, p. 1, in "Russia Withdraws Six Nuclear Experts from DPRK," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38; Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), 22 September 1993, p. 2, in "Russia Says DPRK 'Incapable' of Developing Nuclear Weapons," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38-39; "Pukhanp'a'gyŏn Haekhakcha/Russia Ch'ŏlsujoch'i," Joongang Ilbo, 20 September 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "'Pukhan Myŏtnyŏnnae Haekkaebalmothae'/Russia Wŏnjaryŏkpu/Uri Taesagwan'e T'ongbo," Joongang Ilbo, 22 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
A Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service report on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction states that North Korea is seeking specialists from overseas "in order to convert missile manufacturing into a competitive export sector." North Korea is using Egyptian technology to upgrade its Scud missiles for export to the Middle East. [Note: Egypt has a variety of technologies that might interest North Korea, including carbon-carbon, advanced gyroscopes, and solid-fuel. This may also refer to a leakage of UK technology obtained in the BAe/AOI joint development project.]
— Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (Moscow), 1993, in "A New Challenge After the Cold War: Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," JPRS-TND-93-007, 5 March 1993, pp. 1-39.
North Korea deploys up to 18 Nodong missiles.
—Yi Sang Won, Hankook Ilbo (Seoul), 28 January 1994, p. 5, in "Press Overview of Deployment," JPRS-TND-94-005, 25 February 1994, p. 42; Lee Sang Wŏn, "Patriot Nodong 1 Ho Kyŏkch'u Kanŭnghalkka," Hankook Ilbo, 28 January 1994, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Syria begins to manufacture North Korean Scud-C [Hwasŏng-6] missiles.
—Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999, in "Mideast Missile Race Detailed," FBIS Document ID FTS19990903000290.
North Korea's Nodong missiles are probably deployed or become operational. Small-scale production had begun by January 1991.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 22.
The group of scientists that was detained in October 1992 when they tried to go to North Korea has returned to Miass after being held for two months at a rest house near Moscow.
—Evgeniy Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 February 1993, in "Defense Workers Tried To Go to DPRK," JPRS-TND-93-005, 12 February 1993, pp. 14-15; Evgeniy Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 February 1993, in "DPRK Reportedly Sought Russian Scientists To Modernize Missiles," FBIS-SOV-92-026, 10 February 1993, pp. 11-12.
Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezai travels to Pyongyang from Beijing to finalize new agreements regarding weapon systems, including ballistic missiles. Shortly before Rezai's departure from Iran, a member of the Iranian parliament reveals that North Korea has demanded a cash payment of $2.4 to $2.7 billion for the 200 to 300 Scud-B missiles delivered to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. [Note: The number of missiles mentioned may be excessive, given North Korean production capabilities and the level of Iranian Scud-B use during the two "Wars of the Cities." During that stage of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran fired approximately 91 Scud-B missiles. It is unlikely that North Korea would demand a cash payment given the financial arrangements already in place with Iran, and the price of about $10 million seems excessive.]
—Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran Seeks Missiles from China, North Korea," Mednews, vol. 6, no. 8, 25 January 1993, pp. 3-4.
The German weekly Focus reports that North Korea is helping Iran develop nuclear missiles and that Iran has two 40-kiloton nuclear warheads. The report also claims that a German firm supplied guidance equipment to Iran.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 26 January 1993, in "German Weekly Says DPRK Helping Iran Develop Nuclear Weapons," BBC Summary of Broadcasts, 29 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korea gives assurances to visiting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze that it will not employ Russian missile and nuclear scientists and engineers. The North Korean decision follows threats by Kunadze to suspend diplomatic relations if demands not to employ Russian technicians were not met. According to reports, Russia gives the United States a detailed report about Kunadze's trip.
—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Urged Not to Hire Russian Nuclear Scientists," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
CIA Director James Woolsey, in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, states, "North Korea apparently has no threshold governing its sales [of missiles]; it is willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay."
—"North Korea Seen Successful in Test of Nodong-1 Missile," Aerospace Daily, 29 June 1993, pp. 538-539.
Russian scientists who were thwarted in their attempt to travel to North Korea in late 1992 to assist with weapons-development efforts tell ITAR-TASS they "had not intend to create modern strategic armaments in North Korea and were to train local personnel for designing such armaments."
—Evgeni Tkachenko, "Best Russian Missile Designers Wanted to Make Money in North Korea," ITAR-TASS, 24 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Yuriy Bessarabov, a leading expert from the Russian firm Unique Defense Enterprise, says that low wages were responsible for the attempt by 60 scientists from the machine design bureau in Miass (Makayev Design Bureau), Chelyabinsk region, to fly to North Korea to train personnel for strategic arms development programs. Most of the scientists were strategic missile experts, which may indicate that North Korea is seeking assistance in designing a warhead and delivery system for a nuclear device. Larry Niksch, a Congressional Research Service Asian specialist, says that it is possible that North Korea has developed a nuclear bomb but does not yet have a warhead.
—Michael Breen, "North Korea's Nuclear Denials Set Stage for Challenge," Washington Times, 19 February 1993, pp. A1, A6; Evgeniy Tkachenko, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 24 February 1993, in "Missile Designers Explain Attempt to Work in DPRK," FBIS-SOV-93-035, 24 February 1993, pp. 11-12.
North Korea sends a message to the IAEA that it is unable to accept special nuclear inspections because of the Team Spirit joint military exercise conducted by the United States and South Korea.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 11 March 1993, in "Refuses IAEA Inspections," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, p. 17.
Following the 7th session of the 9th Central People's Committee in Pyongyang, North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). North Korea says the decision is made because of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to conduct a special inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities, and because of the resumption of the joint Team Spirit military exercise conducted by the United States and South Korea. The NPT stipulates that a nation's withdrawal becomes effective 90 days after the intention to withdraw is announced.
—"International News Briefs," IAEA Bulletin, February 1993, pp. 44-45; "North Korea More Isolationist," Daily Yomiuri, 13 March 1993, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 12 March 1993, in "CPC Decision Reported," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 17-18; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 12 March 1993, in "Statement Notes Withdrawal," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 18-19; Korean Central News Agency, 12 March 1993, in "KCNA Reports Statement," FBIS-EAS-93-047, pp. 19-20; Korean Central News Agency, 12 March 1993, in "News Conference on Withdrawal," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 20-22.
German intelligence sources are quoted as saying that North Korea has clandestinely ordered a special metal in Berlin to be used in the manufacture of "ramps" for missile launchers. The metal is a controlled item under Germany's export control laws.
—"Puk, Missile Pupum Milsuip/Berlin Sŏ/Tŏk-Mi-Rŏ Chŏngbogi'gwan Kukpijosa," Chosun Ilbo, 23 March 1993, <http://www.chosun.com>.
A 21-member Iranian delegation, headed by Brigadier General Hossein Mantequei, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in charge of the Iranian SSM force, and officials from the Iranian Defense Industries Organization and the missile division of the IRGC, visits Pyongyang in the fifth such visit in the past year. The delegation is to observe the final tests of the Nodong-1 missile and to be trained in its use. According to the People's Mujahedeen of Iran, some of the delegation will stay in North Korea for at least one month. The delegation's presence indicates that a final deal, which may include the purchase of fixed and mobile launchers, could be imminent. The delegation may also have established a timetable for the testing of Nodong-2 in Iran. US officials believe that Iranian oil may be exchanged for the missiles; Iran supplies approximately 40% of North Korea's oil needs. According to the Chosun Ilbo, the Iranian delegation is seeking to purchase 150 Nodong missiles.
—Douglas Jehl, "Iran Is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kevin Rafferty, "Iran and N. Korea 'To Test Missile'," Guardian (London), 26 October 1993, p. 20; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 24-25; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Puk Missile Nodong 1 Ho/Sajŏng 1 Ch'ŏn km Tongpug'aanbo 'Bisang'," Chosun Ilbo, 10 April 1993, p. 4 in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea completes development of the Nodong-1 missile.
—Yonhap News Agency, 16 July 1993, in "U.S. Report on DPRK-Iran Missile Deal Cited," FBIS-EAS-93-138, 21 July 1993, p. 33.
Foreign diplomats in Beijing claim that North Korea is nearing final testing of a 1,000km-range [Nodong-1] missile. According to the sources, North Korea could begin serial production of the missiles by the end of the year.
—Vladimir Skosyrev, "DPRK Intends to Supply Iran with Intermediate-Range Missiles," Izvestiya (Moscow), 10 April 1993, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-93-069 "DPRK Develops New Surface-to-Surface Missile," 13 April 1993, p. 6.
During a defense industry conference in Seoul, Shin Sŏng T'aek, a researcher at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, says that North Korea is at the stage of developing a nuclear warhead for its ballistic missiles. Shin says that North Korea will not conduct a full-scale nuclear test, but that North Korea has already conducted secret nuclear-related tests underground.
—"'Puk, Haekt'an Missile Changch'ak Chikchŏn'/Kukpangyŏn Shin Sŏng T'aek Paksa," Segye Ilbo, 3 April 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea denies reports that it is exporting to the Middle East missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads, and dismisses the reports as a US propaganda plot.
—Korean Central News Agency, 3 April 1993, in "KCNA Denies North Shipping Missiles to Mideast," FBIS-EAS-93-063, 5 April 1993, p. 4.
China's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Wu Jianmin, states that US threats of instigating UN economic sanctions against North Korea for missile proliferation will only serve to complicate the situation.
—Vladimir Skosyrev, "DPRK Intends to Supply Iran with Intermediate-Range Missiles," Izvestiya (Moscow), 10 April 1993, p. 3, in "DPRK Develops New Surface-to-Surface Missile," FBIS-SOV-93-069, 13 April 1993, p. 6.
A US official suggests that the March 1993 Iranian delegation to North Korea may have explored the possibility of assembling the Nodong-1 in Iran from components produced in North Korea in order to more easily conceal the delivery of the missiles. US officials say Iran hopes to acquire up to 150 Nodong-1 missiles, and that deliveries could begin by the end of the year. The delegation is said to still be in North Korea.
—Douglas Jehl, "Iran Is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Rupert Cornwell, "Iran 'Seeks Missile Deal' with N Korea," The Independent (London), 9 April 1993, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Missile Mission," The Times (London), 9 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
A US State Department spokesman says the United States is attempting to use diplomatic efforts to halt the North Korean sale of 1,000km-range [Nodong] ballistic missiles to Iran. An Iranian military delegation is reportedly in North Korea to negotiate a contract to acquire up to 150 Nodong missiles from North Korea. [Note: The sale is reportedly cancelled as part of a secret side agreement to the US-North Korea Agreed Framework that is signed in October 1994.]
—Rupert Cornwell, "Iran 'Seeks Missile Deal' with N. Korea," The Independent (London), 9 April 1993, p. 13, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Lee Kyŏng Hyŏng, "Pukhan Chunggŏri Missile Yangsan Imbak/NYT Podo," Taehan Maeil, 10 April 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kim Ch'a Ung and Nam Ch'an Sun, "Puk Missile Iran P'anmae/Misŏ Chŏkkŭk Chŏji," Donga Ilbo, 10 April 1993, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; O Sŭng Ho, "Nodong 1 Ho/Hwahakhaekt'andu Changch'ak/Pukhan Missile Ŏ'nŭ'sujun'in'ga," Taehan Maeil, 10 April 1993, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Puk Missile Nodong 1 Ho/Sajŏng 1 Ch'ŏn km Tongpug'aanbo 'Bisang,'" Chosun Ilbo, 10 April 1993, p. 4 in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Lloyd's List International reports that North Korea and Iran are close to a deal for the exchange of intermediate-range missiles for oil. The report quotes US officials as saying that "North Korea may be hoping that the oil shipments will continue even if the UN imposes an embargo on the Asian country for refusing to let inspectors see its nuclear facilities." Iran reportedly supplies about 40% of North Korea's oil.
—"Iran May Swap Oil for North Korea Missiles," Lloyd's List, 9 April 1993, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Izvestia, citing Foreign Ministry officials in Beijing, reports that North Korea's development of a 1,000km-range ballistic missile is imminent, and that North Korea will probably begin mass production of the missile by the end of the year. According to military specialists, the missile will be capable of carrying of carrying chemical and nuclear warheads. There are other reports that an Iranian military delegation is currently in North Korea to negotiate the sale of 150 of the missiles. [Note: The missile is the so-called Nodong-1, which is tested in late May 1993. According to Flight International, the deal to sell up to 150 Nodong missiles to Iran is called off as part of a secret side-agreement with the United States when North Korea signs the Agreed Framework in October 1994.]
—Vladimir Skosyrev, Izvestia, p. 3, in "North Korea to Sell Intermediate-Range Missiles to Iran," Russian Press Digest, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Iranian Missile Deal with N. Korea Falters," Flight International, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korea denies allegation made by Western news sourced that it intends to export medium-range missiles to Iran.
—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 17 April 1993, in "Pyongyang Denies Exporting Missiles to Iran," FBIS-EAS-93-073, 19 April 1993, p. 21.
North Korea denies allegations by Western intelligence that North Korea and Iran are engaged in a cooperative effort to develop a ballistic missile system capable of striking Japan with nuclear and chemical warheads. Iran is allegedly providing North Korea $500 million for missile development in exchange for an unknown number of nuclear bombs and plans for nuclear weapons reprocessing plants. [Note: While North Korea may be able to offer some assistance in the area of nuclear weapon development, it is doubtful that it is in a position to provide any working models.]
—Charles Fenyvesi, ed., "Washington Whispers," US News & World Report, 29 March 1993, p. 18; "Fear of N. Korea Fuels Arms Race," Washington Times, 19 April 1993, p. A2.
General Robert RisCassi, Commander, US Forces Korea, tells the US Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea is unstable politically and economically, and that North Korea could launch an invasion of South Korea. RisCassi says that North Korea considers its nuclear weapons program as the key to state survival, and that North Korea appears to be selling missiles, missile technology, and chemical and biological weapons to countries in the Middle East for oil and hard currency.
—Douglass Jehl, "U.S. Agrees to Discuss Arms Directly With North Korea," New York Times, 23 April 1993, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "U.S. Commander in S. Korea Sees Threat from N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kyŏng Hyŏng, "'Pukhan'gunbu'nŭn Kim Jong Il Mitchi Anhnŭnda'/RisCassi Saryŏnggwan Mi Sangwŏn Chŭng'ŏnyoji," Taehan Maeil, 23 April 1993, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The United States offers to hold high-level talks with North Korea to resolve the crisis caused by North Korea's announcement last month to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—Douglass Jehl, "U.S. Agrees to Discuss Arms Directly With North Korea," New York Times, 23 April 1993, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Kono Yohei, a "top Japanese government spokesman," says Japan does not see any evidence that North Korea is preparing a military attack against South Korea. The statement is in response to General Robert RisCassi's testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 April 1993.
—Kyodo News Service, "Japan Sees No Sign N. Korea Preparing to Invade South," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
According to anonymous analysts, Syrian production of North Korean Scud-C missiles at Aleppo and Hama begins. Some analysts believe that China also may have helped with the project.
—Robert S. Greenberger, "Washington Insight: North Korea's Missile Sales in Mideast, Along With Nuclear Issue, Raise Concern," Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1993, p. A10; "Pukhan, Syria Dŭng Chungdonggukka'e Missile Such'ul—WSJ Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 20 July 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>.
US intelligence discovers preparations for a missile test at Musudan-ri.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 21.
Negotiations between North Korea and Iran over the sale of up to 150 Nodong missiles reach "an advanced stage" before the flight-test of the Nodong in late May. However, a US Defense Intelligence Agency official claims the sale is scrapped as part of a secret side agreement when the United States and North Korea sign the Agreed Framework in October 1994.
—"Iranian Missile Deal with N Korea Falters," Flight International, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korea successfully launches four missiles from the Musudan-ri test facility in Hwadae-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province, two of which are thought to be Nodong-1 missiles. Later reports confirm that only one of the missiles was a Nodong. The missiles were reportedly fired in the direction of the Japanese Noto Peninsula at target buoys in the Sea of Japan. One missile traveled 500km; another traveled 100km; the remaining two fell short of 100km. Two North Korean naval vessels, a Najin-class frigate and a minesweeper, are positioned 30km apart about 350km off Noto, reportedly to monitor the launch. Israel's Mossad reportedly warned the United States and Japan of the test weeks in advance. Iranian and Pakistani observers are present for the tests.
—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 14 June 1993, in "DA: DPRK 'Appears' to Have Tested Missile," FBIS-EAS-93-112, 14 June 1993, p. 5; David E. Sanger, "Missile Is Tested by North Koreans," New York Times, 13 June 1993, p. 7; Kim Yong Kol, Hankook Ilbo, 16 June 1993, p. 4, in "Israel Makes Gesture to North Korea for Improvement of Relations," FBIS-EAS-93-114, "Possible Israeli Aid to DPRK Viewed," 16 June 1993, p. 20; "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 24 June 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; "North Korea Seen Successful in Test of Nodong-1 Missile," Aerospace Daily, 29 June 1993, pp. 538-539; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 203; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 17, 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, pp. 186-189; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 283-286, 291; Yu Yong Wŏn, "'Puk Changgŏrip'o Chŏnbang Chŭnggang'/Kukpangbu, Rodong 1 Ho Palsasŏnggong Ch'ŏt Kongshikhwag'in," Chosun Ilbo, 25 June 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander General Mohsen Rezai holds talks with North Korean defense chiefs in Pyongyang and urges closer ties between the two nations. [Note: This visit is most likely the same as that mentioned on 16 June 1993.]
—"Alarm Sounded Over Missile Plans Involving Tehran and North Korea," Mideast Mirror, vol. 7, no. 237, 7 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Japan's Sankei Shimbun quotes Itamar Rabinovitch, Israel's ambassador to the United States, as having said that North Korea's Nodong missile has a range of 1,300km and that North Korea is exporting the missile to Iran. Rabinovitch claims the Nodong can be modified to extend the range from 1,000km to 1,300km. [Note: This report does not explain how the range is extended. It does not say if it is simply from a reduction in the payload, or other modifications.]
—"Pukhan, Nodong 1 Ho Missile Sajŏnggŏri 1 Ch'ŏn 3 Paek KM Ro Yŏnjang," Joongang Ilbo, 8 June 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>.
North Korea announces the suspension of its decision to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The announcement follows five days of bilateral talks with the United States. [Note: According to North Korea, this decision does not return North Korea to International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards. North Korea characterizes its position as somewhere between full-member and non-member status. However, the IAEA considers North Korea subject to full safeguards.]
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korea Won't Quit Nuclear Ban Treaty, Inspection of Two Key Sites Still Rejected," Washington Post, 12 June 1993, p. A1.
North Korea denies negotiating with Israel to halt its missile exports for aid and denies ever having sold weapons or missiles to Arab nations in the Middle East. North Korea also denies sending any invitation to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in December 1992.
—"North Korea Denies Reported Arms for Aid Deal with Israel," Agence France Presse, 11 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; Korea Times, 16 June 1993, p. 2, in FBIS-EAS-93-114, "Seoul 'Concerned' with Israel-DPRK Contacts," 16 June 1993, p. 20; "Israel Gwa Kyŏngwŏnhyŏpsang/Pukhan, T'aimji Podo Puin," Joongang Ilbo, 12 June 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Japanese government sources for the first time confirm North Korea's flight test of the Nodong ballistic missile in late May 1993.
—Sam Jameson, "N. Korea Tests Missile Able to Reach Japan," Los Angeles Times, 12 June 1993, p. A13, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "N. Korea Tests Missiles; Capable of Hitting Japan," Yomiuri Shimbun, 12 June 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres expresses his desire to visit North Korea in order to convince Pyongyang not to sell missiles to Iran. Sources say Peres is expected to offer economic aid in exchange for halting the missile exports. The amount of aid is said to be $1 billion.
—"Israel Seeks to Block North Korean Missile Sales to Iran," Agence France Presse, 14 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Martin Sieff, "Israel to Woo North Korea to Keep Missiles from Iran," Washington Times, 15 June 1993, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ >; Korea Times, 16 June 1993, p. 2, in FBIS-EAS-93-114, "Seoul 'Concerned' with Israel-DPRK Contacts," 16 June 1993, p. 20; Kim Yŏng Kŏl, "Israel, Pukhan'e Kwan'gyegaesŏn 'Sonjit'/Peres Oemu Pangbukkyehoek Palghyŏ," Hankook Ilbo, 16 June 1993, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Israel Oemu P'yŏnghwabangmun Ch'ujin/'Tae Iran Missile P'anmae Chungji Sŏltŭk'," Kukmin Ilbo, 15 June 1993, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "I Oemu Pukpangmun Kyehoek/'Missile Tae Iran P'anmaep'ogi Sŏltŭk'," Taehan Maeil, 15 June 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhan Missile Such'ul Chŏji/Israel Owmu Kot Pangbuk," Segye Ilbo, 15 June 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Israel Oemu/Pukhanbangmun Kyehoek," Donga Ilbo, 15 June 1993, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Japan's Defense Agency confirms North Korea's successful flight test of the Nodong in late May 1993. The agency says the missile is almost fully developed and will be deployed in the near future.
—Kyodo News Service, "Japan Confirms N. Korea's Test Firing of New Missile," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Agency Believes Nodong-1 Fully Developed," Daily Yomiuri, 15 June 1993, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Japan Confirms North Korea's Test Firing of New Missile," United Press International, 14 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Lee Jae Mu, "Shilhŏmsŏnggong Nodong 1 Ho/Puk, Kot Shilchŏnbaech'i Kanŭng," Hankook Ilbo, 16 June 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Pu Ji Yŏng, "'Pukhan Rodong 1 Ho Shilchŏnbaech'i Imbak'/Il Pangwich'ŏng," Chosun Ilbo, 16 June 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
In Pyongyang, North Korea and Iran sign a 1993-94 plan for scientific, technological, educational, and cultural exchanges.
—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 16 June 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-114, "Technological Exchange Plan Signed with Iran," 16 June 1993, p. 16.
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a Saudi paper based in London, reports that there is a tripartite deal between Iraq, Iran, and North Korea in which Iran will transship Iraqi oil to North Korea through the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The deal is worth $120 million, and its proceeds are to be divided equally between Iran and Iraq. The Iranian portion will be transferred to the North Korean firm Changgwang Shinyong, and is to finance the purchase of "long-range" missiles from North Korea. Iranian deputy defense minister Ahmad Wahedi is handling the Iran-North Korean negotiations with the assistance of the head of the defense ministry's missile department, Montaqi, and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) representative in Pyongyang, Tabaqi. The Iranian foreign ministry advisor is conducting negotiations between Iraq and Iran. Under the agreement, North Korea is to receive 15,000 barrels of crude oil per day.
—Walid Abi-Murshid, "In Three-Way Trade Operation, Korean Missile Deal for Iran to Be Financed by Iraqi Oil Exports," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 17 June 1993, p. 1, in FBIS-NES-93-118, "DPRK Missiles for Iran in Secret Deal with Iraqi Oil," 22 June 1993, p. 53.
South Korean defense officials announce that the North Korean missile tests on 29 and 30 May 1993 were successful. The announcement claims that there were a total of four launches from the Hwadae-kun [Musudan-ri] missile test facility over the two days. Two of the missiles flew 500km, and the other two flew 100km.
—"Kukpangbu, Pukhan Nodong 1 Ho Shihŏmsagyŏk Sŏnggong Hwagin," Joongang Ilbo, 24 June 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-120, "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," 24 June 1993, p. 19.
In Beijing, Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Director-General Eitan Bentsur meets with North Korean officials in an attempt to dissuade them from concluding a reported deal to provide Iran with 150 Nodong-1 missiles in exchange for oil and cash. The meeting reportedly ends with the North Korean officials demanding cash for compliance. [Note: There are additional reports that place Bentsur in Pyongyang at about this time performing the same mission. It is uncertain whether this visit was in conjunction with, or confused with the Beijing visit.]
—Asher Wallfish, "Israel 'Cannot Ignore Missile Sales to Iran'," Jerusalem Post, 30 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "U.S. Prods Israel to Halt Talks With North Korea on Missile Sales," Arms Control Today, September 1993, p. 24; Clyde Haberman, "Israel Again Seeks a Deal With an Outcast," New York Times, 11 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Leslie Susser, "Peres: Korea-Bound?" Jerusalem Post, 15 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Steve Rodan, "All Eyes Are On Israel's North Korean Connection," Jerusalem Post, 25 March 1994, p. 3B, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
CIA Director James Woolsey, in testimony before Congress, states that the Nodong-1 missile, which could be fitted with nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) as well as high-explosive (HE) warheads, had been tested, and that "of greatest concern is North Korea's continued efforts to sell the missile abroad particularly to dangerous and potentially hostile countries such as Iran." Director Woolsey also says, "With this missile, North Korea could reach Japan; Iran could reach Israel; and Libya could reach US bases and allied capitals in the Mediterranean Region."
—Associated Press, "US Officials Welcome Delay In N. Korean Missile Sale," Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1993, p. 4.
North Korea's ambassador to China tells reporters that if it were true that North Korea tested a missile on 29 May 1993, then it was a normal event, as countries often need to conduct military exercises.
—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 24 September 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-185, "Test of Nodong-1 Missile Said 'Confirmed'," 27 September 1993, p. 13.
According to the Japanese daily, Sankei Shimbun, the 21-member Iranian delegation of April 1993 was to sign a contract for the purchase of 150 Nodong-1 missiles, which reportedly have a CEP of 2,000m. The missile was originally designed with a range of 1,000km in 1991, but, at Iranian request, this was increased to 1,300km so that the missile could reach Israel. Iran reportedly supplied financial support to extend the range. According to the Joongang Ilbo, the Iranian delegation signed a contract with North Korea for the purchase of 150 Nodong missiles and part of the delegation is still in North Korea.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 July 1993, in "Iran Said to Place Order for 150 DPRK Missiles," FBIS-EAS-93-134, 15 July 1993, p. 18; "Pukhan Nodong 1 Ho Pan'gyŏngmyŏngjungbŏmwi 2 Ch'ŏn M—Sankei Shinmun Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 15 July 1993, <http://www.joins.com>.
The Wall Street Journal reports that North Korea is assisting Libya to establish a Scud production facility near Tripoli known as the "Central Repair Workshop." The report also says that North Korea is selling Scud-B and Scud-C missiles to Iran, Libya, and Syria.
—Robert S. Greenberger, "Washington Insight: North Korea's Missile Sales in Mideast, Along With Nuclear Issue, Raise Concern," Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1993, p. A6.
US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Frank Wisner, and his Japanese counterpart, Administrative Vice-Defense Minister Shigeru Hatakeyama, agree to form a joint committee to monitor development of the Nodong-1 missile. The committee will comprise officials from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and the Japanese Defense Agency's (JDA) Policy Bureau.
—Naoaki Usui, "U.S., Japan Monitor Korean Missile," Defense News, 9-15 August 1993, p. 28; Kyodo News Service, 2 August 1993, in "Tokyo and Washington Agree Measures to Counter North Korean Missile Development," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Japan, U.S. to Counter N. Korean Missiles," Agence France Presse, 2 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Kyodo News Service, "Wisner Expresses Concern over N. Korean Missile Program," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Japan, U.S. to Cooperate in Missile Defense," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 2 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Two Russian civilian Condor transport aircraft and crews, leased by Syrians, depart with seven MAZ 543 "chassis" from Sunan airfield in North Korea, landing in Damascus, Syria on 5 August 1993. According to US intelligence sources, the MAZ 543s are probably taken from Damascus to a missile plant in Nasariya for use as mobile missile launchers. North Korea reportedly has several types of missile launchers for its Scuds. The MAZ 543 chassis is manufactured in Minsk, Belarus, and is used for Scud transporter erector launchers (TELs) and heavy trucks for both military and civilian use. According to US intelligence reports, North Korea has imported vehicles from the German MAN truck company, and used them to make TELs. [Note: There are unconfirmed reports that the two aircraft carried spare parts for Scud missiles. The MAZ 543s were not complete mobile missile launchers, and may have been delivered to Nasariya for the attachment of the erector unit.]
—Jack Katzenell, Qol Yisra'el (Jerusalem), 20 September 1993, in "Russia Did Not Transport Missiles From DPRK to Iran," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, p. 34; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Says Russians Helped Damascus in a Missile Plan," New York Times, 12 December 1993, pp. 1, 20; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Buying Old Russian Subs," New York Times, 20 January 1994, p. A6.
According to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Syria receives Scud-C missiles from North Korea via Russian aircraft, and Iran may also have received Scud-Cs in this fashion. [Note: Rabin says the shipment was on 8 August, but it is not clear if this could be the 5 August 1993 delivery of MAZ 543 transporter erector launchers (TELs) to Syria or if this is a second delivery.]
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 15 August 1993, in "DPRK Shipped Scuds to Syria on Russian Airplanes," JPRS-TND-93-027, 26 August 1993, p. 9; "'Pukhan, Nodong 1 Ho Syria'e Such'ul'—Rabin Israel Ch'ongni P'ongno," Joongang Ilbo, 16 August 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>; "Iran Will Soon Have Korean Missiles Able to Hit Israel: Report," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korean army First Lieutenant Im Yŏng Sŏn defects. He later discloses in a news conference on 24 August 1993 that North Korea is currently constructing two additional underground long-range missile launch bases, one at Chunggang-kun, Chagang Province and the other at Wŏnsan, Kangwŏn Province. Im states that missiles launched from these bases will be able to strike US military facilities in Japan and Guam. He says that North Korea already has underground missile bases at Mt. Komdŏk, Hwadae-kun, North Hamgyŏng Province, and at Okpyŏng-nodongjagu, Munchŏn, Kangwŏn Province. [Note: The actual name is "Okp'yŏng-dong."]
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 August 1993, in "Says Long-Range Missile Bases Built," FBIS-EAS-93-162, 24 August 1993, p. 23; "2 N. Korean Missile Bases Allegedly Target Japan," Jiji Press, 24 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
At the behest of the United States, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announces that Israel will break off discussions with North Korea, which were designed to halt the sale of North Korean missiles to Iran and Syria. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that North Korea wants $500 million to stop the sales.
—Dan Izenberg and Batsheva Tsur, "Israel Heeds US Request To Stop Talks With N. Koreans on Missile Shipments, Jerusalem Post, 17 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "U.S. Prods Israel to Halt Talks With North Korea on Missile Sales," Arms Control Today, September 1993, p. 24.
US Army General (ret.) Robert W. RisCassi (former Commander, US Forces Korea), commenting on the 29 May 1993 test-launch of the Nodong-1 missile, states, "there was no telemetry with the shots, which was strange, in that there was no close-down of the sea and air space in that direction, which is odd when you are making a missile that you've not tested before and are firing at any extended ranges." Because of this, RisCassi suspects that the test was a demonstration for Middle East buyers, rather than a serious technical evaluation. [Note: Although there was no intercepted telemetry, the North Koreans would have almost certainly launched the missile with the intent of receiving test data. The United States and others either might have failed to intercept the telemetry, or there could have been a transmission failure. Another explanation could be that North Korean engineers used an on-board data recording and recovery package, which the Chinese have been known to use in missile testing. Furthermore, the flight path was lined with North Korean naval vessels, and the flight took place within range of coastal monitoring stations, either of which could provide valuable data.]
—Bill Gertz, "General Spotlights N. Korean Threat," Washington Times, 15 September 1993, p. A6.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights in the US Congress, Joseph Bermudez states that North Korea is developing the Nodong-2 missile with a range of 1,500-2,000km, and is trying to complete development between 1995 and 1998. Regarding the failure of Russian engineers' to complete their intended travel to North Korea in late 1992, Bermudez says this is evidence that North Korea may not have the indigenous technology to complete the development of the new missile. [Note: The "Nodong-2" is also known as the "Taepodong-1," until the real name "Paektusan-1" is revealed in September 2001.]
—Chin Ch'ang Ŭk, "Pukhan, Nodong 2 Ho Scud Missile Kaebalchung—95~98 Nyŏn Wallyo," Joongang Ilbo, 16 September 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>; Kim Yŏng Chin, "Puk, Nodong 2 Ho Kaebalchung'/Mihawŏnbogosŏ/Sajŏng 2 Ch'ŏn km...95 Nyŏnkke Saengsan," Kukmin Ilbo, 16 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea is currently building launch positions for six SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) near its Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. There are already 47 SAM positions within a 6km radius of Yŏngbyŏn.
—"Pukhan Yŏngbyŏn Iltaee Missile Kiji Kŏnsŏl—Haeksisŏlboho Taebi," Joongang Ilbo, 15 September 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>.
An Israeli press report quotes Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin responding to questions about the use of Russian aircraft to transport North Korean missiles to Iran. During the interview, Adamishin said, "To my knowledge there were no ballistic missiles...you cannot check them all, but to my knowledge there were no military equipment [sic] in these flights."
—Jack Katzenell, Qol Yisra'el (Jerusalem), 20 September 1993, in "Russia Did Not Transport Missiles from DPRK to Iran," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, p. 34.
According to a South Korean government official, a Russian intelligence official recently informed the South Korean government that Russia is keeping watch over 3,500 nuclear physicists to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology abroad. According to reports, Russia withdrew six nuclear experts from North Korea in early 1993.
—Joongang Ilbo, 20 September 1993, p. 1, in "Russia Withdraws Six Nuclear Experts From DPRK," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, p. 38; "Pukhan P'a'gyŏn Haekhakcha/Russia Ch'ŏlsujoch'i," Joongang Ilbo, 20 September 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry formally confirms the missile test firing [on 29 May 1993 at Musudan-ri], stating that Japan was fomenting anti-North Korean sentiment in reference to the "normal missile drill." The statement is the first North Korean acknowledgement that it has been developing the Nodong, which the spokesman says is "necessary and an issue of national sovereignty."
—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 24 September 1993, in "Test of Nodong-1 Missile Said 'Confirmed'," FBIS-EAS-93-185, 12 October 1993, p. 34; "Puk Nodong 1 Ho Kaebal Ch'ŏt Shiin, Chŏngdanghan Pangwiryŏk Kanghwa Chujang," Joongang Ilbo, 25 September 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>.
Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in New York. Although Velayati denies any Iranian involvement in North Korea's missile program, Hata claims that the Iranian presence at the May 1993 North Korean missile test indicates that they were involved. Hata warns Velayati that Iran will find itself isolated if it persists in this relationship with North Korea.
—Lally Weymouth, "Shadow Over Japan," Washington Post, 1 November 1993, p. A17.
The Japanese Defense Agency begins a secret study of the feasibility of developing five to seven military reconnaissance satellites to give the Japanese Self-Defense Forces the ability to track North Korean activity, such as ballistic missile launches, 24 hours a day. The study is in response to the May 1993 North Korean launch of a Nodong-1 missile that impacted in the Sea of Japan off the Noto Peninsula. The report is issued in January 1994.
—Kim Hyo Sun, "Ilbon 'ChŏngCh'alwisŏng' Ch'ujin," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 17 August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Chŏn Hyŏn Il, "Il, Chŏngch'alwisŏng Poyu Kŭkpich'ujin/Pangwich'ŏng, Pimilgyehoek Surip," Segye Ilbo, 17 August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The South Korean Ministry of National Defense releases its Defense White Paper 1993-1994. The report says North Korea "is currently estimated to possess the production capability of more than 100 Scuds per year." The report also says that North Korea has exported Scud missiles to the Middle East and has developed the Nodong-1, which has an estimated range of 1,000km.
—The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1993-1994 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, October 1993), p. 68.
Quoting reports that first appeared in the London-based Saudi newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, The Guardian of London reports that the Nodong-2 is to be tested in the Lut Desert in southeast Iran in "the next few days." The Nodong-2 is said to be an improved version of the Nodong-1, with a range of 1,500-2,000km. A North Korean military delegation is reportedly in Iran to witness the test. North Korea and Iran are believed to have signed a contract for the delivery of 150 Nodong missiles, with deliveries to Iran to begin by the end of the year. [Note: There are conflicting reports about the missile's range and payload, and no test takes place. The range of 1,500-2,000km indicates this may be a reference to the Shehab-4/Paektusan-1.]
—Ed Balnche, "Iran, North Korea to test New Missile In Desert: Report," Associated Press, 22 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Kevin Rafferty, "Iran and N Korea 'To Test Missile'," The Guardian (London), 26 October 1993, p. 20; Pu Chi Yŏng, "Puk, Iran'sŏ Rodong 2 Ho Palsashilhŏm/Idalmalkke Namdongbu Samaksŏ," Chosun Ilbo, 24 October 1993, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Paper: N. Korea, Iran to Test Missile with Range of About 2,000 Kilometers," Daily Yomiuri, 24 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; KBS Radio, 23 October 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly to Test-Fire Nodong-2 Missile in Iran," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
A 36-page top-secret memorandum, by the Center for Military Strategic Analysis at the Russian General Staff, entitled "The Russian Federation Military Policy in the Asia Pacific Region under the New Military Political Conditions" states that 160 Russian "scholars" have assisted North Korea's missile and nuclear programs since the mid-1980s. The memorandum clearly states that Russia was assisting North Korea's nuclear missile program in the late 1980s, and that Russian experts participated in the manufacture of the Nodong-1. The Japanese weekly Shukan Bunshun disclosed the contents of the memorandum in January 1994.
—Akira Kato, "Kitachosenwa Sudeni Genbakuwo Motteiru," Shukan Bunshun, 27 January 1994, pp. 50-55; Sergey Agafonov, Izvestiya (Moscow), 27 January 1994, pp. 1, 4, in "'Active' Russian Participation Claimed," JPRS-TND-94-005, 25 February 1994, pp. 48-49; Radio Moscow, 29 January 1994, in "Participation in DPRK Nuclear Program Denied," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, p. 15; Pavel Felgengauer, "North Korea Has No Nuclear Bomb. The Publication in Shukan Bunshun Is Based on a Hoax. There Will Be No Official Investigation in the General Staff," Segodnya (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 1, in "General Staff on 'Hoax'," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, pp. 15-16; Sergey Agafonov, "...And the Japanese Weekly Has Other Documents in Store," Izvestiya (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 3, in "Further on Russian Involvement," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, p. 17.
Iran's Foreign Ministry denies allegations that Iran will test a Nodong-2 over the southeastern part of the country by the end of this month.
—"Iran Denies Planning Joint Missile Test with N. Korea," Agence France Presse, 24 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Xinhua General Overseas News Service, "Iran Denies Missile Test-Fire," Xinhua News Agency, 23 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
North Korea denies claims made in the Western press that it intends to test a ballistic missile in Iran, stating, "It is inconceivable that the DPRK, making consistent efforts for world peace and security, intends to conduct a missile launching test in a far-off foreign country." The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) also denies these claims.
— Kevin Rafferty, "Iran and N Korea 'To Test Missile'," The Guardian (London), 26 October 1993, p. 20; Korean Central News Agency, 28 October 1993, in "Japanese, U.K. Reports on DPRK Missile Test in Iran Denied" ["Groundless Rumor of 'Missile Launching Test''—KCNA Headline], JPRS-TND-93-035, 10 November 1993, p. 13.
The scheduled test of a Nodong missile in Iran is postponed.
—"N. Korea's Air Force Chief Visits Iran for Closer Ties," Washington Times, 25 February 1994; Ed Blanche, "North Koreans Visit Iran to Step up Military Cooperation," Associated Press, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Syria and Iran are reportedly cooperating to develop a cruise missile with Chinese and North Korean technology as well as technology from Germany and other European nations. The development of the missile is reportedly "centered on Iran's Ministry of Heavy Industries factories with imported technology from Germany and other European nations."
—Paul Beaver, "Flash Points," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 December 1993, p. 18.
North Korea signs a contract with Russia to purchase 12 discarded submarines as "scrap." There are concerns that North Korea may attempt to use the submarines for military purposes.
—Yonhap News Agency, 13 May 1994, in "DPRK Rejects Monitoring of Submarine Dismantling," FBIS-SOV-94-093, 13 May 1994, p. 17.
A Japan Defense Agency official states that the Nodong-1 missile is almost ready for deployment. The official says it is not clear when deployment of the missiles will be completed, but he "feels North Korea is nearing the stage of completing deployment." He says North Korea is very close to completing development of the missile and also claims that Pyongyang could possibly produce several Nodong missiles next year.
—"Development of North Korean Missile Close to Completion," Agence France Presse, 11 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nxis.com/>; "North Korea 'Very Close' to A Missile," Toronto Star, 12 November 1993, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nxis.com/>; "N. Korea's Rodong Missile Nears Completion," Daily Yomiuri, 13 November 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nxis.com/>; "Puk Rodong 1 Ho Missile Paech'iwallyo/Il T'ongshin, Pangwich'ŏngsoshikt'ong Inyongbodo," Chosun Ilbo, 12 November 1993, <http://www.chosun.com>.
South Korea's KBS-1 Radio cites the Russian newspaper Izvestiya as having reported that North Korea has provided Iran with the technology to manufacture Nodong-1 missiles in exchange for Western technology and equipment.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 12 November 1993, in "DPRK Reportedly Transfers Missile Technology to Iran," JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, p. 22.
The Times of London reports that Iran is assembling Scud-C missiles supplied by North Korea, and funding the development of the Nodong-1. The report also claims that Iran and Syria are cooperating on the development of a cruise missile.
—Michael Evans, "Iran and Syria 'Plan Missile'," The Times (London), 12 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Iran denies claims made in The Times of London on 12 November 1993 that it is financing the North Korean production of the Nodong-1. Iran also denies allegations that it is jointly producing an advanced cruise missile with Syria.
—"Iran Denies Report on Missile Production," Moneyclips, 15 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Iran Denies Missile Production," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 13 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Islamic Republic News Agency (Tehran), 13 November 1993, in "Report on Missile Production Denied," FBIS-NES-93-21815, November 1993, p. 75.
Russia's First Deputy Security Minister Sergey Stepashin announces the uncovering of a large-scale North Korean Special Services operation intended to recruit a large number of Russian missile and space specialists for work in North Korea. The organizer of the operation, Major General Nam Gye Uk, a counselor at the North Korean in Moscow, was expelled from Russia. Alexei Kandaudov, a Russian Security Ministry official, cites this as "the first case when a foreign diplomat has been asked to leave the country for an attempted recruitment of Russian scientists."
—Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 15 November 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-219, "DPRK Diplomat Expelled After Efforts to Recruit Experts," 16 November 1993, p. 5; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Says Russians Helped Damascus in a Missile Plan," New York Times, 12 December 1993, pp. 1, 20; "North Korean Diplomat Expelled for Recruiting Russian Scientists," Associated Press, 16 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Anne McElvoy and Wolfgang Munchau, "Russia Foils North Korea Plot to Hire Nuclear Team," The Times (London), 17 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Agence France Presse, "N. Korean Envoy Warns Against Threats on Suspected Nuke Program," 17 November 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; O Chung Sŏk, "Rŏ, Pukhan'oegyogwan Ch'ubang Hwag'in Sodong/3 Gaewŏlchŏn Missile Kisulcha Yuch'i Sa'gŏn," Chosun Ilbo, 17 November 1993, p. 7, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Middle Eastern intelligence sources claim that North Korea is expected to deliver Nodong intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Iran "within months." A full test of the missile is expected to take place under North Korean supervision in the southern Iranian desert by early 1994.
—"No-Dong Delivery," Flight International, 8 December 1993, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
US government officials believe that North Korea has postponed a missile sale to Iran. One explanation is that North Korea is doing it for diplomatic reasons in regard to US demands for nuclear inspections. Another possible reason is that there have been production problems or a snag in the terms of the export contract. North Korea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Hŏ Jong, says that North Korea never had any intention of selling missiles to Iran, stating, "There is no sale. It is entirely false." [Note: According to Flight International, the deal to sell up to 150 Nodong missiles to Iran is called off as part of a secret side-agreement with the United States when North Korea signs the Agreed Framework in October 1994.]
—Associated Press, "US Officials Welcome Delay In N. Korean Missile Sale," in Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1993, p. 4; "Iranian Missile Deal with N Korea Falters," Flight International, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto travels to China and North Korea two months after being elected. There is evidence she is seeking cooperation in missile development. Soon after her visit, Pakistan begins a project to purchase and produce the Nodong, known in Pakistan as the "Ghuari."
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 23.
A Japanese Foreign Ministry official states that Japan has made repeated overtures to Iran not to assist North Korea in the testing of the Nodong missile. He suggests that Japan could suspend a yen credit of about $38.6 million in economic aid to Iran if such a test occurs in Iran.
—"Japan Mulls Halt in Iran Loans," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 2 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/; Igor Shchogolev, "ITAR-TASS Foreign News Summary," ITAR-TASS, 1 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Puk Nodong 1 Ho Shilhŏmjangso ChegongDdaen/Il, Iran'e Ch'a'gwanch'wiso Kyŏnggo," Joongang Ilbo, 2 December 1993, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
A high-ranking South Korean intelligence official confirms that North Korea conducted its first successful test-launch of the Nodong-1 missile from a mobile launcher in late May 1993 [29 May 1993], striking a target 500km distant.
—Yu Yong Wŏn, "Puk Rodong 1 Ho/Idongshik Palsa Sŏnggong," Chosun Ilbo, 3 December 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.ke/; Chosun Ilbo, 3 December 1993, p. 1, in "Official Confirms North's Mobile Test Launch," FBIS-EAS-93-231, 3 December 1993, pp. 30-31.
The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) quotes an "informed source in Tehran" as having said that Tehran and Pyongyang have signed no contract either on testing or the purchase of North Korean long-range missiles.
—Oleg Kuzmin, "Iran Denies Acquisition of Missiles from North Korea," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 3 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
As part of the sixth high-level delegation to North Korea in 15 months, Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Fourouzndeh visits North Korea to discuss technological cooperation. The visit is for a meeting of a joint commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation established in 1992. According to reports, there is extensive cooperation between the two countries in the areas of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Fourouzndeh is allegedly seeking unmanned areial vehicles (UAVs) and North Korean assistance in building 18 underground missile silos in Iran.
—"N. Korea's Air Force Chief Visits Iran for Closer Ties," Washington Times, 25 February 1994; Ed Blanche, "North Koreans Visit Iran To Step Up Military Cooperation," Associated Press, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Alarm Sounded Over Missile Plans Involving Tehran and North Korea," Mideast Mirror, vol. 7, no. 237, 7 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
The director of the Modern Korea Institute, Katsumi Sato, states that Choch'ongnyŏn, the 150,000 member pro-North Korea association of Korean residents in Japan, has exported "key high-tech components North Korea needs for its war machine," and adds that institute analysis shows that North Korea is "now trying to downsize a missile warhead, so that the Nodong-1 missile could deliver a nuclear bomb to Japan." Sato quotes Im Yŏng Sŏn, a North Korean defector, as saying that 75% of construction equipment used for military facilities in North Korea comes from Japan. According to Sato, Lim said whenever something breaks, the North Koreans take a photograph of the part and fax the photo and part information to Choch'ongnyŏn in Japan, which then ships the parts to North Korea on the Man'gyŏngbong ferry. Tsutomu Nishioka, editor of the Institute's monthly news magazine, notes that ¥16 billion are sent to the DPRK annually in remittances, dwarfing the North Korean budget of 35 billion won, and that "although a ban on cash gifts to North Korean relatives may raise humanitarian problems, to prevent North Korea from developing a nuclear missile should take precedence, as a nuclear attack would snuff out so many people."
—Kyodo News Service, "Pyongyang Watcher Urges Japan to Ban 'High-Tech' Flow," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "North Korean Bombs Can Destroy Loyalists: Expert," Agence France Presse, 15 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Japan Urged to Halt High-Tech Flow to North Korea," United press International, 15 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "'Rodong 1 Ho T'andu Sohyŏnghwa'/Il Yŏn'guso Chujang," Chosun Ilbo, 17 December 1993, <http://www.chosun.com/>.
According to the Israeli Air Force Review, an Israeli "Colonel A" says, "Iran will have [North] Korean Nodong missiles in a year which could be deployed in the west of the country and reach Israel." The colonel also states, "There is no doubt that Iran is trying to obtain the capacity to produce chemical and nuclear warheads," which could be delivered by the Nodong.
—"Iran Will Soon Have Korean Missiles Able to Hit Israel: Report," Agence France Presse, 20 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
A senior Japan Defense Agency spokesman is quoted as saying that "when North Korea succeeded in test-firing the Nodong-1 in late May, it was launched from a fixed platform, so we thought that changing the location was very difficult, but later the United States and Japan learned that a mobile launch was possible by analyzing intelligence." He adds that the mobility of the Nodong-1, and the fact that North Korea has relocated most of its military facilities underground, make detection and destruction of the missiles extremely difficult. The official also states that the Nodong-1 is too large to be launched from a ship. According to international military sources, "North Korea will put the Nodong-1 missile into operational deployment next year [1994]."
—"Rodong 1 Ho Idongshik Hwagin/Ilchi 'Yo'gyŏkkollan,'" Chosun Ilbo, 25 December 1993, <http://www.chosun.com/>; "Rodong 1 Can Be Fired From Mobile Launchers," Daily Yomiuri, 24 December 1993, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Pukhan Nodong 1 Ho Missile Idongbalsashik Kongshikhwag'in—Il Yomiuri Shinmun," Joongang Ilbo, 24 December 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>; South Korean News Agency [sic], "North Korea Reportedly Able to Fire Nodong-1 from Mobile Launcher," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
In a recent secret report to the US House Armed Services Committee, the CIA claims that North Korea will have the capability to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could strike the United States with biological or chemical weapons within 10 years, and with a nuclear warhead within 10-15 years. The report concludes that even though the North Korean government has made the development of ICBMs a priority, the probability is low because North Korean military plans are emphasizing the efficient use of resources. The report also stated that North Korea could acquire a complete ICBM missile system from another country.
—"'Puk, ICBM Kaebal Chamjaeryŏk'/15 Nyŏnnae Misajŏnggwŏn Kanŭng," Chosun Ilbo, 24 December 1993, <http://www.chosun.com>; "Puk, Haekt'andu Changch'ak Taeryukkant'ando Missile Saengsannŭngnyŏk Poyu," Joongang Ilbo, 23 December 1993, <http://www.joins.com/>.
Officials in Washington say that North Korea has delayed plans to sell Iran the Nodong-1 missile. The reason for the delay is unclear, but officials have a number of theories, among them diplomatic maneuvering linked to nuclear inspections, production problems, or final arrangement problems with Iran. [Note: According to Flight International, the deal to sell up to 150 Nodong missiles to Iran is called off as part of a secret side-agreement with the United States when North Korea signs the Agreed Framework in October 1994.]
—Associated Press, "US Officials Welcome Delay In N. Korean Missile Sale," Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1993, p. 4; "Korea (DPRK): Missile Sale Off," Asian Recorder, 15-21 January 1994, p. 23686; "Iranian Missile Deal with N. Korea Falters," Flight International, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto denies international media reports that she will be discussing missile procurement or development during her two-day visit to North Korea, which is to begin on 29 December 1993. The Pyongyang visit, which immediately follows a meeting in Beijing, is at the invitation of the North Korean President Kim Il Sung.
—Radio Pakistan Network, 26 December 1993, in "Denies Possible Talks on Missiles," FBIS-NES-93-246, 27 December 1993, p. 57; Radio Pakistan Network, 27 December 1993, in "Departs for China," FBIS-NES-93-246, 27 December 1993, p. 57.
Kim Il Sung expresses the desire to place a satellite in orbit at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 28-29; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missile Seen Posing Risk to U.S.; Rocket Might Reach Alaska, Hawaii," Washington Times, 16 September 1998, p. A1. Kim Il Sung expresses the desire to place a satellite in orbit at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 28-29; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missile Seen Posing Risk to U.S.; Rocket Might Reach Alaska, Hawaii," Washington Times, 16 September 1998, p. A1.
