This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
The Korean People's Army (KPA) establishes regular chemical/biological units. [Note: Considering this occurs following the Korean War (1950-53), these units were most likely defensive in training and material.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "CW: North Korea's growing capabilities," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 2, 14 January 1989, p. 54.
North Korea reportedly receives sarin (GB, nerve agent) from the USSR. Pyongyang later builds chemical weapons plants with technical assistance from the Soviet Union. [Note: The source provides no details concerning the exact nature of these "chemical weapons plants."]
—"South Says North Korea Has 1,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons," Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, 21 March 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
Under the "First Five-Year Plan," North Korea begins development of an offensive, chemical weapons production capability.
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "CW: North Korea's growing capabilities...," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 2, 14 January 1989, p. 54.
Kim Il-sung announces the "Declaration for Chemicalization," an effort said to include construction of research and production facilities for chemical weapons production.
—Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, White Paper 2000, <http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/emainindex.html>.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) establishes the "chemical bureau" (later designated as the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau in 1981) under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces.
—"North Said Owning Enough Chem-Weapons to Wipe out South," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 March 1994.
The Soviet Union resumes technical assistance to the DPRK in 1966, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training materials. Moscow also provides "small quantities" of mustard and nerve agents to North Korea.
—Pak Tong-sam, "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655.
Kim Jung Chan, a Korean People's Army (KPA) officer who served as military attaché in the North Korean embassy in East Germany, reportedly obtains "technical know-how" for the production of chemical weapons (CW) agents from the East German government.
—Testimony, Hearing of the International Security Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Weapons Proliferation in North Korea, 21 October 1997.
Ongoing, large-scale production of chemical agents reported in North Korea, including cyanogen chloride, as well as limited production of mustard and Tabun.
—"South Korea Says North Has Biological, Chemical Weapons," Kyodo News Service, 23 October 2 1992; Joseph S Bermudez Jr., "CW: North Korea's growing capabilities...," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 2, 14 January 1989, p. 54.
The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports that "North Korea has developed a protective chemical weapons (CW) capability. It is further estimated that the DPRK would proceed with development of an offensive capability, including the production and weaponization of CW agents.
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993, p. 226.
Korean People's Army (KPA) officer (phonetically rendered as "Ting Jung Chen") is named chief of the [KPA's?] External Business Affairs bureau based on his success in CW agent production. [Note: According to testimony from Ch'oe Ju-Hwal, a DPRK defector, the position described is usually held by a KPA officer with a rank of general. This organization may be part of the "Yongaksan Company" in the External Economic General Bureau under the Second Economic Committee.]
—Testimony, Hearing of the International Security Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Weapons Proliferation in North Korea, 21 October 1997.
A senior participant at the 7th ROK/US Military Committee Meeting says "it is quite likely that North Korea would use its chemical weapons . . . and has stockpiled considerable amounts of chemical weapons."
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993, p. 226.
ROK Minister of Defense, Lee Ki Baek tells the Korea Herald that "North Korea has stockpiled some 180 to 250 metric tons of chemical weapons, including mustard gas and nerve gas."
—"Defense Minister on DPRK Submarine, Rocket Test," The Korea Herald, 29 January 1987, p. 1, in FBIS-APA-87-020, 30 January 1987, p. E4.
DPRK government announces its desire for "turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free, peace zone as well as a zone free from chemical weapons."
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993, p. 226.
The reported inventory of chemical weapon (CW) agents in the DPRK includes sarin (GB), tabun (GA), phosgene (CX), adamsite (DM), mustard agent family and blood agents (hydrogen cyanide).
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "CW: North Korea's growing capabilities...," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 2, 14 January 1989, p. 54.
North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Young Nam states that his country was not involved with producing or storing nuclear and chemical weapons and was not interested in importing such weapons either.
—"Major step forward for North Korea," The Daily Yomiuri, 15 June 1991, p. 6.
Chemical weapon (CW) agents are reportedly produced at 11 locations in North Korea.
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "CW: North Korea's growing capabilities...," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 2, 14 January 1989, p. 54.
US Secretary of Defense Cheney says that 23 countries have plans to develop chemical weapons, and that 10 others, including North Korea, already possess chemical weapons.
—"Hwahangmugi-T'ando Missile Pukhan Kaebalgyehoek/Cheney Mi Kukpang Palg'hyŏ," Joongang Ilbo, 12 June 1990, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
In a speech before the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, US Secretary of Defense Cheney states that 23 countries are involved in developing a chemical warfare program, to one extent or another. Cheney notes that "...23 foreign countries have confirmed or suspected chemical warfare programs, and 10 have, or may have, biological warfare programs. Once again, that would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea."
—Robert MacKay, "Cheney: 23 Nations May Have Chemical Weapons Programs," UPI, 22 June 1990.
Offensive roles of the nuclear and chemical defense units in the Korean People's Army are codified in a military manual, Konggyokchon [Offensive Warfare], published at the Kim Il Song Military University. According to this 1991 manual, in wartime and during conduct of military operations, nuclear and chemical defense units would be organized into chemical reconnaissance and flame-thrower units.
—Kim Kwi Kun, "DPRK to Operate Nuclear-Chemical Defense Units in All-Out War," Choson Ilbo (Internet version), 7 December 1999, translated in FBIS Document FTS19991208001896.
South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced that the ROK would not manufacture, possess, or use either nuclear or chemical weapons. President Roh also encouraged the North Korean government to make a reciprocal pledge.
—T. R. Reid, "S. Korean Leader Pledges Policy of No Nuclear Arms," Washington Post, 8 November 1991, p. A27.
Kim Il Sung directs that protective masks be provided to the entire population of the DPRK. Regular nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense drills are also required of both military and civilian personnel. [Note: Apparently, this is the first time that such extensive training and equipment have been given to the civilian population in North Korea.]
—From ROK MND, White Paper, 1999, <http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/emainindex.html>.
The ROK Agency for National Security Planning claims the DPRK had "six chemical-weapons storage centers, each outfitted with a stockpile of 1,000 tons of material--a portion of which the military keeps in the payloads of artillery pieces."
—"North Korea Said to Have Chemical- and Biological-Weapons Capabilities," UPI, 23 October 1992.
North Korea categorically refutes all South Korean claims that it is developing a chemical weapons stockpile. It states that the South Korean propaganda is baseless for it is counting pharmaceutical and medicinal facilities to be part of the alleged chemical weapons' infrastructure. North Korea also charges that the US government has placed "as many as 25,000 drums of chemical weapons of 10-odd types, including poisonous gas" in South Korea.
—"North Korea Denies Reports of Chemical Weapons Production," BBC, 18 November 1992, Summary of World Broadcasts.
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev says that his country has urged North Korea to open itself up to inspections of nuclear facilities and to join the Chemical Weapons Convention.
—"Russia Calls on North Korea to Agree to Nuclear Inspections," BBC, 24 November 1992.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry denies that its government is developing and stockpiling chemical weapons and its official position against the development of such unconventional weapons has not changed from before: "The Korean People's Democratic Republic has never had any chemical weapons and the stand of its government, which comes out against its development, production, stockpiling and application, has not changed a bit."
—Vladimir Nadashkevich, "North Korea Has No Chemical Weapons," ITAR-TASS, 15 January 1993.
A Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) broadcast declares that "It is a fact known to the world that the DPRK, which sets store by international law and has complied with it in good faith, has no chemical weapons."
—KCNA, "DPRK Has No Chemical Weapon Plant," 28 April 1993, Transcribed in Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-TND-93-012, 4 May 1993.
Analyst Joseph Bermudez reports that North Korea is estimated to have the capacity to "produce at least 4,500 tons of chemical agents annually, and it has already stockpiled 1,000 tons of chemical weapons."
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993, p. 228.
North Korea successfully tests Nodong-1 missile. The missile is suspected of being able to deliver a chemical payload.
—David E. Sanger, "Missile Is Tested by North Koreans," The New York Times, 13 June 1993, p. 7.
In a white paper, the South Korean National Unification Board claims that North Korea has eight functional chemical weapons plants and three laboratories working on biological weapons capabilities. The government white paper also alleges that its northern neighbor has 1,000 tons of stored bio-chemical weapons.
—N. Korea Operates Eight Chemical Weapons Plants: Seoul," Agence France Presse, 22 February 1994.
Recent DPRK military defector Yi Chung Kuk states that "North Korea has chemical weapons enough to demolish the southern part of the peninsula without using nuclear weapons."
—"N. Korea Has Enough Chemical Weapons to Demolish South: Defector," Agence France Presse, 22 March 1994.
Sgt. Yi Chung Kuk, who defected to South Korea on 18 March [1994], tells a news conference that North Korea has the technology to mount chemical weapons onto Scud missiles though it is not capable of mounting nuclear weapons.
—"Defector on Chemical Warfare Capability, Leadership and Food Shortage," Kyodo News Service, 28 April 1994, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; "N. Korea's Scuds Said Capable of Carrying Chemicals," Japan Economic Newswire, 28 April 1994.
Yi Chung Kuk, a former member of the People's Armed Forces Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, alleges link between the "February 8 Vinalon Complex" and chemical weapons production. He further alleges that the father of "vinalon," a synthetic fiber produced in North Korea, also contributed his expertise to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction research and development, including chemical weapons.
—FBIS Report: "DPRK's Yi Sung-ki, Reputed 'Godfather' of Chemical, Nuclear Weapons, Profiled," 25 April 2001, Document ID KPP20010425000114.
The South Korean National Unification Board accuses North Korea of testing chemical weapons on its political prisoners. The unification board also reports to the National assembly that North Korea currently possesses about 1,000 tons of chemicals for use in a war.
—"North Korea Alleged Using Detainees in Chemical Weapons Tests," AP, 26 September 1994.
According to the Seoul Shinmun, "North Korea is estimated to have up to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, most of which is sarin (GB) gas...and only a limited stock of other types of chemical weapons, such as those that have suffocating and blood-affecting properties."
—"South Estimates DPRK Has 5,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons, Mostly Sarin," Seoul Shinmun, 15 April 1995, p. 1, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
According to Yonhap, "North Korea has stockpiled about 1,000 tons of chemical weapons including those of sarin...North Korea, he said, is capable of producing 4,500 tons of chemical weapons a year in peace-time and 12,000 tons in war."
—"South Says North Korea Has 1,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons," Yonhap news agency, Seoul, 21 March 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
South Korea's National Unification Board submits a report to the National Assembly that says North Korea has about one ton of biological and chemical weapons, and that they can be delivered by FROG-5s, FROG-7s and Scud missiles. The report lists the following biological and chemical agents: blister agent, nerve agent, choking agent, blood agent, tear gas, cholera, plague, anthrax, and hemorrhagic fever.
—Kang Sŏng Bo, "Puk Saenghwahangmugi 1 Ch'ŏnt'on Poyu/Yŏndaegŭpkkaji Hwahaksodae P'yŏnsŏng Hullyŏn," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 23 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kim Rang Ki, "Puk, Saenghwahangmugi 1 Ch'ŏn t Poyu/T'ong'ilwŏn Kukkamjaryo," Chosun Ilbo, 23 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Seang-Hwahangmugi/1 Ch'ŏn t Poyu/Pukhan/T'ong'ilwŏn Kukkamjaeryo," Taehan Maeil, 23 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
South Korea's Foreign Ministry submits a report to the National Assembly that says North Korea has between 1,000 and 5,000 tons of biological and chemical weapons (combined). The report says that most of North Korea's artillery and multiple rocket launchers are capable of delivering chemical weapons to Seoul. Furthermore, North Korea's Scud missiles are capable of striking all of South Korea.
—Kim Yŏn Kwang, "Puk Hwahangmugisudo'gwan'I Sajŏnggwan/Scud Changch'ak Ddaen Hanbando Chŏn'yŏk," Chosun Ilbo, 24 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
In testimony before the National Assembly, General Kim Hong Rae, South Korean Air Force Chief of Staff, says that North Korea has deployed about 600 FROGs and Scuds. Kim says that North Korea has chemical weapons, and is developing nuclear weapons. General Kim also says the United States has three intelligence satellites monitoring North Korean military activities.
—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Said to Have Deployed Hundreds of Missiles," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Hwang Yu Sŏng, "'Puk Missile 6 Paekki Chakchŏn Paech'i'/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkam Tappyŏn," Donga Ilbo, 30 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Lee Chung Kŭn, "'Puk Scud 6 Paekki Chakchŏnbaech'i'/Hanbandojŏn'yŏk'I Sajŏnggwŏn/Konggunbonbu Kukkam," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 30 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Hŏ Yong Pŏm, Hong Sŏk Chun, and Kwŏn Sang Ŭn, "Puk, Scud Subaekki Paech'i/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkamdappyŏn/Namhan Chŏn'yŏk Sajŏnggwŏn," Chosun Ilbo, 30 September 1995, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.
US officials believe that North Korea would definitely use chemical weapons if it attacks South Korea, but the likelihood of such an attack is quite minimal.
—"US Thinks N. Korea Could Use Chemical Arms," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 March 1996.
Japanese police arrests Tanetoshi Li, 34, after he allegedly exported hydrofluoric acid and sodium fluoride to North Korea without permission from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
—"Trader Nabbed for Illegal Chemical Exports," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 8 April 1996.
Citing a secret Defense Intelligence Agency report, Shukan Gendai alleges that North Korea has been developing an offensive chemical weapons capability since 1990. It also claims that there are plants all over the country (including those at Kanggye and Sakchu) producing over 20 types of chemical warfare agents, such as sarin and potassium cyanide.
—"Real Threat: DPRK Chemical Weapons," Mainichi Daily News, 11 April 1996.
Analyst Joseph Bermudez reports on 12 North Korean chemical facilities alleged to be manufacturing chemical weapons (CW) agents. Facilities include the storage depots at Kanggye and Sakchu, Factory No. 279 (CW defense equipment), and "store offices" at Maram and Chiha-ri. Six corps munitions depots specializing in CW ordnance are found at Sanum-ri, Hwangch'ŏn, Samsan-dong, Sariwŏn, and Wangjaebong. CW agent manufacturing is alleged to take place at the following cities in chemical plants: Anju, Aoji-ri, Ch'ongjin, Hamhung, Hwasung, Manp'o, Sakchu, Sariwon, Shinhung, Shin'ǔiju, and Sunch'ŏn.
—See also Table 8.2, DPRK Chemical Warfare Facilities, in Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 225.
A Korean resident in Japan, Kim Won-pong, lists nine factories in the North that are capable of producing chemical weapons (CW) agents, these being located in Anju, Aoji-ri, Ch'ongjin, Hamhŭng (two facilities), Hwasŏng, Manp'o, Shin'ǔiju, and Sunch'ŏn.
—FBIS Report: "DPRK Factories Suspected of Producing Chemical Agents," Kim Won-pong, Kitachosen jinmingun no zensho (Portrait of the North Korean People's Army), Tokyo, December 1996, p. 127, translated by FBIS, 17 December 1996.
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Updated September 2004 |
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