Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987, it is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons program. Defectors from the DPRK and the defense agencies of the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) generally agree that the country began to acquire a biological weapons capability in the early 1980s. However, open-source information on the DPRK's biological weapons program varies considerably, so it is difficult to know of its true state. Perhaps the most authoritative analysis was made in 2006 by the ROK's Ministry of National Defense (MND), which estimates that the DPRK possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of biological agents including the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.[1] However, heightened concerns regarding DPRK 's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, as well as its ongoing program to export weapons and related dual-use equipment, have overshadowed international considerations of whether the DPRK adheres to the BWC.[2]

Open-sources provide varying assessments of DPRK's purported capabilities in biological weapons. These estimates range from its possession of a rudimentary biological warfare (BW) program to having deployed biological weapons. However, most official estimates appear to conclude that the DPRK possesses a range of pathogens that can be weaponized and the technical capabilities to do so rather than ready-to-use weapons. The United States government believes that the DPRK possesses a substantial biological weapons capability. General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), stated in a testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2002 that "...North Korea has the capability to develop, produce and weaponize biological warfare agents."[1] In May 2002, John R. Bolton, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, described DPRK's biological weapons program as "a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability" and claimed that it "has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention." Bolton further noted that the "leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to do so, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these deadly weapons."[2] Further, in 2006, the MND stated that "It is assessed that Pyongyang has been producing poison gas and biological weapons since the 1980s. It is believed that... North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox, and cholera."

Some assessments of DPRK's BW program have described the country's biotechnology infrastructure as sorely deficient in advanced equipment and expertise. However, achievements in biological research by North Korean scientists suggest that in some areas of biomedical research they possess considerable capabilities. For example, published research carried out by North Korean scientists from 1990 to 1997 demonstrates a high level of expertise working with vaccinia virus. The research most likely contributed to the development of vaccines or pharmaceutical products, but such work could also prove useful to a BW program since the vaccinia virus' genome is closely related to that of variola virus, which causes smallpox. An Open Source Center analysis published in January 2009 supported the conclusion that experiments, including genetic modifications of vaccinia virus, were done for peacefully-directed medical research. Nevertheless, it is likely that similar experiments could be used to produce toxins, enhance the virulence of viruses, transform the vaccinia virus into a pathogen, and provide a cover for a smallpox R&D program.[4] Also indicative of a substantial biotechnology capability is that the country's scientists received an award for the development of a Hepatitis-B vaccine in 1999.[5] Less clear than its research capabilities are the DPRK 's capabilities in weaponization and delivery of BW agents.

Although efforts to strengthen international and national export controls and the implementation of sanctions on Pyongyang have limited the DPRK 's ability to import dual-use equipment and supplies, the country has proven resourceful in securing materials from abroad. In 2006, for example, Japanese authorities discovered that DPRK had obtained a freeze dryer—which could be used to freeze-dry pathogens of possible biological weapons applications—from a Tokyo-based trading company in 2002.[6] DPRK also has sufficient stocks of the growth media—such as agar, peptone, and yeast extract from breweries—to support a BW program.[7]

Several unconfirmed reports state that DPRK engaged in human testing as recently as 2002 as part of the chemical and biological weapons development effort. As noted by the U.S. Department of State in its International Religious Freedom Report 2007, these allegations are extremely difficult to verify due to the DPRK being a closed society.[8]

History

Asserting that poisonous gas and bacteria had been used against DPRK and Chinese forces during the Korean War, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (d. 1994) in the early 1960s ordered the establishment of a biological weapons program. The country subsequently established such a program within the Academy of National Defense. However, results from this program were unremarkable. An estimated 10-13 different types of pathogens were investigated during the early development process, including the etiological agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox, and yellow fever. According to reports, the DPRK imported via entities in Japan and elsewhere cultures of anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), plague (Yersinia pestis) and cholera (Vibrio cholerae)bacteria. Typhoid (which is caused by Salmonella typhi) has also been mentioned in reports on the DPRK BW development program. Actual production of BW agents, including the causative bacteria of cholera, typhus (rickettsia), tuberculosis, and anthrax is believed to have begun in the early 1980s. Unlike DPRK's development of chemical weapons, its biological weapons development has been mostly indigenous.[9]

List of Suspected BW Agents in North Korea

BW agents are reportedly cultured in both civilian and military-related research institutes in the DPRK. According to various accounts, pathogens having possible utility for BW that are allegedly being researched and developed by the DPRK include:

• Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
• Clostridium botulinum (produces botulinum toxin that causes botulism)
• Mycobacterium tuberculosis (tuberculosis)
• Rickettsia prowazekii (typhus)
• Salmonella typhi (typhoid)
• Vibrio cholerae 01 (cholera)
• Yersinia pestis (plague)
• Korean hemorrhagic fever virus (hemorrhagic fever)
• Variola major (smallpox)
• Yellow fever virus (yellow fever)

A report from Jane's Intelligence Group noted that North Korea scientists had used microencapsulation to protect Bacillus anthracis cells from UV light. It also reiterated the allegation that DPRK possesses cultures of variola major.[10]

DPRK'S Biological Warfare Delivery Systems

Little is known about the organization of the DPRK's BW program, although one author suggests that it is likely organized in a similar way to the DPRK CW program. If this is the case, then the Second Economic Committee and its subsidiary Fifth Machine Industry Bureau would fulfill requirements for biological weapons set by the North Korean military. The latter organizations are directed by the National Defense Commission and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.[12]

In contrast to the DPRK's considerable capabilities to deliver CW agents, it is much less clear whether comparable munitions are available to the DPRK to deliver BW agents. Although DPRK has advanced missile technology, the fragile nature of biological agents complicates the task of using missiles as a means of delivery and dispersal. While the ROK government has estimated that half of DPRK 's long-range missiles and 30 percent of its artillery pieces are capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads,[11] it is not known whether biological payloads would survive and be effectively dispersed by these missiles.

Facilities

Estimates in open sources of the number of biological weapons facilities that the DPRK possess vary widely and therefore the real number is unknown. One report from Jane's states that there appear to be at least ten of them, some of which are reported to function under the guise of electrical engineering facilities.[16] A handbook on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) published in 2001 by the South Korean MND contains a map listing suspect BW facilities in DPRK, including three production and research facilities. While the locations of the research facilities were not published, the three production sites were reported to be located at Chongju, Munchon, and the Sohae coast.[17] The facility in Munch'on, Kangwon Province, manufactures an estimated 200 metric tons of growth media per year.[18]

According to defector Choi Ju Hwal, a former sergeant in the DPRK People's Army (KPA), there is a Joint Research Institute responsible for biological weapons development. This institute is placed within the military-medical department, which reports to the General Logistics Bureau of the Armed Forces Ministry.[19]

North Korea and the 1972 Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BWC)

The DPRK is a state party to the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BWC), having acceded to it on March 13, 1987. Although the U.S. and other governments have asserted that the DPRK has, or is, violating the BWC, no official attempt has been made to apply provisions spelled out in the BWC for having these allegations investigated or verified.

Map by the ROK Ministry of National Defense (2001); green markers indicate biological weapons-related facilities.

Sources:
[1] Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 05 March 2002, www.shaps.hawaii.edu/ security/ us/ schwartz_ 2002.html.
[2] John R. Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction," Heritage Lectures, No. 743, 06 May 2002, www.heritage.org/ research/ public diplomacy/ hl743.cfm.
[3] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, p. 26, www.mnd.go.kr.
[4] OSC Analysis, "Researchers Likely Genetically Modified Vaccinia Virus for Production of Vaccines, Pharmaceuticals from 1990-1997," 23 January 2009, in OSC document KPF20090123327002.
[5] Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan (Seoul), January 1999, in OSC document FTS19990121001655.
[6] "DPRK Probably Produced Centrifuge To Produce Biological Agents," U.S. Army Asian Studies Detachment, 22 November 2006, in OSC document JPP20071005137003.
[7] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 2008-2009," August 2008, pp. 30-31, janes-store.ihs.com/ pdf/ Nuclear- Biological- and- Chemical- Defence- 2008-9.pdf.
[8] U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2007, 2007, www.state.gov/ g/ drl/ rls/ irf/ 2007/ 90140.htm.
[9] Pak Tong-sam, "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan (Seoul), January 1999, translated in OSC document FTS19990121001655.
[10] Andy Oppenheimer, ed., "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 2008-2009," August 2008, pp. 30-31, janes-store.ihs.com/ pdf/ Nuclear- Biological- and- Chemical- Defence- 2008-9.pdf.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 227; Daniel A. Pinkston, "The South Korean Ballistic Missile Program," Strategic Studies Institute, February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffiles/ PUB842.pdf.
[13] Trefor Moss, "Launch preparations are for communications satellites, says Pyongyang," 02 March 2009, www.janes.com/ news/ defence/ triservice/ jdw/ jdw090302_ 1_n.shtml; "North Korea sparks fears of strike on U.S. with 'rocket' launch," Mail Foreign Service, 24 February 2009, www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/ worldnews/ article- 1153771/ North- Korea- sparks- fears- strike- U-S- rocket- launch.html.
[14] "U.N. Chief Voices Concern over N. Korean Rocket Launch," Yonhap (Seoul), 29 March 2009, in OSC document KPP20090329971018.
[15] "N. Korea's Missile Capability Improves," Korea Times Online, 06 April 2009, in OSC document KPP20090406107005.
[16] Oppenheimer, "Jane's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 2008-2009."
[17] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Hwasaengbang Misail Olmana Algo Hyesimnikka, in Korean, p. 32, 01 December 2001; ROK MND Book on DPRK Chemical, Biological Warfare Capabilities, 01 December 2001, in OSC document KPP20020103000062.
[18] "South Korea: Monthly on DPRK Weapons of Mass Destruction," 21 Nov 1998, in OSC document FBIS-EAS-98-325, cited at www.fas.org/ nuke/ guide/ dprk/ facility/ munchon.htm.
[19] Hearing of the International Security Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on Weapons proliferation in North Korea, Chaired by Senator Thad Cochran (R-Mi), Federal News Service, 21 October 1997, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.

	Updated November 2009