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Updated August 2008
Missile Overview
Introduction
Before Colonel Gaddafi announced his decision to renounce all WMD related programs in December 2003, Libya had been trying to increase its ballistic missile capability since the 1970s. Early imports of entire Scud-B and FROG 7 systems from the Soviet Union were followed by the pursuit of an indigenous missile production infrastructure over the course of two and a half decades. Libya’s indigenous effort began with the help of German engineers, and was later supported by illegal arms shipments containing a wide variety of missile-related equipment and technological assistance from various countries including China, North Korea, Germany, Serbia, Iraq, and Iran. In 2004, experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya removed some of the most critical parts of Libya’s missile infrastructure, which included untested Scud-C systems and guidance components. Their inspections revealed that although Libya had been frantically trying to improve its ballistic missile capabilities, its efforts had been largely unsuccessful. Attempted purchases of MRBMs or IRBMs were repeatedly thwarted by pressure from the international community. Not surprisingly, none of Libya’s indigenous missile programs ever reached operational status. After its decision to renounce the pursuit of WMD, Libya has converted most of its Scud-B arsenal into defensive short-range weapons, and has also pledged to eliminate any missiles going beyond the range (300km) and payload (500kg) guidelines defined by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
History
Libya’s attempts to acquire ballistic missile technology and associated systems go back to the mid-1970s. In 1976, Libya purchased around 80 Scud-B missiles and launchers form the Soviet Union. This was followed only two years later with the purchase of around 40 FROG 7 rockets and launchers, again from the Soviet Union. [1] [2] Later that decade, Libya also tried albeit unsuccessfully, to acquire SS-21 Scarab SRBMs (70km range, 480kg payload [3]) from Moscow. Other missile systems that Libya tried to purchase on the open market throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s included the Russian SS-12 Scaleboard and SS-23 Spider SRBMs. However, these efforts were unsuccessful. During the same period, Colonel Gaddafi also approached the Brazilian aerospace consortium Orbitas about a potential sale of its MB/EE 600km range missile system, but was rebuffed. [4]
In 1980, Tripoli signed a contract with the German firm Orbital Transport und Raketen AG (OTRAG, "Orbital Transport and Rockets, Inc.") to develop a missile infrastructure in Libya. [5] However, after two years of development efforts in Libya, and vary of Libya’s military intentions, the West German government pressured OTRAG to cease operations in Libya. Although OTRAG complied with the request, most of the equipment remained, and former OTRAG employees continued working on Libya’s missile program. [6] [7] [8] In 1987, the remnants of the OTRAG project were integrated into the secret Ittisalt program to develop a 300 to 700 km range liquid fueled missile based on German designs at a research center near the Siwa Oasis. [9] [10] Around the same time, Libya also entered into negotiations with several Brazilian firms regarding missile and artillery technology transfers. The outcome of these negotiations remain unclear; however if successful, they were probably merged with the OTRAG designs in order to develop the 950km liquid fueled Al-Fatah MRBM. [11] None of these indigenous missile development projects ever reached operational status, in fact the Al-Fatah test flights in 1987 and 1993 were dismal failures because of difficulties with the guidance components. [12]
On 14 April 1986 Libya launched two Scud-B missiles to attack a U.S. radar station on the Italian island of Lampedusa, but the missiles failed to reach their target and fell into the Mediterranean Sea. The facility had been instrumental in coordinating the U.S. air strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi. According to Libyan sources, the U.S. attacks caused over 100 casualties; among them Colonel Gaddafi’s 15 months- old daughter. The Reagan government had justified the air strikes by accusing Gaddafi of assisting the earlier bombing in Berlin. [13] [14] [15] [16]
In 1990, Israeli intelligence sources claimed that Libya was trying to acquire the Chinese solid fueled DF-15/M-9 SRBM (600km range, 500kg payload). [17] U.S. intelligence sources later alleged that the Libyan negotiations with Beijing had been in the final stages before U.S. pressure thwarted the sale in 1989. Tripoli also approached China about the liquid fueled DF-3A/CSS-2A IRBM (2,500km range, 2,150kg payload) but Chinese authorities were unwilling to enter into talks about a potential sale. [18]
Spanish intelligence sources claimed that in 1992 Tripoli signed an agreement with Pyongyang about technical assistance for the Libyan ballistic missile program. [19] Other sources claim that this agreement was already concluded in 1989 or 1991, and included North Korean supply of Scud-C Hwasong 6 and Scud-D Nodong missile systems or components to Libya. [20] [21]
Libya’s attempts to either purchase entire systems or develop an indigenous ballistic missile production capability continued throughout the 1990s. Under U.S. pressure in 1993, Ukrainian authorities seized roughly 80 metric tons of ammonium perchlorate, a key component for the production of solid missile propellants. The chemicals were of Russian origin and the transaction had allegedly been brokered by the Serbian arms manufacturer JPL Systems. [22] Two years later JPL Systems was accused of signing a contract worth $30 million to aid Libya on the Al-Fatah missile development program, although the Serbian firm’s expertise was mainly in the production of long range multiple rocket launchers. [23] [24] [25]
In the mid-1990s there also appeared reports about a cooperation agreement between Libya and Iran on ballistic missile development. Allegedly, Libya paid over $31 million to Tehran in exchange for material and technical know-how with the aim of expanding the range of its Scud-B arsenal and finalizing the Al-Fatah project. [26]
According to the German Federal Intelligence Service, (BND) in January 1995 Libya and Iraq concluded a framework agreement on joint ballistic missile development. German intelligence officials revealed that a series of Scud test launches had taken place in the Southwestern Libyan desert to increase the range of the missiles. [27] Around the same time, the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigations and the Public Prosecutor in Munich began investigating German missile engineer Walter Ziegler, who had been highly influential in continuing Libya’s missile development effort even after OTRAG had officially left the country. [28] Ziegler had already been investigated from 1986 to 1989, but to no avail. [29] However, in 1998, Ziegler was finally indicted for his assistance to Libya’s missile development effort. According to investigators, he had used his companies Globesat and Polytec based in Munich to smuggle arms technology to Libya through a network of letter-box firms in Malta, Luxembourg, and London. Equipment supplied by Ziegler and his network included telemetric transmitters used to measure the trajectory of missile flight paths, chromium-nickel-steel alloy tubes for missile casings and fuel tanks, and electronic navigation equipment. [30] [31]
In August 1996, Italian authorities boarded a cargo freighter headed for Tripoli in La Spezia. The officials found three containers with components for a metal pressing machine that could be used to press combustion chambers for missiles. The machine had been produced by the German firm H&H Metallorm that went bankrupt in 1993. Several managers of H&H Metallorm had already been sentenced to prison for exporting similar machines to Iraq. [32]
On 30 June 1999 Indian customs officials at the Northwestern port city Kandla boarded the freighter Ku-Wol San owned by Puhung Trading Corp. of North Korea [33]. The Indian officials discovered wooden crates designated "water refinery equipment" that actually contained an entire assembly line for Scud missile production. The shipment seized included missile nose cones, sheet metal for frames, heavy-duty hydraulic pressing machinery, warhead guidance systems, calibration and evaluation instruments, and missile engineering blueprints labeled Scud-B and Scud-C. Indian authorities had boarded the freighter suspecting arms intended for Pakistan, but a detailed investigation by U.S. and South Korean authorities revealed that the shipment was indeed intended for Libya, and constituted only a part of North Korea’s sustained assistance to Tripoli’s effort in developing a ballistic missile infrastructure. [34] [35] [36]
In November 1999, U.K. authorities seized a shipment of missile parts bound for Libya. At Gatwick airport a cargo flight to Tripoli via Malta carried 32 crates that had been disguised as automotive spares but actually contained Scud components of North Korean origin. [37] [38] [39] Shipping records indicated that a Taiwanese company had shipped the missile components through Hong Kong using forged documents. [40]
Although two decades had only brought marginal success, at the turn of the millennium Libya was apparently still trying to improve its missile capability. In 2000, China was accused of providing technical expertise to Libya’s missile development efforts. A report by the National Security Agency claimed that the state-run China Precision Machine Import-Export Co. had agreed to supply Libya with a hypersonic wind tunnel, a crucial component used for modeling and simulation in missile development. [41]
On 6 April of the same year, Swiss authorities arrested a Taiwanese businessman at Zurich international airport, trying to smuggle four Scud missile propulsion units in his luggage to Libya. During the course of further investigations, the Swiss state prosecutor’s office also noted that the Taiwanese company, the 44-year old Hsieh Chin-Yi worked for had been repeatedly accused of covertly supplying Libya with Scud components throughout the 1990s. [42]
In 2001, U.S. intelligence officials accused Iran of installing equipment on Libyan facilities for advanced missile production. According to the report, Iranians had been spotted working on a factory involved with the Al-Fatah program, with the effort being coordinated by the Iranian Shahid Hemmet Industrial Group. [43]
Renunciation of WMD programs
On 19 December 2003, Colonel Gaddafi stunned the world by announcing that Libya would renounce its pursuit of WMD and long range ballistic missile capabilities. [44] In March 2003, the head of Libya’s intelligence service, Musa Kusa approached the British MI-6 to begin negotiations about a cooperative effort between officials of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya, with the goal of dismantling the Libyan facilities involved in nuclear, chemical, and missile research and development. [45] After two initial visits from American and British experts in October and December of that year, the agreement was made public on 19 December 2003.
In January 2004, the most critical materials of Libyan missile research and development activities were flown out to be stored at the Department of Energy’s Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. [46] The shipment included five Scud-C missile guidance sets along with their gyroscopes. A second shipment included five complete and two partial Scud-C missiles and their launchers that Libya had produced with North Korean assistance. [47] Libya was allowed to retain its Scud-B missiles and FROG 7 rockets but pledged to convert its Scud arsenal into short range, purely defensive weapons, and to eliminate all missiles going beyond the range and payload guidelines set forth by the MTCR. Libya also pledged to end all military trade with North Korea. [48] [49]
Libya’s ballistic missile development effort had been concentrated at three facilities, a solid propellant plant and rocket engine test stand at Tarhuna, the Al-Fajer Alga Did factory for Scud maintenance and modification, and the liquid fueled refurbishment plant run by the Central Organization for Electronic Research in Tripoli. [50] In the latter part of 2004, experts from the IAEA, the U.S. and the U.K concluded that Libya’s missile program had been heavily dependant on foreign assistance, poorly managed, and mostly focused on maintaining its Scud B inventory. They also found that Libya had only been able to gain five Scud-C guidance systems, and was thus very much in the early stages of its Scud-C development effort. Furthermore, the authorities concluded that contrary to Israeli intelligence claims in the 1990s, Libya had not been able to acquire a Nodong type missile system. Most of the facility components for the Al-Fajer plant had been provided by North Korea, and Iran had provided assistance to the Central Organization for Electronic Research. Yugoslavian companies and individuals had also been involved in Libya’s missile development effort, with all wind tunnel tests being conducted in Belgrade. [51]
Current Capabilities
Libya’s current missile arsenal is still characterized by its acquisitions from the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The Libyan Army deploys four SSM brigades with Scud-B missiles and around 40 FROG 7 rockets. Due to poor management and lack of advanced military infrastructure many of the estimated 80 Scud-Bs are believed to be kept in storage or simply inoperable. The Libyan armed forces also lack appropriate training and organization to effectively deploy its SRBMs, and its radar capabilities remain outdated. Libya’s Army has around 3,000 anti-tank missiles, including Milans, AT-3 Saggers, AT-4 Spigots, and AT-5 Spandrels. [52]
Libya’s Navy’s missile capabilities are equally outdated, incorporating around 40-50 SS-N-2C Styx ASCMs (83 km range, 513kg payload), four batteries of SA-N-4 Gecko SAMs, and roughly 32 Otomat Mark I/II missile launchers (80km range, 210kg payload). The missiles are deployed on two 1,900 ton Koni-class missile frigates (four Styx missiles, one SA-4 battery each), two 660 ton Nanuchka II-class corvettes (four Styx missiles , one SA-4 battery each), eight 311 ton Combattante IIG-class missile patrol boats (four Otomat launchers each), six 245 ton Osa II-class missile patrol boats (four Styx missiles each), and a few selected shore batteries for coastal defense. The Navy also has 25 Mi-14 Haze ASW and 7 SA-341 Superfrelon ASW and SAR helicopters which are all capable of carrying the French AM-39 Exocet ASCM, but it is unclear whether Libya’s Navy actually possesses the French Exocet ASCMs. [53] [54]
With the end of arms sanctions following its decision to disclose and dismantle its WMD capabilities, Libya has recently stepped up efforts to modernize its missile forces. In August 2007, Libya signed a confirmed deal worth around $400 million with France for MBDA’s Milan anti-tank missile and Tetra communications equipment. [55] [56]
In mid-2007, the first reports appeared that Libya had secured a tentative agreement with Russia about the sale of The S-300PMU 2 Favorit (SA-20 Gargoyle) and Tor M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet) air defense systems. The Favorit version of the S-300 series has an improved range of 200km and is capable of engaging enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles flying from 10 m to 27 km above earth at speeds up to 10,000 km/h. [57] The Tor M2E short range anti-air defense system is an upgraded version of the original Tor first fielded in 1986. The M2E version carries up eight 9M331 missiles, and a new radar system capable of processing up to 48, and engaging up to four targets. [58] [59] Before President Putin’s visit to Libya on 16 April 2008, rumors emerged again about the alleged deal. According to sources within Russia’s defense industry, the alleged contract valued at $2.5 billion, was to include several S-300PMU 2 Favorit air defense systems, around 20 Tor M2E and Buk M1-2 anti-aircraft missile systems, and a modernization of the Soviet made weaponry in Libya’s armed forces. [60] However, at present these reports remain unconfirmed.
Key Sources:
[1] Statement by Joseph Bermudez Jr. Before The House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights, September 14, 1993. p. 7.
[2] Robert Waller, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 2: Libya, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 8.
[3] Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 4, 1999, p. 83.
[4] Robert Waller, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 2: Libya, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.
[5] Statement by Joseph Bermudez Jr. Before The House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights, September 14, 1993, p. 7.
[6] Thomas Scheuer, "Old Hand Trapped," Focus, December 3, 2001, p. 84-87, Open Source Document EUP200112040000420.
[7] Hans Leyendecker, "A Veteran of Arms Dealing, September 18, 1998, p. 11, Open Source Document FTS19980919000465.
[8] "Proliferation von Massenvernichtungsmitteln und Traegerraketen," Bundesnachrichtendienst (German Federal Intelligence Service), April 1997.
[9] Statement by Joseph Bermudez Jr. Before The House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights, September 14, 1993, p. 7.
[10] Robert Waller, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 2: Libya, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.
[11] Statement by Joseph Bermudez Jr. Before The House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights, September 14, 1993, p. 7.
[12] Robert Waller, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 2: Libya, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.
[13] "Lampedusa played 'key role' / Libya attacks Italian radar base in response to US bombing raid," The Guardian, April 17, 1986.
[14] E. J. Dionne Jr, "Italian Isle, Site Of U.S. Base, Is Fearful Of Qaddafi's Anger," The New York Times, May 27, 1986, p. A1.
[15] Loren Jenkins, "Italy Takes Over U.S. Base; Coast Guard Navigation Site on Island Threatened by Libya," Washington Post, June 2, 1986, p. A20.
[16] "Libya strikes back at US signals base / Attack on Italian Lampedusa in retaliation for American air raids," The Guardian, April 16, 1986.
[17] "Libya trying to buy Chinese SSMs, says Israel," Flight International, May 23, 1990.
[18] Statement by Joseph Bermudez Jr. Before The House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights, September 14, 1993, p. 7.
[19] "Scud components may have been bound for Libya," Jane’s Missile and Rockets, July 1, 2000.
[20] Statement by Joseph Bermudez Jr. Before The House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights, September 14, 1993. p. 8.
[21] Joseph Bermudez, "Ballistic Missile Development in Libya," Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1, 2003.
[22] "Libya sells Al-Fatah design to Iranians," Flight International, April 14, 1993.
[23] Bill Gertz, "Serbia is helping Libya with ballistic missiles, CIA says," The Washington Times, November 12, 1996, p. A3.
[24] Libya-SAIC brief/CNS Document. (available on request)
[25] Robert Waller, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 2: Libya, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 9.
[26] Michael Evans, "Libya and Iran 'plan joint missile project'," The Times, April 1, 1995.
[27] Rudolf Lambrecht and Leo Mueller, "Germans involved in Libyan, Iraqi Missile Production," Stern, February 26, 1998. p. 34. Open Source Document FTS 19980226000293.
[28] Rudolf Lambrecht and Leo Mueller, "Germans involved in Libyan, Iraqi Missile Production," Stern, February 26, 1998. p. 34. Open Source Document FTS 19980226000293.
[29] Hans Leyendecker, "A Veteran of Arms Dealing, Sueddeutsche Zeitung September 18, 1998, p. 11, Open Source Document FTS19980919000465.
[30] Thomas Scheuer, "Old Hand Trapped," Focus, December 3, 2001, p. 84-87, Open Source Document EUP200112040000420.
[31] Hans Leyendecker, "A Veteran of Arms Dealing, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, September 18, 1998, p. 11, Open Source Document FTS19980919000465.
[32] Thomas Scheuer, "Raketen-Kayser unter Beschuss," Focus, September 1, 1997, www.focus.de/ politik/ deutschland/ ruestung- raketen- kayser- unter- beschuss_aid_166724.html.
[33] "India Seizes Suspect Missile Ship," The Courier Mail, July 5, 1999, p. 13.
[34] Joby Warrick, "On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory," The Washington Post, August 14, 2003, p. A01.
[35] "Seizure of the North Korean ship Ku-Wol San by the Indian Coast Guard", Aviation Week, July 26, 1999, p. 25.
[36] "India detains North Korean ship with missile machinery," Deutsche Presse Agentur, July 4, 1999.
[37] "Libya; Libya's Scud Missiles?" North Africa Journal, January 13, 2000.
[38] "Scud parts seized by UK customs," Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, February 1, 2000.
[39] Richard Bond, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Targeting Iran and North Korea?" British American Security Information Council, Occasional Paper No. 53, January 2007, p. 5.
[40] Statement by Joseph Bermudez Jr. Before The House Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On International Security, International Organizations, And Human Rights, September 14, 1993, p. 7.
[41] Bill Gertz, "Beijing delivered missile technology to Libya, U.S. says," The Washington Times, April 13, 2000, p. A1.
[42] "Scud components may have been bound for Libya," Jane’s Missile and Rockets, July 1, 2000.
[43] Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Iran Helps Libya," The Washington Times, February 2, 2001, p. A8.
[44] Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. 2.
[45] Gawdat Baghat, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Libya," International Relations, Vol. 22 (I), 2008, p. 105.
[46] Robin Hughes, "Libya ships nuclear weapon material to US," Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 4, 2004.
[47] Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, Human Rights and the Future of U.S.-Libyan Relations, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Statement of the Honorable Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, March 10, 2004, p. 20.
[48] "Libya promises to cut Scud-B missiles' range," The International Herald Tribune, April 12, 2000, p. 7.
[49] Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, Background
[50] Andrew Koch, "More Details of Libyan WMD revealed," Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 31, 2004.
[51] Andrew Koch, "Libya’s missile programme secrets revealed," August 18, 2005.
[52] Andrew H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Middle East," Praeger: Westport, Conneticut, 2004, 96, 100-101
[53] Andrew H. Cordesman, "The Military Balance in the Middle East," Praeger: Westport, Conneticut, 2004, p. 102-103.
[54] "Middle East Military Balance," The Institute for National Security Studies, www.inss.org.il/ upload/ (FILE)1188812942.pdf.
[55] Peter Lewis, "France agrees Libyan arms sale," Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 15, 2007.
[56] Gerrard Cowan, "Suitors eye Libyan market," Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 26, 2007.
[57] "S-300PMU2 Favorit SA-20 GARGOYLE," Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ world/ russia/ s-300pmu2.htm.
[58] Stefan Marx, "Russia's debt deal with Libya clears way for weapon sales," Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, May 2, 2008.
[59] "The TOR-M2E anti-aircraft missile system," Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol", www.kupol.ru/ en/ AntiaircraftMissileSystems/ Tor-M2E.
[60] Vladimir Petrov, "Russia cancels Libya’s debt in return for contracts," Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 18, 2008.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
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