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Updated September 2009
Biological Overview
Introduction[1]
Libya signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in December 1971;[2] however, it declared it would only be bound to the protocol as long as other signatory countries did not pose a threat to Libya's sovereignty by failing to comply with the protocol. Libya then signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) without reservations in 1982.[3] Between the time Libya signed the BTWC and late 2003, there were a number of allegations, particularly in the 1990s, that Libya had pursued offensive biological warfare (BW) capabilities and had produced limited quantities of proscribed biological agents in violation of its international commitments. In December 2003, Libya renounced its pursuit of all WMD development activities, including BW, and agreed to allow inspections to prove its commitment to complying with international agreements.[4] The results of these inspections, and their relationship to earlier intelligence community assessments were summarized by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. In its final report, the Commission noted that "no evidence of an expected small scale Libyan biological weapons program has been uncovered."[5]
History
For decades no hard data were available from open sources about Libya's effort to develop and produce biological weapons. In the mid-1990s, it was believed that the Libyan BW program "[was] in the early research and development stage."[6] Libya's BW capabilities reportedly included an unconfirmed number of microbial and toxin agents, although Libya reportedly had not yet succeeded in its efforts to develop effective delivery systems.[7] Western intelligence agencies lacked any firm information pointing to the locations of the facilities believed to be manufacturing BW agents. It was believed, however, that Libya's Rabta facility, primarily a chemical weapons (CW) plant, might also contain biological research facilities.[8] It seemed possible that, like Rabta, the Tarhunah CW plant could also manufacture biological agents in the near future.
In early 1995, U.S. intelligence sources claimed that Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi was attempting to recruit South African scientists to Tripoli to assist in Libya's development of biological weapons.[9] These scientists had secretly developed biological weapons that were allegedly used to assassinate opponents of South Africa's apartheid regime.[10] Even if Libya had received such foreign assistance, it would have needed several years to develop the capability to weaponize BW agents. As Libya and other developing countries discovered, developing effective BW munitions and missile warheads is technologically demanding because of the need to avoid killing the microbial agents in the process of dissemination, and to disperse the agents at the proper altitude. Nevertheless, Libya's mere possession of BW agents would have represented a significant military threat. Furthermore there was concern that Libya might supply BW to terrorist groups based on its past patterns of support for anti-Israeli and anti-Western terrorists.
May 2002 allegations that Libya had been seeking to acquire BW technology from Cuba further damaged Libya's international relations, especially with the United States.[11] A November 2003 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report concluded that "evidence suggested that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities that could be used to develop and produce BW agents."[12] It should be noted that seeking to purchase dual-use equipment is not in itself proof of the existence of a BW program. In December 2003, after a period of lengthy negotiations with the United States and Britain, Libya agreed to open its WMD programs to international inspection and accept their elimination in return for a normalization of its international relations.
Status
As part of its announcement on December 19, 2003 that it would dismantle its WMD programs, Tripoli also agreed to adhere to its BTWC commitments. Following the announcement, U.S. and British representatives were allowed to enter Libya to monitor and verify the destruction of Libya's WMD. They did not locate evidence of an advanced BW program, but they did corroborate that Libya had a limited research and development program for BW. Although U.S. and British inspectors met with many Libyan officials, scientists, and technicians, they were not able to fully clarify the extent of the Libyan BW effort. Their Libyan interlocutors either denied any knowledge of the existence of an offensive BW program or claimed that such work had not progressed beyond planning before being cancelled at the express order of Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. However, despite efforts to procure dual-use technologies, Libya did not have the technological base to weaponize biological agents irrespective of any interest to do so. In return for accepting international inspections, Libya expected the trade sanctions imposed since 1992 to be lifted, and the United States responded positively lifting WMD related sanctions in 2004.[13] In 2006 the U.S. Department of State removed Libya from its list of State Sponsors of Terror resulting in the lifting of further sanctions.[14]
Sources:
[1] This report is a revised and updated version of Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit
of WMD," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 92-99.
[2] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 1980 (Taylor & Francis Ltd. and Crane, Russak & Company, 1980), pp. 376-78.
[3] "Ratifications to the BTWC," SIPRI, 1995-2004, projects.sipri.se/ cbw/ docs/ bw-btwc-rat.html.
[4] Tyler, Patrick E., "Qaddafi's New Tune Confounds," New York Times, December 30, 2003, www.iht.com/ ihtsearch.php? id=123192& owner=(NYT)& date=20040219154355; and "Libya to Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction," JANA, December 19, 2003, in FBIS Document GMP20031219000267, 19 December 2003.
[5] Unclassified Version of the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 253, www.gpoaccess.gov/ wmd/ pdf/ full_ wmd_ report.pdf.
[6] Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996), p. 27.
[7] Philip Finnegan, "Libya Ceases Work on Chem Factory," Defense News, December 16-22, 1996, p. 1.
[8] Bill Gertz, "Satellites Spot Poison-Bomb Plant in Libya," The Washington Times, March 5, 1991, p. 3.
[9] James Adams, "Libya Reportedly Seeking Biological Weapons Program; South African Angle," The Sunday Times, February 26, 1995, p. 1.
[10] Ibid.
[11] "Cuba Markets WMD Technology to Iran, Libya," Vol. 4, No. 180, Middle East Newsline, May 15, 2002, www.menewsline.com/ stories/ 2002/ june/ 06_01_1.html; "U.S. Warns Libya, Syriato End WMD Programs," Vol. 4, No. 168, Middle East News, May 7, 2002, www.menewsline.com/ stories/ 2002/ may/ 05_21_4.html.
[12] CIA, "Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003."
[13] "Bush Eases Many Sanctions on Libya," Reuters, April 24, 2004.
[14] Elise Labott, "U.S. to restore relations with Libya," CNN, May 15, 2006, www.cnn.com/ 2006/ US/ 05/ 15/ libya/ index.html
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
