Introduction[1]

Libya signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in December 1971;[2] however, it declared it would only be bound to the protocol as long as other signatory countries did not pose a threat to Libya's sovereignty by failing to comply with the protocol. Libya then signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) without reservations in 1982.[3] Between the time Libya signed the BTWC and late 2003, there were a number of allegations that Libya had pursued offensive biological warfare (BW) capabilities and had produced limited quantities of proscribed biological agents in violation of its international commitments. Regardless of these allegations, Libya proved unable to move beyond the research and development phase of BW development due to a poor technological base. In December 2003, Libya renounced its pursuit of all WMD development activities, including BW, and agreed to allow inspections to prove its commitment to complying with international agreements.[4]

History

For decades no hard data were available from open sources about Libya's effort to develop and produce biological weapons. In the mid-1990s it was believed that the Libyan BW program "[was] in the early research and development stage."[5] Libya's BW capabilities reportedly included an unconfirmed number of microbial and toxin agents, although Libya reportedly did not succeed in developing effective delivery systems.[6] Despite little knowledge about the locations of the facilities that manufacture BW agents, Libya's Rabta facility, primarily a chemical weapons (CW) plant, was believed to also contain biological research facilities.[7] It seemed possible that, like Rabta, the Tarhunah CW plant could also manufacture biological agents in the near future.

In early 1995, U.S. intelligence sources claimed that Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi was attempting to recruit South African scientists to Tripoli to assist in Libya's development of biological weapons.[8] These scientists had secretly developed BW that were allegedly used to assassinate opponents of South Africa's apartheid regime.[9] Despite such foreign assistance, it would have taken several years for Libya to be capable of weaponizing BW agents. As Libya and other developing countries discovered, developing effective BW munitions and missile warheads is technologically demanding because of the need to avoid killing the microbial agents in the process of dissemination, and to disperse the agents at the proper altitude. Nevertheless, Libya's mere possession of BW agents represented a significant military threat because dissemination by terrorists of an agent like anthrax could have inflicted mass civilian casualties.

Allegations that Libya had been seeking to acquire BW technology from Cuba in May 2002 further damaged Libya's international relations, especially with the United States.[10] There were also reports in June 2003 that Libya was employing approximately 400 Iraqi scientists in its biological and chemical weapons programs. A November 2003 CIA report concluded that "evidence suggested that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities that could be used to develop and produce BW agents" In the first half of the year.[11]

Status

As part of its announcement on December 19, 2003 that it would dismantle its WMD programs, Tripoli also agreed to adhere to its commitments under the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. Following the announcement, U.S. and British inspectors were allowed to enter Libya to monitor and verify the destruction of Libya's WMD. They have not located evidence of an advanced BW program, but they did corroborate that Libya had a limited research and development program for BW. However, Libya did not have the technological base to weaponize biological agents. In return for accepting international inspections, Libya expected the trade sanctions imposed since 1992 to be lifted, and the United States responded positively. Libya's renunciation of WMD consequently prompted the Bush administration to allow companies to resume trade and investment between Libya and the United States.[12]

Key Sources:
[1] This report is a revised and updated version of Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of WMD," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 92-99.
[2] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 1980 (Taylor & Francis Ltd. and Crane, Russak & Company, 1980), pp. 376-78.
[3] "Ratifications to the BTWC," SIPRI, 1995-2004, http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-rat.html.
[4] Tyler, Patrick E., "Qaddafi's New Tune Confounds," New York Times, 30 December 2003, http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=123192&owner=(NYT)&
date=20040219154355; and "Libya to Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction," JANA, 19 December 2003, in FBIS Document GMP20031219000267, 19 December 2003.
[5] Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996), p. 27.
[6] Philip Finnegan, "Libya Ceases Work on Chem Factory," Defense News, December 16-22, 1996, p. 1.
[7] Bill Gertz, "Satellites Spot Poison-Bomb Plant in Libya," The Washington Times, March 5, 1991, p. 3.
[8] James Adams, "Libya Reportedly Seeking Biological Weapons Program; South African Angle," The Sunday Times, February 26, 1995, p. 1.
[9] Ibid.
[10] "Cuba Markets WMD Technology to Iran, Libya," Vol. 4, No. 180, Middle East Newsline, 15 May 2002, http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2002/
june/06_01_1.html ; "U.S. Warns Libya, Syria to End WMD Programs," Vol. 4, No. 168, Middle East News, 7 May 2002, http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2002/may/05_21_4.html.
[11] CIA, "Attachment A: Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003."
[12] "Bush Eases Many Sanctions on Libya," Reuters, 24 April 2004.

	Updated October 2008