IntroductionOn 19 December 2003, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) agreed to eliminate all materials, equipment, and programs resulting in the production of nuclear or other internationally proscribed weapons. Libya's leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi admitted that, in contravention of its international obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Libya had pursued a nuclear weapons program, allegedly to counter the covert Israeli nuclear program. In 2004, the United States and Britain dismantled Libya's nuclear weapons infrastructure with oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Libya signed the NPT in 1968, ratified it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980. Despite these commitments, Libya under Gaddafi sought, with varying degrees of success, nuclear technologies, fissile materials, weapons designs and know-how from several countries including, China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union/Russia, Belgium, and Ukraine. In 1979, a Soviet-supplied nuclear reactor was installed at a research center at Tajura. Prior to its December 2003 admission, the nuclear program that Libya had declared to the IAEA consisted of a 10MW IRT research reactor (a pool-type research reactor using 80% enriched uranium) in operation and a critical assembly (100W), both located at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). The total quantity of declared nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards amounted to 20 kilograms of uranium-235 in highly enriched fuel and 1,000 metric tons of uranium ore concentrate.[1] In fact, Libya's nuclear weapons program aided by the transfer from Pakistan and other countries of centrifuges and related equipment, depleted uranium hexaflouride gas (UF6), technical design data, and a fission weapon blueprint, was more advanced.
Gaddafi's decision in December 2003 to reveal the true scope of Libya's nuclear ambitions was most likely motivated by four primary factors: 1) his increasing desire to regain admission to the international community by renouncing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 2) his fear that Libya might be subject to a U.S. invasion on the grounds that it possessed WMD; 3) the interception in October 2003 of a ship bound for Libya with a cargo of Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts manufactured in Malaysia; and 4) the promise that long-standing international sanctions imposed because of Libya's terrorist activities would be lifted, leading to economic and other benefits.[2] In return for assurances from the United States and Britain, Libya admitted to the IAEA that it had been engaged for more than a decade in the development of a uranium enrichment capability and had acquired Chinese-origin nuclear weapon design and fabrication documents. Following these admissions, the IAEA director general and Agency inspectors visited several sites involved in Libya's undeclared nuclear program. In a subsequent report, the IAEA concluded: "Starting in the early 1980s and continuing until the end of 2003, Libya imported nuclear material and conducted a wide variety of nuclear activities which it had failed to report to the Agency as required under its Safeguards Agreement."[3] These activities, which surprised Western intelligence services, included separating plutonium, and acquiring a significant amount of technical know-how regarding the key elements for nuclear weapons production.[4] Libya agreed to transfer sensitive nuclear-related materials, documents, and previously undeclared nuclear materials to the United States; conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA; and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In 2004, officials from Libya, the U.S., and the U.K., began the laborious process of disarming Libya. This was carried out under IAEA supervision and lasted till September of the same year. The process was divided into three phases, and upon the successful completion of each phase, the Bush administration improved relations with Tripoli in incremental steps, culminating with the full restoration of diplomatic ties by May 31, 2006.[5][6] By August 2005, the U.S. had already signed a bilateral agreement with Libya specifying joint research and scientific cooperation on non-power applications of nuclear energy.[7] More recently, in December 2007, Libya signed a cooperation agreement with France, covering the development of civilian applications of nuclear energy and the supply of reactors for sea-water desalination.[8]
History
1968-1990
While still under the rule of the pro-Western King Idris, Libya signed the NPT in July 1968. Even though Idris was overthrown in a 1969 coup led by the Revolutionary Command Council headed by Gaddafi, Libya still ratified the NPT in 1975. However, many reports indicate that Gaddafi, whose rise to power was partly driven by resentment over the 1967 defeat of the Arabs by Israel, began seeking a nuclear capability shortly after taking power and adopted a strong anti-Israel stance.
Owing to its relatively low level of technical development, Libya’s efforts focused mostly on foreign suppliers. In 1970, for example, Libya reportedly made an unsuccessful attempt to purchase nuclear weapons from China.[9] And in 1978, Libyan agents allegedly tried to buy nuclear weapons from India.[10] There are also many reports of nuclear dealings during the 1970s between Libya and Pakistan. These allegedly involved Libyan assistance to Pakistan in acquiring access to uranium ore concentrate from neighboring Niger in return for Pakistani nuclear assistance to Libya.[11] Whether these dealings laid the basis for later Libyan-Pakistani nuclear cooperation remains unclear.
Evidence released by the IAEA in 2004 suggests that during the 1970s and 1980s, Libya decided to pursue both pathways, i.e., uranium and plutonium based nuclear weapons. Steps were taken in the 1970s to gain access to uranium ore, uranium conversion facilities, and enrichment technologies that together would have allowed Libya to produce weapons-grade uranium. This activity was conducted covertly and in violation of IAEA safeguards, with one obvious example being Libya’s pursuit of foreign supplies of uranium ore concentrate (UOC). Reports indicate that during the 1970s, Libya imported 1,200 tons of uranium ore concentrate from French-controlled mines in Niger without declaring it to the IAEA, as required by the NPT.[12] Libya admitted to the IAEA in 2004 that it had actually imported 2,263 metric tons of uranium ore concentrate from 1978 to 1981, but only declared the import of 1,000 metric tons.[13] The remaining 1,263 metric tons were thus, not subject to IAEA safeguards and could have been used in covert nuclear activities.
Libya also worked to acquire uranium conversion facilities, which would have enabled it to convert the UOC to a form more suitable for enrichment. In 1982, Libya attempted to purchase a plant for manufacturing uranium tetrafluoride from the Belgian firm Belgonucleaire. U.S. analysts suspected that the intended use for the plant was to produce uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for a centrifuge uranium enrichment program (like that pursued by Pakistan). At the time, Libya had no declared nuclear facilities that required uranium tetrafluoride, and the purchase was refused.[14] However, this refusal did not discourage Libya which in 2004 admitted to the IAEA that it acquired a pilot-scale uranium conversion facility in 1984.[15] The IAEA report does not identify the country that supplied Libya with this facility. The plant was fabricated in portable modules in accordance with Libya’s specifications. These modules were received in 1986, but then placed in storage until 1998.[16] Libya has also admitted that during the 1980s, it conducted undeclared laboratory-scale uranium conversion experiments at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center.[17] Along these same lines, Libya has now reported exporting several kilograms of UOC in 1985 to a "nuclear weapon state" for processing into various uranium compounds. Libya subsequently received a variety of compounds back from the state in question, including 39 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride. This export was also not reported to the IAEA by either Libya or the nuclear weapon state.[18] The IAEA report does not name the nuclear weapon state involved in this transaction, but David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security said the Soviet Union and China were the most likely suspects, although he added, "I think it's hard to know...It was a time when people weren't scrutinizing these things very carefully."[19]
Uranium enrichment equipment and technology was also sought by Libya during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1973, Libya tried to purchase 20 calutrons to enrich uranium from the French company Thomson-CSF. The deal, apparently supported by top company officials, was blocked by the French government because of the obvious use enrichment technology would have to an undeclared nuclear weapons program.[20] Later, in the 1980s, a foreign expert began a research and design program at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center in Libya aimed at producing gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.[21] The foreign expert was reportedly a former employee of a German firm.[22] However, Libya has told the IAEA that by the time the foreign expert concluded his work in 1992, Libya was not yet able to produce an operating centrifuge, and no centrifuge experiments involving nuclear materials had been conducted. However, technical expertise useful for the next stage of centrifuge development and design had been acquired.[23] According to the IAEA, after the German expert left, the uranium enrichment program lost momentum, and was not reinvigorated until after 1995.[24]
In order to build its nuclear expertise, Libya also pursued "peaceful" cooperation with the Soviet Union, under IAEA safeguards. The main result of Soviet-Libyan nuclear cooperation was the completion in 1979 of the 10 MW research reactor at Tajura. This reactor offered Libya the opportunity to explore plutonium production technology, which Libya did, while evading IAEA safeguards intended to detect such activities. Between 1984 and 1990, Libya produced several dozen small uranium oxide and uranium metal targets, a number of which were irradiated in the Tajura reactor to produce radioisotopes. Thirty-eight of these targets were dissolved and the radioisotopes extracted in hot cells. Libya has reported to the IAEA that very small amounts of plutonium were extracted from at least two of these targets.[25] Presumably the data gathered in these experiments would have proved useful if Libya had decided to pursue plutonium production more actively.
Libya did make efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to buy a reactor larger than the one at Tajura. In 1976, negotiations were held between France and Libya for the purchase of a 600 MW reactor. A preliminary agreement was reached, but strong objection by the international community led France to cancel the project.[26] At one point, the Belgian firm Belgonucleaire was in discussions to provide engineering support and equipment for this proposed project, but in 1984, U.S. pressure led the firm to refuse the contract.[27] Discussions with the Soviet Union about power reactor projects continued, but never produced a final agreement. By the late 1980s, Libya's nuclear program began to be hampered by economic sanctions prompted by Quadhdhafi's support of terrorism. In 1986, for example, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Libya, which were later expanded in 1992 and 1996.[28]
1990-2003: Nuclear Weapons Program Intensifies
By the early 1990s, Libya's support of international terrorism, in particular the 1988 bombing of a U.S. airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, had prompted the imposition of UN economic sanctions. These sanctions restricted Libya's foreign trade, and probably restricted the funds available to the Libyan nuclear program. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, reports indicate that Libya was trying to exploit the chaos generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to former Soviet nuclear technology, expertise, and materials. In 1992, for example, an official of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, one of Russia's leading nuclear research centers, claimed that Libya had unsuccessfully tried to recruit two of his colleagues to work at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center in Libya.[29] Other reports also suggested that Russian scientists had been hired to work on a covert Libyan nuclear weapons program.
Throughout the 1990s, Gaddafi renewed calls for the production of nuclear weapons in Libya[30] and pursued new avenues for nuclear technology procurement,[31] while publicly, if grudgingly, supporting the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Libya initially rejected an indefinite extension because Israel had never joined the treaty; however, Libya eventually supported the extension. In 1996, Gaddafi stated that Arab states should develop a nuclear weapon to counter Israel's presumed nuclear weapons capability. Nonetheless, in April 1996, Libya signed the African-Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Later the same year, Libya voted against the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the UN General Assembly because it did not provide a deadline for nuclear disarmament. (Libya eventually signed the CTBT in November 2001 and ratified it in January 2004.)[32]
According to the IAEA director general's report of February 2004, "[i]n July 1995, Libya made a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities" including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. In 1997, foreign manufacturers, including Pakistan, provided 20 pre-assembled L-1 centrifuges[33] and components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges and related parts. One of the 20 pre-assembled rotors was used to install a completed single centrifuge at the Al Hashan site, which was first successfully tested in October 2000. Libya reported to the IAEA that no nuclear material had been used during tests on L-1 centrifuges.[34]
In 1997, Libya began receiving nuclear weapons-related aid from Dr. A.Q. Khan, the chief architect of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and confessed proliferator of nuclear technologies to several countries of concern, including Iran and North Korea. (This cooperation continued until fall 2003 when Khan's clandestine collaboration with these countries became public following Libya's disclosures about its efforts to build nuclear weapons.) In 1997, Khan supplied Libya with the 20 assembled L-1 centrifuges[35] and components for an additional 200 more for a pilot facility. In 2001, Libya received almost two tons of UF6; while some reports claim that the UF6 was provided by Pakistan,[36] others cite evidence that it originated in North Korea.[37] IAEA sources believe that the amount of UF6 is consistent with the requirements for a pilot enrichment facility. If enriched, the UF6 could produce a single nuclear weapon.[38]
In late 1997, Libya also renewed its nuclear cooperation with Russia and in March 1998, Libya signed a contract with the Russian company Atomenergoeksport for a partial overhaul of the Tajura Nuclear Research Center.[39]
In late 2000, Libya's nuclear activities accelerated. Libyan authorities informed the IAEA that at that time, Libya began to order centrifuges and components from other countries with the intention of installing a centrifuge plant to make enriched uranium. Libya also imported equipment for a fairly large precision machine shop (located at Janzour) and acquired a large stock of maraging steel and high strength aluminum alloy to build a domestic centrifuge production capability.[40] In September 2000, Libya received two L-2 centrifuges (European-designed centrifuges more advanced than the L-1). In late 2000, Libya began to progressively install 9-machine, 19-machine, and 64-machine L-1 centrifuge cascades into a large hall at Al Hashan.[41] (Only the 9-centrifuge machine was completely assembled in 2002.[42]) Libya also ordered 10,000 L-2 centrifuges from Pakistan. By late December 2002, component parts for the centrifuges began arriving in Libya.[43] However, in October 2003, U.S. intelligence agencies seized a consignment of centrifuge-related equipment bound for Libya in a northern Mediterranean port.[44] Subsequent investigations revealed that many of these components were manufactured by the Scomi Precision Engineering SDN BHD plant in Malaysia with "roles played by foreign technical, manufacturing, and transshipment experts, including A.Q. Khan and his associates at A.Q. Khan Laboratories in Pakistan, B.S.A. Tahgir in Malaysia and Dubai, and several Swiss, British, and German nationals."[45]
Libya sought not only the capability to enrich uranium to weapon-grade but also the know-how to design and fabricate nuclear weapons.[46] In either late 2001 or early 2002, A.Q. Khan provided Libya with the blueprint of an actual fission weapon.[47] According to the February 2004 IAEA report, Libya acknowledged receiving from a foreign source in late 2001 or early 2002, documentation related to nuclear weapon design and fabrication. "The documents presented by Libya include a series of engineering drawings relating to nuclear weapons components, notes, (many of them handwritten) related to the fabrication of weapon components. The notes indicate the involvement of other parties and will require follow-up."[48] U.S. intelligence analysts believe the documents included a nuclear weapon design that China tested in the late 1960s and later shared with Pakistan. Apparently the design documents produced by Libya were transferred from Pakistan and contained information in both Chinese and English, establishing their Chinese origin. The weapon blueprint sets forth the design parameters and engineering specifications for constructing an implosion weapon weighing over 1,000 pounds that could be delivered using aircraft or a large ballistic missile; Pakistan has most likely advanced to building more advanced nuclear weapons.[49] Libya told IAEA investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs and it would have had to ask the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear weapon.[50] The IAEA is still investigating the extent of Libya's knowledge in the weapons-design area. It is believed that along with on location assistance, Pakistani nuclear scientists also offered briefings for their Libyan counterparts in Casablanca and Istanbul.[51]
Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons
At the same time that Libya pursued centrifuge technology and nuclear weapons designs, its leader Colonel Gaddafi began to make overtures to the West in hopes of having economic and other sanctions lifted. Reportedly, Libya had established secret communications with the United States as early as 1999 regarding terrorist activities and WMD.[52] According to some analysts, the September 11 attacks, which Gaddafi denounced, and the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq increased Libya's desire to make peace with the United States.[53] In March 2003, days before the invasion of Iraq, Gaddafi's personal envoys contacted President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair about Libya's willingness to dismantle all WMD programs. Subsequently, at Gaddafi's direction, Libyan officials provided British and U.S. officers with documentation and additional details on Libya's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile activities.[54] In August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility for the 1988 bombing of a U.S. commercial airliner, Pan Am 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland, and agreed to pay millions of dollars to each of the victims' families. In response, the UN Security Council voted to end international sanctions, but the Bush administration abstained, saying that Libya still had to answer questions about its WMD and meddling in African conflicts.[55]
Despite its ongoing negotiations with the West, Libya continued to procure nuclear technologies from other countries. In October 2003, British and U.S. ships operating pursuant to the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, intercepted a German cargo ship heading to Libya from Dubai with a cargo of centrifuge parts allegedly based on Pakistani designs.[56] Following the seizure of the ship, Libya reportedly allowed U.S. and British officials to visit 10 previously secret sites and dozens of Libyan laboratories and military factories to search for evidence of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities and for chemical and missile programs. Finally, on December 19, Gaddafi announced his commitment to disclose and dismantle all WMD programs in his country. In a letter to the UN Security Council, Libya reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT and agreed to abide by the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (allowing for additional and more intrusive inspections of nuclear-related sites), and to receive inspections teams to verify its new commitments.[57] President Bush stated that with Gaddafi's announcement, "Libya has begun the process of rejoining the community of nations."[58] One news source quotes Gaddafi as claiming that his decision to forego WMD programs was based on national security and economic interests. In an address to the Libyan People's National Congress, he reportedly said, "Today it becomes a problem to have a nuclear bomb. At the time, it was maybe the fashion to have a nuclear bomb. Today, you have no enemy. Who's the enemy?"[59]
Several factors probably contributed to Libya's decision to renounce its nuclear program. First, 30 years of economic sanctions significantly limited oil exports and hurt the Libyan economy. Second, Libya's nuclear program progressed fairly slowly and at a great cost to the country, both economically[60] and politically. Third, the elimination of WMD was a prerequisite to normalizing relations with the West, and ending Libya's pariah status reportedly had become particularly important to Gaddafi. Fourth, according to U.S. officials, Libya wanted to avoid the fate of Iraq, which allegedly was invaded to prevent it from developing WMDs.[61] Finally, the October 2003 seizure of the ship with centrifuge-related cargo and ensuing investigations may have persuaded Libya to give up its weapons program.[62]
Current Status
IAEA Inspections and Nuclear Facility Dismantlement
Following the December 2003 announcement, a Libyan delegation informed the IAEA director general that "Libya had been engaged for more than a decade in the development of a uranium enrichment capability."[63] Libya admitted importing natural uranium, centrifuge and conversion equipment and nuclear weapons design documents. However, the Libyan officials said that the enrichment program was at an early state of development, no industrial scale facilities had been built, and that it lacked the technical know-how to interpret the weapons design documents. Libya acknowledged that some of these activities put it in violation of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and allowed the IAEA director general and Agency teams to make several visits to 18 locations related to possible nuclear weapons-related activities, and begin the process of verifying the previously undeclared nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, and activities. The Agency concluded that "initial inspections of these locations did not identify specific facilities currently dedicated to nuclear weapon component manufacturing."[64] However, it also noted that further analytical and field activities would be necessary to determine how far Libya had progressed in weapons design activities.
Pursuant to understandings with Britain and the United States, Libya agreed to transfer to the United States "sensitive design information, nuclear weapon related documents, and most of the previously undeclared enrichment equipment, subject to Agency verification requirements and procedures."[65] On January 4, 2004 Libya deposited its instrument of ratification of the CTBT and on January 22, it sent its nuclear weapons design information, including the Chinese blueprint purchased from Pakistan, to the United States. Beginning January 26, U.S. transport planes carried 55,000 pounds of documents and equipment related to Libya's nuclear and ballistic missile programs to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. The nuclear portion of this shipment "included several containers of uranium hexafluoride (used as feedstock for enrichment); 2 P-2 [L-2] centrifuges from Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories and additional centrifuge parts, equipment, and documentation."[66] This was followed by a written confirmation by Libya to the IAEA on February 18, indicating its intention to conclude an Additional Protocol and to act as if the protocol had entered into force on December 29, 2003.[67] In March, missile parts and an additional 1,000 centrifuges were shipped from Libya.[68]
Also, in March 2004, Russia began airlifting HEU from the TNRC IRT-1 research reactor to Dimitrovgrad, to begin the process of converting the Tajura reactor to use of LEU fuel. Approximately 16 kilograms of HEU were removed and shipped under this process.[69] A little over a year later the first contract was signed between the Russian fuel fabricator TVEL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), and Libyan authorities for LEU fuel supply of the Tajura reactor by TVEL. The deal was funded by the Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) that is a key component of the DoE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and the IAEA. One of the conditions for U.S. funding was the conversion to LEU of the Libyan IRT-1 reactor.[70][71] The fuel supplied by TVEL is square low density uranium oxide with 19.7% U235, produced at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant[72] and the first shipments to Tajura arrived in January 2006 with an initial 14kgs.[73]
IAEA Report and Resolution
On 20 February 2004, the IAEA director general issued a report[74] on the implementation of Libya's IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The report recounts Libya's decision to reveal its nuclear program, sign an Additional Protocol, and allow IAEA inspections of previously undeclared nuclear-related facilities. The report also recounts what Libya revealed about its nuclear procurement and development activities and the findings of the IAEA inspection teams that visited Libya in December and January. The report finds, "Starting in the early 1980s and continuing until the end of 2003, Libya imported nuclear material and conducted a wide variety of nuclear activities, which it had failed to report to the Agency as required under its Safeguards Agreement."[75] Such violations included failure to declare the import and storage of UF6 and other uranium compounds; failure to declare the fabrication and irradiation of uranium targets, and their subsequent processing, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium; and failure to provide design information for the pilot centrifuge facility, uranium conversion facility, and hot cells associated with the research reactor. The report states that these failures and Libya's acquisition of nuclear weapon design and fabrication documents are "matters of utmost concern." However, the report also notes Libya's cooperation with the ongoing investigation and its policy of full transparency.
The IAEA director general's report also touches on the larger issues—support from foreign sources and a nuclear proliferation network—related to Libya's acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technologies. "As part of verifying the correctness and completeness of Libya's declarations, the Agency is also investigating...the supply routes and sources of sensitive nuclear technology and related equipment and nuclear and non-nuclear materials. At this early stage in the Agency's investigation, it is evident already that a network has existed whereby actual technological know-how originates from one source, while the delivery of equipment and some of the materials have taken place through intermediaries, who have played a co-ordinating role, subcontracting the manufacturing to entities in yet other countries."[76] The Agency plans to take steps to ensure that sensitive nuclear technologies found in Libya will not be proliferated further.
On 10 March 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution[77] commending Libya for its cooperation with the Agency, but noting with concern the breach of its Safeguards Agreement and its acquisition of nuclear weapons designs. The resolution requests that the Director General report Libya's past failures to meet its Safeguard Agreement obligations to the UN Security Council for information purposes while commending the efforts Libya has taken to remedying its non-compliance. The resolution also requests that Libya continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
Improved relations with the U.S.
In January 2004, officials from Libya, the U.S., and the U.K. agreed on a three-phased approach to complete Libya’s disarmament. From the onset the Bush administration planned to reward Tripoli for each successfully completed phase with incremental steps to bring Libya back into the international community. In February, after Phase I, in which most of the proliferation-sensitive material was removed from Libya, the U.S. government partly lifted its travel restrictions, and allowed American companies to begin negotiations about potential business contracts with Libya[78]. Later that month the U.S. established a two-person interests section at the Belgian embassy in Tripoli.[79]
Phase II focused on removing the remnants of Libya’s nuclear, chemical, and missile programs, and redirecting former Libyan WMD scientists and technicians.[80][81] Once this phase had been completed, the Bush administration lifted most of the sanctions imposed by the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), issued a general trade and investment license for U.S. companies interested in the Libyan market, and formally opened a Liaison Office in Tripoli.[82]
By late September 2004, Phase III that dealt mostly with verification issues was completed and President Bush allowed the U.S. Export-Import Bank to facilitate American exports to Libya.[83] On September 20, President Bush issued Executive Order 13357 allowing direct air service between the U.S. and Libya, unblocking roughly $1.3 billion in Libyan assets, and permitting Libyan purchases of U.S. aircraft.[84] In October the same year, the EU sanctions on Libya that had lasted for twelve years also came to an end.[85]
On May 15, 2006 the U.S. government announced it would restore full diplomatic relations with Tripoli and also remove Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and by May 31 the Liaison Office in the Libyan capital was upgraded to full embassy status. In September the same year, President Bush signed the Iran Freedom Support Act that ended sanctions on Libya as imposed by the ILSA.[86] In January 2008, the Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al Rahman Shalgam visited Washington, D.C. to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. During the visit – the first to the U.S. by a Libyan Foreign Minister in over thirty years - a bilateral scientific cooperation agreement was signed.[87]
Nuclear Cooperation with the U.S. and France
In August 2005, Libya and the United States signed an agreement for scientific cooperation on non-power applications of nuclear energy.[88] The agreement signed by Libya’s National Bureau for Research and Development (responsible for the Tajura research facility), and the DoE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) specifies, among other things joint research and cooperation in areas like reactor operation, nuclear medicine, neutron activation analysis, radiation protection and low-level radioactive waste management and disposition focusing on the Tajura facility. American scientists participating will come from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee.[89] The agreement is made possible by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) operated by the NNSA that evolved from the Sister Laboratory Program going back to the 1980s.[90] According to Livermore scientists that have frequented Libya under the INSEP program, the Tajura IRT-1 research reactor was restarted in April 2007 with LEU fuel. The American scientists also assisted Tajura employees in the calibration of a newly introduced thermoluminescent dosimetry system.[91]
In March 2006, French and Libyan officials met for the first time at the Tajura facility to discuss a possible bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy.[92] More than two years later on July 25, 2007 in Tripoli, France and Libya issued a joint statement including a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU), in which the French Comission a’l Energie Atomique agreed to work with the Libyan National Bureau for Research and Development on improving Libya’s nuclear energy infrastructure, specifically as a source for desalinating sea water, as well as uranium exploration and production.[93][94] Analysts at that time believed that the MOU would increase the chances of the French state-owned energy giant Areva to win the bidding war for about 1,600 metric tons of yellowcake (triuranium octoxide, U3O8) stored at Tajura, and also increase the company’s chances for prospect and mining rights of possible Libyan uranium deposits in the future.[95] The outlook of French dual-use equipment exports to Libya led to sharp criticism by German politicians and diplomats given Siemens (a German company) 34% stake in Areva.[96][97] However, French officials were quick to point out that a nuclear reactor for any desalinization project in Libya would be supplied by Technicatome, a subdivision of Areva in which Siemens held no shares, and also argued that according to EU regulations any dual-use equipment export would only have to be authorized by the national government, and reported to Euratom.[98] In September 2007, Alain Bugat, the Administrator General of the French Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique said it was unclear for now which Areva reactor would eventually be supplied to Libya, but suggested that a two-loop 600 or 900MW pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) would be best suited for Libyan needs.[99] At the original meeting in Tripoli in July, Libyan officials had demanded Areva’s top of the line 1,600MW four loop PWR design, but were rebuffed by the French delegation.[100]
Later that year, in December 2007, France and Libya signed an official nuclear pact stating that Areva would supply “one or more” reactors for seawater desalination. The agreement also included other measures designed to improve Libyan nuclear energy infrastructure, like assistance in establishing regulatory and legislative frameworks for nuclear energy matters.[101]
Although welcomed, the deal has been contentious. Initially it seemed that Germany was alone in its critical view of the French Libyan nuclear agreement, but in early 2008, French nonproliferation experts also expressed their doubts about the deal, arguing that the planned nuclear technology exports carried a high risk of accidents.[102] In March 2008, the Director General of the IAEA, ElBaradei also voiced his concern, saying that France was acting too aggressive in its attempts to sell nuclear technology to countries without the required experience and nuclear infrastructure.[103] Finally in April 2008, Andre Lacoste, the Chairman of France’s Nuclear Safety Authority told a panel of legislators that specific criteria on nuclear technology exports to countries lacking nuclear experience should be agreed upon by the International Nuclear Regulators Association. Lacoste also wrote an open letter to President Sarkozy urging him to be more “pragmatic” about signing nuclear cooperation agreements with developing countries.[104]
Key Sources:
[1]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," (GOV/2004/12), February 20, 2004, p. 1.
[2]Carla Anne Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2004, p. A1.
[3]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 7.
[4]"IAEA report on Libyan nukes stuns the West," World Tribune.com, March 4, 2004, <http://216.26.163.62/2004/me_libya_03_03.html>.
[5]Wyn Q. Bowen, “Chapter 4: Dismantlement,” Adelphi Papers, 46:380 (2006), p. 75.
[6]Christopher M. Blanchard, "Libya: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, Updated January 24, 2008, Executive Summary.
[7]“U.S. and Libya Sign Sister Laboratory Agreement,” National Nuclear Security Administration, August 24, 2005, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/print/1169.htm>.
[8]Anne MacLachlan, “France, Libya initial nuclear pact, emphasize infrastructure-building,” Nucleonics Week, December 13, 2007, p. 15.
[9]Joseph Cirincione with Jon Wolfstahl and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 321; John Pike, "Libyan Nuclear Weapons," Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org;wmd/world/libya/nuclear.htm>.
[10]Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, 89.
[11]Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, 89.
[12]Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, 89.
[13]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 3.
[14]Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, 89.
[15]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 4.
[16]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 4.
[17]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 4.
[18]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 4.
[19]Joe Fiorill, "Nuclear Weapon State Processed Uranium for Libya, IAEA Says," Global Security Newswire, February 23, 2004.
[20]Kenneth Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, Simon Wiesenthal Center Middle East Defense News, August 1992, 89.
[21]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.
[22]Peter Slevin, "Libya Made Plutonium, Nuclear Watchdog Says," Washington Post, February 21, 2004, p. A15.
[23]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.
[24]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.
[25]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 6.
[26]Barnaby, Frank, The Invisible Bomb, The Nuclear Race in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), p. 98.
[27]Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2003.
[28]Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 306.
[29]Jack Kelley, "Russian Nuke Experts Wooed," USA Today, January 8, 1992; "Libya Denies Offers to Soviets," Washington Post, January 11, 1992.
[30]Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review No.4 (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 97.
[31]Reports from the early 1990s allege that Libya tried to acquire nuclear materials or know-how from China (R. Jeffrey, "U.S. Complains to China About Libyan Arms Shipment," Washington Post, 28 April 1992); Russia (N. Mengel, Courier-Mail, 20 January 1992; Lee Michael Katz, "Nuclear Threat Different, Not Gone, Panel Warned," USA Today, 23 January 1992; "Soviet Scientists," USA Today, 23 January 1992); Iraq (Tom O'Dwyer, "Libya Helps Iraq Dodge Weapons Supervision," Jerusalem Post, 1 November 1995); and Ukraine (Barbara G.B. Ferguson, "Libya, Ukraine Sign Deal on Nuclear Technology Transfer," Saudi Gazette, 12 June 1996).
[32]Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.
[33]The L-1 centrifuge is also referred to as G-1 or P-1. It is an old design of European origin. ("IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.)
[34]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 5.
[35]Khan stole the L-1 designs from the European enrichment consortium URENCO in the mid-1970s to launch Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. (David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered," March 1, 2004; Gaurav Kampani, "Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," CNS Research Story, February 23, 2004 <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm>, p. 1.)
[36]Gauray Kampani, “Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," CNS Research Story <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm>, p. 3.
[37]David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Evidence is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A1.
[38]David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Evidence is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A1.
[39]Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307.
[40]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, p. 6.
[41]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, p. 5.
[42]Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. 2.
[43]Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. 5; Gauray Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," CNS Research Story, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm>, p. 3.
[44]Gauray Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," CNS Research Story, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm>, p. 3.
[45]David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered," March 1, 2004.
[46]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, p. 6.
[47]Gauray Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," CNS Research Story, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm>, p. 4.
[48]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 6.
[49]Gauray Kampani, Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan," CNS Research Story, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm>, p. 4.
[50]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 6.
[51]David Rhodes and David E. Sanger, "Key Pakistani Is Said to Admit to Atom Transfers," New York Times, February 1, 2004.
[52]Barbara Slavin, "Libya's Rehabilitation in the Works Since Early '90s," USA Today, April 27, 2004.
[53]Carla Anne Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2004, p. A1.
[54]"President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 19, 2003.
[55]Carla Anne Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2004, p. A1.
[56]Samia Amin, "Recent Developments in Libya," February 10, 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Factsheets/
developemntsinlibya.htm>.
[57]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 2.
[58]"President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 19, 2003.
[59]"IAEA report on Libyan nukes stuns the West," World Tribune.com, March 4, 2004, <http://216.26.163.62/2004/me_libya_03_03.html>.
[60]According to Libya's top oil official, if the country had continued its nuclear program, it would "find it adding up to the billion [of dollars] quite easily." (qtd. in Carla Anne Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2004, p. A1.)
[61]Carla Anne Robbins and Tom Hamburger, "PSI Helped Push Libya to Ditch Pursuit of Arms," Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2003, p. A4.
[62]Carla Anne Robbins, "In Giving Up Arms Libya Hopes to Gain New Economic Life," Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2004, p. A1.; Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. 2.
[63]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 2.
[64]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 7.
[65]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 3.
[66]Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. 4.
[67]Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, "Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction," CRS Report for Congress, April 22, 2004, p. 5.
[68]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 3.
[69]“Libya sends Tajura HEU to Russia, prepares to convert reactor to LEU,” Nuclear Fuel, Mar, 15, 2004, p. 6.
[70]Ann MacLachlan, “Environmental analysis completed for Uzbek spent HEU return plan,” Nuclear Fuel, July 18, 2005, p. 9.
[71]“Idaho National Laboratory Scientist Securing highly Enriched Uranium Abroad,” Science Daily, May 4, 2005, <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/05/050504180103.htm>.
[72]Ann MacLachlan, “LEU fuel for Russian research reactors to be shipped this fall, Nuclear Fuel, July 18, 2005, pg 10.
[73]Alexei Breus, “Russia sends LEU package to Libya in exchange for HEU fuel,” Nuclear Fuel, Jan 2 2006, p. 14.
[74]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya".
[75]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.", p. 7.
[76]IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," p. 8.
[77]IAEA Board of Governors Resolution "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" (GOV/2004/18), adopted March 10, 2004.
[78]Wyn Q. Bowen, “Chapter 4: Dismantlement,” Adelphi Papers, 46:380 (2006), p. 75.
[79]Christopher M. Blanchard, "Libya: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, Updated January 24, 2008, p. 6.
[80]Wyn Q. Bowen, “Chapter 4: Dismantlement,” Adelphi Papers, 46:380 (2006), p. 76.
[81]“Agencies Plan Exchange with Libya’s Former Weaponeers,” Science, April 8, 2005.
[82]Wyn Q. Bowen, “Chapter 4: Dismantlement,” Adelphi Papers, 46:380 (2006), p. 76.
[83]Wyn Q. Bowen, “Chapter 4: Dismantlement,” Adelphi Papers, 46:380 (2006), p. 77.
[84]Christopher M. Blanchard, "Libya: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, Updated January 24, 2008, p. 6.
[85]Wyn Q. Bowen, “Chapter 4: Dismantlement,” Adelphi Papers, 46:380 (2006), p. 77.
[86]Christopher M. Blanchard, "Libya: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, Updated January 24, 2008, p. 6, 7.
[87]Christopher M. Blanchard, "Libya: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, Updated January 24, 2008, p. 1.
[88]“U.S. and Libya Sign Sister Laboratory Agreement,” National Nuclear Security Administration, August 24, 2005, <http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/print/1169.htm>.
[89]Daniel Horner, “U.S., Libya to collaborate on non-power nuclear work,” Nuclear Fuel, August 29, 2005, p. 9.
[90]“Scientists without borders,” Science & Technology Review, November 2007, <https://www.llnl.gov/str/Nov07/bissani.html>.
[91]“Scientists without borders,” Science & Technology Review, November 2007, <https://www.llnl.gov/str/Nov07/bissani.html>.
[92]“Libya, France discuss nuclear cooperation for "peaceful purposes," BBC, March 15, 2006.
[93]“Libyan and French leaders issue joint statement,” BBC, July 26, 2007.
[94]Anne MacLachlan, “France, Libya initial nuclear pact, emphasize infrastructure-building,” Nucleonics Week, December 13, 2007, p. 15.
[95]Ann MacLachlan and Mark Hibbs, “Franco-Libyan MOU might be Areva's ticket to Libyan uranium,” Nuclear Fuel, July 30, 2007.
[96]“Germany criticizes sharply nuclear deal between France, Libya,” BBC, July 27, 2007.
[97]Mark Hibbs and David Stellfox, “German concern about Libya deal not shared by US, other EU members,” Nuclear Fuel, August 9, 2007, p. 6.
[98]Mark Hibbs and David Stellfox, “German concern about Libya deal not shared by US, other EU members,” Nuclear Fuel, August 9, 2007, p. 6.
[99]Ann MacLachlan, “Libyans consider several options for nuclear power, desalination,” Nuclear Fuel, September 27, 2007, p. 8.
[100]Anne MacLachlan, “France, Libya initial nuclear pact, emphasize infrastructure-building,” Nucleonics Week, December 13, 2007, p. 15.
[101]Anne MacLachlan, “France, Libya initial nuclear pact, emphasize infrastructure-building,” Nucleonics Week, December 13, 2007, p. 15.
[102]“French experts disagree on value of exporting nuclear technology,” BBC, February 19, 2008.
[103]Michelle M. Smith and Charles D. Ferguson, “France's nuclear diplomacy; Energizing Arabia,” The International Herald Tribune, March 12, 2008, p. 8.
[104]Ann MacLachlan, “Newcomers to nuclear power urged to join nuclear safety convention,”
Nucleonics Week, April 17, 2008, p. 10.
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Updated August 2008 |
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