Updated October 2009
Introduction

Japan's 1947 constitution, which renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes, sets important limits on Japanese security policy. As a result, the U.S.-Japan security arrangement is the cornerstone of Japan’s security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it is generally perceived that Japan has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. Tokyo is highly active in the international nonproliferation and disarmament arena, and party to all relevant multilateral treaties and regimes. As the only country to have suffered nuclear weapons attacks, Japan has been especially active in the field of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control. Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997. Before 1945, Japan developed and employed both chemical and biological weapons. (Japan also attempted unsuccessfully to develop nuclear weapons program during the Second World War.) Japan is now a state party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Japan is also a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Zangger Committee. Japan also actively promotes the strengthening of IAEA safeguards and export controls. Japan has an active nuclear energy program, one of the world's leading chemical industries, a growing biotechnology sector, and an active commercial space program. Japan is taking initiatives to promote disarmament and nonproliferation education since the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Secretary General’s report on the UN Study on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education in November 2002.
|
|||||||||||||
Nuclear
Japan's commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and its support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has remained unchanged since it acceded to the treaty in 1976. Based on this basic stance, Tokyo has been further intensifying its efforts toward strengthening multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament regimes since the early 1990s. Domestically, Japan's "Atomic Energy Basic Law" allows only peaceful nuclear activities, and its "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" pledge that Japan will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT. In addition, Japan's "nuclearization" debate resurfaces once in a while responding mainly to an evolving regional security environment. Despite some speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the deep aversion to nuclear weapons among the Japanese public and Tokyo's strong commitment to international nonproliferation regimes make any move in this direction improbable. At the same time, Japan increasingly relies on nuclear power for its electricity needs, and has a highly developed civilian nuclear sector. With almost no indigenous energy sources, Japan's nuclear energy accounts for over 30% of the country's total electricity production, and Japan plans to increase this to 41% in 2017. Currently, Japan has 55 nuclear power reactors in operation across the country (the third largest number after the United States and France.)
Biological
Japan had an active biological weapons (BW) program prior to 1945. The focal point was the now infamous Unit 731 based at a laboratory complex in northeastern China during the Japanese occupation. Unit 731 experimented on Chinese civilians and Allied prisoners of war with various biological agents, including plague, cholera, and hemorrhagic fever. In addition to the living body test, the Japanese military used biological weapons against China. Most of the data the Japanese military accumulated during WWII was confiscated by the US military. After World War II, the Japanese government abandoned its BW program. Japan signed the BWC in 1972 and ratified it in 1982. Japan has actively supported negotiation of a protocol to strengthen current BWC provisions. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack and failed attempt to disperse anthrax, Japan has increased its focus on bio-terrorism defenses. Although Japan has a growing biotechnology industry, it is still small in comparison to its chemical industry. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan's biotech industry is subject to a comprehensive set of export controls.
Chemical
Japanese scientists began developing chemical weapons (CW) as early as 1917. The Japanese Army used CW after invading China in 1937, conducting an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 attacks. Japan reportedly produced five to seven million munitions containing agents such as phosgene, mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and diphenyl cyanarsine. Although Japanese forces used many of these munitions between 1937 and 1945, a considerable amount was abandoned when Japanese forces retreated. After World War II, Japan pledged to not produce CW and participated in the negotiations for the CWC, which Japan signed in 1993 and ratified in 1995. Japan's CWC obligations include the responsibility for the disposal of abandoned CW (ACW) in China. Between 300,000 to 400,000 munitions remain in China's Jilin Province. The deadline for completion of the clean-up is 2007, but Tokyo and Beijing have requested a five-year extension from the OPCW. Japan's chemical industry is the world's second largest, with about 16 percent of global chemical production. As a member of the Australia Group, Japan has developed comprehensive and well-enforced export controls on chemical weapons precursors and dual-use items. Since the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack, Japanese spending on CW defense has increased.
![]()
Missile
Japan does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. Japan lacks sophisticated command and control systems, as well as some guidance and warhead technology that would be necessary to develop operational missiles. Japan is an active member of the MTCR and was involved in drafting the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). Japan is one of the most active partners with the United States in the field of missile defense. Japan has deployed a multi-layered missile defense system consisting of sea-based midcourse missile defense (the Aegis BMD system), and ground-based terminal phase missile defense (Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3). Recently, Japan has become more assertive in the field of space activities mainly because of North Korea's ballistic missiles launches and accelerating development of China's space program. On August 27, 2008, the Basic Space Law entered into force lifting the ban on the Japanese government's use of space for defense purposes.
Sources:
[1] Status of Japan's participation in Treaties and organizations, cns.miis.edu/ inventory/ pdfs/ japan.pdf
[2] "Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation: Japan's Role in the NPT," NTI Issue Brief
Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, (CRS Report)
[3] Japan's Space Law Revision: the Next Step Toward Re-Militarization? NTI Issue Brief
[4] Not Going Nuclear: Japan's Response to North Korea's Nuclear Test, Arms Control Today
[5] The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report Nonproliferation Review
[6] "Japan's Plutonium Reprocessing Dilemma", Arms Control Today Japan and Future of Nuclear Disarmament, Foreign Policy in Focus
[7] Under Fukuda, Japan Accelerates Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation with the United States, WMD Insights
[8] Japan's Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policy, Japanese MOFA, www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/ un/ disarmament/ policy/ pamph0603.html
[9] Center for Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation
[10] Hiroshima Peace Institute
[11] Atomic Energy Commission of Japan: Long-Term Program for Research
[12] Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy
[13] Biotechnology Japan Market Report
[14] Defense of Japan 2007
![]()
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.











