Introduction

Iraq came very close to becoming the first Arab country to produce nuclear weapons. Before its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), pursued a multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons program. Originally, Iraq intended to secretly extract plutonium from its safeguarded reactors to use as fissile material in an implosion-type device. After the destruction of its French-built Osiraq reactor by Israeli jets in 1981, Iraq pursued multiple uranium enrichment options.

Had Iraq not invaded Kuwait in 1991, it may have been able to build a weapon within a few years. With a bomb design progressing rapidly, Iraq lacked only the fissile material to have all the components necessary for a working device.[1] The invasion and subsequent Persian Gulf War, however, forced Saddam Hussein to alter his plans. Fearing the end of his regime was imminent, Saddam ordered a "crash program" to extract enough fissile material for a bomb that could be used against invading coalition forces or Israel. Coalition bombing unknowingly hampered this effort. Post-Gulf War inspections and defectors subsequently revealed much of the infrastructure and ambitions of Iraq's weapons program.

The Israeli "Threat"

Iraq maintained a very small civilian nuclear program that began during the Atoms for Peace program in the mid-1950s. In 1962, it acquired a 2 megawatt (MW) research reactor from the Soviet Union. Iraq's interest in nuclear weapons would begin in the mid-1970s. Iraq was initially influenced by the book The Israeli Bomb?, which described a bleak existence for the Arab world as long as Israel possessed nuclear weapons with no Arab counter-threat. Thus, Iraq set out to build a nuclear weapon program that would rival Israel's.[2] The Iraqis would also attempt to mimic Israel's strategy by acquiring a medium-sized research reactor along with its uranium fuel and irradiate indigenous uranium to produce plutonium. This would be done clandestinely since Iraq had ratified the NPT, and the reactor would be subject to IAEA inspections. By 1971, a small group of scientists had developed a 40-page plan outlining a bomb program they estimated would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

In 1974, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Paris to negotiate the purchase of a reactor similar to the French Osiris reactor. Then Vice-President Saddam Hussein would personally visit Paris a year later to "sweeten" the deal for the French with promises of cheap Iraqi oil. By 1976, a $300 million deal had been completed for two reactors—one a 40MW(th) reactor that the French dubbed "Osirak," and an 800kW(th) reactor called Isis.[3]

While Iraq attempted to maintain the façade that its purchase was for peaceful nuclear research, some of its other actions belied stated intentions. Prior to his trip to Paris, Saddam Hussein told the Lebanese news magazine Al-Usbu al-Arabi that the agreement with the French would be "the first concrete step toward the production of the Arabic atomic weapon" and that Iraq needed help in obtaining nuclear weapons to counter Israel's nuclear arsenal. [4] Then, toward the conclusion of the Osiraq deal, feeling U.S. and Israeli pressure, France expressed reservations about supplying Iraq with highly enriched uranium (HEU) as the reactor fuel. It suggested a reactor that used a lower enriched "caramel" fuel. Iraq balked, insisting on the HEU model. Observers also now note that Iraq never considered light water power reactors and expressed interest only in reactors with proliferation potential—evidence of Iraq's true nuclear ambitions for careful observers.

With the reactor deal complete, Iraq set out to build a radiochemical laboratory; it contracted the Italian firm SNIA-Techint in 1979 to build a pilot plutonium separation facility along with a uranium refining and fuel manufacturing plant. Neither facility was subject to IAEA safeguards. Around this time, Iraq also began importing natural uranium in large shipments coming from Portugal, Brazil, and Nigeria.

This period also saw the return to Iran of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, the Shiite cleric, from his exile in Iraq. Shortly thereafter, Iran became an Islamic republic and Saddam Hussein became deeply concerned about unrest in the huge Shiite population in Southern Iraq. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran.

The 10-year war with Iran played a role in Saddam's thinking vis-à-vis Iraq's nuclear weapon program. Saddam wanted the "ultimate equalizer" if faced with an overwhelming invasion force. The cost of the war, which considerably damaged Iraq's economy, also influenced his decision to invade Kuwait. Kuwait refused to loan Iraq $10 billion and would not forgive some Iraqi debt incurred during the Iran-Iraq War.[5] At this point, Iraq had spent roughly $750 million on the nuclear weapons program.

Iraqi scientists calculated that the Osiraq reactor could produce between 5 and 25 kilograms (kg) of plutonium per year (the upper limit, however, would require the reactor to operate continuously at maximum power). In the most public signal that Israel was aware of Iraq's true intentions, the reactor cores for the Osiraq and Isis reactors were damaged by saboteurs in an explosion while awaiting shipment to Iraq in a warehouse in the French Mediterranean town of Seyne-sur-Mer. Rather than wait the two years the French estimated it would take to rebuild them, Iraq accepted the damaged cores, which had hairline fractures.[6]

Israel Alters Iraq's Strategy

Iraq proceeded with building its nuclear infrastructure and plans to subvert IAEA inspections. However, before any significant progress could be made, the Osiraq reactor was destroyed by Israeli jets in June 1981. In August of that year, Iraqi Vice-Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and French President Francois Mitterand met to discuss the possibility of rebuilding the reactor. But by late 1981, it was becoming clear that France was reluctant to rebuild the reactor, and Iraq was forced to change strategies in its nuclear weapon program.

Since the Osiraq reactor was destroyed before it could produce any plutonium, Iraq had to seek another source of fissile material. Uranium enrichment became the preferred method and over the next decade, Iraq would explore a number of methods for uranium enrichment including gas centrifuge, chemical enrichment, ion exchange, as well as laser isotope separation. In late 1981, Iraqi scientists finalized a strategy to enrich uranium using electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), believing it to be the best option. The plan envisioned industrial-scale plants with a production capacity of 15kg per year of 93 percent HEU from natural uranium feedstock.[7] Using LEU feed increased the estimates of weapons grade uranium to between 25 and 50kg per year.

As a secondary method, Iraq explored uranium enrichment through the gaseous diffusion process. The intention was to produce low enriched uranium as feedstock for EMIS, or if EMIS was unsuccessful, the gaseous diffusion process would be expanded to produce HEU directly.[8]

The EMIS project proceeded in three phases. Phase one involved the construction of an electromagnet and magnet-separator systems. This took place at the al-Tuwaitha facility south of Baghdad. The second phase involved the building of four magnet/separators; but according to Iraqi declarations, the separators never achieved more than 20 percent of their capacity and though they were operated until 1991, the total enriched uranium output was only 640 grams at an average enrichment of 7.2 percent.[9]

The third phase in the EMIS project was the production phase. Two identical sites, al-Tarmiya and al-Sharqat (also Ash Sharqat) were envisioned. Iraq contracted with foreign engineering firms to construct al-Tarmiya, but built al-Sharqat without foreign involvement. The design for al-Tarmiya called for some 90 separators for producing both LEU and HEU. The project was hampered with technical problems and by the time of the Persian Gulf War, a total of eight R120 separators were in limited operation at al-Tuwaitha.[10] Both facilities were damaged by coalition bombing and EMIS-related equipment was subsequently destroyed by IAEA inspectors.

Exploratory work on Iraq's gaseous diffusion project began in 1982. However, after some initial success in developing barrier material, it became apparent that continuing the effort would require an industrial infrastructure well beyond Iraq's capability.[11] By 1987, the decision had been taken to reassign critical personnel to the burgeoning gas centrifuge project, and the entire effort was cancelled in 1989.

Unlike the EMIS program, which relied little on imported equipment, Iraq's gas centrifuge program depended on foreign suppliers for both equipment and design information. Iraq procured critical design information and technical assistance from three German experts—all former employees of the German firm MAN Technologie AG.[12]

Iraq also faced initial difficulties in machining precision components and sought assistance from suppliers in Germany, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland. By 1990, Iraq had produced its first carbon fiber magnetic centrifuge. Operating continuously for a year, a cascade of 1,000 of these centrifuges could have produced 10kg of HEU at 93 percent enrichment. In mid-1989, Iraq was confident enough in its centrifuge project to contract with several entities both foreign and domestic to build the al-Furat facility for the mass production of centrifuges. IAEA inspectors discovered the al-Furat facility in July 1991.

In the late 1980s, Iraqi first considered a missile as a delivery system for its burgeoning nuclear device. The weapon design at this point was judged to be too heavy for as a warhead for Iraq's existing missiles. A team was assigned to modify the existing design so that total weight of the missile would be one ton or less.[13] During the crash program, Iraq considered modifying the al-Hussein missile so that it could deliver a 1000kg warhead to 650km; otherwise, the weight of the existing design would limit the range to 300km.[14]

So close…

Iraq intended to use an implosion design for its first nuclear weapon. Primary work on weaponization was done at the al-Atheer complex, where Iraqi scientists labored to overcome problems with the conventional high-explosive charges needed to compress the core of the nuclear device. Confident that a working weapon was on the horizon, Iraq selected a site in southwestern Iraq for an underground nuclear test.[15]

Saddam Hussein, however, sabotaged his own nuclear effort when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Hussein had underestimated the U.S. reaction and soon heard U.S. President George Bush declare that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not tolerable. Facing what he viewed as a threat to the existence of his regime, he ordered a "crash program" (Project 601) to extract Iraq's stock of safeguarded HEU for use in a nuclear device. Saddam's plan was to use the weapon against Israel or coalition forces as they approached Kuwait City. Iraqi scientists designed a chemical plant "based on solvent extraction technology" at the Tuwaitha site. The team working at the plant was confident that it could process one or two fuel cells per day, extracting around 26kg of HEU by year's end.[16] However, the coalition bombing campaign effectively ended the "crash program."

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the world learned the extent of Iraq's nuclear weapon program. Much of the information came from defectors—including Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamel, who defected to Jordan, and Khidhir Hamza—was previously unknown, including evidence of the "crash program." Iraq's EMIS program, using declassified data from the U.S. Manhattan Project, had gone undetected.[17]

In his 1996 report to the UN Secretary General, Hans Blix declared that "All quantities of special nuclear material [highly enriched uranium or plutonium] found in Iraq have been removed and the industrial infrastructure which Iraq had set up to produce and weaponize special nuclear material has been destroyed." Despite the absence of UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors on the ground from 1999 to November 2002, no credible evidence has emerged through renewed inspections indicating that Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear program. Iraq, however, maintains its nuclear expertise, including design information, scientists and engineers, and a powerful and effective concealment apparatus. A U.S. Defense Department report assessed that "Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon," adding that the amount of time needed could be "substantially shortened" if Iraq obtained fissile material from a foreign source.[18] On March 7, 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamad ElBaradei reported to the UN Security Council that "After three months of intrusive inspection, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indications of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq."[19]

IAEA inspectors evacuated later that month, as the U.S.-led coalition’s incursion into Iraq was set to begin. Following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in April, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG) took up the hunt for WMD stockpiles and evidence of such illicit programs. ISG inspectors, led first by former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay then Mr. Charles Duelfer, visited numerous sites across Iraq where they sifted through documents and interviewed scores of Iraqis. In its comprehensive report issued on September 30, 2004, the ISG concluded there is no evidence to suggest that a coordinated effort to restart Iraq’s nuclear program had existed since the first Gulf War ended in 1991.[20]  Inspectors instead found that Saddam Hussein had planned to recreate his WMD programs after international sanctions were lifted. Even then, though, his planning was reportedly more focused on the development of ballistic missiles and tactical chemical warfare capabilities, rather than nuclear weapons. The ISG’s inquiry did yield evidence, however, that Iraq concealed elements of its nuclear program from inspectors after 1991, including by secreting away documents, hiding technology and attempting to maintain the brain trust of scientists who had earlier worked on the nuclear program. The regime also had long sought to falsely aggrandize Iraq’s overall WMD capabilities in order to project strength and deter potential aggressors. Meanwhile, as these facts came to light, so too did reports that nuclear-related equipment and materials had disappeared from Iraq since the coalition invaded in 2003. According to the IAEA, dual-use items were “systematically removed” from facilities the IAEA had monitored prior to the war.[21]  Concerns exist that these items may be sold to groups or countries interested in producing nuclear weapons.

However, in mid-January, 2005 Mr. Duelfer officially brought the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to a halt and quelled most of these concerns. The chief inspector of the ISG stood by his September 2004 report in which he reported no findings of stockpiles of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, and asserted that no additional stockpiles had been found in the investigation since that report. The search continued past the September report due to the White House's belief that there was still a possibility that weapons had been removed from the country, or hidden somewhere deep within. However, U.S. intelligence officials have confirmed that such a possibility is very slight.[22]

As a result of the findings of the Iraq Survey Group, the United States Congress arranged for a Senate Committee inquiry into the case of mistaken intelligence which released a report on 29 March 2005 about the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. The Committee reviewed the prewar intelligence and then determined whether or not the conclusions the intelligence community reached were realistically based on their prior knowledge. In most cases, including the status of Saddam's nuclear program, the committee accused the intelligence community of using insufficient sources, being too wedded to previous assumptions, and failing to research the issues to a reasonable degree. The report states the intelligence community was "almost completely wrong"[23] in its assumptions on the nuclear program, and distributes the accusations widely throughout all agencies within the intelligence community including the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Key Sources:
[1] Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda, (New York: Scribner Press, 2000), p. 234.
[2] Ibid., p. 65.
[3] The Iraqis called the two reactors Tammuz-1 and Tammuz-2.
[4] Federation of American Scientists, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz," www.fas.org/ nuke/ hew/ Iraq/ IraqAtoZ.html; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, p. 105; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superpowers in a Fragmented World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 37.
[5] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," Foreign Policy, January/February 2003, www.foreignpolicy.com/ wwwboard/ walts.html#bio.
[6] Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb; the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York, NY: Times Books, 1981), pp. 227-233; Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, p. 110.
[7] IAEA, "Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996)," S/1997/779, 8 October 1997, p. 35, www.iaea.or.at/ worldatom/ Programmes/ ActionTeam/ reports/ s_1997_779.pdf; David Albright and Khidhir Hamza, "Iraq's Reocnstitution of Its Nuclear Weapons Program," Arms Control Today, October 1998.
[8] Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, pp. 138-139; David Albright and Khidhir Hamza, "Iraq's Reconstitution of its Nuclear Weapons Program," Arms Control Today, October 1998, www.isis-online.org/ publications/ iraq/ act1298.html>; IAEA, "Fourth Consolidated Report," pp. 35-37, www.iaea.or.at/ worldatom/ Programmes/ ActionTeam/ reports/ s_1997_779.pdf>.
[9] IAEA, "Fourth Consolidated Report," p. 35.
[10] At this time, the al-Sharqat facility was only about 80 percent complete.
[11] Albright and Hamza.
[12] IAEA, "Fourth Consolidated Report," pp. 39-41; Mark Hibbs, "Stemmler, Too Sold Baghdad Urenco Centrifuge Blueprints," Nuclear Fuel, 12 February 1996; Mark Hibbs, "German Expert Wanted By Authorities for Giving Iraq Carbon Centrifuge Rotors," Nuclear Fuel, 9 November 1992; Mark Hibbs, "Internal Security Probe Underway Following URENCO Design Diversion," Nuclear Fuel, 29 January 1996.
[13] IAEA, "Fourth Consolidated Report," p. 57.
[14] Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miraiam Rajkumar, "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction," (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 277.
[15] Federation of American Scientists, "Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," www.fas.org/ nuke/ guide/ iraq/ nuke/ program.htm; IAEA, "Fourth Consolidated Report," pp. 54-56.
[16] Federation of American Scientists, "Iraqi Nuclear Weapons," www.fas.org/ nuke/ guide/ iraq/ nuke/ program.htm>.
[17] IAEA, Report of the fourth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991); Federation of American Scientists, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Aflaq to Tammuz."
[18] U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 40; Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miraiam Rajkumar, "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction," pp. 273-275.
[19] Mohamad ElBaradei, "Statement to the UN Security Council," 7 March 2003.
[20]"Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD," Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, www.cia.gov.
[21]Louis Charbonneau, "U.N. fears bombmakers may get Iraq nuke items – diplomats," Reuters, 12 October 2004.
[22] Dafna Linzer, "Search for Banned Arms In Iraq Ended Last Month; Critical September Report to Be Final Word," The Washington Post, 12 January 2005.
[23] U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Overview of the Report," 29 March 2005, pp. 8-9, www.wmd.gov/ report/ report.html #overview.

	Updated November 2008