This information supplements what was already known about Iraq's missile development prior to the 2003 invasion. Indeed, much had already been uncovered by UN weapons inspectors who first entered Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and remained there until December 1998. Later, in November 2002, a new wave of UN inspections occurred as Hussein sought to avert an increasingly likely invasion by U.S.-led coalition forces. During their short time in Iraq before the onset of the military campaign to oust the Hussein regime in March 2003, this contingency of UN inspectors supervised the destruction of 50 of Iraq's 75 deployed Al Samoud missiles, along with six missiles still in production and assorted warheads, training missiles, and launchers.

Table I below shows the basic design characteristics of Iraq's various missile programs under the former Saddam Hussein regime, including the effective range. One of the most notable features of the Iraqi missile program was the extensive effort aimed at reverse engineering and modifying the Soviet Scuds in order to increase their effective range. Nearly all of Iraq's operational ballistic missiles were variants of the Scud-B, including the Al Hussein, Al Abbas, and the Al Hijarah missiles. All of these variants utilized liquid fuel propulsion systems (kerosene fuel and red fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer) and crude guidance systems. The Iraqi modifications however, introduced problems of flight stability; it was quite common for Al Hussein missiles to break up upon atmospheric reentry.

Although Iraq's ballistic missiles were considered inaccurate by U.S. standards, they were remarkably more effective than most people realize. In early 1988, the seven-week missile exchange between Baghdad and Tehran killed 2,000 Iranians and injured another 6,000.[2] During the 1991 Gulf War, 28 of the 148 U.S. personnel killed in action were the result of Al Hussein missile launches.[3] Over two million people fled Tehran[4] during the 1988 "war of the cities," leading military observers to conclude that Iraq's modified Scuds certainly accomplished their primary military objective-to inspire terror.

History

Iraq is believed to have fired over 516 Scud-Bs and Al Hussein missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War,[5] and another 93 at coalition partners during the 1991 Gulf War.[6] Given these figures, Iraq arguably has more combat experience launching ballistic missiles than any other nation, including the United States. Furthermore, Iraq not only has vast experience launching ballistic missiles, it was also the victim of numerous Iranian Scud attacks making it quite unique among missile capable nations.

1970s and 1980s: The Scud Modification Program
Iraq began arming itself with short-range ballistic missiles by purchasing 819 Scud-B short-range ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union in 1974.[7] The deal with the Soviets also included 11 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). The Soviets continued to supply Iraq with Scuds armed with conventional warheads throughout the 1970s and 1980s.[8]

However, it was not long before the 300km range of the Soviet supplied Scud-Bs was strategically irrelevant. The outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in 1980 led to a significant turn in the Iraqi missile program. Tehran's distance from the Iran-Iraq border was twice the range of the Scud-B; whereas the proximity of Baghdad to the border allowed Iran to hit the Iraqi capital without modifying its Scud missiles. Iraq began serious efforts at modifying its existing Scud arsenal in order to increase the weapon's range. By 1988, the Al Hussein variant was operational with a range of 650km. Not only did this close the "missile gap" with Tehran, but it also served Saddam Hussein's wider objectives for regional dominance. The increased range was achieved by simply cutting the fuel and oxidizer tanks in half and adding an additional section to each tank. By effectively increasing the propellant load and decreasing the payload mass (see table 1), Iraq was able to achieve significant gains in range.

Throughout the late 1980s, Iraq continued to develop longer range missiles and began a program to produce its own such versions. By April 1988, the Al Abbas, a longer-range version of the Al Hussein, was successfully test fired. However, problems with flight stability and poor guidance plagued the program so it was abandoned. The Al Hijarah configuration also appears to have met a similar fate.

Unlikely Partners: The Link between South America
and the Middle East
In 1985, Saddam Hussein's desire to reach all the players in the Middle East with his weapons led to Iraq's most significant missile development effort, the BADR-2000 program (also known as the Condor II program in Argentina). The BADR-2000 program was a cooperative effort with Egypt and Argentina to develop a two-stage solid fuel missile. General Hussein Kamel, head of Iraq's Military Industrial Commission (MIC), utilized Iraq's sophisticated procurement network to obtain the parts and technology needed to produce solid rocket motors. The procurement networks were originally set up clandestinely to obtain nuclear weapons technology, primarily from Europe; however, the networks turned out to be extremely useful for the BADR-2000 effort. A consortium of 16 European companies was established to serve as technical support for the missile development. Consen, as the consortium was named, was based in Switzerland but the bulk of technical assistance came from German firms.[9] By 1989, Iraq had spent $400 million[10] to complete the construction of production plants capable of producing solid rocket motors and the test stands required to produce the missiles.

The 1991 Gulf War effectively stopped Iraq's missile development efforts. Under UN Security Resolution 687, most of Iraq's missiles, warheads, test and manufacturing facilities were destroyed or shut down by UNSCOM weapons inspectors. However, Resolution 687 did allow Iraq to continue developing short-range missiles (under 150km), although this was subject to close UN monitoring.

Staying under the UN Radar: The Post-Gulf War
Development of the Al Samoud
Following the Gulf War, Iraq attempted to work within the boundaries of the 150km range limit, while maintaining technical expertise and manufacturing capability clearly intended to sustain future attempts at long-range missile development. Iraq experimented with shorter range surface-to-surface missiles, namely the Ababil-100 and the Al Samoud missiles. Based on the Soviet SA-2 design, the Al Samoud liquid engine missile had a stated range of 100km although it was clear to UN and intelligence experts that the rocket had a range closer to 180km. The suspected range ultimately resulted in a demand by the U.S. that Iraq destroy its Al Samoud inventory in order to comply with Resolution 687. Ultimately, Iraq yielded, but some analysts believed that Iraq was hiding some of its arsenal. The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) gathered testimony from missile designers at the Al Kini State Company that Iraq had begun work on converting SA-2 missiles into ballistic missiles with an intended range of 250km.[11]

The Ababil-100 had a solid propellant design and one UN inspector dubbed it "BADR-2000 Junior."[12] The Ababil was said to have a range of 140km, although there is no evidence to support that it was actually ever flight tested. The ISG obtained testimony from a variety of Iraqi sources that a proscribed-range version of the Ababil-100 was under development. The solid rocket motor was to be 800 to 1000mm, or much greater than the 500mm Ababil-100. The goal of this program was to produce a missile varying in range between 400 to 1000km[13]

The Ultimate Terror Weapon: Chemical and Biological Warheads
The terror factor was multiplied by the fact that Iraq had developed both chemical and biological warheads. It is believed that as many as 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads were manufactured prior to the 1991 Gulf War.[14] UNSCOM inspectors were able to verify the destruction of at least 30 sarin-filled warheads;[15] however, it remains unclear whether biological warheads, most likely filled with anthrax spores, were unilaterally destroyed, as claimed by Iraq.[16] Although the effectiveness of Al Hussein missiles armed with chemical agents against military point targets would have been limited, the first and second gulf wars clearly showed the the terror evoked by the possible use of such weapons. Reports of Israeli citizens constructing sealed shelters out of plastic and duct tape in their homes, and television images of reporters donning gas masks at the sounds of incoming warning sirens is ample evidence of the anxiety produced by such weapons.

Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq was known to have investigated the conversion of Soviet Mig-21 aircraft into UAVs designed to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing chemical or biological agents. Iraq had converted a number of Czech L-29 training aircraft into UAVs. More recently, according to the ISG, Iraq maintained two UAV programs working in parallel: one at Ibn Fernas and one at Al-Rashid Air Force Base. Besides working to convert manned aircraft into UAVs, Ibn Fernas developed small UAVs, including the RPV-20, RPV-30, and the Pigeon RPV program, all declared for the first time in 2002. Although Iraq claimed that none of these systems exceeded the UN-mandated 150km range limitation, the ISG learned from several Iraqi sources that the RPV-20 flew over 500km on autopilot (as reported by Secretary of State Colin Powell in his February 2003 UN speech). Less is known about developments by the al-Rashid group, particularly the extent to which any of these small UAVs were intended for weapons-delivery missions as opposed to traditional reconnaissance or decoy uses.

When the U.S. Senate Select Committee released its report on the Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq in March of 2005, the intelligence community was reprimanded for most of its previous assertions, except for its conclusions on Iraq's missile capabilities. The report commended the intelligence community for its accurate assessment of the number of Scud-type ballistic missiles in Saddam's possession, as well as the intelligence on the al-Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range ballistic missile. However, the intelligence community was found to have overstated what was known about the biological warfare delivery intentions behind Iraq's possession of small UAVs.[1]

The ISG also discovered two previously undisclosed cruise missile programs, both involving the conversion of the HY-2 Seersucker anti-ship cruise missile into a land-attack system. The first program, more modest in its technical demands, increased the range of the anti-ship missile from 100km to 150-180km. It is unknown whether or not this conversion effort involved replacing the HY-2 autopilot and terminal guidance with a true land-attack navigation system, including perhaps the integration of an inertial navigation system with inputs from a global positioning system (GPS) receiver. In any event, 10 of these modified missiles were delivered to the Iraqi military prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom and two of them were fired at coalition targets. Three other Seersuckers were also launched during the campaign. Although none of the Iraqi cruise missiles caused significant damage against their intended targets, Iraq's use of low-flying cruise missiles contributed to the Patriot missile defense system's unfortunate series of friendly fire incidents, two of which led to the loss of two coalition aircraft and the deaths of three crew members.[17]

The second and more ambitious cruise missile program - called Jenin - entailed converting the HY-2 into a 1000km-range land-attack system. According to Dr. David Kay, the Jenin concept was presented to Saddam Hussein in late November 2001 and produced an unusually quick approval response. To achieve such a significant increase in range, the Jenin program involved replacing the HY-2's liquid rocket engine with a turbine engine from a Russian helicopter. Iraq halted the program roughly a year after it began and just prior to the return of UNMOVIC inspectors in November 2002.[18]

Other Delivery Systems
In December 1989, Iraq tested a space launch vehicle. The Al Abid space launch vehicle (SLV) was described by the Iraqis as a three-stage vehicle. The first stage consisted of five Scud missiles strapped together; the upper stages appear to have been engineering dummies, or they simply failed to ignite or separate. However, the test was considered significant because the successful clustering of motors did demonstrate a level of engineering expertise previously unknown to Western intelligence agencies.[19]

Other delivery systems included the so-called Supergun, designed by famed ballistics expert Gerald Bull. Although not a missile, the Supergun was designed to fire 1,000mm artillery shells up to ranges of 1,200km. It was believed that these artillery pieces would be capable of delivering chemical and biological rounds. European customs inspectors confiscated many of the Supergun components and UN inspectors destroyed a smaller prototype found at a site north of Baghdad.

Status

One of the stated objectives of the March 2003 U.S. offensive in Iraq was to rid the country of weapons of mass destruction, including delivery systems. With the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party, it is unclear to what extent Iraq will be allowed to rearm itself. For the near-term it appears virtually certain that Iraq will not be allowed to reconstitute its missile development programs.

In the meantime, insurgent missile capabilities remain a point of concern for the coalition forces. Coalition troops and aircraft as well as civilian aircraft have been attacked by shoulder-fired missiles, SAM or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs). These missiles are usually purchased on the black market and can be easily transported in suitcases.

Key Sources:
[1] U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Conclusions,"
29 March 2005, pg. 24, intelligence.senate.gov.
[2] ibid.
[3] ibid.
[4] ibid.
[5] "Iraq's Missile Program," Iraq Watch website, www.iraqwatch.org.
[6] Missile report from FAS website, www.fas.org.
[7] "Iraq's Missile Program," Iraq Watch website, www.iraqwatch.org.
[8] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. and Seth W. Carus, "Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's' Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, p. 204.
[9] "Iraq's Missile Program," Iraq Watch website,www.iraqwatch.org.
[10] ibid.
[11] The Interim Report of Dr. David Kay, available at www.cia.
[12] ibid.
[13] ibid.
[14] "UNSCOM and Iraqi Missiles - Iraq Special Weapons," Federation of American Scientists website, www.fas.org.
[15] ibid.
[16] ibid; "Iraq's CBW Capability in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations," declassified CIA report, 25 June 1996, www.gulflink.osd.mil
[17] For a detailed account of Iraq's use of cruise missiles during the war,
see Dennis M. Gormley, "Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq
War," Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter 2003-04), pp. 61-86, www.cns.miis.edu.
[18] The Interim Report of Dr. David Kay.
[19] "Iraq's Missile Program," Iraq Watch website www.iraqwatch.org.

	Updated November 2008