17 May 2000
The head of U.K. Defence intelligence says that Iraq "can regenerate [its] biological warfare capability within months."
--"Gulf Weapons Proliferation Unstoppable", Middle East Economic Digest, 23 May 2000, p. 4.

24 May 2000
In an interview with the Guardian, Ambassador Richard Butler, the former chairman of UNSCOM, alleges that he has evidence from his time in Baghdad that Saddam Hussayn had kept weapons of mass destruction from the U.N. and that over the past 18 months he has used the absence of the U.N. to build his arsenal of missiles and chemical and biological weapons.
--Ewen MacAskil, "Iraqi Nerve Gas 'Could Paralyse Western Cities'," The Guardian, 24 May 2000.

19 November 2000
The Sunday Telegraph reports that, according to Western intelligence reports, Iraq has been stockpiling an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons in schools and hospitals. The items listed include large quantities of growth media used to produce biological weapons.
--Christina Lamb, "Saddam Stockpiling Deadly Chemical Weapons," Sunday Telegraph, 19 November 2000.

January 2001
The U.S. Department of Defense, in its report Proliferation: Threat and Response, states that "...in the absence of UNSCOM inspections and monitoring during 1999 and 2000, we are concerned that Baghdad again may have produced some biological warfare agents."
--U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 40.

22 January 2001
The New York Times reports that, according to a new intelligence estimate, "Iraq has rebuilt a series of factories that the United States has long suspected of producing chemical and biological weapons..." The construction of two factories, located in an industrial complex in Fallujah, has resumed, as well as the production of chlorine at a third in the same complex. Government officials say that all three factories were previously involved in producing chemical or biological agents.
--Steven Lee Myers and Eric Schmitt, "Iraq Rebuilt Weapons Factories, Officials Say," New York Times, 22 January 2001.

15 February 2001
The Herald, a British newspaper, reports that according to an internal U.N. report, the castor oil production plant near Fallujah has been rebuilt since it was destroyed by U.S. attacks in 1998 and is now potentially capable of manufacturing "a significant amount" of ricin.
--Ian Bruce, "Revealed: Saddam's Factory of Death; Iraq Uses Castor Oil By-Product to Make Biological Weapons," The Herald, 15 February 2001, p. 2.

28 February 2001
U.S. officials state that Iraq and Sudan engaged in a joint effort to develop chemical and biological weapons in Sudan. It is also reported that Iraq has exported technology and expertise in non-conventional weapons to Libya and Sudan.
--"Iraq Exports WMD Expertise to Arab Allies," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 84, 28 February 2001.

Early March 2001
A classified report by UNMOVIC, which is based on analysis of information inherited from UNSCOM, states that "...the production of Agent B (B. anthracis spores) could be much greater than stated and, had such production taken place, the remaining quantities would still retain significant activity given the stability of this agent."
--"Missiles and Viruses Still Troubling U.N. UNMOVIC Report," Financial Times, 2 March 2001, p. 11.

April 2001
In a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Iraqi Ambassador to the U.N. Mohammed al-Duri, seeks approval for financing to refurbish a laboratory for the manufacture of vaccines for Foot and Mouth disease, which was previously destroyed by UNSCOM inspectors. The financing would be taken out of the revenue from the U.N. oil-for-food program.
--"Iraq Seeks Help Making Foot-and-Mouth Vaccine," The Nando Times, 8 April 2001.

2001
Adnan Ihsan Saiid al-Haaidiri, an Iraqi defector who was involved in the construction of "clean rooms", claims that many small laboratories were being carefully constructed.
--Joby Warrick, "In Assessing Iraq's Arsenal, the 'Reality is Uncertainty'," Washington Post, 31 July 2002, p. 1.

2002
A CIA analysis places Iraq's anthrax-bacteria supply at 2,650 gallons.
--Graham T. Allison, "The View From Baghdad", Washington Post, 31 July 2002, p. 19.

29 January 2002
President Bush lists Iraq in his "Axis-of-Evil" State of the Union Address. He also says that "the Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade."
--The President's State of the Union Address, The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C. Office of the Press Secretary, 29 January 2002.

12 September 2002
President Bush addresses the U.N. General Assembly, expressing that "if Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately...the Security Council resolutions will be enforced...or action will be unavoidable."
--"Presidents Remarks at the United Nations", Office of the Press Secretary, 12 September 2002.

16 September 2002
Iraq announces that it will allow the return of UN inspectors without conditions.
--Eleventh quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2002/1303, 27 November 2002, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/
document_list.asp>.

November 2002
U.N. inspectors, as part of UNMOVIC, return to Iraq.

27 November 2002
UNMOVIC begins inspections in Iraq.
--Twelfth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2003/232, 28 February 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages
/document_list.asp>.

7 December 2002
Iraq provides UNMOVIC with an updated full and complete declaration as required by Resolution 1441 describing its proscribed weapons programs and other biological programs. The declaration consists of more than 12,000 pages, but with the exception of non-weapons related biological declarations and missile development declarations, UNMOVIC finds very little new information.
--Twelfth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2003/232, 28 February 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/
document_list.asp>.

5 February 2003
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presents intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs to the U.N. Security Council intelligence, including alleged mobile biological production facilities and signals intelligence.
--White House Press Release, "U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council," 5 February 2003.

19-20 February 2003
The Independent reports on 19 February that three giant cargo ships, which are suspected of carrying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, are being tracked by US and British intelligence. However, the following day, a report by The Guardian says that the US Navy is boarding approximately six ships per day in search of Iraqi WMD, but so far has only found small amounts of drugs and unauthorized guns. Also in the report, David Osler, an editor of Lloyd’s List maritime journal, notes that chemical weapons do not take up much space and safe storage of missiles on a commercial ship would require large-scale adaptations.
--“Iraq Crisis: Three mystery ships are tracked over suspected weapons’ cargo,” Independent (London), 19 February 2003; “Ships boarded in search for smuggled weapons,” Guardian (London), 20 February 2003.

February 24, 2003
Dan Rather interviews Saddam Hussayn concerning the many aspects of Iraq's alleged illicit weapons programs and the impending military confrontation. He denies that Iraq is in breach of Security Council resolutions.
--Dan Rather Interview with President Saddam Hussayn, 24 February 2003.

28 February 2003
After three months of inspections, UNMOVIC observes that Iraq has been very helpful in matters relating to inspection “process”, but has been less forthcoming in substantive matters and notes that Iraq could have made greater efforts to either find and produce remaining WMD stockpiles or show credible evidence of their destruction.
--Twelfth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2003/232, 28 February 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/document_list.asp>.

6 March 2003
An UNMOVIC working document reports on the clusters of remaining unresolved biological disarmament issues including those related to B. anthraxis, botulinum toxin, mycotoxins including aflotoxin and trichothecenes, wheat cover smut, Clostridium perfrigens, ricin, undeclared BW agents, drying of BW agents, bacterial BW agent production, genetic engineering, viral research, and BW agent stimulants.
--"Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes," UNMOVIC Working Document, 6 March 2003, pp. 95-131.

7 March 2003
Hans Blix reports to the U.N. Security council on the progress of the UNMOVIC disarmament mission in Iraq. He reports that there was initial period of reluctant cooperation by the Iraqis but that there now seemed to be an acceleration of cooperative initiatives including the acceptance of disarmament of its al-Samoud 2 missiles.
--"United Nations Weapons Inspectors Report to the U.N. Security Council on Progress in the Disarmament of Iraq", United Nations, 7 March 2003.

16 March 2003
UNMOVIC inspectors withdraw from Iraq following a notification from U.S. administration.

16 March 2003
The Iraqi weapons declaration to the United Nations names the American Type Culture Collection of Manassas, VA and the Pasteur Institute in Paris as the sources of all foreign germ samples used to create Iraqi biological weapons. According to the document, these two biological supply houses shipped 17 types of biological agents to Iraq in the 1980s, among which were anthrax and bacteria needed to make botulinum toxin.
--Philip Shenon, “Iraq likes germs for weapons to US and France,” New York Times, 16 March 2003, p. 18.

18 March 2003
UNMOVIC inspectors withdraw from Iraq following a notification from the US administration of the imminent invasion of Iraq.
--Thirteenth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2003/580, 30 May 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic
/new/pages/document_list.asp>.

19-20 March 2003
US and Coalition forces commence Operation Iraqi Freedom, a military invasion of Iraq, on 20 March at 4 am in Baghdad (8 pm on 19 March in Washington, DC).
--“The war begins,” Economist, 20 March 2003, <http://www.economist.com>.

28 May 2003
A joint CIA/DIA report on Iraqi mobile biological warfare plants outlines the capture and analysis of suspected mobile production trailers. The trailers are suspected to be part of a two or three trailer production unit of biological material or hydrogen, making them suitable for possible use in Iraq's biological or missile programs.
[Note: the trailers were later determined to be for hydrogen production for balloons.]
--"Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants", CIA, DIA, 28 May 2003.

30 May 2003
UNMOVIC reports on the findings of its inspections in Iraq. Highlights of this report include a destruction study of R-400 bombs, an anthrax destruction study, mobile biological weapons production laboratories, and destruction of biological material. UNMOVIC inspected the Al Azziziyah firing range, where Iraq claimed to have unilaterally destroyed 157 R-400 bombs filled with biological agent. To prove the destruction, Iraq excavated and recovered the bombs and pieces of the bombs. The number of base plates, markings on fragments, and level of corrosion were all consistent with Iraq's claims. Chemical and biological sampling of two intact filled bombs showed the presence of B. anthracis and also high levels of manganese and formic acid, which are consistent with Iraq's claims of chemical inactivation with potassium permanganate and formaldehyde. Iraq submitted an anthrax destruction study report to UNMOVIC to prove its previous unilateral destruction of anthrax stocks at Al Hakam in 1991. However, the study could not prove the amount of anthrax that had been dumped. UNMOVIC inspected several suspected mobile biological weapons production facilities in Iraq. Inspections were made based on intelligence provided by other governments. Several sites had seed-processing equipment that looks similar to biological weapons production equipment, but no evidence of mobile biological weapons production activity was found. UNMOVIC requested and received declarations and pictures from Iraq on all its mobile facilities. These facilities were then randomly tested by UNMOVIC during regular inspections, but no evidence of biological weapons production was found. In addition to inspections, 244.6 kilograms of growth media and 40 vials of expired toxin standards was destroyed under UNMOVIC observation.
--Thirteenth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2003/580, 30 May 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new
/pages/document_list.asp>.

June 2003
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) is created to search for WMD in Iraq. It is composed of approximately 1,400 WMD specialists and is led by David Kay, a former top UN weapons inspector.
--James Risen, “After the war: Illegal weapons; US asks ex-UN inspector to advise on arms search,” New York Times, 11 June 2003, p. A18.

30 June 2003
Dr. Hans Blix ends his appointment as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC. Demetrius Perricos is appointed Acting Executive Chairman.
--Fourteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2003/844, 28 August 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/
document_list.asp>.

18 July 2003
Declassified excerpts from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate are released by the White House. These excerpts contain forty "distinct caveats or conditions on the intelligence judgment" which were usually dropped in other official publications and statements.
--Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq: Evidence and Implications, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004), p. 17.

2 October 2003
Dr. David Kay delivers to Congress a statement on the first six months of progress of the Iraq Survey Group. He reports that much has been found concerning the intent of Saddam to restart his illicit programs. He also reports that stockpiles of biological weapons have not been found.
--"Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group", Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 October 2003, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/
david_kay_10022003.html>.

10 October 2003
The only evidence of biological weapons recovered in Iraq by the Iraq Survey Group is a vial containing Clostridium botulinum Type B from a scientist's refrigerator. "Kay said the vial had been stored for safekeeping in an Iraqi scientist's refrigerator since 1993."
[Note: C. botulinum Type A is the most virulent type used for in weapons programs. The toxin generated by Type B is much less toxic. C. botulinum is ubiquitous. It is widely distributed in soil and marine sediments throughout the world. It is also found in the intestinal tract of animals. The organism can be isolated occasionally from many foods because of its widespread occurrence in the environment and is usually associated with research on endemic public health issues in the Middle East.]
--"Revelations Cast Doubt on Iraq Find," The Guardian (UK), 10 October 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1057558,00.html>.

26 November 2003
UNMOVIC publishes a historical review of the destruction of proscribed biological weapons materials and agents since 1991. The report details Iraq's initial declarations regarding biological weapons research in 1991, further declarations by Iraq in 1995 admitting bulk production of biological agents, Iraq's claims of unilateral destruction of biological weapons and agents in 1991, destruction of biological weapons and materials under Special Commission supervision in 1996, destruction of biological materials under UNMOVIC supervision in 2003, and the status of biological weapons facilities after 1996.
--Fifteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2003/1135, 26 November 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/
document_list.asp>.

23 January 2004
Dr. David Kay resigns his positions from the Iraq Survey Group because he came to the conclusion that WMD would not be found in Iraq: "I don't think they existed. What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last Gulf War and I don't think there was a large-scale production programme in the 90s." David Kay criticized the intelligence that led to the war in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying "we were all wrong and that is most disturbing." Kay does state, even if Iraq did not have weapons stockpiles, this does not mean that nation wasn't dangerous.
--"US Steps Back from WMD Claims," BBC News, 24 January 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3426931.stm>; "Admit WMD mistake, survey chief tells Bush" The Guardian (London), 3 March 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1160842,00.html>.

25 January 2004
There are suspicions that the Iraq's CBW materials may have been moved to Syria. "We are not talking about a large stockpile of weapons," he said. "But we know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD programme. Precisely what went to Syria, and what has happened to it, is a major issue that needs to be resolved." There is no physical evidence to support this contention.
--"Saddam's WMD hidden in Syria, says Iraq survey chief," The Telegraph (UK), 25 January 2004, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/01/25/wirq25.xml>.

27 February 2004
UNMOVIC releases a summary of Iraqi chemical and biological munitions. Iraq declared and subsequently destroyed R-400 bombs filled with biological agent. Some were destroyed unilaterally and others under Special Commission supervision.
--Sixteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2004/160, 27 February 2004, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/
document_list.asp>.

30 March 2004
The CIA releases the unclassified portion of testimony by the new head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), Charles Duelfer, before the US Congress. Regarding biological weapons, Duelfer says that the ISG has new information on Iraq's dual-use facilities and research projects and their potential to be quickly converted to weapons programs. He states that Iraq had such facilities and also had plans to build new facilities. He cites the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center, as an example of a biological dual-use facility and research center. In particular, this facility did research on Bacillus thuringiensis, which is a commercial biopesticide that can also be used as a surrogate for anthrax for production and weapons development.
--Testimony to the US Congress by Mr. Charles Duelfer, Director of Central Intelligence Special Advisor for Strategy regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs, 30 March 2004, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/
2004/tenet_testimony_03302004.html>.

30 March 2004
Senator Carl Levin issues a statement that the publicly released testimony of Charles Duelfer to Congress on 30 March 2004 creates a misleading impression that there is WMD in Iraq, while the classified testimony casts doubts on that conclusion.
--Senator Carl Levin, Press Release, 30 March 2004, “Statement of Senator Carl Levin relating to public release of testimony of Mr. Charles Duelfer DCI’s Special Advisor for WMD in Iraq”, <http://www.nci.org/04nci/04/
carl-levin.htm>.

28 May 2004
UNMOVIC comments on the unclassified portion of Charles Duelfer’s testimony to the US Congress on 30 March 2004, saying that both UNMOVIC and UNSCOM repeatedly inspected the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center and categorized it as being subject to intensive monitoring because of the dual-use nature of the facility and its research. UNMOVIC also reports that Iraq purchased both biological and chemical dual-use equipment between 1999 and 2002, but there is no evidence that it was used in prohibited weapons programs. Most of the materials bought were declared to UN monitors properly.
Seventeenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2004/435, 28 May 2004, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new
/pages/document_list.asp>.

9 July 2004
The Butler report, which will be published next week, will say that the September 2002 dossier of the Joint Intelligence Committee in Britain omitted several caveats qualifying British intelligence on Iraq. For example, the dossier claimed that Iraq could deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes, but did not mention that this claim only referred to short range munitions and came from only one source.
--“UK Butler Inquiry ‘to finger’ Foreign Secretary Straw over Iraq War legality,” Agence France-Presse, FBIS EUP20040709000353, 9 July 2004.

14 July 2004
The Butler Report is issued in Britain. This report mostly reviews the reliability and quality of intelligence provided to the UK government prior to the 2003 war with Iraq. The report also says that Iraq did not have significant stocks of chemical and biological weapons or developed plans to use such weapons.
--Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, House of Commons document number HC 898, 14 July 2004, <http://www.official-
documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf>.

27 August 2004
UNMOVIC reports that significant amounts of Iraqi WMD related items have been exported from Iraq as scrap metal and are showing up in scrapyards in many countries, most notably Jordan and the Netherlands. These items include SA-2 missile engines and chemical dual-use items that still had UN tags attached to them. UNMOVIC estimates that the export of these items began in June 2003 and continued until June 2004. Through the use of satellite imagery, UNMOVIC has determined that several sites previously monitored by them before Operation Iraqi Freedom have been looted and razed. With the exception of the items that have turned up in scrapyards, the status of the dual-use equipment and materials contained at these sites is unknown.

UNMOVIC comments on the likelihood of biological munitions being found in Iraq by coalition forces. UNMOVIC states that biological munitions were produced on a limited scale and were supposedly destroyed unilaterally by Iraq. However, excavations by the UN to account for this destruction were interrupted by the UNMOVIC withdrawal. UNMOVIC judges it unlikely that anything more than fragments of biological munitions will be found and states that such fragments should not contain any live biological agent.

UNMOVIC issues an assessment of Iraq’s remotely piloted and unmanned aerial vehicle (RPV/UAV) programs based on inspections conducted in the 1990s and 2003. They state that although they had concerns about the ability of some the RPV/UAVs to fly beyond the allowed range, the vehicles were unable to effectively deliver chemical or biological agents. While Iraq’s RPV/UAVs technically could have been modified to carry small amounts of chemical or biological agents, the quantities would not have been large enough to make an effective military weapon. In addition, no technical evidence was ever found by UNMOVIC indicating that the Iraqis had tried to develop such modifications.
--Eighteenth quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), UN document S/2004/693, 27 August 2004, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/
quarterly_reports/s-2004-693.pdf>.

23 September 2004
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his followers threaten to behead a British contractor, Ken Bigley, unless Iraqi female prisoners are released. This demand focuses attention on two imprisoned women scientists: Dr. Rihab Taha, also known as “Dr. Germ”, who was in charge of an Iraqi facility that weaponized anthrax, botulinium toxin, and aflatoxin and believed to have designed the Iraqi biological weapons program; and Huda Salih Mahd Ammash, also known as “Mrs. Anthrax” and “Chemical Sally”, who was the only woman to serve on Saddam Hussein’s Revolutionary Command Council. Although the Iraqi Ministry of Justice is not opposed to releasing these women, the US authorities are still refusing to release them.
--“Hostage crisis: US detaining Iraq scientists despite failure to find WMD,” Independent (London), 23 September 2004, p. 4; “Scientists had key roles in Saddam’s laboratories,” Irish Times, 23 September 2004.

30 September 2004
The Iraq Survey Group releases its final report on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The report finds Saddam intended to resume WMD programs after UN sanctions were lifted. According to the ISG, Iraq probably destroyed biological weapons stockpiles in 1991 and 1992, but continued biological weapons research until the mid 1990s. Research included assassination uses of biological weapons and human testing. In 1996, Iraqi BW facilities and equipment were destroyed under UN supervision. Iraq could have quickly re-established small scale BW programs within a few weeks through the dual-use civilian facilities in the country. However, the ISG found no evidence that Iraq was pursuing this option. In addition, the ISG found no evidence that Iraq had established any mobile BW production facilities.
--Comprehensive report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/
general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html>.

8 October 2004
Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group is quoted responding to a question about the possibility that Iraqi WMD were transferred out of Iraq prior to March 2003. He says: “We cannot yet definitively say whether or not WMD materials were transferred out of Iraq before the war. Neither can we definitely answer some questions about possible retained stocks though, as I say, it is my judgment that retained stocks did not exist.” [By excluding the possibility of retained stocks of WMD, or new production prior to March 2003 Duelfer also appears to exclude the possibility that WMD were transferred to Syria or any other country.]
--Janine Zacharia, “Bush concedes Iraq had no WMDs,” Jerusalem Post, 8 October 2004, p. 1, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 October 2004
UNMOVIC remains concerned about the destruction of WMD sites and facilities in Iraq and the subsequent disappearance of dual-use equipment. It recommends that Iraq set up an inventory system to track the location and condition of such equipment and indicates that UNMOVIC is ready to assist in this effort. Iraq had no immediate comment on UNMOVIC’s concerns, but the US State Department, which has been helping Iraq set up methods to restrict the movement of these materials, said that Iraq has put new export controls in place to prevent WMD materials or technology from leaving Iraq.
--Robert McMahon, “Iraq: UN Mission hopes for tighter controls on Iraqi ‘dual-use’ sites,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 October 2004.

14 January 2005
White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, rules out the possibility that Iraqi WMD may have been moved to Syria.
--Brian Knowlton, “Search for banned weapons in Iraq ends quietly,” International Herald Tribune, 14 January 2005, p. 3.

17 January 2005
US Intelligence and congressional officials say they have not seen any evidence that WMD components or equipment were moved from Iraq to Syria, Jordan or elsewhere before or after the March 2003 US invasion. In a separate statement Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) says: “What I can tell you is that I believe we know a lot of materials left Iraq and went to Syria. There was certainly a lot of traffic across the border points. But whether in fact in any of these trucks there was WMD-related materials, I cannot say.”
--Katherine P. Shrader, “US intelligence found no evidence WMD moved from Iraq,” Associated Press, 17 January 2005, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 February 2005
Arab news sources allege that U.S. forces have used “bombs which gave off apple-scented poisonous gas” in the course of their assault on Iraqi insurgent forces in the city of Fallujah. A representative of the Iraqi Ministry of Health is quoted as saying that U.S. forces used inter alia “mustard gas, nerve gas, and other burning chemicals.”
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 68 (June 2005), p. 26.

27 April 2005
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) publicly releases the Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisors to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD. On the question of purported transfers of Iraqi WMD to Syria the report says: “There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation. ISG was unable to complete its investigation and it is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war. It should be noted that no information from debriefing of Iraqis in custody supports this possibility. ISG found no senior policy, program, or intelligence officials who admitted any direct knowledge of such movement of WMD. Indeed, they uniformly denied any knowledge of residual WMD that could have been secreted to Syria.” The report concluded that “[b]ased on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials.”
--Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Duelfer Report), March 2005, p. 1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/
reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/addenda.pdf>; Dana Priest, “Report finds no evidence Syria hid Iraqi arms,” Washington Post, 26 April 2005; Katherine Shrader, “Weapons inspector ends WMD search in Iraq,” Associated Press, 26 April 2005; Rowan Scarborough, “CIA can’t rule out WMD move to Syria,” Washington Times, 27 April 2005, ; “Puncturing another weapons myth,” New York Times, 30 April 2005, p. A12; Anders Strindberg, “Report finds no evidence of WMD transfers to Syria,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 June 2005.

15 October 2005
The permanent Constitution of Iraq is ratified by popular referendum. Article 9, paragraph 1 (e), provides that “the Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and associated equipment, materiel, technologies and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production and use of such weapons.”
--Letter dated 5 February 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, UN Document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/116/Add.1, 10 February 2006, p. 2, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/241/33/PDF/N0624133.pdf >.

17 December 2005
US forces release biological weapons scientists Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash and Rihab Taha from custody, after more than three years in detention, on the grounds that they no longer pose a security threat.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No 71 (May 2006), p. 26.

26 January 2006
Georges Sada, formerly second in command of the Iraqi Air Force, claims that in June 2002 Iraq transported WMD to Syria aboard several refitted commercial jets, under the pretence of conducting a humanitarian mission for flood victims. He says that two commercial jets were converted to cargo jets, in order to carry raw materials and equipment related to WMD projects. The passenger seats, galleys, toilets and storage compartments were removed and new flooring was installed. Hundreds of tons of chemicals were reportedly included in the cargo shipments. Sada says he obtained the information from two Iraq Airways captains who were reportedly flying the sorties. The allegations are included in Sada’s newly published book, “Saddam’s Secrets” which he is promoting in the United States.
--Ira Stoll, “Iraq's WMD Secreted in Syria, Sada Says,” The New York Sun, 26 January 2006, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>

9 March 2006
Speaking at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, former CIA official, Mr. Paul Pillar, speculates that Iraq will be seeking WMD again within the next five to ten years. He explains this as a necessary reaction to threats posed to Iraqi security by regional neighbors possessing or seeking WMD themselves.
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No 72+73 (September 2006), p. 13.

26-28 April 2006
Three Iraqi representatives attend the meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Sixth BWC Review Conference in Geneva.
--List of Participants, BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.2, 28 April 2006, p. 10, <http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/6rc/docs/pc/
BWC_Conf.VI_PC_INF2_EFS.pdf>.

8 September 2006
The US Select Committee on Intelligence releases Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Pre-War Assessments. Regarding Iraq’s alleged biological weapons programs this preliminary report states that “[p]ostwar findings do not support the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessment [see 1 Oct 02 and 18 Jul 03] that ‘Iraq has biological weapons’ and that ‘all key aspects of Iraq’s offensive biological weapons (BW) program are larger and more advanced than before the Gulf war’ [or] that Iraq possessed, or ever developed, mobile facilities for producing biological warfare (BW) agents…” The report did note however that “[a]lthough Iraq no longer had a large scale BW production capability after 1996, Iraq did retain an inherent dual-use capability ... and that Iraq could have re-established an “elementary” BW program within a few weeks to months, but would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability.
--Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, 8 September 2006, p. 54-55, <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/srpt109-331.pdf>.

Regarding pre-war claims that Iraq had been providing CBW training to al-Qa'ida operatives the report concludes that “No postwar information has been found that indicates CBW training occurred and the detainee who provided the key prewar reporting about this training recanted his claims after the war.”
--Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, 8 September 2006, p. 106, <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/srpt109-331.pdf>.

30 to 31 October 2006
The Iraqi government participates in the twenty-fifth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) interdiction exercise which takes place in international waters off the north-eastern coast of Bahrain. [Iraqi participation does not appear to include the deployment of military assets and may to be limited to an observation role.]
--The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 74 (December 2006), p. 61-62.

20 November – 8 December 2006
Five Iraqi representatives attend the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in Geneva, Switzerland.
--List of Participants, BWC/CONF.VI/INF.8, 7 December 2006, p. 18-19, <http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/6rc/docs/inf/BWC_CONF.VI_INF.8_EN.pdf>.

28 June 2007
The UN Security Council adopts resolution 1762 under which it “decides to terminate immediately the mandates of UNMOVIC and the IAEA under the relevant resolutions.”
--S/RES/1762 (2007), 29 June 2007, p. 2, <www.un.org>.

20-24 August 2007
An Iraqi delegation of three attends the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland.
--List of Participants BWC/MSP/2007/MX/INF 3, 24 August 2007, p. 13, <www.opbw.org>.

10-14 December 2007
An Iraqi delegation attends the fourth Meeting of the States Parties (MSP) to the BWC in Geneva, Switzerland.
--List of Participants BWC/MSP/2007/INF 1, 14 December 2007, p. 14, <www.opbw.org>.

18-22 August 2008
An Iraqi delegation of three attends the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Meeting of Experts in Geneva, Switzerland.
--List of Participants BWC/MSP/2008/MX/INF.5, 22 August 2008, p. 15, <http://www.unog.ch>.

	Updated October 2008