Other Names: Shehab-3

Iran has been an active participant in the DPRK's Nodong program from its inception in the late 1980s. This would lead to the establishment of the Shahab-3 ("meteor" or "shooting star") program and has allowed both technology and components from the DPRK's programs to continue to flow into Iran's missile programs. Exactly when the Iranians established the Shahab-3 program is presently unclear. Preliminary evidence suggests that both the Nodong and Shahab-3 programs were established concurrently in 1988, although the Shahab-3 program may have had a different name at the time. It appears that a key element of the program was not to purchase and deploy a fleet of Nodong missiles—which it could have done; instead it was to develop the technology and industrial infrastructure to the point where it could produce the system indigenously. The Shahab-3 is of strategic importance for two primary reasons. First, its 1,300km+ range allows it to strike every important U.S. ally in the region (i.e., Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey), southern Russia, and most of Afghanistan. Second, it was designed as a delivery system for WMD warheads.

In March 1993, a 21-member Iranian delegation traveled to Pyongyang;[1] Brigadier General Hossein Mantequei, the director of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), headed this delegation. The delegation was staffed with a predominance of missile experts who would remain in the DPRK for several months.[2] The purpose of the visit was reportedly to discuss ballistic missile-related cooperation, arrange for Iranian training on the Nodong and participation in the forthcoming Nodong test, and the purchase of an estimated 150 Nodong missiles, mobile-erector launchers (MELs) and support equipment.[3] Both Iranian and Pakistani missile specialists are believed to have been present for the DPRK's 29-30 May 1993 test event in which one Nodong and three Hwasong-6 missiles were launched.[4]

Although it is unclear, it is believed that the DPRK was to commence delivery of Shahab-3 components, technology, and a small number (e.g., 1-2) of prototype missiles in mid-1993.[5] These actions led to reports in October of that year that Iran would soon flight-test the new system in the Dasht-e Lut desert (as it had the Shahab-2 in 1991). These reports were vigorously denied by both Iran and the DPRK, and no such test took place.[6] According to U.S. sources, the agreement for the Shahab-3s was placed on hold for unknown reason. It would appear, however, that the delay centered on the three Iranian concerns of quality control, delivery schedules, and costs.[7] The Iranians had frequently complained of poor quality control and the missing of delivery commitments.[8] All the while, the DPRK was seeking to renegotiate contracts and asking for exorbitant prices for its missiles and related technologies. These factors were combined with intense Japanese and U.S. pressure on the DPRK not to sell the Nodong to Iran.

As part of the regularly scheduled meetings of the "Joint Committee for Cooperation in Economics, Science and Technology between Iran and the DPRK," Iranian Defense and Military Logistics Minister Mohammed Forouzandeh flew to the DPRK in December 1993, where he met with Minister of People's Armed Forces O Chin-u and senior DPRK officials. Primary items for discussion were the Iranian complaints and participation in the Nodong and Taepodong missile programs.[9]

The following year, in February 1994, KPAF commander General Cho Myong-rok visited Iran with a 29-member delegation of military and nuclear experts and toured the Shahrud Missile Test Facility.[10] This may have been a reciprocal visit to Mohammed Forouzandeh's December 1993 visit and was intended to conclude a contract for the sale of an estimated 150 Nodongs. The Iranians were also interested in concluding this contract, but held concerns about poor quality control of missiles and components received and numerous missed delivery commitments. These Iranian concerns had apparently become so serious that they had felt obliged to decrease crude oil shipments to the DPRK. This action further worsened the DPRK's deepening economic crisis and is believed to have also been a significant factor in Cho's visit.[11]

In June 1994, U.S. intelligence reported that Iran would conduct flight-test the Shahab-3 within 12 months. Part of the reasoning behind these reports was the deliveries of technologies, components, MELs, and missiles in prefabricated "knockdown" kits, as well as the DPRK's reluctance to flight-test the Nodong from its own territory for fear of worsening the current state of tension over its nuclear program; a test flight in Iran would carry no such risks. As with the 1993 reports of a Shahab-3 test, none was carried out in 1994-1995.[12] In the second half of 1994, U.S. sources attributed this failure to test the Shahab-3 to a suspension in missile cooperation between Iran and the DPRK. This itself was a result of a secret annex attached to the 1994 Agreed Framework signed by the DPRK and the United States. While the details of this annex are unknown, it apparently focused primarily upon the delivery of completed Nodong systems because the DPRK and Iran continued their ballistic missile cooperation in other areas.[13]

Against this background, the Israeli reports in early 1995 that the DPRK had recently provided Iran with an estimated 12-24 Nodong missiles are intriguing.[14] Although the delivery schedule of Shahab-3s to Iran is unclear, reports suggest that in 1995-1996 Iran had taken delivery of approximately 20 missiles and a small number of MELs (e.g., four-eight). These were incorporated into Iran's Shahab-2 missile brigade and the Shahab-3 test and evaluation component was expanded to battalion size. This battalion is believed to have retained responsibility for operational test and evaluation of the new system.[15]

In the mid-1990s, the DPRK's 1994 agreement with the United States and recurring Iranian problems with the DPRK slowed cooperation with the DPRK. This had a domino effect and slowed the introduction of the Shahab-3 into Iranian service, and startup of Iranian assembly and production. It has been suggested that the Iranians were not pleased with the overall progress within the Nodong program and that the problems they were encountering with the newly delivered missiles only exacerbated this sentiment. This situation provided impetus for expanded missile-related cooperation and acquisition with Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Europe. This in turn appears to have led to the decisions to replace a number of Shahab-3 subsystems with technology and components acquired from Russia and to focus the Shahab-4 project more heavily upon Russian technology rather than that from the DPRK. Numerous sources suggest that the Shahab-5 is based upon the DPRK's Taepodong system; however, this remains to be verified.

The majority of the technologies and components acquired from the PRC went primarily into the various solid fuel rocket and short-range missile programs; however, some are believed to have been incorporated in the Shahab-3 program (e.g., manufacture of composite materials). For example, the guidance components could be utilized in the Shahab-1, or adapted for use in the Shahab-2 or Shahab-3. Between mid-1994 and mid-1995, the PRC delivered guidance system components, computerized machine tools, test equipment, propellant ingredients, and other missile-related components and technologies to Iran. The computerized machine tools were superior to equipment previously supplied by the DPRK and provided a significant improvement to Iran's overall missile production capabilities. Later acquisitions included solid fuel technology (e.g., casting of solid fuel rocket motors, x-ray machines); the China Precision Engineering Institute New Technology Corporation concluded a contract with Iran's DIO to sell gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment; and Great Wall Industries provided telemetry and test range equipment.[16]

The majority of the Iran-Russia activities during this period were for the Shahab-3 and -4 (see separate entry) programs. Iran began hiring large numbers of Russian missile technicians and scientists and acquiring advanced technologies and components. Among the technologies and components sought after or acquired were composite materials manufacturing, specialized steel, guidance system components, engine technology, basic ballistic missile design and production assistance, construction of wind tunnels, model missile manufacture, and development of related computer software. In addition, Iran is reported to have acquired a small number of Russian RD-214 engines and their design drawings. It was also interested in acquiring even more advanced engines.[17] Much of this assistance was funneled into Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG, a.k.a., Hemmet, or Hemat), which appears responsible for the various Shahab missile programs. Israeli sources have identified five Russian entities that have occupied crucial positions within the Iranian missile program: the Polyus Research Institute and Kutznetzov (formerly NPO-Trud), involved in developing engine and guidance systems; the Bauman National Technical University and the Central Aerodynamics Institute (TsAGI), involved in developing propulsion systems; and the Russian Space Agency, which provided wind-tunnel testing in Russia.[18] TsAGI reportedly has several contracts with Iran's SHIG for the construction of a wind tunnel, manufacture of missile models, and creation of related software.[19] Other sources include the NIIGrafit, which manufactures material used to coat ballistic missile warheads (a shipment of material from NIIGrafit was intercepted by Austria on its way to Iran), and Rosvoorouzhenie, Russia's arms export agency.[20] Because of U.S. pressure, a number of these organizations quickly dropped their association with the Iranian missile program. The acquisition of Russian and PRC missile-related technologies and components would play an ever-increasing role in Iranian missile developments into 2001.[21]

Iranian and Syrian missile representatives traveled to the DPRK in October 1996 to observe a planned flight-test of a Nodong prototype. This, however, was canceled possibly in consideration of DPRK-U.S. political developments at the time and capture of a Korean People's Navy Sang-o class infiltration submarine at the South Korean city of Kangnung in September.[22]

By 1997, many of the recurring Iranian problems with DPRK missiles and technology had been addressed and missile-related cooperation improved. An example of this renewed cooperation was the 1997 Iranian acquisition of the computer software related to the manufacture of Shahab-3 components and systems. With this software, Israeli intelligence sources believed that Iran could domestically produce the Shahab-3 within two years.[23] During the year, Iran conducted six-eight ground tests of the Shahab-3 engine at the SHIG "Complex 6000."[24]

In late September 1997, the Russian Scientific and Production Center Inor signed a $48,000 contract with Instrumentation Factories Plan (a component of DIO) to provide 620kg of four special metal alloys used in the production of long-range missiles. Of this 620kg, 240kg were 21HKMT specialty steel. The remaining 380kg of materials are the alloy foils 49K2F, CUBE2, and 50N. All these materials play a critical role in the production of ballistic missiles.[25]

The following year, in May 1998, a truck from the Russian Moso Company left Moscow for Iran with a shipment of 22 tons of specialty steel suited for manufacturing fuel tanks for Scud-missiles. Several days later this truck was detained at the Iran-Azerbaijan border because problems with its documentation—misrepresentation of the type of steel and the shipper (Europalace-2000).[26] Concurrent with these efforts with Russia, Iran acquired in May-June approximately 1,000 tons of specialty steel for its missile programs from the PRC.[27]

In June 1998, reports originating with Iranian opposition groups indicated that development of the Shahab-3 had been completed and that the system was moving into the pilot production phase. With the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics placing an order for the production of 15 missiles by the end of March 1999. These same source state that the DIO was now capable of manufacturing the Shahab-3 fuel tanks and system, oxidizer tanks and system, tail section, warhead compartment and the MEL. It was still dependent upon the DPRK for the guidance and propulsion systems. There was, however, a strong Iranian effort to produce the engine within the country.[28]

The following month, on 22 July 1998, Iran conducted its first flight-test of the Shahab-3 (and the third test of a Nodong derivative). This missile is believed to have been a DPRK produced Nodong which was assembled in Iran with few, if any, local internal modifications. The test took place from the Shahrud Missile Test Facility. Where the missile was launched from a MEL, flew south-southeast for approximately 100 seconds, and traveled 1,000km before exploding northwest of Iranshahr. Initially it was uncertain at the time whether this was an accidental explosion, or if the Iranians deliberately terminated the flight after achieving their objectives. Subsequent data indicates that it was a failure due to an engine malfunction.[29] Following the test of the Shahab-3 former president Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that such missiles were a basic component of any nation's defenses and that the missile was of entirely Iranian design, "The Shehab-3 is an entirely Iranian missile. There could be some adaptations from foreign makes, but it is not similar to any foreign missile."[30] Like the earlier test of the Ghauri, DPRK observers are believed to have been present for the test of the Shahab-3.[31]

Although the guidance system and warhead separation subsystem were not completely tested by the flight concerns were immediately as to when the new system would be operationally deployed. Most estimates suggested 12-24 months (e.g., July 1999-July 2000). The Iranians may have followed the DPRK example and considered that they had an "limited operational capability" with a small number Shahab-3s regardless of any problems or shortfalls in testing.[32]

Following the test Iran claimed that "the development of its missile capability was for purely defensive purposes." Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Reza Nouri further stated that "the missiles were an instrument to defend Islamic and Arab countries in the region."[33]

The Iranian test of the Shahab-3, and continued Russian assistance to Iran's missile and civilian nuclear programs, led the U.S. State Department to impose sanctions on seven Russian entities on 6 August 1998—Baltic State Technical University, Europalace 2000, Glavkosmos, Grafit (a.k.a., State Scientific Research Institute of Graphite or NIIGRAFIT), INOR Scientific Enterprise, MOSO Company, and the Polyus Scientific Production Association. Additionally it was investigating two additional entities—the Tikhomirov Institute and Komintern Factory.[34] Five months later three additional Russian entities were sanctioned—D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia, Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI), and the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (a.k.a., NIKIET, Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (RDIPE), or ENTEK).[35]

In early 1999, Israeli intelligence sources indicated that Iran had recently delayed a second test flight of the Shahab-3 due to technical problems. Specifically integrating modern Russian technology into the unsophisticated Shahab-3. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani denied the Israeli allegations stating that "we have successfully tested the Shehab-3, we do not need to do it again. That missile became operational the day it was tested successfully." He went on to state that the Shahab-4 "...is intended to carry satellites into orbit and it carries no warhead... It will have no military purpose." Without providing details he said that Iran had faced "mechanical problems" with the Shahab-4 engine.[36]

Later in the year, a U.S. businessman revealed that entities in Armenia and Belarus had traded heavy machinery and materials for Iranian goods. The machinery included manufacturing and numerically controlled milling machines for use in Iran's missile programs. Also included were materials for manufacturing liquid rocket fuel. The equipment and materials were transported to Iran through Armenia.[37]

In support of the Shahab-3 program, the DPRK provided Iran with 12 engines in November 1999. These engines were shipped from Sunan International Airport aboard an Iran Air Boeing 747-100 transport and arrived in Iran on 21 November.[38]

In December, reports surfaced that Iran would conduct a second flight-test of the Shahab-3 from the Shahroud Missile Test Facility in the first quarter of 2000.[39] This flight-test occurred in July 2000 under the supervision of IRGC commander Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi. The Shahab-3 was launched under operational conditions not from the Shahroud Missile Test Facility but from a MEL located at the new IRGC airbase at Mashhad. The missile flew 850km before impacting in the Dasht-e Lut desert west of Zahedan. A major goal of the test is believed to have been to demonstrate complete systems integration—especially the propulsion and guidance subsystems. The missile was equipped with a DPRK-produced engine from the shipment that had arrived the previous November. Following the test, U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources concluded that Iran had essentially completed the initial development phase of the Shahab-3 and would likely enter the series production phase in 2001. A senior Israeli defense official stated, "it won't be accurate, but it will be able to strike anywhere in Israel."[40]

The July flight-test of the Shahab-3, and continued DPRK assistance to Iran's missile programs, led the U.S. State Department to impose sanctions on four Iranian and one DPRK entities on 14 April 2000: the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), SANAM Industrial Group, and the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation.[41]

The following month, Iran began preparations to conduct another flight-test of the Shahab-3.[42] At that time, it was estimated that the test would occur later that month. The test, however, was delayed for a month apparently so as to not embarrass Iranian President Mohammed Khatami during his visit to the UN Millennium Summit. The following month, on 21 September, Iran conducted its third flight-test of a Shahab-3. Speaking to the IRNA News Agency, Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani identified the system as the "Shehab-3D" and indicated that it was an satellite launch vehicle (SLV): "...the necessary basis for designing and producing carriers to put satellites in orbit have been created. ...No military use has been forecast for Shahab-3D."[43] Interestingly, an Iranian spokesman also described the system as being "solid-liquid fueled." U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources, however, state that Shamkhani's statements were incorrect and that the system is a ballistic missile. The flight-test is believed to have originated in northeastern Iran (e.g., either the Shahroud Missile Test Facility or the IRGC airbase at Mashhad) with the flight path taking the missile due south. The missile launched properly, however, approximately 100 seconds into the flight and 1,000km downrange the engine failed and the missile either exploded or was detonated by ground control. Some sources suggest that this test was the first time Iran has used an engine of indigenous manufacture. This seems unlikely. It is more probable that the engine was of DPRK manufacture and had been assembled and modified by the Iranians with technology acquired from Russia.[44]

In January 2001, reports indicated that U.S. intelligence had detected Iranian preparations to conduct a "full-range" flight-test of the Shahab-3; however, no flight-test occurred.[45]

In early 2001 the Shahab-3 is believed to have entered limited series production. As far as can be determined, the production model is based upon the system successfully flight-tested in 2000. Iranian missile forces are believed to have achieved an emergency operational capability with the system shortly afterwards. The majority of the system is manufactured indigenously with the DPRK providing engines and a few critical components. For several years, Iran has been attempting to manufacture the Shahab-3 engine but has repeatedly encountered significant problems therefore forcing it to rely upon engines manufactured by the DPRK.[46]

Responding to Iranian missile developments, especially the sale of missile engines to Iran, the United States imposed sanctions against the DPRK's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation in January and June 2001. These sanctions appear to have had little effect upon either Iran or the DPRK.[47]

In mid-2001 Iran is reported to have initiated a comprehensive review and reorganization of its diverse rocket and missile development programs. This effort is believed to have been initiated in an effort to prioritize and rationalize the entire development and production infrastructure and reduce costs. Its long-term effects upon the Shahab-3 program are presently unclear.[48]

In mid-January 2002, Iran began preparations to conduct another flight-test of the Shahab-3. The missile, however, exploded while being fuelled, causing a number of fatalities.[49]

Shortly afterwards, DPRK technicians arrived to assist the Iranians conduct a systematic review of Shahab-3 defects and prepare for another test-launch. On May 1 Iran conducted its fifth flight-test of the Shahab-3. The missile was launched from the "Semnan region" and traveled approximately 1,000km before impacting in the Dasht-e Lut desert southwest of Zahedan. Although the range was less than the nominal 1,300km, the test was considered a complete success, suggesting that Iran had succeeded in solving several technical difficulties in the guidance and engine sub-systems that have plagued the system to date. Israel sources indicate that the improvements in the guidance sub-system were most impressive and that the missile struck a predetermined target. Following the test Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani stated, "We will continue our missile program in order to promote the power and the precision of the Shahab-3 missile." Israeli sources state that the test was "a milestone" for the program.[50]

The following year in July and August, Iran continued its Shahab-3 test program. Few details are available concerning these tests. Both appear to have been conducted from the "Semnan region." Neither appears to have been successful and the in July test, the missile is reported to have traveled only 100km before exploding. This, however, remains to be confirmed.[51]

In October Brigadier General Ahmad Vahid, chairman of the Iranian Aerospace Industries Organization, stated that Iran would soon test-launch a reconnaissance satellite and that this would be the culmination of the Shahab-program. He further stated,

"We are going to develop this missile so as to have a range of more than 1,500km because our main aim from developing it is to strike Israeli targets if Iran comes under Israeli missile strikes. Reaching this level in the missile's performance takes us to the threshold of success in sending a missile to an orbit outside earth's atmosphere. The Iranian organization has started work to achieve this goal and to design a lightweight small satellite. We expect to make the first test soon."[52]

But he refused to name the approximate date for this test. General Vahid stressed that Iran has no intention of developing ballistic missiles with ranges that exceed Israeli targets.

In the last week of June 2003, Iran conducted another flight-test of the Shahab-3. Details concerning the test are lacking; however, Israeli sources suggest that this as being the most successful to date. An foreign ministry spokesman stated, "it was a final test before delivering the missile to the armed forces. It was within the same range that we had declared before."[53]

If Russian and other East European assistance to the Iranian missile program continues, it will result in a Shahab-3 system that resembles the original DPRK produced Nodong but possesses significantly different and improved internal sub-systems—resulting in a more capable missile. Since the airframe is unlikely to change significantly, it will be difficult to detect and identify the majority of these internal modifications. The Shahab-3 program has undeniably been of significant benefit to both Iran and the DPRK at numerous levels. In relation to the Shahab-3 program, Iran's cooperation with Russia has undoubtedly been beneficial to both countries and produced a superior weapon system. Although some sources suggest that Iranian-DPRK ballistic missile cooperation has declined in the late 1990s, it would appear that it is still quit significant, especially given the continued exchange of high-level political and military delegations and the U.S. State Department's 2 January 2001 imposition of sanctions on the DPRK's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for its continued assistance to Iran's missile programs.[54] The Iranian-Russia relationship appears to be strong and will likely continue to expand into other areas of ballistic missile research and development.[55]

Available information suggests that Iran has a current inventory of 25-100 Shahab-3 missiles. These systems are capable of being armed with conventional high explosive, submunition, chemical, biological, and radiological dispersion warheads. Given a favorable environment, a nuclear capability could be achieved by 2008.

Key Sources:
[1] "Pyongyang Strongly Denies Reports of 'An Agreement With Iran for Missile Exports'," North Korea News, 26 April 1993, No. 680, p. 5; Douglas Jehl, "North Koreans Reported Selling Missiles to Iran," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9.
[2] Stephen J. Hedges and Peter Cary, "The Other Problem in the Persian Gulf," U.S. News & World Report, 14 November 1994, pp. 87-88.
[3] From April 1993 and April 1998 over 300 Iranian missile technicians and engineers have been trained in the DPRK.
[4] "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," pp. 184-191; and Bill Gertz, "Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles," p. A3.
[5] Other reports suggest that delivery may have later during 1994, however, this appears to be too late. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Says Russians Assisted Damascus With Missile Plan," New York Times, 12 December 1993, p. 1; Sid Baldman, "U.S. Warned Israel About North Korean Missiles Going to Syria," United Press International, 16 August 1993.
[6] "North Korea Strengthens Military Cooperation With Iran," North Korea News, 20 December 1993, No. 714, p. 4; "Iranian Defense Minister Visits North Korea," Reuters, 6 December 1993; "Iranian Defense Minister Leaves for North Korea," Reuters, 6 December 1993; "Iran Denies Missile Link With North Korea," Reuters, 2 December 1993; "Planned Missile Test With DPRK Denied," IRNA, 23 October 1993, as cited in FBIS; Ed Blanche, "Iran-Missile," Associated Press, 22 October 1993.
[7] Robert Burns, "US-Korea Missile," Associated Press, 25 December 1993.
[8] Almost all users (i.e., Egypt, Iran, Syria, and UAE) of DPRK Scud-class missiles have complained about the poor quality control and missed delivery commitments.
[9] "North Korea Strengthens Military Cooperation With Iran," North Korea News, 20 December 20, 1993, No. 714, p. 4; "Iranian Defense Minister Visits North Korea," Reuters, 6 December 1993; "Iranian Defense Minister Leaves for North Korea," Reuters, 6 December 1993.
[10] "Iran's Top Diplomat Visits Pyongyang," North Korea News, 7 February 1994, No. 721, p. 4; "North Korean Air Forces Chief Visits Iran," p. 5; and Ed Blanche, "Iran-North Korea," Associated Press, 24 February 1994.
[11] Douglas Jehl, "Iran is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9.
[12] Martin Sieff, "N. Korean Missiles May be Tested in Iran this Year," Washington Times, 16 June 1994, p. A13.
[13] "Israeli Report on Nuclear Targeting Priorities," Davar, 13 January 1995, p. 15, as cited in JPRS; "Woolsey Visit, DPRK-Iran Missile Threat Viewed," Ha'aretz, 22 December 1994, p. B2, as cited in FBIS; "Gur on Iranian Purchase of Nodong Missiles," IDF Radio, 7 December 1994, as cited in FBIS.
[14] "Israel Claims Government Received DPRK Missiles," Independent, 2 May 1995, p. 10. These reports may be in error and represent some other form of missile related cooperation between the two countries.
[15] Duncan Lennox, "Ballistic Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 April 1996, p. 40.
[16] The Iranian acquisition efforts with the PRC were broad ranging. For example, it sought to acquire additional C-802 (CSSC-8 saccade) anti-ship cruise missiles from the PRC. "Israel-Russia Missiles," Associated Press, 30 September 1997; Bill Gertz, "Russia, China and Iran's missile program," Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1; Bill Gertz, "China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-range Missile," Washington Times, 17 June 1997, p. A3; Bill Gertz, "GOP Senator Hits Clinton policy Cites Russian, Chinese Arms Sales to Iran with Impunity," Washington Times, 18 April 1997, p. A8.
[17] The RD-214 engine powered the R-12 (SS-4 sandal), which is the source of numerous reports indicating Iranian interest in acquiring the SS-4.
[18] Kutznetzov (NPO Trud) is a major rocket motor manufacturer; Polyus (a.k.a, North Star) is reportedly Russia's leading laser developer; and the Bauman National Technical University has been described as the Russian equivalent of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Most of these Russian entities have denied there involvement in the Iranian missile program. Bill Gertz, "Russia, China and Iran's missile program," Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1.
[19] Bill Gertz, "Russia, China and Iran's missile program," Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1.
[20] Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, "Russia's Resolve on Iran in Doubt," Times - Picayune, 26 April 1998, p. A1.
[21] The Iranian acquisition efforts with Russia were broad ranging. For example, it sought to acquire S-300 (SA-10 grumble) and 9K38 Igla (SA-18 grouse) SAMs. "Israel-Russia Missiles," Associated Press, 30 September 1997; Bill Gertz, "Russia, China and Iran's missile program," Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1; Bill Gertz, "China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-range Missile," Washington Times,17 June 1997, p. A3; "Tehran Reportedly Wants To Use Syrian Espionage Network," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30 May 1997, p. 8, as cited in FBIS; Bill Gertz, "GOP Senator Hits Clinton policy Cites Russian, Chinese Arms Sales to Iran with Impunity," Washington Times, 18 April 1997, p. A8; "Russia Denies SS-4 Technology Sale to Iran," Segodnya, 15 February 1997, p. 2, as cited in FBIS; Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy, Tim, and Holly Porteous, "Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens," International Defense Review, 1 February 1997, p. 1; "Iranian Missile Deal with N Korea Falters," Flight International, 23-29 October 1996; Central Intelligence Agency, The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Nonproliferation Center, March 1995, pp. 8-13; Rodan, Steve, "Iran Has Problems With Shihab-3," Middle East News Line, 1 March 1999; Bill Gertz, "Longer Range on Iranian Missile Shahab-4 Could Hit Central Europe," Washington Times, 29 July 1998, p. A12.
[22] "'Concern' Expressed at Iran-DPRK Missile Cooperation," Qol Yisra'el, 19 November 1996, as cited in FBIS.
[23] "Iran Could Build Nodong in Two Years," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 1997, p. 5; "N. Korea Said Supplying Iran With Military Software," Ha'aretz, 24 April 1997, as cited in FBIS.
[24] Barton Gellman, "Shift by Iran Fuels Debate Over Sanctions While Urging U.S. Dialogue: Tehran Pursues New Arms," Washington Post, 31 December 1997, p. A1; Eric Arnett, "Iran Made Rocket Motor Test, Says Israeli General," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 April 1997, p. 4.
[25] Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals Contract Contrary to Official Denials," Washington Times, 20 October 1997, p. A1.
[26] Europalace-2000 is sometimes spelled Europalas-2000. Gordon, Michael R. and Schmitt, Eric. "Russia's Resolve on Iran in Doubt," Times - Picayune, 26 April 1998, p. A1; "Missile-Quality Steel Halted at Iran Border," Reuters, 25 April 1998.
[27] David Makovsky, "Missiles Feared as China Sends Steel to Tehran," Ha'aretz, 2 June 1998, as cited in FBIS.
[28] "Iran's Shahab 3 IRBM 'Ready for Production'," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 16 June 1998.
[29] Andrew Koch and Steve Ridan, "Iran Begins Serial Production Of Shahab 3," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 October 2001; "Iran's Shihab-3 Missile," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 2000, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0008_me2.htm>.
[30] "Iran Missile Eyes 'Nuclear' Israel," Reuters, 29 July 1998.
[31] Michael Eisenstadt and Azriel Lorber, "Iran's Recent Missile Test: Assessment and Implications," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch, Number 303, 5 August 1998; Bill Gertz and Martin Sieff, "Iran's Missile Test Alarms Clinton," Washington Times, 24 July 1998, p. A1; Tim Weiner, "Iran Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis," New York Times, 23 July 1998; Bill Gertz, "Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile Weapon Could Strike Israel, U.S. Troops," Washington Times, 23 July 1998, p. A1.
[32] Walter Pincus, "Iran May Soon Gain Missile Capability; Tehran Could Build, Deploy Medium-Range Weapon in 2 Years, U.S. Officials Say," Washington Post, 24 July 1998, p. A28.
[33] Economist Intelligence Unit, "The Crown Prince's Influence on Foreign Policy Continues to Grow," Country Report-Saudi Arabia, no. 4, 1998, pp. 12, 26.
[34] Department of State, "Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Entities in Russia," Federal Register, Volume 63, Number 151, 6 August 1998, p. 42089; "U.S. Acts on Russian Entities, Citing Iran threat," Reuters, 28 July 1998.
[35] Department of State, "Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Entities in Russia, Including Ban on U.S. Government Procurement," Federal Register, Volume 64, Number 11, 19 January 1999, p. 2935.
[36] "Iran 'Armed and Safe' 20 Years After Revolution," Reuters, 7 February 1999; "Iran Delayed Missile Test Due to Problem," Reuters, 20 January 1999.
[37] "Armenian Says Iran Traded Arms For Missile Equipment," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 October 1999, p. 1, as cited in FBIS.
[38] Bill Gertz, "N. Korea Sells Iran Missile Engines," Washington Times, 9 February 2000.
[39] Ed Blanche, "Iran Launches Four New Missile Programmes," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 30 December 1999.
[40] Steve Rodan, "Shahab 3 Suffers Test Launch Setback," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 February 2002; "Iran's Shihab-3 Missile," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 2000, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0008_me2.htm>; Steve Rodan, "Shihab-3 Minus Lethal Warhead Viewed by Israeli Officials," Middle East Newsline, 4 April 2000.
[41] Department of State, "Bureau of Nonproliferation, Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in North Korea and Iran," Federal Register, Volume 65, Number 73, 14 April 2000, p. 20239.
[42] There is some confusion regarding the Shahab-3 flight-test program. Several sources indicate that Iran conducted a successful test on 15 July 2000; however, no details have been provided. It is likely that this test was an engine test rather then a flight test of the Shahab-3. "German Intelligence Chief Views Dangers of Proliferation," Hamburg Welt am Sonntag, 24 September 2000, p. 2, as cited in FBIS; Bill Gertz, "Iran Missile Test Fails After Takeoff," Washington Times, 22 September 2000.
[43] Iran has publicly indicated an interest in space research and satellites since the mid-1990s. In August 1998, Iranian television showed what appears to have been a mock-up of a clam-shell nosecone with a small satellite inside of it and a model of a SLV with a bulbous payload section, apparently based upon the Shahab-3. Concurrent with the 2000 launch of its "Shahab-3D," Iran announced its participation in the development of two small satellites—MESBAH and SMMS. The MESHBAH will be used to train Iranian specialists and advancing aerospace technology and research at government scientific research centers. The SMMS (small multi-mission satellite) is apparently related to the Asian Research Satellite (ARS), which is a joint project of a number of south and east Asian countries including: Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, PRC, ROK, and Thailand. "Into Space—Under the Banner of Islam?," Novosti Kosmonavtiki, 1 October 2000, p. 46, as cited in FBIS; "Iranian Defense Minister on Shahab-3 Missile," IRIB Television, 5 August 1998, as cited in FBIS; "Further on Khatami's Visit to Defense Ministry," IRIB Television, 1 August 1998, as cited in FBIS; and "Iran's Khatami's on Military Issues, Missiles," IRIB Television, 1 August 1998, as cited in FBIS.
[44] Penney Stewart, "Iran and Syria Test Fire Tactical Ballistic Missiles," Flight International, 3 October 2000, p. 23; Bill Gertz, "Iran Missile Test Fails After Takeoff," Washington Times, 22 September 2000.
[45] Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, 12 January 2001.
[46] Andrew Koch and Steve Rodan, "Iran Begins Serial Production Of Shahab 3," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 October 2001.
[47] Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Hit With Sanctions," Washington Times, 28 June 2001; "US says China, N.Korea firms aid Iran," Reuters, 27 June 2001; Department of State, "Bureau of Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against a North Korean Entity, Including Ban on U.S. Government Procurement," Federal Register, Volume 66, Number 123, 26 June 2001, p. 33988; Department of State, "Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against a North Korean Entity, Including Ban on U.S. Government Procurement," Federal Register, Volume 66, Number 11, 17 January 2001, p. 4050.
[48] "Iran Reportedly Cuts Down Production of Ballistic Missiles," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 August 2001, p. 3.
[49] Steve Rodan, "Shahab 3 Suffers Test Launch Setback," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 February 2002.
[50] Robin Hughes, "Iran Claims 'Success' With Latest Missile Test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 June 2002.
[51] Andrew Koch and Steve Rodan, "Iran Tests Latest Ballistic Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 September 2003. Interestingly, one source suggests that these test were of the Shahab-4 and that they were successful. Philip Sherwell, "Russia Adds Range to Iran's Latest Missiles," Telegraph, 10 November 2002.
[52] "Iranian Official Cited on Shehab-2 Missile, Israel's Nuclear Warheads," Al-Hayah, 3 October 2002, p. 4, as cited in FBIS.
[53] Ze'ev Schiff, "Discovering the Shihab-3," Ha'aretz, 23 July 2003; Gil Hoffman, "Mofaz: IDF Ready for Shihab-3," Jerusalem Post, 22 July 2003; Nazila Fathi, "Iran Confirms Test of Missile That Is Able to Hit Israel," New York Times, 8 July 2003; Amir Oren, "Iran's Successful Missile Test Puts Israel Within Range," Ha'aretz, 4 July 2003, as cited in FBIS.
[54] Department of State, "Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against a North Korean Entity, Including Ban on U.S. Government Procurement," Federal Register, Volume 66, Number 11, 17 January 2001, pp. 4050-4051.
[55] "Russia, Iran Agree on 'Impressive' Military-Technical Cooperation," Kommersant, 15 March 2001, p. 10, as cited in FBIS; Robert O. Freedman, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s" MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2000; Arieh O'Sullivan, "Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon - Source," Jerusalem Post, 15 September 1999; "Iran Has Problems With Shihab-3;" James Risen, "C.I.A. Sees a North Korean Missile Threat," New York Times, 3 February 1999; "Paper Says Iraq, Iran Trying To Acquire Armament Technology," Berliner Zeitung, 15 December 1994, p. 2, as cited in JPRS.

	Updated February 2006