Iran, as a result of a secret 1984 agreement with Libya, was able to acquire approximately two MAZ-543P TELs and 20 Scud-B missiles. These missiles and TELs are believed to have reached Iran during January or February 1985 via both Boeing 747 airlift over Turkey and by sea.[1] Upon arrival, the missiles were assigned to a newly created battalion-sized missile unit of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force, whose personnel had received preliminary training in both Libya and Syria. As a result of a secret agreement reached in Tehran during January 1985, Syria reportedly provided additional assistance with the dispatch of special advisers to complete the Iranian's training and to assist in operating the Scud-Bs. The Syrian advisors were stationed in both the Kermanshah and Dezful regions.[2] After a period of approximately one month, the missile unit attained initial operational capability. Iraq had not been idle while Iran pursued the acquisition of arms and missiles: during 1983-1984, Iraq had launched approximately 58 Scud-Bs (33 in 1983 and 25 in 1984) at Iranian cities, and by 12 March 1985, it had launched an additional 42.

On 12 March 1985, Iran conducted its first ballistic missile attack against Iraq, when at 0240 hours troops launched a Libyan supplied Scud-B at Kirkuk. This was followed two days later by an early morning attack on the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.[3] By 1 April, a total of eight Scud-Bs had been fired—one against Kirkuk and seven against Baghdad. The Iranians identified the unit that conducted these attacks as the Khatam ol-Anbya (a.k.a., Khatam-ul-Anbia, "Seal of the Prophets") missile unit.[4]

Iraqi officials soon identified Kermanshah (140km from the Iraqi border) as the location from which Iran was launching the missiles.[5] Over the next three months, both sides conducted a small-scale "War of the Cities" with Iran launching missiles at Baghdad and Iraq countering with Scud-B missile attacks upon number of Iranian border cities. As a result of a cease-fire agreement in early June, the War of the Cities came to an end and neither side is reported to have launched any missiles for the remainder of the year.

During this War of the Cities, Iran launched a total of 14 Scud-Bs (one against Kirkuk and 13 against Baghdad), while Iraq launched 48 (primarily against Dezful and Bakhtaran—being unable to reach Tehran). In all but one case, the Iranian missile attacks consisted of a single missile.

Aside from depleting the missile arsenals of both sides, the War of the Cities had a significant impact on both sides. For Iran it was a public relations and morale-building victory to be able to repeatedly attack the Iraqi capital with relative impunity. Unfortunately, the resulting Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian cities outnumbered the Iranian efforts by greater than 3:1 and caused hundreds of casualties. Thus both the value of possessing a ballistic missile force and the country's own vulnerability to missile attacks were impressed upon the Iranians. Although it was operationally surprised by the Iranian attacks, Iraq took comfort in the fact that it had clearly out-performed the Iranian missile effort and inflicted considerably more physical damage than itself had sustained. It was, however, an extremely frustrating public relations defeat not possessing missiles with the range to strike at the Iranian capital of Tehran (approximately 450km from the Iraqi border). The subsequent Iraqi al-Husayn/al-Abbas missile programs (see appropriate section) were a direct result of this frustrating inability to strike Tehran.[6]

One of the more intriguing aspects concerning this first Iranian use of Scud-Bs were reports suggesting that the Iranian missiles were a modified version of the Scud-B. Iraqi officials stated that the size of the explosions in Baghdad indicated a warhead of 120-200kg as opposed to the standard 1,000kg Scud-B warhead. Since the Iranians were extremely fortunate to simply acquire and successfully employ their few Scud-Bs, it is extremely unlikely that they had modified their missiles in any form.[7]

A not unexpected result of the Libyan sale of Scud-Bs to Iran was the straining of relations between Tripoli, Baghdad, and Moscow. Meanwhile Iraq, on 25 June, severed diplomatic relations with Libya.

With regards to the Soviet Union, the Libyan sale was in contravention of an agreement between the two countries. Within two weeks of the first Iranian Scud-B attack, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Minister of State for Military Affairs Abdul-Jabber Shanshel made an unscheduled visit to Moscow. The purpose of this trip was to enlist support in stopping future Libyan Scud-B deliveries and to obtain Soviet military supplies and weapons.[8] This Iraqi effort apparently had its effect within one month, as the Soviets slowed down the flow of aid to Libya and dispatched Anatoliy Gromyko, director of the African Research Center, to Libya in May. Here he met with Libyan officials to persuade them not to transfer additional Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles to Iran.[9] The effect of the Soviet pressure upon Libya was relatively quick and typically Libyan—they asked Iran to return the Scud-Bs saying that it "had only lent" them to Iran.[10] More significantly, the Libyans declined to provide additional Scud-Bs, although they would continue the supply of financial and other military assistance to Iran.[11]

For a number of reasons, 1985 would prove to be a turning point in the political and technical development of Iran's missile capabilities. At the height of the March-June War of the Cities, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hashemi-Rafsanjani publicly stated that the acquisition of a viable ballistic missile force had become a national priority and that Iran would soon become "...a missile power second only to the superpowers."[12]

The week after the cease-fire, Hashemi-Rafsanjani led a high-level Iranian delegation to Libya and Syria seeking additional Scud-B missiles and continued military assistance.[13] The following week, he visited the PRC and DPRK. These trips apparently laid the foundation for future deliveries of missiles and missile-related technology to Iran. While Libya declined to provide additional Scud-Bs due to Soviet pressure, Syria may have done so sometime in 1986. Reports suggest that it provided Iran with a small number of missiles in an arrangement reportedly worth $15 million.[14] If this is correct, the number of missiles provided was likely to be very small—approximately one dozen. The visits to the PRC and DPRK were also successful and would lay the foundations for the acquisition of a wide range of missiles and missiles technologies. Most notable among these would be the DPRK Hwasong-5 (Shahab-1/Scud-B), Hwasong-6 (Shahab-2/Scud-C), and Nodong (Shahab-3).

Between June 1985 and June 1986, neither Iran nor Iraq launched any missile attacks, as each side was occupied with the ground war and developing its own missile production infrastructure. Beginning in June 1986, possibly as a result of receiving Syrian Scud-Bs, Iran initiated isolated Scud-B attacks against Baghdad and Kirkuk. By the end of 1986, Iran had launched an additional eight missiles, bringing its total of Scud-Bs fired against Iraq to approximately 22.

During 1987, the "Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force" fired an additional 18 Scud-B missiles, increasing to 40 the total number launched against Iraq. This probably depleted the unit's inventory of missiles obtained from Libya and Syria though some reports suggest that in late 1987, the Libyans may have supplied 12 additional Scud-B missiles in return for a supply of chemical weapons technology and munitions.[15]

The first DPRK-produced Hwasong-5 (known in Iran as the Shahab-1) arrived in 1987 and both the Scud-B and Shahab-1 saw extensive use in the second War of the Cities during February-April 1988 (see Shahab-1 entry). Iran employed the last of the R-17 Scud-Bs obtained from Libya and Syria. The Shahab-1 replaced the Scud-Bs in the Iranian inventory.

Key Sources:
[1] Barry Schweid, "Washington News," Associated Press, 9 January 1986; Subhy Haddad, "Iraq Says it Has Pinpointed Iranian Missile Launching Base," Reuters, 29 March 1985; "Libya delivered USSR-made Scud B missiles to Iran via Turkey," Al Khaleej, 28 March 1985, p. 1, as cited in FBIS.The exact number of TELs and missiles obtained from the Libyans is uncertain. Estimates range from 20-50 missiles. Given the known numbers fired during the war it would appear that an estimate of 20-30 missiles is reasonable.
[2] Foreign Report, 18 July 1985.
[3] "Iran-Iraq," Xinhua, 14 March 1985.
[4] British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4: The Middle East, Africa and Latin America, 15 March 1985, p. ME/7900/A/1. The name "Khatam ol-Anbya" was apparently the identity of the field headquarters of the Iranian military command at that time.
[5] Ibid.
[6] For a discussion of the early Iraqi program see W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Iraq's al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part I," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 204-209; W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Iraq's al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part II," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1990, pp. 242-248; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Iraqi Missile Update," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1990, p. 329.
[7] "Iraq Says it Has Pinpointed Iranian Missile Launching Base," 29 March 1985.
[8] Ibid.
[9] "USSR Seen Trying to Block Supply of Scuds to Iran," KUNA, 20 May 1985, as cited in FBIS.
[10] "Libyan Wants Return of Missiles ‘Lent' to Iran," KUNA, June 1, 1987.
[11] Egozi, Arie. "Libya's Gadhafi Indicates Strong Interest in Chinese Ground-to-Ground Missiles," Defense News, 13 June 1988, p. 33.
[12] "Hashemi-Rafsanjani's Remarks," NHK Television Network, 11 June 1985, as cited in FBIS.
[13] Foreign Report, 18 July 1985.
[14] There is still considerable debate as to whether Syria actually provided Scud-Bs to Iran. This Iranian-Syrian agreement may have solely been for traditional military assistance. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-87, Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., New York, 1987, p. 33.
[15] "Iranians Back Off Claim for Weapons," Washington Times, 31 December 1987, p. 9.

	Updated February 2006