Iran currently possesses the capability to employ ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery rockets against its regional neighbors, Israel and US forces deployed in the region. A large number of these systems currently possess the capability to delivery chemical, biological or radiological dispersion warheads. If conditions remain favorable, it will be able to extend the reach of its ballistic missile forces to include Southern Europe, North Africa, and South Asia by 2005-2010 and possibly the continental United States by 2015. A true nuclear weapons delivery capability could be obtained within the next five years. Any one of a host of international or domestic factors, however, could accelerate or delay these developments.
Iran believes that a strong missile force is critical to its security and acts as a deterrent to foreign (especially US) aggression. This concept was clearly articulated by Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani on 7 February 1999 when he stated, "Iraq would have undoubtedly not attacked us 20 years ago if we he had then the power we have now....Because of our deterrent power, Israel's threatening rhetoric against us has also decreased lately."[1]
Available information suggests that Iran has a current ballistic missile inventory of 325-550 systems: 200-300 Shahab-1, 100-150 Shahab-2, 25-100 Shahab-3, and 1-5 Shahab-4/5 prototypes. The relative numbers of Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 systems could change in favor of the Shahab-2 if Iran undertakes to upgrade the earlier systems to Shahab-2 configuration. Reliable estimates of long-range artillery rocket (e.g., Fajr, Nazeat and Zelzal) inventories are unavailable. These totals could quickly be increased should Iran make the decision to either purchase additional systems from the DPRK or accelerate Shahab-3 production.[2] Although information is sparse, Iran is believed to field the equivalent of two surface-to-surface missile brigades. The first is equipped with Shahab-1 systems. This unit consists of six-twelve MAZ-543P TELs and unknown number of MELs. It is believed to be organized into two-three battalions. The second is equipped with Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 systems. It consists of approximately four-six Shahab-2 TELs and four-eight Shahab-3 MELs and is believed to be organized with one-two Shahab-2 and one-two Shahab-3 battalions. Each brigade is believed to have an operational test and evaluation responsibility for its respective missile systems. It is likely that a third brigade equipped with the Shahab-3 will be formed by 2005. There may also exist a small number of independent Shahab-2 or -3 units of battalion size. There are also an unknown number of long-range artillery rocket units, some perhaps of brigade size.
US-led Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom—while first reducing and then eliminating the military threat from Iraq—have also crystallized within the Iranian military and political leadership the concepts on ballistic and cruise missiles and long-range artillery rockets: they are essential tools on the modern battlefield; key elements in regional power status and prestige; and essential to deter Israel and the United States from aggressive actions against Iran.
From a proliferation standpoint, Iran currently presents a number of challenges. Primary among these are:
- The continued willingness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia to provide Iran with both missiles and missile-related technology that at the very least exceed the intentions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This has been complemented, to a lesser extent, by the willingness of other nations (e.g., Libya and Syria) to cooperate within the realm of ballistic missile development.
- The ongoing ability and willingness of Iran to fund the development of missiles and missile-related technology in other countries (e.g., DPRK, Libya, and Syria).
- Development of both an indigenous missile design and production capability, and the evolution of a strategic doctrine that foresees Iran as a regional superpower, "...a missile power second only to the superpowers," and a "...center..." for other third world nations seeking missile capabilities.[3]
- Iran's ballistic missile capabilities are complemented by extensive nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, which themselves are the recipients of significant foreign assistance.
Key Sources:
[1] "Iran 'Armed and Safe' 20 Years After Revolution," Reuters, February 7, 1999; and "Iran-Missile," Associated Press, 7 February 1999.
[2] Eisenstadt, Michael. "The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment," MERIA, Volume 5, Number 1, December 2000.
[3] "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Delivers Friday Prayer Sermon," Tehran Domestic Service, 19 August 1988, as cited in FBIS; "Hashemi-Rafsanjani's Remarks," NHK Television Network, 11 June 1985, as cited in FBIS.
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Updated February 2006 |
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