Iran has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and publicly decried all forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, it does have a very sophisticated biotechnology infrastructure that includes leading research facilities and trained personnel. It has also participated in several scientific exchanges with foreign experts.

Iran has shown an interest in acquiring BW agents from foreign sources. The speaker of the Iranian parliament publicly stated in 1988 that "...we should fully equip ourselves in defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons."[2] Canadian and Dutch scientists were approached by Iranian personnel looking to acquire mycotoxin-producing fungi (Fusarium spp.) in 1989. Sources also claim that Iran has pursued the acquisition of castor beans (known to be used for producing the deadly toxin ricin)[3] and retains several cultures of the anthrax-producing bacteria Bacillus anthracis.

Given Iran's strong biotechnology and pharmaceutical infrastructure, it is not difficult to envision the development of a concealed BW program. Several dual-use items have been imported into Iran from Western countries, and Iran is also working closely with India and Cuba within the realm of biotechnology.

History

Some Western sources believe that Iran first developed its BW program during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Currently, its growing biotechnology industry does have the potential to divert dual-use agents for illicit warfare purposes. There are several reasons why Iran would pursue a BW program, including establishing a deterrent against Iraq, establishing regional dominance, or developing an alternative to conventional weapons for asymmetric conflicts. Some experts speculate that in its biological arsenal, Iran possess agents such as botulinum toxin, B. anthracis, and ricin.

In the early 1980s, upon approval of the World Federation of Culture Collections, the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Biotechnology set up a 600-strain Persian Type Culture Collection to assist Iran's biotechnology industry. In August 1989, Iran was accused of trying to purchase strains of Fusarium spp. from Canada and the Netherlands, which could be used to develop T-2 mycotoxin. It is believed that the strains were destined for the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology and the Imam Reza Medical Center. It must be noted that Dr. Bruno Schiefer, the Canadian toxicologist approached by Iran, was doubtful that Iran would use the strains for illicit BW purposes. While the two strains of fusaria Iran requested are in fact dangerous to animal and human nervous systems, Schiefer contended that the toxins (T-2 and related "trichothecene mycotoxins") produced by the fungi would not kill quickly enough to be an effective agent. Contravening his own argument, however, Schiefer also speculated that the Iranians were most likely trying to acquire the fungi for defensive purposes, such as developing gas masks that would be protective in the event of its offensive use. T-2 and other trichothecene mycotoxins are suspected components of "yellow rain," which was allegedly used in battle by Communist regimes in Southeast Asia during the 1970s and early 1980s.

European firms have been targeted by Iranians for technology and equipment. In addition, it has been alleged that former Soviet bioweaponeers have been hired by Iran to specifically work on its BW arsenal. These scientists are supposedly experimenting with the causative agents of such diseases as Marburg, smallpox, plague, and tularemia. According to Michael Eisenstadt, Iran "probably is researching such standard agents as anthrax and botulin toxin and it has shown interest in acquiring materials which could be used to produce ricin and mycotoxins."[4] Another report indicates that "Iran has...conducted extensive research on more lethal active agents like anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and biotoxins."[5] It must be noted that this latter source, cited by Anthony Cordesman, cannot be independently corroborated, and firsthand data on Iranian BW agents is unavailable in open sources.

Agents and Delivery

Some of the most common agents that are associated with the Iranian BW program in the open literature are B. anthracis, botulinum toxin, ricin, T-2 mycotoxin, and Variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox. (A table of cultures that Iran is known to possess is available in the Biological Capabilities section.)

With respect to delivery of any BW agent, it is not immediately clear what route Iran has taken or will take. Some experts believe that Iran is developing the capability to deliver biological agents by Scud missiles, aircraft, or other aerosolization techniques.[6] According to the CIA, Iran possesses weaponized biological agents that could be dispersed by artillery and aerial bombs.[7] The Iranian Shahab missile is reportedly capable of carrying biological warheads.[8] Iran has also conducted chemical and biological defense military exercises with helicopter sprayers and worked with cruise and ballistic missiles, although there is no concrete evidence that it has developed a biological warhead to be fit on such missiles.

Status

Iran's biopharmaceutical industries are increasingly sophisticated and produce a variety of vaccines for humans and livestock. The Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines and the Pasteur Institute are leading regional facilities in the development and manufacture of vaccines. In January 1997, Iran created an organization called the Iranian Biotechnology Society (IBS), which serves as an umbrella organization to bring together various institutes and individuals focusing on biotechnology related research. IBS has several branches and over 350 members.

As there is no concrete mechanism for verifying government reports or allegations from exile groups, many of the allegations regarding the Iranian BW program remain unsubstantiated. Most of the literature and accusations come from CIA reports, uncited writings of experts, and claims made by Iranian dissidents. The majority of these reports cite Iranian attempts to purchase fusaria from Canada and the Netherlands as evidence that Iran is working on a covert weapons program. While this could be true, it should be noted that the utility of these fungal species is not limited to BW applications. For instance, the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology claims it researches Fusarium spp. to fight agricultural ailments in sunflower, tomato, and tobacco fields. Also, Iran offered one of its premier facilities, the Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines, to host mock inspections for the BWC. If covert activities had in fact been taking place at this location, these inspections would have significantly jeopardized such efforts. As a general principle the bulk of writing and comment on this topic presumes Iranian intent to develop and have available for use BW agents. Once this presumed intent is accepted as fact many otherwise legitimate activities can easily be interpreted as indicators revealing the existence of a covert BW program.

Publicly released information from Iranian scientific institutions shows no concrete proof of an offensive BW program. However, the available information does not disprove allegations made by a variety of sources. The sophisticated research facilities in Iran could easily serve as a front for illicit BW-related activities and offer a legitimate excuse to import dual-use material. Before the 1990 Gulf War, Iraq had used its single cell protein research program at al-Hakam to camouflage its development of biological agents, including B. anthracis. Similar, presumably legitimate advanced research is being carried out at the National Research Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology near Tehran.

Finally, it is significant that U.S. intelligence agencies have altered their stance on Iranian BW activity since the early part of this decade. Recent reports limit themselves to observations such as the rather simple observations such as: “Tehran continues to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment and expertise which have legitimate uses, but also could enable ongoing biological warfare efforts.”[14]

In mid 2008 it is impossible to make any stronger statement than that Iran possesses the technical capability to actively pursue a basic BW program if it should choose to do so. However, it is impossible to conclusively demonstrate on the basis of publicly available information that such a program currently exists or existed at some point in the recent past. Even if Iran possesses BW agents, it would still face a significant challenge successfully achieving their weaponization and delivery. There are no indications that Iran has successfully weaponized BW agents. Given its current state of technology and the problems associated with delivering a sophisticated BW agent, it is unlikely that Iran currently has the means to carry out a significant biological attack.

	Updated July 2008