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Updated April 2010
Biological Overview
Although Iran has previously been accused of secretly developing an offensive biological warfare (BW) program, most notably in the 1990s, more recent assessments have tended to avoid such definitive claims, instead emphasizing the dual-use capabilities inherent to Iran's civilian biotechnology sector. There is a high probability that Iran has pursued a defensive BW capability which could serve as a starting point for offensive work if Iran were interested in undertaking such a program. It is impossible to state with any certainty whether or not Iran currently maintains or has ever pursued an offensive BW program. However, on the basis of available information, it seems likely that Iran has undertaken some BW-related work in the past and furthermore that its capacity to pursue such a program has increased over time. Iran ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 22 August 1973[1] and has publicly decried all forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), although the sincerity of such public statements has been disputed.[2]
U.S. intelligence agencies have released to the public statements and reports regarding their assessments of Iran's BW activities and capabilities. For example, in a 1996 report to the U.S. Senate, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) claimed that "Iran has had a biological warfare program since the early 1980s. Currently the program is in its research and development stages, but we believe Iran holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons..."[3] However, more recent reports reveal less certainty about whether an Iranian BW program exists. A 2008 report from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) states that "Iran probably has the capability to produce biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW."[4] In an unclassified section of the report to Congress covering 2009, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis repeated the assessment from the 2008 report.[5]
History
As there are very few sources on Iran's efforts to establish an offensive or BW offensive program, it is difficult to provide a history of possible BW activities. Given Iran's sophisticated biotechnology and pharmaceutical infrastructures, Iran could have the capability to develop a BW program. In addition to its domestic biological industries, Iran has imported several dual-use items from various countries, and cooperated extensively with Cuba in the realm of biotechnology.[6] The following section draws on allegations made by Western intelligence agencies and reports of Iran's possibly BW-related imports.
There are several reasons why Iran would pursue a BW program, including establishing a deterrent against regional foes, or developing an alternative to conventional weapons for asymmetric conflicts. Some experts speculate that Iran may have at one time possessed agents such as botulinum toxin, B. anthracis, and ricin, although these accusations cannot be confirmed.[7]
In the past, Iran indicated some interest in the acquisition of BW agents from foreign sources. The speaker of the Iranian parliament publicly stated in 1988 that "...we should fully equip ourselves in defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons."[8] In 2002, in a submission to the BTWC, Iran also declared that it "has carried out some defensive studies on identification, decontamination, protection, and treatment against some agents and toxins," while also in the same submission denying that it had a "National Biological Defensive Program."[9]
Reports in the early 1990s claimed, without citing specific sources, that Iran at one time pursued the acquisition of castor beans (known to be used for producing the deadly toxin ricin)[10] and that it additionally worked to develop botulinum toxin and anthrax. [11] These claims, however, remain unsubstantiated. Reports also circulated in 1989 that Iran attempted to procure Fusarium spp. (a fungus that produces T-2 mycotoxins) from Canadian scientists. It is believed that the Iranian scientist who ordered the strains may have worked for the Imam Reza Medical Center. A separate incident occurred when the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology apparently attempted to order the same strains (in addition to nine others) from a facility in the Netherlands. Both of these attempts were unsuccessful. Although it is unclear what the intended end-use of these materials might have been, both T-2 and trichothecene mycotoxins have the potential to be utilized as BW agents.[12]
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Iran may have attempted to hire former Soviet bioweaponeers.[13] These scientists supposedly had experience with the causative agents of such diseases as Marburg, smallpox, plague, and tularemia.[14] One analyst for the U.S. government, Milton Leitenberg, directly contradicted this allegation in his own assessment in 2005, saying that "those few Russian scientists that went to Iran did not come from institutes that worked with smallpox."[15]
In the mid-1990s, analysts speculated that Iran was "probably...researching such standard agents as anthrax and botulinum toxin and [that it had] shown interest in acquiring materials which could be used to produce ricin and mycotoxins."[16] This particular source drew upon the 1989 reports of Iranian attempts to procure T-2 mycotoxin strains, although did not provide independent corroboration of the occurrence of such events.
Since the passage of the Iran Nonproliferation Act in 2000, the U.S. government has levied sanctions against multiple companies that exported goods the United States considered to be of a dual-use nature. However, the sanctions only specify that the materials could be used for WMD; they do not indicate if the sanctioned company exported potential BW-related materials. Information released by official sources, including the Department of State, generally provides the sanctioned companies' names but does not provide further details.[17]
Some sources have linked sanctioned companies to possible BW material by examining the companies' business activities. The Oriental Scientific Instruments Corporation (OSIC), which was sanctioned by the United States in 2004, "manufactures a large array of pathological instruments and even supplies live monkey and primates for biological research. Live primates are required for the development of biological weapons that are effective against humans." However, live primates also have a variety of legitimate uses, thus their import does not conclusively prove the existence of a BW program. This same source relates that another sanctioned company, Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, exports spray-dryers, which are "critical for the manufacture of biological weapons such as anthrax and smallpox."[18] The company's English language Web site lists the following products: glass-lined reactors, tanks, heat exchangers, evaporators, columns, agitators, and double-cone rotary dryers,[19] which could have multiple applications.
Another entity that faced U.S. sanctions beginning in 2007 is the Defense Industries Organization of Iran, which states on its Web site that its "range of...products and services are classified and rendered in the area of detection, protection, decontamination and treatment to its local and international customers worldwide."[20] This description could suggest that the company is involved in the areas of chemical and/or biological defense.
In 2009, reports surfaced of a confidential document recommending that the European Union (EU) sanction several entities "allegedly linked to Iran's covert nuclear or biological weapons programmes."[21] According to reports, the intention of the draft proposal was to encourage the United States to follow suit and similarly impose tougher sanctions against Iran. It is unclear whether these EU sanctions were enacted; however, in February 2010 France and Germany renewed threats to expand sanctions against Iran, which could incorporate the recommendations listed in this document.[22]
Iran's official position on the acquisition of biological weapons, and WMD in general, is summarized in its UN Security Council Resolution 1540 documents, which state, "the Islamic Republic of Iran considers acquiring, developing, and using WMD as inhumane, immoral, illegal, and against its very basic principles."[23] In these reports, Iran also highlights its efforts to combat biological weapons proliferation, including the relevant Islamic Penal Code (Article 688) and Ministry of Health and Medical Treatment and Education provisions.
In 2007, Iran also presented to BTWC states parties evidence of laws and regulations it has enacted to counteract biological weapons proliferation, including the Environment Protection and Improvement Act of 1974 and the Importation and Exportation of Noxious and Poisonous Substances through Customs Act of 1988.[24] Iran points to its adoption of the Plant Protection Act in 1967 and the Iran Veterinary Organization Act of 1971 as examples of legislative steps it has taken to ensure the safeguarding of Iranian industries that come into contact with dual-use materials.[25] Iran also offered one of its premier facilities, the Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines, to host trial inspections for the BWC in 1998.[26] However, despite its proclaimed support for the BTWC, Iran did not submit Confidence Building Measures (CBM) as stipulated by the states parties to the BTWC until 1998, more than 10 years after which these submissions began. Moreover, when Iranian officials first submitted the declarations, "they conveniently 'forgot' to submit perhaps the two most critical CBM forms out of eight."[27]
Iran also has historically opposed international restrictions on its imports of dual-use biological materials. Specifically, Iran points to the Australia Group as exercising discriminatory controls on exports to Iran of dual-use biological materials and technology.[28]
Agents and Delivery
Several state intelligence agencies as well as analysts have accused Iran of either attempting to develop or of stockpiling the following agents: B. anthracis, botulinum toxin, ricin, T-2 mycotoxin, and Variola virus. (A table of cultures that Iran is believed to have at one time possessed is available in the Biological Capabilities section.)
With respect to delivery of BW agents, it is impossible to judge with certainty the level of advancement in Iran's alleged program. In the past, experts accused Iran of pursuing sophisticated delivery techniques for BW agents with aircraft and Scud missiles. Reports also indicated that Iran may have attempted aerosolization of BW agents.[29] In 1996, the CIA claimed that Iran possessed weaponized biological agents that could be dispersed by artillery and aerial bombs.[30] News reports in the late 1990s speculated that Iran's Shahab missile could carry biological warheads.[31] There is no direct evidence, however, that Iran designed missiles to be fit with biological warheads. Moreover, more recent government reports do not specify which BW agents, if any, have been developed by Iran, or which delivery methods Iran might use for any biological weapons. Iran does maintain a sophisticated missile and rocket program (See the Iran Missile profile.) for further information).
Status
Iran's biopharmaceutical industry has become increasingly sophisticated and produces a variety of vaccines for humans and livestock. The Razi Institute for Serums and Vaccines and the Pasteur Institute are leading regional facilities in the development and manufacture of vaccines. In January 1997, Iran created an organization called the Iranian Biotechnology Society (IBS) to oversee biotechnology research in Iran. IBS has over 350 members[32] and maintains several branches. The Persian Type Culture Collection is another biological center in Iran, which utilizes strains of yeast, fungus, and bacteria. The Web site for the center states that it "operates according to international quality criteria," and provides services to both private industry and academia.[33]
The sophistication of the Iranian biotechnology industry has raised suspicions of a possible BW program; however, allegations concerning such a program remain unsubstantiated. Most of the literature and accusations come from CIA reports, expert analysis without sources, and claims made by Iranian dissidents. The majority of these reports cite Iranian attempts to purchase Fusarium spp. from Canada and the Netherlands in 1989 as evidence that Iran was working on a covert weapons program.[34] While this could be true, it should be noted that the utility of these fungal species is not limited to BW applications. Further, these incidents took place over two decades ago, rendering analysis based on these assumptions suspect.
Publicly released information from Iranian scientific institutions shows no concrete proof of an offensive BW program. The sophisticated research facilities in Iran could easily serve as a front for illicit BW-related activities and offer a legitimate excuse to import dual-use material. Similar, presumably legitimate advanced research is being carried out at the National Research Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology near Tehran.
Finally, it is significant that throughout this decade, U.S. intelligence agencies have not provided concrete evidence, or issued unequivocal statements, in regard to an Iranian BW program. In a 2001 report, the CIA assessed that "Tehran continued its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. We judge that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran's biological warfare (BW) program. Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability for BW deployment."[35]
In 2006, the DNI report stated, "As of 2004, the status of Iran's biotechnology infrastructure indicated that at a minimum, Iran probably had the capability to produce at least small quantities of BW agents for offensive purposes. Iran continued to seek dual- use biotechnology materials, equipment, and expertise that is consistent with its growing legitimate biotechnology industry but could benefit Tehran's BW program."[36]
In 2008, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency official reported: "Tehran continues to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment and expertise which have legitimate uses, but also could enable ongoing biological warfare efforts."[37] Finally, in an unclassified section of the report to Congress covering 2009, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis concluded "Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW.[38]
All of these reports and statements leave much open to interpretation, including the implication that Iran may indeed have "ongoing" efforts aimed at fostering a BW program. It could also mean that there is a lack of evidence for any kind of program, or that none exists at all. Similarly, the 2009 report from the DNI stated: "Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so."[39] This statement in particular implies that the Iranians do not currently produce BW agents.
Publicly available information is thus largely inconclusive about whether Iran currently maintains an offensive BW program. Even if Iran did possess BW agents, it would still face a significant challenge in achieving their weaponization and delivery. At present, there are no indications that Iran has successfully weaponized BW agents.
Sources:
[1] "Status of the
Convention," Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW),
October 6, 2009, www.opbw.org.
[2]
See "Annex to the Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2005 from the Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the
Chairman of the Committee," 1 March 2005, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
"The Islamic Republic of Iran considers acquiring, developing, and using
WMD as inhumane, immoral, illegal, and against its very basic principles"
and Hossein Aryan, GlobalSecurity.org, "Commentary: Iran's
Hard-Liners Look to Justify a Nuclear Arsenal," 16 February 2010,
www.globalsecurity.org.
[3]
"Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and its
Interests Abroad," Central Intelligence Agency, written responses to questions
before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, Hearing
104-510, www.fas.org.
[4]
"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1
January to 31 December 2008," Director of National Intelligence, http://dni.gov.
[5]
"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1
January to 31 December 2009, www.hstoday.us.
[6]
Dana Garrett, "Iran Grants Cuba 20-million Euro Credit," Havana
Journal, 18 January 2005, http://havanajournal.com;
"Iran, Cuba Sign Trade Memorandum of Understanding," Tehran
Times, 19 June 2008, www.tehrantimes.com;
"Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India," Arms Control
Association, www.armscontrol.org.
[7]
Prepared Testimony of Michael Eisenstadt before the House International
Relations Committee, "Iran's Military Capabilities and Intentions: An
Assessment," 9 November 1995.
[8]
Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Weapons," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds.,
Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 84.
[9] Iranian CBM Submission to
the BTWC, 2002, as quoted in Milton Leitenberg, "Assessing the Biological
Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat," Strategic Studies Institute, December
2005, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[10] The report does not clearly
state whether the castor beans were acquired for BW purposes or simply to derive
castor oil. The potential for illicit application of castor beans, however,
makes it worth mentioning in this section. See Eric Croddy et. al., Weapons
of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and
History (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005), p. 241; Michael Eisenstadt,
The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, Case
Study 4: Iran, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998, p. 2;
and Douglas Waller, "Sneaking in the Scuds," Newsweek, 22
June 1992, www.newsweek.com.
[11] Jonathan B. Tucker,
"Dual-Use Toxins: Dilemmas of a Dual-Use Technology: Toxins in Medicine
and Warfare," Politics and the Life Sciences, February 1994 and
Anthony Cordesman, et. al., "Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Biological Weapons Programs," Center for Strategic and International
Studies, http://csis.org.
[12] Michael R. Gordon with
Stephen Engelberg, "Iran is Said to Try to Obtain Toxins," New York
Times, 13 August 1989, p. 11.
[13] Linda D. Kozaryn,
"Former Soviets' Bio-War Expert Details Threat," American
Forces Press Service, U.S. Department of Defense, 3 November 1999,
www.defense.gov and Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam
C. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Arms
Race? (USA: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), p. 173.
[14] Statement by Dr. Kenneth
Alibek before the Joint Economic Committee, White House, 20 May 1998,
www.house.gov.
[15] Milton Leitenberg,
"Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat,"
Strategic Studies Institute, December 2005,
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[16]
Prepared Testimony of Michael Eisenstadt before the House International
Relations Committee, "Iran's Military Capabilities and Intentions: An
Assessment," 9 November 1995.
[17] See list of sanctioned
entities at U.S. Department of State, "Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000," www.state.gov and "Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, 13 February 2009,
www.state.gov.
[18]
Charles R. Smith, "Bush Sanctions Chinese Firms' WMD Exports to
Iran," Newsmax, 8 April 2004, http://archive.newsmax.com.
[19] Zibo Chemet Equipment Co.,
Ltd., www.chemet.net.
[20]
Defense Industries Organization of Iran, www.diomil.ir.
[21]
Guy Dinmore, et.al., "EU Trio Targets Tougher
Iran Sanctions," Financial Times, 25 February 2009, www.ft.com.
[22]
Associated Press, "Europe Threatens Iran With New Sanctions," Fox
News, 19 February 2010, www.foxnews.com.
[23]
"Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the
Committee," UN Security Council, 1 March 2005, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
[24]
"National Laws and Regulations on Handling and Application of Biological
Agents and Toxins," Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 23
August 2007, www.brad.ac.uk.
[25]
"Note Verbale Dated 14 February 2006 from the Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the
Committee," UN Security Council, 18 February 2006, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org and
"National Laws and Regulations on Handling and Application of Biological
Agents and Toxins," Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 23
August 2007, www.brad.ac.uk.
[26]
"Report of a National Trial Visit to a Vaccine and Serum Production
Facility," Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 14 January 1999,
www.opbw.org.
[27]
See Leitenberg, "Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism
Threat." The forms not submitted "were the declarations that require
the state to list national biological defense research and development programs
(Form A2) and past activities in offensive/defense biological research and
development programs (Form F)."
[28] Martin Matishak,
"U.S. to Announce Framework for Bioweapons Treaty Policy in Geneva,"
Global Security Newswire, 4 December 2009, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org
and "China, Iran Oppose Ban on Biological Weapons," United Press
International, 9 May 2001.
[29]
"Biological Warfare: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb-Iran," Jane's Intelligence
Review, 1 March 1999.
[30]
Barbara Starr, "Iran Has Vast Stockpiles of CW Agents, Says CIA," Jane's
Defense Weekly, 14 August 1996, p. 3.
[31] Bill Gertz, "Iran Tests
Medium-Range Missile," Washington Times, 23 July 1998, p. 1.
[32] According to its Web site,
the Iranian Biotechnology Society "presently has 356 members. 102 of them are regular, 77 affiliated, 173 students and some
institutional members." See http://ibs.nrcgeb.ac.ir.
[33]
Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, Iranian Research Organization for
Science and Technology Web site, "Persian Type Culture Collection," www.irost.org.
[34]
Michael R. Gordon with Stephen Engelberg, "Iran is Said to Try to Obtain
Toxins," New York Times, 13 August 1989, p. 11.
[35] "Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January Through 30
June 2001," Central Intelligence Agency, www.fas.org.
[36]
"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1
January Through 31 December 2004," Director of National Intelligence, www.fas.org.
[37]
Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States, 28 February 2008, p. 12, www.dia.mil.
[38]
"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1
January to 31 December 2009, www.hstoday.us.
[39]
"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating
to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1
January to 31 December 2009," Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
