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Updated November 2008
Nuclear Overview
Introduction
While suspected of harboring nuclear weapons ambitions at various points in history (and especially under Nasser in the 1960s), the Egypt of 2008 is a member in good standing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the leading proponent of establishing a weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Many scholars and practitioners worry that Iran's nuclear activities could provoke an Egyptian policy reversal, but currently Egypt seems to perceive developing nuclear weapons as counter to its national interests.[1]
Furthermore, despite possessing a comparatively advanced capability in nuclear technology (for the Middle East), Egypt is years away from the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Although Egypt operates two small research reactors and possesses other fuel-cycle relevant technology and expertise, none of its past efforts to acquire power reactors was successful. Historically, a combination of factors—leadership priorities, supplier-based constraints, financial difficulties, safety concerns, etc.—prevented Egypt from developing a nuclear energy program of weapons significance.[2] Since 2006, reinvigorated Egyptian interest in creating a civil nuclear power infrastructure has led to a flurry of preparative activities—it remains to be seen whether recent attempts, unlike historical ones, will reach fruition. If they do, Egypt eventually could possess a hedge capability, with this capability's level of sophistication defined by whether or not Egypt possesses indigenous enrichment and/or reprocessing capabilities.
History
Ambiguous Nuclear Ambitions (1955 to 1981)
Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became Egypt's first president in 1954, also presided over his country's earliest notable forays into nuclear technology. Nasser founded the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1955. The AEC was transformed into the Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) in 1956—an organization now known as the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA).[3] Until the 1967 Six Day War, the AEE made impressive progress in developing an Egyptian nuclear infrastructure—whether Nasser intended this infrastructure to serve military or exclusively peaceful purposes remains a matter of considerable debate among scholars.
It was no coincidence that Egypt's burgeoning interest in nuclear energy closely followed U.S. President Eisenhower's famous—and in later decades infamous—"Atoms for Peace" speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1953. A related UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in 1955, afforded representatives from Egypt and numerous other countries invaluable insights into beginning their own nuclear programs.[4] An IISS report asserts: "The conference not only provided the basic structure for the AEE's programmes, but was also the foundation for a series of negotiated bilateral cooperative agreements with foreign countries. Arguably, it was this willingness on the part of foreign countries to assist that allowed Egypt's programme to develop in the first place."[5]
Ibrahim Hilmy Abdel Rahman, the first Secretary General of the AEE, presided over nuclear developments in Egypt until 1958. During Rahman's tenure, Egypt pursued a number of nuclear cooperation agreements, most significantly concluding one with the USSR in 1956. This was followed by a 1958 bilateral reactor deal through which the USSR supplied Egypt with a 2MWt light water research reactor (the ETRR-1, which went online in July 1961) and associated fresh and spent fuel services. Sources mentioning the deal are quick to point out that the reactor—built at Inshas and unsafeguarded until the 1980s—produced weapons insignificant quantities of plutonium.[6] While this is true, Egypt's decades of experience operating a research reactor provided it with extensive dual-use experience and the opportunity to train generations of scientists and nuclear engineers.
Rahman's 1958 departure from the AEE left a void filled by two individuals—El Sayed Amin al Khashab became Secretary General of the AEE while Salah Hedayat became its Director General.[7] Soon after, between 1960 and 1967, Egypt would embark on its most active period of nuclear expansion. Analysts attribute much of the enthusiasm (and funding) surrounding the program during this time to the 21 December 1960 announcement by Israel's Prime Minister David Ben Gurion that the Dimona facility was indeed a nuclear reactor. Although Ben Gurion insisted that Dimona's purposes were exclusively peaceful, the announcement precipitated significant political fallout, especially in neighboring states.[8]
A subsequent chain of Egyptian statements and incidents—sometimes well documented, and in other cases alleged—are the basis for many scholars' conclusions that from 1960 to 1967 Nasser's government was pursuing nuclear weapons.[9] James Walsh, who has perhaps written the most in-depth study of Egypt's nuclear program to date, concludes: "...it is fair to say that Egypt's most intensive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons (or the capability to produce them) occurred during this phase—that is, just after the disclosure of the Dimona reactor, but before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war."[10] It is indisputable that Egypt stepped up its rhetoric on the issue of nuclear weapons following the Israeli announcement—for example, in 1961 Nasser warned that if Israel acquired them, "we will secure atomic weapons at any costs."[11]
Indeed, during this period, the Egyptian government dramatically increased its investment and research into nuclear technologies.[12] It attempted quite persistently to acquire a sizeable power reactor—and was notably insistent that it be a natural uranium fueled heavy water-moderated reactor rather than a light water reactor.[13] While such reactors obviate the necessity of purchasing or producing enriched uranium, they are notable from a proliferation standpoint for being better producers than light water reactors—in both quantity and quality—of weapons useable plutonium. Initially promising discussions with Siemens (for a heavy water reactor), and later Westinghouse (for a light water reactor), ultimately fell apart.[14]
Finally, from a diplomatic standpoint, nuclear issues became an increasingly popular agenda item in Egypt's bilateral and multilateral talks. In addition to debatably military-related discussions over power reactors and other dual-use technologies, numerous reports allege that Egypt explicitly requested either nuclear weapons or assistance in making them from countries such as the Soviet Union, China, and India.[15] Furthermore, Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions increasingly included mention of nuclear weapons—"At several Arab League meetings in the 1960s, Egypt proposed a pan-Arab nuclear programme to match Israel's, hosted by Egypt and financially supported by other members..."[16] None of these diplomatic initiatives are known to have gone anywhere meaningful.
There does not appear ever to have been an unambiguous top-level political commitment to "go nuclear." Despite occasional rhetorical indications of proliferation intent, Egypt's leadership never allocated the resources and political commitment necessary to the success of a weapons program. This suggests that while Nasser and other Egyptian policymakers explored the proliferation option at the rhetorical level, actual development of a nuclear weapons capability was never a policy priority. As an IISS report notes, "Tellingly, he [Nasser] never established a separate budget for nuclear-weapons development."[17]
Analyses of the Egyptian program universally acknowledge the crippling effects of the June 1967 Six Day War on its trajectory. Einhorn observes: "The loss of oil from the Sinai, the closure of the Suez Canal, and the decrease in foreign assistance in the aftermath of the war had a devastating impact on the Egyptian economy, and funding for the nuclear program was frozen. All AEA capital projects were canceled, and activities were limited to planning and paper studies."[18] Soon after, in 1968, Egypt signed the NPT. With Anwar Al-Sadat's assumption of power upon Nasser's death in 1970, Egyptian nuclear rhetoric again underwent a shift—this time further away from threats that it would pursue weapons. Ironically, with more certainty that an Israeli nuclear threat existed came less Egyptian effort to match that threat. Changes to both Egypt's leadership and its economic and geopolitical circumstances wrought changes to its attitude on how to address the Israeli threat.[19]
While Sadat's government increasingly distanced itself from nuclear weapons rhetoric, it did not abandon the long-cherished dream of an Egyptian nuclear power program. Sadat struck an eight reactor deal with U.S. President Nixon in 1974—the deal fell through when "The United States introduced new conditions in the late 1970s that Egypt found unacceptable..." [20] However, Sadat's 1979 negotiation of a peace settlement with Israel would dramatically alter Egypt's regional security equation and pave the way for its ratification of the NPT soon thereafter. In theory, these events should also have finally enabled Egypt to embark upon the nuclear power program it had so long desired.
Egypt Commits to Nonproliferation—But on its Terms (1980 to the present)
The Sadat government's 1980 decision to ratify the NPT (followed by ratification on February 26, 1981), was a redefining moment for Egypt's nuclear program. Soon after, with the 1982 entry into force of its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 302), Egypt's facilities were brought into the verification and inspection components of the nonproliferation regime.[21] This period also encompassed a leadership change, as Hosni Mubarak became president in October 1981 following Sadat's assassination.
Thus from a position of ambiguity and opaqueness, the Egyptian stance became one of unambiguous nonproliferation and transparency. But Egypt's decision to ratify the NPT and accept non-nuclear weapon state status was taken out of rational self-interest. Correspondingly, its actions vis-à-vis the nonproliferation regime since that time have been only conditionally supportive. Since ratifying the NPT, Egypt's nuclear policies have fallen into two broad categories: (1) a fluctuating interest in and commitment to a domestic nuclear power program; and (2) a well-articulated, but highly complicated position on the nonproliferation regime—while consistently leading efforts to establish a Middle East WMD-Free Zone, Egypt has been a thorn in the side of NPT review conferences and has refused to participate in numerous nonproliferation relevant agreements on the basis of Israel's non-participation in the NPT.
Ironically, while the historical record suggests that Egypt finally ratified the NPT in large part because it was finding it prohibitively difficult to purchase power reactors from outside the regime,[22] government interest in nuclear power significantly declined when Mubarak took office in 1981. The Mubarak government initially moved forward with Sadat's plans, including negotiating for reactors with the United States, France, and West Germany. However, the sudden weakening of the Egyptian economy and the April 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe made the deals both unattractive and unfeasible for Egypt.[23] Over the next two decades, interest in nuclear energy periodically resurfaced, but the government never committed to the idea enough for power reactors to be built. Egypt's most significant improvement to its nuclear technology capabilities was its purchase of a 22.5MWt light water research reactor from Argentina in September 1992—the ETRR-2 was completed in 1997 at the Inshas Nuclear Research Center and operates on 20% enriched uranium.
Meanwhile, Egypt's position vis-à-vis the nonproliferation regime has been two-fold since NPT ratification. While consistently leading efforts to establish a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (and since 1990 a WMD-Free Zone), Egypt has also obstructed key components of the nonproliferation regime for their lack of universality (i.e. because Israel remains outside the NPT). Egypt has therefore refused to join the IAEA Additional Protocol and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Pelindaba Treaty), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.[24]
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Egypt nearly blocked indefinite extension of the treaty.[25] Ultimately, it agreed to extension in return for the conference's adoption of a Resolution on the Middle East, calling upon all Middle Eastern countries "to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction..."[26]
Recent Developments and Current Status
More than two decades after its comprehensive safeguards agreement entered into force, the Egyptian government found itself the subject of an IAEA investigation into possible compliance violations. At issue were a number of reporting failures—while the activities themselves were permissible, they should have been reported to the Agency in a timely manner and continually monitored. The violations were discovered and investigations begun in 2004, with preliminary conclusions reported in February 2005.
The Director General's report to the IAEA Board of Governors highlighted compliance problems falling into the categories of "uranium conversion experiments, uranium and thorium irradiation experiments, and preparatory activities related to reprocessing."[27] In its defense, the Egyptian government argued that: "Differing interpretations of some aspects of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, especially with regard to the developments that have occurred in the Safeguards System since the mid 1990's, have resulted in not reporting to the Agency in an appropriate and timely manner, a number of research experiments and activities."[28]
The Director General's report concluded: "...the repeated failures by Egypt to report nuclear material and facilities to the Agency in a timely manner are a matter of concern," softening its criticisms with the observation that, "The cooperation extended by Egypt since the September 2004 meeting in clarifying these issues and in granting the Agency access necessary for it to carry out its assessment of the correctness and completeness of Egypt's declarations has been welcome."[29] Similarly, a U.S. statement to the Board of Governors highlighted the sense that Egypt's cooperative response to the investigation greatly mitigated any concerns brought about by its violations: "...Egypt is demonstrating the appropriate means for resolving outstanding safeguards issues, specifically full cooperation with the IAEA on steps to address all concerns."[30] Given that no new violations were later discovered, this was essentially the end of the matter.
Developments since 2006 suggest that the Egyptian government, after decades of indifference, is again strongly interested in investing in a nuclear power program. Early indications of official interest included Gamal Mubarak's call for Egypt to pursue nuclear energy during a September 2006 National Democratic Party conference, soon followed by similar statements by President Mubarak, his father.[31] In March 2007, Energy and Electricity Minister Hassan Younis announced plans to construct "10 nuclear-powered electricity-generating stations across the country."[32] The government is in the process of reviewing bids for the first nuclear power plant.[33]
Perhaps the most contentious issue to surface over Egypt's renewed interest in nuclear power has been the question of whether or not it will build indigenous enrichment and/or reprocessing facilities. Consistent with its refusal to enter into any new nonproliferation agreements absent Israeli (and full regional) participation, Egypt insists that it has every right under the NPT to the complete nuclear fuel cycle.[34] As Egyptian Ambassador Nabil Fahmy asserts: "What we've spoken out against are any attempts to limit the right of state-parties to the NPT to the full fuel cycle...There is a fundamental difference here between 'Do I have the right to buy or to acquire this technology?' and 'Do I decide that it's the right thing for me to do?'"[35]
Only time will tell whether the government will ultimately invest the political and financial resources required to build one or more nuclear power plants, but it is certainly demonstrating a high level of commitment at present. While some argue that the program is a hedge against Iran, it remains unlikely that Egypt will pursue nuclear weapons in the near future even if Iran obtains them. While the effects on policy of the eventual departure from power of President Mubarak are unknowable, an Economist article on the general state of politics in Egypt makes an argument likely to apply to nuclear weapons considerations: "...whoever runs Egypt, the task of housing, feeding and schooling all those millions, let alone overhauling the country's myriad crumbling institutions, will leave little energy for other adventures."[36]
Key Sources:
[1] On the debate over whether
Egypt would pursue nuclear weapons in the wake of an Iranian nuclear weapons
capability, see: Robert J. Einhorn, "Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a
Non-Nuclear Course," The Nuclear Tipping Point, Eds. Kurt M.
Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2004, Chapter 4, pp. 43-82.
[2] For an extensive 1995
articulation of the subject—which remains relevant today—see Barbara
Gregory's article. Gregory concludes that while supplier restraints were
in some cases relevant, " ...they cannot be said to represent a major
stumbling block to Egyptian nuclear development since Egypt joined the
NPT...Cairo's slow progress in the nuclear field appears to be more
closely tied to factors examined here, including inadequate political support,
an inability to obtain funding, and environmental concerns." Barbara M.
Gregory, "Egypt's Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier-Based and
Other Developmental Constraints," Nonproliferation Review (Fall
1995), p. 26.
[3] IAEA,
"Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Egypt," August 2005, www-pub.iaea.org.
[4] For background on Atoms for
Peace, and its role in the global spread of nuclear technology see: Peter R.
Lavoy, "The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace," Arms Control
Today, December 2003, www.armscontrol.org/act.
[5] Nuclear Programmes in the
Middle East: In the shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), p. 18.
[6] Nuclear Programmes in the
Middle East: In the shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), p. 18.
[7] Einhorn asserts: "An
indication of the program's enhanced military orientation was the
appointment of Salah Hedayat—a leading proponent of an Egyptian nuclear
weapons capability with close ties to the Egyptian military..." Robert J.
Einhorn, "Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course," in The
Nuclear Tipping Point, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell
B. Reiss (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 45.
[8] Maria Rost Rublee,
"Egypt's Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons Learned,"
Nonproliferation Review (November 2006), p. 557.
[9] Maria Rost Rublee,
"Egypt's Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons Learned,"
Nonproliferation Review (November 2006), p. 556. Robert J. Einhorn,
"Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course," in The Nuclear Tipping
Point, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 45.
[10] James Walsh, Bombs
Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics (PhD
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001).
[11] Etel Solingen,
Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 239.
[12] Robert J. Einhorn,
"Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course," in The Nuclear Tipping
Point, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 45-46.
[13] Maria Rost Rublee
cites a former Egyptian military official as claiming that the heavy water
reactors Egypt was pursuing at that time "...were designed to be a
plutonium route to nuclear weapons." Maria Rost Rublee,
"Egypt's Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons Learned,"
Nonproliferation Review (November 2006), p. 558.
[14] For details of the
ill-fated bidding process and its aftermath, see: James Walsh, Bombs
Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics (PhD
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001), 161-163.
[15] Nuclear
Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick,
(London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 19-20.
[16] Nuclear Programmes
in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), p. 19.
[17] Nuclear Programmes in
the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), p. 19.
[18] Robert J. Einhorn,
"Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course," in The Nuclear Tipping
Point, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 46-47.
[19] For a political
economy argument on why Sadat's government did not pursue nuclear weapons,
see: Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the
Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
[20] Etel Solingen,
Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 235.
[21] IAEA, "INFCIRC
302," July 1983, www.iaea.org.
[22] For a discussion of the
reasons Sadat pushed NPT ratification, see: Robert J. Einhorn, "Egypt:
Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course," in The Nuclear Tipping
Point, ed. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 50.
[23] Etel Solingen,
Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 230.
[24] See: "Inventory
of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes: Egypt," The
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies: www.nti.org.
[25] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B.
Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2005), p. 267.
[26] Rebecca Stevens and
Amin Tarzi, "Egypt and the Middle East Resolution at the NPT 2000 Review
Conference," CNS Reports, 24 April 2000, www.cns.miis.edu.
[27] IAEA, "Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt: Report by the
Director General," 14 February 2005, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[28] "Note Verbal, From
the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the International Atomic
Agency," IAEA, 1 February 2005.
[29] IAEA,
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of
Egypt: Report by the Director General," 14 February 2005, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[30] Greg Webb, "Case
Closed on Egyptian Nuclear Research," Global Security Newswire, 4
March 2005.
[31] "Mubarak's Son Proposes Developing Nuclear Energy," Associated
Press, 19 September 2006.
[32] James M. Acton and Wyn Q. Bowen, "Atoms for Peace in the Middle East: The
Technical and Regulatory Requirements," NPEC Working Paper Series, 2008,
p. 12.
[33] "Egypt to
Assess First Nuclear Plant's Tender Papers," Xinhua.net, 4
May 2008.
[34] The Egyptian
statement at the 2008 NPT PrepCom was a recent articulation of a long-standing
position in this regard: "Egypt rejects any attempts to impose additional
obligations on non-nuclear weapon states...if they are not reciprocated by equal
and commensurate measures by states that still lie outside the treaty and are
not bound by Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements." Leonard S. Spector and
Benjamin Radford, "Algeria, Emirates Plan Nonproliferation-Friendly
Nuclear Programs; Egypt Keeps Fuel Cycle Options Open, Rejects Expanded IAEA
Monitoring," WMD Insights, June 2008, www.wmdinsights.com.
[35] Miles Pomper and Peter
Crail, "Interview with Nabil Fahmy, Egyptian Ambassador to the United
States," Arms Control Association, 21 July 2008, www.armscontrol.org.
[36] "Egypt: Will the dam
burst?" The Economist, 11 September 2008, www.economist.com.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
