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Updated October 2008
Biological Overview
Public claims that Egypt has an active biological warfare (BW) program have circulated since the early 1970s following a series of statements by Egyptian officials in 1972. Since that time Egypt has been regularly discussed as a likely possessor of an offensive BW capability. However, it is important to understand that despite the regular inclusion of Egypt in lists of BW possessor nations very little, if any, data exists that compellingly, or indeed convincingly, supports allegations of an Egyptian BW program. Most available open-source data pertaining to the existence of such a program is highly speculative and uncorroborated, lacking independent confirmation.
The starting point for most discussions of Egyptian BW capabilities is a statement made by then-president Anwar Sadat in February 1972 at a meeting of the Arab Socialist Union National Congress. Responding to a question from the audience asking about an Egyptian response to a hypothetical Israeli BW attack Sadat stated: "The only reply to biological warfare is that we too should use biological warfare. ... Briefly, we have the instruments of biological warfare in the refrigerators and we will not use them unless they [Israel] begin to use them."[1] The statement clearly indicates an assumption that the most effective deterrent to the use of biological weapons is the threat of an equivalent response. Although it was not made clear what sort of capability Egypt possessed the most literal interpretation of Sadat’s statement would be that at a minimum Egypt had a store of pathogenic cultures stored at a research institute. It may be significant that Sadat’s statement did not allude to the possession of deliverable biological weapons. The comments were not widely reported outside of Egypt and two months later, in April 1972, Egypt signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). There was one further statement in 1972 alluding to the existence of an Egyptian BW capability, this time by the Minister of the Interior. In June of that year he stated that "the enemy," presumably Israel, would never use BW because they are aware that Egypt has "adequate means of retaliating without delay."[2] Both of these statements came during a period during which Egypt was attempting to re-equip its military as a prelude to resuming its war with Israel which had ended its most recent hot phase with an Egyptian defeat in 1970.[3] It is possible that the Egyptian government felt the need to make a series of statements that could have a deterrent effect against Israel.
Through the remainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s, there was no significant public discussion of Egyptian BW capabilities though attention was frequently drawn to its suspected chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. Beginning in 1989, Egypt began to be mentioned as a possible possessor of biological weapons, especially in public testimony by U.S. government officials, but public statements were cautious and did not offer any details. A significant new report came in 1993, when the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service released a report stating that “Egypt has a program of military-applied research in the sphere of biological weapons, but no data has been obtained on the creation of biological agents in the interests of military offensive programs.” The nature of military-applied research was not specified in the report but from the context does not appear to include production of BW agents or weapons systems.
In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) issued a series of reports on compliance with international arms control treaties. In these the regularly noted that "the United States believes that Egypt had developed biological warfare agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt had eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist."[4] This statement is as significant for what it does not say as for what it does. At no point does it allude to the existence of any new evidence suggesting the existence of a BW program since 1972, nor does it state that there is any evidence of any ongoing activities, only the existence of a capability which is itself undefined. In contrast to the ACDA reports, documents on proliferation released to the public by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) made absolutely no mention of Egypt in the context of BW.
Western and Israeli sources continue to occasionally report that Egypt is developing an illicit BW program and has worked extensively on defensive BW efforts. These reports which are often vague tend not to offer any new information or provide any supporting evidence. Furthermore these reports frequently conflate discussions of offensive and defensive BW and CW programs and capabilities creating the potential for confusion.[5] These statements, especially those alleging offensive BW efforts, have become less frequent since the mid 1990s, a change that could arise from one or several of a number of different causes including but not limited to new intelligence, an unwillingness to discuss Egyptian proliferation issues, or even a simple lack of concern over Egyptian capabilities.
Although it signed the BWC in 1972 in the subsequent thirty-six years Egypt has steadfastly refused to ratify the treaty. In some quarters this has been taken as a sign that Egypt is maintaining a covert BW capability. However, given the BWC’s lack of verification provisions there is no reason to believe that Egypt would not have been able to maintain a secret BW program irrespective of its treaty status as was done in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite not ratifying the Convention Egypt regularly attends meetings and discussions of BWC members, including working groups and review conferences as an observer. When discussing the BWC, Egyptian officials generally make a point of expressing their support for the convention’s objects and purposes. At the same time they also emphasize that Egypt’s ongoing refusal to ratify the BWC is a political position based on concerns over Israel's nuclear weapons arsenal and the Israeli refusal to sign the BWC.
Egypt does have a basic biotechnical infrastructure that could serve as a potential base for a covert BW program and has been developing its industrial and research capabilities over time. As a developing nation with a strong agricultural and health services sector, Egypt conducts research on a host of diseases and pathogens that affect both humans and crops. In 1997, Egypt imported $48 million worth of biotechnology-related lab equipment, though it cannot be determined if any of it was used for research on BW-related agents. The Egyptian government anticipates this field to grow significantly in the next few years, and since 1998 its five-year plans have highlighted the significance of scientific development and have allocated resources to upgrade scientific research facilities across the country.
From time to time it has been asserted that Egypt operates large scale dual-use facilities outside Cairo that support its alleged covert BW program. According to some experts, Egypt conducts research on various bacteria, viruses, and toxins including pathogens causing Rift Valley fever, encephalitis, and mycotoxicosis. There is no evidence to support these claims.
To a significant degree, current assessments of Egyptian capabilities in the area of offensive BW appear to be predicated on the assumption that activities and capabilities suspected or known to exist in the early 1970s have continued. On the basis of this presumption Egyptian efforts to modernize or expand its biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries are seen as confirming or even increasing its BW capabilities.
In summation, pending the release of new information from classified sources or archives, the sole definitive evidence supporting the existence of an Egyptian BW program are two statements made in 1972. These appear to have served as the basis for a series of occasional statements by U.S. officials such as those made by the ACDA. That amount to nothing more than a statement of ignorance regarding the current status of Egyptian BW activities. Generally speaking, discussions of Egyptian BW activities by NGOs and academic researchers have not added anything to the discussion save to repeat the statements and public judgments of officials. Ultimately the most that can be said on this topic with any confidence is that two public statements alleging Egyptian BW capabilities were made at a time of international tensions in 1972 and that these have served as the basis for treating Egypt as a possible BW possessor state ever since. This is despite regular assurances by Egyptian officials since that time to the effect that Egypt does not possess or seek to obtain biological weapons.
Key Sources:
[1] Julian Perry Robinson, The
Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Volume II: CB Weapons Today
(Stockholm: SIPRI, 1973), p. 241.
[2] Ibid.
[3] This conflict was the "war of attrition" initiated by Egypt in 1969
and ending in partial defeat in 1970. The war was an attempt to reassert
Egyptian control over that part of its territory bordering the Suez canal while
pressing Israeli forces to withdraw from the canal's east bank. The war
was also an effort t reassert Egypt's military credibility in the wake of
its crushing defeat in June 1967.
[4] Adherence to and
Compliance with Arms Control Agreements (Washington D.C., Government
Printing Office, 1995), p. 15; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Annual
Report, Section VII: Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control
Agreements (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1996).
[5] These discussions are
further complicated by the frequent practice of combining allegations of
chemical and biological weapons possession in the same statements making it
difficult to determine if charges of development, possession or even deployment
apply equally to both weapons classes or only one of these.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
