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Updated August 2008
Biological Overview
Introduction
Cuba provides an opportunity to examine the dual-use nature of modern biotechnology, which on the one hand has substantially benefited health delivery, pharmaceutical and chemical industries, and agriculture, yet also presents a dark side, namely, the possible application of biotechnology for purposes of warfare, terrorism, and criminality. Although the United States (U.S.) ended its offensive biological warfare (BW) program in 1969, the Cuban government has since alleged repearedly that American biological weapons have been used to attack Cuban people, animals, and plants (see Table 1). The most serious of such allegations was made in 1997 and came to involve the State Parties of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Cuban government continued to allege use of biological agents by the U.S. against up to 2005. These allegations imply that the Cuban government believes that the U.S. has been, and continues to be, a developer of biological weapons in violation of the BWC, which was ratified by the U.S. in 1975 and by Cuba in 1976. Cuba has not supported any of its charges with hard evidence.
In 2002, the situation changed drastically as the U.S. government lodged the first of what was to become a series of accusations that Cuba both fostered the international proliferation of biological weapons and possessed a national BW capability. As was with Cuba, the U.S. government has not produced any hard evidence to support its charges.
The Cuban allegations have been convincingly discredited.[1] Not so with the U.S. allegations; their veracity is yet to be substantiated or disproved. While we are not in a position to do either, we can provide information and options for the consideration of the issue. To enable a reader to better make her or his own judgment about the veracity of U.S. allegations, and Cuban denials, we seek to provide the scientific/technical context in which they have been made. Accordingly, the sections that follow describe and discuss: (1) recent Cuban history; (2) Cuban accomplishments related to the biosciences and biotechnology; (3) relevant Cuban military issues; (4) Cuba vis-à-vis BW; and (5) threat assessment of Cuba in the biological area.
1. Recent Cuban History
The insurrection led by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz began during the mid-1950s and ended after Cuba's President Fulgencio Batista fled in December 1958. A Castro led revolutionary government was installed on January 1, 1959, but soon dissolved. In February 1959, Castro formally assumed the duties of President and commander-in-chief, positions he holds to this day, although since August 2006 he has ceded power to his brother Raul Castro while he battles illness. After an initial period of seemingly satisfactory relations between Cuba and the U.S., the Eisenhower Administration became disenchanted with Castro and his politics, and after many exchanges of insults and mutual recriminations, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed in January 1961. In January 1962, the U.S. engineered Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of American States, and a month later it instituted a total trade embargo of Cuba, which continues at the time of this writing. The main reason the U.S. gave for these drastic actions was that Cuba was actively supporting guerrilla and terrorist organizations throughout Central and South America that aimed to overthrow legitimate governments. The Cuban government has often complained that the blockade has led to its population suffering privation, including shortages of food, medicines, and agro-chemicals. In 1977, low-level diplomatic relations were resumed when the two nations opened "interest sections" in, respectively, Havana and New York. The difficult relationship between Cuba and the U.S. continues, and is at times made worse when one or the other side does something particularly irritating to the other. Currently, an undercurrent of uncertainty surrounds the future of the Cuban government and its relationship with the U.S. as Fidel Castro continues to battle an undisclosed illness. Certainly the Cuban allegations have distressed several U.S. presidential administrations, and we assume that recent U.S. allegations are of concern to the Castro government.
2. Cuban Accomplishments in the Biosciences and Biotechnology
Because the Bush administration has leveled claims that Cuba is misusing its prowess in biotechnology, it is most prudent to start our treatise by examining Cuba's biotechnology establishment. Several analysts knowledgeable in the biosciences have written their assessments of the status of biotechnology in Cuba,[2] and it is not necessary to duplicate the entirety of this work here. For the purposes of this article, we limit our consideration to a brief history of biotechnological development in Cuba and its major achievements in more recent times.
History of Biotechnology in Cuba
In 1960, Castro proclaimed that education and science were the future of Cuba. Even at the beginning of his rule, people who know him claim that Castro believed that biotechnology was of high importance to Cuban economic development. Castro was responsible for reorganizing the Cuban Academy of Sciences (established in 1861) so it would be in a better position to lead science and for making funding available to build and furbish the new National Center for Scientific Research (known by its Spanish acronym "CENIC"). CENIC, which became operational in 1965, was to be the primary training facility for Cuban bioscientists, including those who came to staff its major biotechnology laboratories.
Biotechnological development was given a substantial boost as a result of an epidemic of dengue fever that broke out in Cuba in 1981. Cuba had previously experienced outbreaks of dengue fever, most recently in 1977, but this outbreak was especially damaging because two separate dengue fever viruses, types DEN-1 and DEN-2, were responsible, with the second causing the deadly dengue hemorrhagic fever. By the time the epidemic was over, 344,203 Cubans had been struck by the disease; of these, 10,312 contracted dengue hemorrhagic fever of whom 158 died.[3] This unprecedented disaster starkly revealed shortcomings in the Cuban public health system, which Castro attempted to cover up by claiming that the outbreak had resulted from a U.S. biological attack (see below). It is has been hypothesized that Castro had concluded that the protein interferon, which is produced naturally by the human defense system when attacked by viruses, was the most promising therapeutic agent for treating dengue fever, and subsequently ordered its production in Cuba.[4] We do not know how Castro came to know about interferon and its putative properties, but it could have been as a result of having visited the Soviet Union and learned about its work on interferons. In any case, in 1981, CENIC organized a meeting of 12 directors from as many research institutes, creating the Biological Front (Frente Biologico) as a vehicle to expand the participation of scientists in political decision-making affecting scientific issues. The Biological Front was designed to coordinate the needs and interests of various sections of government, forming a policy-making body capable of involving different factions interested in the direction of Cuban biotechnology research.[5] Members of the group include representatives from the Academy of Sciences, the Council of State, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Ministry of Sugar.[6] The Biological Front endorsed Castro's order and a plan to build the necessary research, development, and production facilities for interferon was immediately instituted.
In the early 1980s, methods that used genetically engineered bacteria to produce the scarce interferon protein were published in the U.S. and West Europe. Scientists in the Soviet Union were quick to learn these methods and develop new capabilities for studying and producing interferons. Beginning in 1981, Cuban scientists were sent to the Soviet Union to receive the training and other assistance that would enable them to genetically engineer an industrial strain of the Escherichia coli bacterium to produce alpha-2 interferon at home. This work was initially done at a make-shift laboratory in west Havana with personal oversight by Castro, but then was transferred to the Center for Biological Research (CIB) after is inauguration in 1982, which was to use interferon production as a "model" for further development of "genetic engineering and bioprocessing."[7] CIB was a major beneficiary of Soviet scientific techniques, as many of its students and researchers were to receive training in the USSR. After their return, Cuban scientists were able to expand and improve on the Soviet methods, in the process developing a higher level of expertise in gene manipulation and molecular virology, monoclonal antibody production, immunochemistry, and tissue culturing than their Soviet counterparts. Interestingly, while Soviet scientists were able to genetically engineer bacteria to produce several different types of medically important proteins, such as insulin, interferons, and growth hormone, the Soviet Communist system proved incapable of commercializing any of them. Conversely, the Cuban Communist system appears to have welcomed innovation and proved willing to support the scientists who were to develop and apply methodologies for the industrial production of these and other proteins, as well as the entrepreneurship to market them successfully at home and in foreign countries.
In 1982, Cuba joined the effort led by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to establish the International Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) as the focal point for Third World aspirations in biotechnology. Over the years, 45 Cuban scientists have received advance training at the ICGEB's two main facilities in Trieste, Italy, and New Delhi, India, and 12 collaborative research projects between Cuban and the ICGEB have been funded by the latter.[8]
The Cuban biotechnology enterprise received a substantial boost when Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) was inaugurated in 1986. Upon becoming operational, the Center immediately expanded the size and capability of the Cuban biotechnology sector manifold by making available to the nation's scientific establishment the most advanced equipment and technology available for scientific research. For example, the Cuban government spent scarce hard currency to equip the new center with Japanese high-grade microscopes, protein purification equipment, 10,000 RPM centrifuges, large-scale fermenters with downstream facilities, ion mass spectrometers, ultra-violet and infrared spectrometers, electrophoresis equipment, gamma counters, DNA synthesizers, and drying and milling machines.[9] It has been estimated that the Cuban government invested over $ 150 million to build and equip the CIGB.[10] As a sign of the Center's high scientific status, it was designated an ICGEB Affiliated Centre that same year.
The CIGB became the focal point of the Scientific Pole (Polo Cientifico) in West Havana, an area that is home to it and other facilities such as CENIC, the Carlos J. Finlay Vaccine and Serum Institute, the Center of Molecular Immunology (CIM), the Pedro Kouri Institute of Tropical Medicine, and another approximately 50 facilities. But it must be made clear that several of Cuba's important institutions remain outside of the Scientific Pole, including the National Center for Biopreparations (BIOCEN).
By designating biotechnology a high priority area for development, and having spent the funds necessary to make Cuban biotechnology reach world class status, Cuba had by the middle 1990s created one of the most technologically advanced biological research industries in the world, able to compete favorably with many industrialized nations. Its applied capabilities came to far exceed those of other Communist nations, including its initial sponsor the Soviet Union (except in the biological weapons area).
Current Status of Cuban Biotechnology
Cuban scientists have many research interests as they attempt to address the technological needs and desires of those both within and outside of Cuba. In the past decade, Cuba has successfully developed a meningitis B vaccine, hepatitis B vaccine, cattle tick "vaccine," and monoclonal antibodies for kidney transplants. Currently, Cuba is conducting trials involving epidermal growth factor, cancer vaccines, AIDS vaccine, and hepatitis C vaccine, as well as with pest-resistant sugar cane. Very recently, Cuba developed a transgenic tobacco plant which will produce an antibody to be used in the production of a hepatitis B vaccine. Further, it is claimed that a transgenic fish, tilapia, is already being sold in Cuban markets; an estimated 30 tons of transgenic tilapia was produced already in 1998.[11] These activities clearly demonstrate Cuba's versatility in biotechnology research and production.[12]
Agricultural research has become a significant sector within the Cuban biotechnology industry. The CIGB and the National Center for Animal and Plant Health are actively pursuing research to prevent crop damage from disease and pests. The Institute for Research on Sugarcane Derivatives (ICIDCA) in particular has become a prominent research facility devoted entirely to agriculture. Its scientists work not only to increase agricultural output from sugarcane crops, but also to fully utilize by-products of sugarcane production.
In 2000, the Cuban Minister of the Sugar Industry announced that Cuba had contacted China for assistance to modernize its sugar industry, utilizing new technologies emerging from the Chinese industry.[13] Cuban biotechnology has also concentrated on "the enhancement of food production and the nutritional value of food," involving the development of new varieties of sugarcane, bananas, potatoes, and tomatoes. This has also evolved into Cuban production of biological fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides.[14]
In addition to agricultural and vaccine successes, Cuba has an extremely sophisticated indigenous capability to produce both pathogens and growth media. BIOCEN's culture media production plant (4,302 square meters) is the only plant in the country dedicated solely to this purpose. It consists of pilot and industrial capabilities, both with equipment for baking, hydrolysis, liquid and solid separation, filtration, homogenization, and dehydration. The media are used for microbiological processes, fermentation, the food industry, and environmental control, along with clinical and veterinary testing, pharmaceutical industry, and water analysis. In the past five years, BIOCEN has produced over 58 tons of culture media.[15]
Reports from Iran claim that BIOCEN started producing large amounts of hepatitis B vaccine to export to Iran in 1995, establishing the foundation for future Cuban-Iranian cooperation in biotechnology.[16] The level of cooperation between the two countries increased dramatically in 2001, as Iran began constructing a $600 million biotechnology institute with the support of the Cuban government and technical assistance from the CIGB. This institute, which is scheduled to produce several Cuban biotechnology products, is expected to have 250,000 square meters of working space, and will be located 12 miles from Tehran.[17] There also have been reports that that Russian, Cuban, and Chinese scientists were helping to increase Iran's biotechnology capabilities through collaborative projects at Iranian universities, military institutes, and governmental facilities, including Tehran University, the Pasteur Institute, and the Razi Institute.[18]
As the Cuban biotechnology industry has expanded over the past decade, the nation has become a major source of both medicine and scientific technology to the developing world. Castro stated that Cuban biotech products began to be exported in 1990, with exports increasing in the subsequent decade.[19] Cuba currently has technology trade agreements with at least 14 countries, with negotiations for trade underway with several other states. In the past decade, Iran, China, India, Algeria, Brazil, and Venezuela have become the main recipients of Cuban technology.[20] Cuba has also helped to initiate joint biotechnology enterprises within other developing countries, specifically Iran, China, and India, transferring technology from several different scientific institutions, including the CIGB and the Center for Molecular Immunology.[21] Cuba has attempted to repay parts of its debt to Brazil, Columbia, and Venezuela by exporting pharmaceutical products to these countries.[22]
The success of Cuba's biotechnology industry, especially with respect to vaccine development, is enabling Cuba to access competitive or otherwise restricted first-world markets. Cuba's most prominent export has become its meningitis B vaccine, which has captured the attention of American and Western European industries in addition to its usual trading partners. Success of this vaccine has helped to create a joint project between GlaxoSmithKline and the Finlay Institute to market the meningitis vaccine in the U.S. In 2004, the U.S. government permitted CancerVax, an American biotechnology company, to sign a multi-million dollor deal to license three experimental cancer vaccines developed in Cuba despite the embargo imposed on Cuban exports by the U.S. government.[23] In addition to seeking to access Western markets, Cuba continues to pursue additional international partners in order to leverage its expertise in biotechnology. Cuba is establishing ties with Vietnam, Belarus, and Pakistan, and others to share its advances, and is reinforcing previous arrangements with other nations.
Cuba now exports biotechnology-related products to at least 50 countries. Estimates of the value of Cuban biotechnology product exports range from $45 million to $290 million per year;[24] it is difficult for an outsider to know which figure is closest to reality. However, even if the higher figure is accepted, analysts estimate that this amount is not sufficient to cover the cost of running the Cuban biotechnology enterprise, creating a need for continual subsidies from the Cuban government. For whatever reasons, the Cuban government has significantly decreased its funding in biotechnology, leaving many facilities struggling to keep their original equipment operational and to pay employees an adequate salary.
3. Cuban Military Developments of Possible Relevance to Biological Warfare
The Cuban government under Castro has throughout its history repeatedly denied interest in acquiring biological and chemical weapons capabilities. However, there have been occasional claims to the contrary. In 1988, Cuban troops fighting in Angola during its civil war were accused of using Soviet-made chemical weapons agents against UNITA rebels, but these allegations have not been substantiated. In the 1980s, former Cuban army officers alleged they had received training in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare. One army officer asserted that his units were trained to poison U.S. water supplies and animals with pathogens that cause such diseases as anthrax, yellow fever, and cholera.[25] None of these assertions have been substantiated.
With assistance from the Soviet Union, the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces had developed into a well-trained and combat ready force by the late 1980s. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the massive flow of foreign assistance that the USSR had provided for many years to Cuba ceased.[26] Facing bankruptcy, the Cuban government cut its military budget by 50 percent, which resulted in a decrease in the combat strength of regular troops to between 50,000 and 65,000. The overall combat readiness of these troops also decreased dramatically, leaving it now a largely defensive force.[27] Almost 75 percent of the military's equipment currently is in storage, and most of this equipment consists of surplus from the Soviet era. However, both the army and navy still maintain substantial surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile capabilities.[28] With the decrease in Cuban military preparedness generally, it is reasonable to assume that the capabilities it once possessed in the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense areas, if any existed, have also declined, but we do not know to what extent. Our research has found no substantial evidence that Cuba's military forces ever possessed offensive NBC capabilities.
4. Cuba vis-à-vis Biological Warfare
Cuban history as related to BW can be said to have gone through two phases. The first phase was characterized by the Cuban government lodging a series of allegations that the U.S. had employed biological weapons against Cuban assets, while the second is somewhat the converse; the U.S. government alleged that Cuba may be misusing its biotechnology capabilities for BW purposes. With respect to both phases, little in the way of convincing empirical evidence has been provided in support of the two sides' claims.
1. Cuban BW Allegations against the U.S.
As late as 2003, Cuban officials asserted that the U.S. mounted 11 (18?) biological attacks between 1962 and 1996 against its population and agriculture (see Table 1). They supposedly triggered diseases affecting humans (dengue fever, dengue hemorrhagic fever, acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, and optic and peripheral neuropathy), animals (African swine fever, rabbit viral hemorrhagic disease, and Newcastle disease), and plants (tobacco blue mold disease and sugar cane rust), as well as an infestation of crops by a destructive flying insect called Thrips palmi. A thorough examination of biological, entomological, epidemiological, and meteorological data has been made, the conclusion of which was that each outbreak or infestation either had a natural cause or was introduced accidentally into Cuba.[29] Further, almost all outbreaks resulted from, or were made worse by, poor decision-making by Cuban leaders that led to deficiencies in public health and diminished ability to control agricultural diseases and infestations. None resulted from an American biological attack.
With one exception, all Cuban allegations have been "unofficial"; i.e., they were made in speeches delivered by high government officials, including Castro, for the consumption of local and international audiences. For reasons it has kept to itself, with one exception the Cuban government chose not to avail itself of existing mechanisms under international law, including the BWC and the United Nations Charter, to have the alleged incidents of biological attack investigated by neutral international bodies that could be organized for that purpose.
The exception occurred in October 1996, when the Cuban government accused the U.S. of having dispersed the insect Thrips palmi to damage its agriculture. In April 1997, the Cuban government informed the UN Secretary-General: "There is reliable evidence that Cuba has once again been the target of biological aggression;"[30] an allegation that the U.S. rebuffed.[31] Cuba then requested that the event be investigated according to mechanisms agreed upon by BWC State Parties at the second and third review conferences of the BWC. In response, a formal consultative meeting was held in August 1997, during which the delegates heard both sides present their views as to how the insect was introduced into Cuba. It must be noted that there was no objective investigation of the Cuban allegation by a third party; for instance, no team of scientists from neutral nations visited Cuba to independently assess its government's claims. Further, no scientific evidence was presented by Cuba to buttress its representative's oral entreaty. In the end, the consultative meeting's finding was in effect a non-finding – it was not possible for the delegates to "...reach a definitive conclusion with regard to the concerns raised by the Government of Cuba."[32]
It is important to note that to support its claim, the Cuban government presented a report at the consultative meeting that provided a detailed description of the U.S. offensive BW program as it existed before its dissolution in 1969 and insinuated that this program continues clandestinely in violation of the BWC.[33]
The Cuban government was not satisfied with the results of the consultative meeting, so it continued to pursue its indictment of the U.S. as a biological aggressor. Thus, after the events of 1997, Cuban organizations have twice brought suit in a Cuban court against the U.S. government seeking compensation for the damages its biological weapons allegedly inflicted on Cuba. The more recent suit was filed in January 2000 and asked for $ 121 billion in damages.[34] The indictment listed 18 U.S. biological attacks against Cuba. In addition to the diseases and insect infestation noted above, it alleged U.S. attacks involving bovine nodular pseudodermatosis (1981), ulcerative mammalitis of cows (1989), black sigatoka of plantain (1990), black plant louse of citrus trees (1992), citrus leafminer of citrus trees (1993), rabbit viral disease (1993), borer worm of coffee (1995), varroasis of bees (1996), ulcerative disease of trout and tilapia (1996), and rice mite (1997). The U.S. government chose not to contest the suit, believing it could not receive a fair hearing in Havana. Although no scientific evidence was presented to prove claims, the suit was adjudicated in plaintiffs' favor in April 2000. As far as can be ascertained, no attempt has been made to collect the award.
The Cuban government continues to allege past U.S. biological attacks, despite the discredited stature of the allegations. Most recently, in late 2005, the Cuban government's national news agency described a vaccine under development at CIGB to protect against rabbit viral hemorrhagic disease, allegedly introduced onto the island in 1993 by the U.S.[35]
U.S. Allegations against Cuba
It is somewhat ironic that Cuba has become the target of BW-related allegations by the U.S., namely, that Cuba may be operating a nascent BW development program. We next review the recent history of U.S. allegations of suspicious or illegal Cuban BW-related activities.
A useful starting point is a report issued by the Defense Intelligence Agency and other members of the intelligence community in 1998.[36] It stated: "Cuba's current scientific facilities and expertise could support an offensive BW program in at least the research and development stage. Cuba's biotechnology industry is one of the most advanced in emerging countries and would be capable of producing BW agents." Thus, nothing damning was noted by the DIA in 1998, only that Cuba had the potential to acquire biological weapons should its leadership so decide. Of course, the same finding could be made in regards to any developing nation possessing substantial capabilities in biotechnology and applied microbiology, such as China, Egypt, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and others. In a subsequent report, issued in 2000 by the U.S. Department of State, seven states were identified as sponsors of international terrorism, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, and North Korea. According to the authors, it was "alarming" that several of these states were believed to also have a BW capacity, although Cuba was not specifically mentioned in this regard.[37]
As a result of two events in 1999, there was a flurry of interest and concern about a possible Cuban BW program. In June, Biohazard, a book written by Dr. Ken Alibek, an important defector from the former Soviet Unions BW program, was published. The book included passages in which Alibek stated that although he did not have firsthand knowledge of Cuba's BW programs, his boss, Major General Yuri Kalinin, after a visit to Cuba in 1990 had told that he was convinced the Havana government was deeply involved in a biological warfare research effort.[38] A strong indication of this, according to Alibek, was that the Cubans used the same cover story as had the Soviets; for example, factories that are said to produce single-cell bacteria for animal feed are actually designed to produce bacteria for biological weapons. Alibek has also asserted that the Soviet Union provided many kinds of direct assistance to Cuba, including BW-related know-how and equipment. Although there were those who questioned Alibek's contentions,[39] due to his stature as a knowledgeable BW expert they could not be ignored. But again, there is no hard evidence to back these allegations.
Another private person, Manuel Cereijo, published his voluminous assessment in 1999 of the threats that Cuba posed to U.S. security, including the supposed biological weapons threat.[40] Cereijo, an engineer most recently affiliated with the University of Miami, has written several articles alleging that Cuba has chemical weapons and practices cyber terrorism. He has also published an earlier article on alleged Cuban BW.[41] While not stating directly that Cuba actually possesses biological weapons, Cereijo asserts that Cuba has acquired fermenters, filtration equipment, and collections of pathogens from the Eastern Bloc that are the same "...used to develop and manufacture bacterial biological weapons." Cereijo's ominous suppositions are not supported by anything more than his own words and should be viewed with extreme caution.
In 2002, serious allegations regarding Cuban BW programs articulated by senior U.S. government officials began to appear. As a prelude, On November 19, 2001, when Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton addressed the representatives of the BWC State Parties assembled on the occasion of the resumed fifth review conference of the BWC, he named Iraq and North Korea as having breached the BWC, and warned of possible violations by other, unnamed countries. While we do not know how many countries Bolton might have been referring to at that time, he named three of them on May 6, 2002 during an address to the Heritage Foundation, a private conservative think tank; Libya, Syria, and Cuba. [42] With respect to Cuba, Bolton stated:
In addition to Libya and Syria, there is a threat coming from another BWC signatory, and one that lies just 90 miles from the U.S. mainland – namely, Cuba... Havana has long provided safe haven for terrorists, earning it a place on the State Department's list of terrorist-sponsoring states. The country is known to be harboring terrorists from Colombia, Spain, and fugitives from the United States. We know that Cuba is collaborating with other state sponsors of terror...
For four decades Cuba has maintained a well-developed and sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the Soviet Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in Latin America, and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines that are sold worldwide. Analysts and Cuban defectors have long cast suspicion on the activities conducted in these biomedical facilities.
Here is what we now know: The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.[43]
Bolton's statement was widely quoted in the mass media and became a major issue in Washington, D.C., as it implied that Cuba was not complying with its obligations under the BWC, possibly because it was undertaking an offensive BW development effort (research, even if "offensive," is not mentioned in the BWC and therefore does not fall under its provisions). Attempting to defuse a sensitive situation, Secretary of State Colin Powell at a press briefing on May 13 answered a question concerning Cuba as follows:
As Under Secretary Bolton said recently, we do believe that Cuba has a biological offensive research capability. We didn't say that it actually had such weapons, but it has the capacity the capability to conduct such research. This is not a new statement... So Under Secretary Bolton's speech which got attention on this issue again wasn't breaking new ground as far as the United States' position on this issue goes.[44]
Several senior officials subsequently followed Powell's lead in expressing U.S. concerns about Cuba possibly misusing its biotechnological capabilities, including Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford Jr.[45] and Bolton himself.[46] In testimony before Congress in March 2004, Bolton referred to a relatively vague Cuban "limited biological weapons effort," restated the allegations he made in 2002, and cited problematic intelligence for the inability of the U.S. to more precisely define Cuban activities.[47] Despite Powell's claims to the contrary, Powell's statement is a significant departure from Bolton's speech, in that only a capability to produce BW agents is alleged, not an actual offensive development program. Another important difference between Bolton's first assertion, which included the words "limited offensive research and development effort," and Powell's subsequent clarification that stated "biological offensive research capability" is that "development" for offensive purposes is explicitly prohibited by the BWC while the word "research" is not mentioned in the BWC and, therefore, can be done for whatever purpose without violating the convention.[48] If the U.S. government's view was that which was espoused by Bolton in 2002, it follows that Cuba has broken international law and thus can be impeached before the UN Security Council, while if its view is more accurately described by Powell, there is no ground for impeachment.
Bolton's central charge vis-à-vis Cuba later became a center of controversy during Bolton's 2005 confirmation hearings for his appointment to the position of ambassador to the UN According to Cristian Westermann, an analyst specializing in bio-weapons within the Department of State, who was charged with clearing the content of Bolton's speech to the Heritage Foundation, Bolton refused to modify the controversial language of the speech regarding the Cuban BW program to more accurately reflect U.S. intelligence.[49] Instead, Bolton sought to have Westermann reassigned. These revelations clearly indicate that significant internal disagreement and uncertainty exist within the U.S. government with respect to the Cuban BW program.
Following the failure of the U.S. to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the U.S. government toned down considerably its claims with respect to Cuba's BW program. In late 2004, the New York Times reported that the U.S. intelligence community has concluded "that it is no longer clear that Cuba has an active, offensive bio-weapons program," although the U.S. continues to believe that Cuba possesses the capacity to pursue such a program should it wish to do so. In 2005, in an annual report to Congress (termed the Noncompliance Report, or NCR), the U.S. Department of State appeared to confirm the thrust of the story:
...there is a split view over whether Cuba maintains a BW effort...In a recent National Intelligence Estimate, the Intelligence Community unanimously held that it was unclear whether Cuba has an active biological warfare effort now, or even had one in the past. On the basis of the same reporting, the policy community believes that the compliance judgment of the June 2003 NCR that Cuba has "at least a limited, developmental offensive BW research and development effort" remains correct...However, all judge with high confidence that Cuba has the technical capability to pursue some aspects of offensive BW.[50]
The Cuban government has strongly denied the allegations that it has or is supporting illicit BW activities. Thus, after Alibek's work was published, a Cuban Foreign Ministry spokesperson called it a "ridiculous fantasy" that Cuba had ever developed biological weapons and stated that the country's biological research facilities were open to visits by foreign scientists.[51] After Bolton's statements, President F. Castro himself publicly rebutted the charges, calling them "Olympic-size lies."[52] He noted that Cuba has The Law against Terrorism Acts that spells out "The person who manufactures, facilitates, sells, transports, sends, introduces in the country or keeps in his or her possession, under any form or in any place chemical or biological agents... is liable to sanctions of 10 to 30 years of imprisonment, life sentence or capital punishment."[53] Castro also asserted:
No one has ever produced a single piece of evidence that any program for developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons has been set up in our country... it would be utterly stupid to behave in any other way... Any such program would lead the economy of any small country to bankruptcy. Cuba would never have been able to transport such weapons. Moreover, it would be a mistake to use them in battle against an enemy that has a thousand times more of those weapons and that would be only to [sic] happy to find an excuse to use them.[54]
The Cuban government has reached out to an independent organization in an effort ot mitigate concerns raised by the U.S. Shortly after Castro's speech, the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. was invited by the Cuban government to bring a group of experts to visit biological facilities of their choice. The trip and its itinerary were organized by Glenn Baker, the director of the Center's Cuba Project. The report detailing the results of this trip makes clear that in agreeing to come, the visit would in "...no way constituted 'inspections,' a term that implies a certain degree of confrontation and an element of surprise... our visit would provide neither the 'smoking gun' nor the 'clean bill of health' that might put an end to the controversy."[55] Nevertheless, in the Center's view, the visit was a worthy undertaking because it would, among other things, gauge the openness and transparency of Cuban biological facilities, help establish a dialogue between Cuban and U.S. bioscientists, and begin a process of future exchange visits.
The expert team visited nine facilities deemed most significant in Cuban biotechnology: CIGB, Center for Molecular Immunology, National Center for Agricultural and Livestock Health, Laboratorios DAVIH, Pharmaceutical Biological Laboratories, Center for Marine Bioactive Substances, Special Processing Plant "La Fabriquita," Carlos J. Finlay Institute, and Pedro Kouri Institute of Tropical Medicine. The aforementioned report contained accounts written by each of the six experts, none of whom found anything suspicious. The impression of team member Terrence Taylor, a former United Nations inspector is representative of the six individual statements. After cautioning that they had seen only a very small number of Cuba's biological facilities clustered in and around Havana, Taylor's impression was that:
Neither I nor any member of the group found any indications that Cuba was involved in other than legitimate biotechnical activities. We did not expect that we would uncover anything to the contrary. The consensus of the group is that while Cuba certainly has the capability to develop and produce chemical and biological weapons, nothing that we saw or heard led us to the conclusion that they are proceeding on this path.
Although no concrete evidence of a Cuban BW program has emerged to date, allegations of such a program continue to emerge. Most recently, in February 2007, a Cuban defector living in the U.S. claimed that Cuba is developing BW agents in a secret laboratory near Havana.[56] Roberto Ortega, a former army colonel who ran the Cuban military's medical services from 1984–1994, publicly described an underground facility named "Labor One," where scientists are allegedly developing several pathogenic agents for use in BW. Ortega's allegations are not supported by any evidence and apparently have drawn little U.S. government concern or public attention.
5. Threat Assessment of Cuba in the Biological Area
When security analysts attempt to assess a threat posed by an adversary they may utilize the following expression:
THREAT = VULNERABILITY × CAPABILITY × INTENTION
In this formulation, Threat is the probability that an adversary will inflict injury or other damage; Vulnerability is the extent to which the nation, or a facility, is open to attack and damage; Capability is whether an adversary has the ability to successfully develop and deploy the weapon under consideration; and Intention is whether the adversary has in mind to use the weapon under consideration. In regards to vulnerability, we assume that the U.S. population and agriculture is indeed vulnerable to biological attack or sabotage. We believe this assumption to be valid in view of the large number of studies done since the events of September and October 2001 that clearly evidence the vulnerability of the U.S. to various forms of biological attack. It is safe to assume that Cuban leaders are well aware of these vulnerabilities.
The issue of capability is not readily analyzed. On the one hand, Cuba undoubtedly possesses a strong capability in biotechnology, one that could be used for biological weapons acquisition should its leaders so decide. On the other hand, we do not know if that capability has in fact been exploited in order to acquire biological weapons. In the unclassified arena, no solid information evidences Cuban development or ownership of biological weapons. And, of course, the intelligence that might underlie the allegations made by U.S. administration officials has not been published, leaving us unable to evaluate it. Nevertheless, for the sake of this analysis, we make the reasonable assumption that Cuba has the requisite capability to acquire biological weapons indigenously.
The last factor, intention, is the most difficult one to assess. To adequately address the question of intent requires understanding the mindset of Cuba's leadership, Fidel and Raul Castro. For example, does Fidel Castro really believe the U.S. has attacked Cuba using biological weapons since the 1960s, or have such claims merely been made to rally public support and deflect criticism aimed at the Cuban government regarding the handling of disease outbreaks, such as the dengue fever outbreak of 1981? A related set of questions may be made with respect to Cuba's biotechnology sector, which as noted previously is highly advanced for a developing country such as Cuba. Was the establishment of the biotechnology sector purely undertaken for legitimate medical and economic reasons, or does a military component exist as well? Finally, we must consider how the intent of the Cuban leadership will evolve when Fidel Castro is no longer the country's leader. This will of course depend heavily on how Fidel Castro's successor, presumably Raul Castro, will guide Cuban foreign policy vis-à-vis the U.S.
We are not in a position to judge the intent of the Cuban government regarding biological weapons development based on publicly available sources. This being the case, it appears that if the U.S. government is in the possession of high quality intelligence strongly indicative of an offensive biological weapons program, it would be appropriate for it to seek redress under international law. Since both Cuba and the U.S. are BWC State Parties, either can call for a consultative meeting about the other's activities that it believes contravene the BWC. Or if this approach is, from past experience, perceived as being insufficient to settle the matter, either can invoke the BWC's Article 6, which would involve having the UN Security Council investigate the claim. Yet a third possibility exists; either side can ask the UN Secretary General to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC. Of course, if either of the two latter approaches was invoked, the accuser would have to present hard evidence to support its charge. In light of the intelligence debacle regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, it is probable that most nations would be unwilling to join the U.S. in punitive actions against Cuba unless the empirical evidence implicating an operational Cuban BW program is especially strong. There is no publicly available indication that the U.S. currently holds such evidence.
There is of course a second kind of threat Cuba allegedly poses, namely, by exporting knowledge and equipment related to biotechnology to nations of concern, such as Iran, it provides them with the means to acquire biological weapons that could threatened world security. This truly is a difficult issue to resolve due to the dual-use characteristics of biotechnology know-how and equipment.
In his May 10, 2002 speech, Castro freely admitted to Cuba having in place or negotiating technology transfer agreements with 14 countries, including Iran (four transfers and four products). He does not state what these transfers and products are, but if it included fermenters, separators, dryers, and other industrial equipment, these could be used for either civilian or military purposes. As discussed above, their ultimate use depends on the intent of the owner/operator. We know with some certainty that Iran has in the past sought to acquire expertise related to biological weapons from the former Soviet Union,[57] so it is wise to presume that this desire still exists. While Cuba may not provide expertise directly related to biological weapons acquisition, by teaching Iranians how to operate the equipment it sells them, the Iranians gain the basic knowledge required to manufacture pathogens and toxins with possible BW applications.
But are the Cubans responsible for how their customers use the equipment and training exported by Cuba? When considering this question, it is useful to remember the situation that the governments of Austria, Sweden, France, United Kingdom, Germany, the U.S., and others faced in regards to selling dual-use equipment and supplies to Iraq before 1991. Industries in these countries, assumedly with the permission of their home governments, provided Saddam Hussein's government with the cell cultures of pathogens and equipment required to manufacture the BW agents used in its weapons. Yet, there is no sign that any of these nations, or their home industries, will be held liable for assisting Iraq to acquire biological and chemical weapons. With this precedent in mind, it would appear that as long as Cuba in good faith sells equipment that it believes will be used for civilian purposes, it is allowed to do so without international opprobrium. The issue then is whether the U.S. government possesses evidence indicating that Cuba has sold one or more nations equipment knowing at that time that it would be used for illicit purposes? If so, it could accuse Cuba of having violated Article 3 of the BWC, which forbids one nation to transfer knowledge and materials related to BW to a second nation, and seek recourse under international law as suggested above. But for now, information implicating Cuba of having violated Article 3 has not been published. Until this is done, there is no ground for implicating Cuba as a proliferant country, and consequently Cuba has the right to sell its biotechnology products to anyone it wants to.
Table 1: Cuban Allegations of U.S. Biological Attacks
1962 – Newcastle disease (a disease of chickens)
1964 – Balloon attack (unspecified)
1971 – African swine fever (a disease of pigs)
1979 – Sugar cane rust (a disease of sugar cane)
1979 – Blue mold disease (a disease of tobacco plants)
1980 – Blue mold disease
1990 – African swine fever
1981 – Dengue fever and dengue hemorrhagic fever (a human disease)
1981 – Acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis (a human disease)
1981 – Bovine nodular pseudodermatosis
1989 – Ulcerative mammalitis of cows
1990 – Black sigatoka of plantain
1992 – Black plant louse of citrus trees
1992 – Optic and peripheral neuropathy (a human disease)
1993 – Rabbit viral hemorrhagic disease
1995 – Borer worm of coffee
1996 – Thrips palmi infestation (a destructive plant pest)
1996 – Varroasis of bees
1996 – Ulcerative disease of trout and tilapia
1997 – Rice mite
Table 2: Money Cuba Claims is Owed [76-79]
| Amount Owed/Date(s) Incurred | Debtor Country | Reason for Debt |
| $30 billion, 1992-? | Russia | Costs incurred by Cuba due to the Soviet Union having unexpectedly ceased its economic assistance. |
| $89 billion, 1962-present | United States | Costs incurred by Cuba due to the 46 year old U.S. trade embargo. |
| $181 billion, 1962-1999 | United States | Costs of damages done to Cuba’s population by U.S. incursions, assassination attempts, biological warfare, etc. |
| $121 billion, 1962-2000 | United States | Additional costs due to damages done to Cuba’s population by U.S. incursions, assassination attempts, biological warfare, etc. |
Sources:
[1] Raymond A. Zilinskas. "Cuban allegations of biological warfare by the United States: Assessing the evidence," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 1999, 25(3):173-227.
[2] Manuel Limonta, "Biotechnology and the Third World: Development Strategies in Cuba," Biomedical Science and the Third World: Under the Volcano, ed. Barry R. Bloom and A. Cerami, (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1989) pg. 325-334; M.J. Ganter, "Economic development evolution vs. revolution," BioPharm, 1991, 4(3):6; Rita R. Colwell, "Report on travel to Havana, Cuba, June 28 - July 4, 1997," Unpublished report to the American Society for Microbiology, 1998; Jocelyn Kaiser, "Cuba's billion-dollar biotech gamble," Science 282:1626-1628, November 1998; Harold Ramkisson, "Science and technology in Cuba today." CARISCIENCE, 1999, <http://www.cariscience.org> (accessed December 2, 2003); Agustín Lage, "Las biotecnologías y la neuva economía: crear y valorizar los bienes intangibles," Biotecnologia Aplicada, 2000, 17(1):55-61; Stanley Satz, "Biotechnology in Cuba," Genetic Engineering News, 2000, 20(12):1, 34; Simon Reid-Henry, "Cuban biotech plans to build on past successes," Genetic Engineering News, 1 February 2002, 22(3):13,15; Glenn Baker (ed.), Cuban Biotechnology: A First Hand Report, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2003).
[3] G.P. Kourí, M.G. Guzmán, and J.R. Bravo, "Hemorrhagic dengue in Cuba: History of an epidemic," Pan American Health Organization Bulletin, 1986, 20:24-30.
[4] An alternative hypothesis is that interferon at the time was believed to be a potential cure for cancer, so Fidel Castro made the decision that Cuba should acquire it for its putative therapeutic value. See "How Castro's enthusiasm for biotech spurred vaccine development," Nature, 1999, <http://www.nature.cm>.
[5] Charles Cooper (ed), Technology and Innovation in the International Economy, (Maastricht, Holland: Edward Elgar- United Nations University Press, 1994), 2.4.4.
[6] Limonta, "Biotechnology and the Third World: Development Strategies in Cuba." Some sources claim that the Biological Front lacks a strong scientific base from which to make policy decisions, yet Manuel Limonta states that the leaders of various biotech institutions are members of the Biological Front, helping to guide the decision-making process.
[7] Cooper (ed), Technology and Innovation in the International Economy.
[8] International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. Activity Report 2002, (Trieste, Italy: International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, 2003).
[9] Limonta, "Biotechnology and the Third World: Development Strategies in Cuba."
[10] Patricia Grogg, "Fewer shots, same protection from disease," Inter Press Service, 2 October 2001.
[11] "How Castro's enthusiasm for biotech spurred vaccine development," Nature, 1999, <http://www.nature.cm>.
[12] Kaiser, "Cuba's billion-dollar biotech gamble."
[13] Prensa Latina, Cuba, 6 July 2000, in "Sugar industry minister visits China," BBC Worldwide Broadcasting, 15 July 2000.
[14] Miriam Elderhorst, "Will Cuba's biotechnology capacity survive the socio-economic crisis?" Biotechnology and Development Monitor, No. 20, pg. 11-13 and 22.
[15] BIOCEN website, <http://www.BIOCEN.cu>.
[16] "Iran pharma links, higher spending," Pharma Marketletter, 3 July 1995.
[17] "Iran-Cuba (scheduled) stalled medicine factory is US's fault, Iranian tells Castro," Financial Times, 9 May 2001.
[18] "Call for international cooperation in biotechnology," IPR Strategic Business Information Database, 29 August 2000.
[19] Fidel Castro, "There will be weapons much more...(II)," Granma Internacional (internet version), 14 May 2002, <http://www.granma.cu>.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Prensa Latina, 15 January 2002, "Iran, Cuba discuss cooperation in biotechnology, agriculture," BBC Monitoring, 18 January 2002.
[22] Dalia Acosta, "Tests to start on AIDS vaccine," Inter Press Service, 28 July 1996.
[23] Andrew Pollack, "U.S. Permits 3 Cancer Drugs from Cuba," New York Times, 15 July 2004, p. C1.
[24] The lower figure is disclosed in an article by Paul Elias, "Cuba has top biotechnology program; US worried about Cuba's bioweapons prowess," Associated Press, 10 May 2002, while the higher figure is found in the article by Mark Fineman, "Little-known biotech industry vital to Cuba's future," Miami Herald, 14 August 1998, <http://www.fiu.edu>.
[25] Juan Armando Montes, "Prepared statement of Juan Armando Montes, Colonel, (retired), US Army Special Forces & Foreign Area Officer (FAD), Latin America, President of the Cuban American Veterans Association, member of the Cuban Unity Broad Opposition Front, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere," Federal News Service, 16 March 1985.
[26] Wolf Jr., C., Yeh, KC, Brunner Jr., E, Gurwitz ,A., Lawrence, M, The Costs of the Soviet Empire (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1983).
[27] Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the Central Intelliegence Agency, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence, National Security Agency, and the United States Southern Command Joint Intelligence Center, The Cuban Threat to US National Security, 6 May 1998, <http://www.defenselink.mil>.
[28] World of Information Business Intelligence Report: Cuba, (Essex, UK: Walden Publishing, 2000), pg. 40.
[29] Zilinskas, "Cuban allegations of biological warfare by the United States."
[30] Cuban Government, "Note verbale dated 28 April 1997 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," UN document A/52/128, 1997.
[31] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. "Cuba: No use of biological weapons. Press statement by John Dinger," <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.
[32] S.I. Soutar, Report to All State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on the Results of the Formal Consultative Meeting of State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention held from 25-27 August 1997, (Geneva: United Kingdom Permanent Representation, 1997).
[33] Consultative Meeting of State Parties of the Convention on Biological Weapons Request by the Republic of Cuba. The Use of Biological Weapons by the United States of America Against Cuba, Geneva, Government of Cuba, 1997.
[34] Raisa, Paiges, "Lawsuit against U.S. for economic damages: $121 billion USD demanded in compensation," Granma Internacional (internet version), 10 April 2000, <http://www.granma.cu>.
[35] "Cuba Tests Potential Vaccine For Virus Introduced by the United States," Havana AIN, 30 November 2005.
[36] Defense Intelligence Agency, The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security.
[37] U.S. Department of State, "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism," Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 Report, 2000, <http://www.state.gov>.
[38] Ken Alibek, with Stephen Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World -- Told From Inside by the Man Who Ran It, (New York: Random House, 1999).
[39] Juan A. Tamayo, "U.S. skeptical of report on Cuban biological weapons," Miami Herald, 23 June 1999, pg. 4A.
[40] Manuel Cereijo, "Cuba: The threat," Guaracabuya, 1999, <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.
[41] Manuel Cereijo, "Cuba's bacteriological warfare efforts," Guaracabuya, 1998, <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.
[42] John Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction," Heritage Lectures 743, the Heritage Foundation, 6 May 2002.
[43] Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil."
[44] Colin Powell on-camera interview, US Department of State, Gander, Newfoundland, 13 May 2002.
[45] "Cuba's Pursuit of Biological Weapons: Fact or Fiction?" Hearing of the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 June 2002.
[46] John R. Bolton, "The U.S. position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW threat," Speech presented on August 27, 2002, at the Tokyo American Center, Tokyo, Japan, <http://www.state.gov>.
[47] John R. Bolton, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., March 30, 2004, p. 26.
[48] Milton Leitenberg, "Distinguishing Offensive from Defensive Biological Weapons Research," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 29(3), p. 223.
[49] Donna Cassata, "Think Your Boss Is Tough? Underlings Describe John Bolton," Associated Press, 13 April 2005.
[50] U.S. Department of State, Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2005, pp. 19-20.
[51] "Cuba ridicules report it has biological arms," Reuters, 24 June 1999, <http://www.globalsecurity.org>.
[52] Cubavision, 10 May 2002, in "Castro refutes US John Bolton's statements on biological warfare," FBIS LAP20020511000019, 10 May 2002.
[53] Cubavision, "Castro refutes US John Bolton's statements on biological warfare."
[54] Cubavision, "Castro refutes US John Bolton's statements on biological warfare."
[55] Baker (ed.), Cuban Biotechnology: A First Hand Report.
[56] Frances Robles, "Ex-Insider: Cuba Has Bioweapons," Miami Herald, 28 February 2007.
[57] Judith Miller and William J. Broad. "The Germ Warriors: A special report; Iranians, bioweapons in mind lure needy ex-Soviet scientists," New York Times, 8 December 1998, pg. A1.
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