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Updated May 2010
Chemical Overview
China is a party to the major international agreements regulating chemical weapons, including the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[1] China also supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004, which compels states to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical weapons. China is currently not a member of the Australia Group (AG), an export control regime focused on chemical and biological weapons; however, since 2006 Beijing has held regular consultation with the AG and China's CW-related export controls are fully in line with AG control lists.
While China declared upon ratification of the CWC in 1997 that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes, it has consistently maintained that the program has since been dismantled. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has conducted over 170 inspections in China to confirm Beijing's declarations and has ruled Beijing as in compliance with its CWC obligations.[2] However, U.S. officials have accused China of not declaring the full extent of its chemical weapons program, past and present. Additionally, the United States has expressed concern over the transfer of controlled chemicals from Chinese entities to nations of proliferation concern, most notably Iran.
China was a victim of chemical weapons warfare during World War II, with some estimates indicating more than 2,000 separate CW attacks by Japanese imperial forces on Chinese territory between 1937 and 1945. The legacy of these attacks continues to linger as a major problem for China, which has an estimated 350,000 abandoned chemical munitions still on its territory, left behind by retreating Japanese forces.[3]
China's Official Position on Chemical Weapons
Beijing's official declarations have consistently shown support for the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In November 1995, Beijing's White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament stated that China supports, as the ultimate goal of disarmament, "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons)."[4] The document also stated that China "has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons," and that "it does not produce or possess chemical weapons."
Similar to its stated position on biological weapons, China has conveyed in official statements a symbolic link between its past victimization by chemical warfare and its support for the total prohibition of chemical weapons. China also points to the legacy of chemical weapons used on its soil as an ongoing tangible danger resulting from the continued presence of abandoned Japanese chemical weapons in China. In its 2005 white paper on nonproliferation, China emphasized this problem, noting that the CW "abandoned by Japan on Chinese soil are still posing a grave and real threat to the lives and property of the Chinese people, and to the ecological environment."[5]
As part of its CWC obligations, in 1997 China declared small-scale chemical warfare agent production facilities, which have since been verifiably destroyed.[6] China has also declared that it has maintained a defensive chemical warfare program to protect itself against chemical attack, which is not in contravention of the CWC. In 1950, China established an anti-chemical warfare school, and in 1956, established the Anti-Chemical Warfare Department with the approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Currently, China conducts research on chemical weapons defense at its Research Institute of Chemical Defense and has two schools for its anti-chemical warfare corps.[7] In October 2008, China announced a new training curriculum for its anti-chemical warfare corps, focusing on the dual mission of defending against CW use in a wartime situation, and dealing with domestic chemical incidents and incidents related to chemical weapons abandoned by Japan after World War II.[8]
It is not known publicly whether China declared to the OPCW a chemical weapons stockpile. Nevertheless, according to the Chinese white paper "China's National Defense in 2008," since the CWC entered into force, China has had over 170 on-site inspections by OPCW personnel to verify submitted declarations, which have affirmed China's compliance with the CWC. Additionally, China has two OPCW-designated laboratories, the Analytical Chemical Research Laboratory of the Institute of Chemical Defense, designated in 1998, and the Toxicant Analysis Laboratory of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, designated 2007.[9] These laboratories assist the OPCW in analyzing samples taken during on-site inspections.
Moreover, since 2002 Beijing has submitted annually declarations on its domestic protection programs, as required by Article X, paragraph 4 of the CWC.[10] Previously, China had failed to declare these activities despite the CWC requirement. Beijing's regular submissions over the last several years are a potential indicator of a growing ability and willingness to fulfill all CWC obligations.
Suspicions about China's CW-Related Activities
Despite Beijing's official position and its emphasis that all on-site inspections have demonstrated strict observance of CWC obligations, there have been allegations that the Chinese government is still secretly pursuing chemical weapons programs, in violation of its CWC commitments. These allegations have originated primarily in the United States, though they have not yet led to any official action against China. (Under the provisions of the CWC, allegations of active CW programs can be brought before the OPCW and a challenge inspection can be called.)
In July 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter stated in testimony before the U.S.-China Commission that "China's maintenance of a chemical weapons program is a matter of serious concern to us." She continued that:
"The United States believes that, despite being a State Party to the [CWC], China has an advanced chemical weapons research and development program. Although China has declared that it does not possess chemical weapons, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its CW program. We also believe that China possesses an inventory of traditional CW agents."[11]
In more recent years, the United States continues to express concern regarding China's CW program, although it is less certain of the current status of the program. In August 2005, a report issued by the U.S. Department of State purports that "China maintains a CW production mobilization capability, although there is insufficient information available to determine whether it maintains an active offensive CW research and development program."[12] Similarly, Assistant Secretary DeSutter noted in a September 2006 testimony that "we simply do not have enough information to determine whether China maintains an active offensive CW research and development program," marking a departure from her more decisive language in 2003.[13]
Nevertheless, the U.S. government has not publicly disclosed specific evidence to support its contentions regarding the possibility of a Chinese CW program.
China's CW Export Controls
China's chemical industry is large and diffuse, and seen as one of the core industries involved in China's overall economic development. As of its March 2008 report submitted during the CWC Second Review Conference, China's total numbers of declared and inspectable industrial facilities were 1,855 and 1,737 respectively.[14] These numbers constitute approximately one third of the total numbers of declared and inspectable facilities of all CWC States Parties. The magnitude of China's chemical industry, combined with Beijing's relatively new export control system, has made domestic enforcement of these laws difficult, resulting in inconsistent implementation. Nonetheless, the Chinese government has repeatedly insisted that it has never violated the CWC, and points out that that the Convention explicitly allows for normal trade and cooperation between State Parties (of which Iran is one) in the chemical industrial field.
China's current chemical export controls consist of six main components:
- December 1995 Regulations on Monitored and Controlled Chemicals (based on the regulations contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention);[15]
- March 1997 Supplement to the December 1995 chemical export control regulations, issued in preparation for China's April 1997 ratification of the CWC;[16]
- August 1997 Ministerial Circular on strengthened chemical export controls;[17]
- June 1998 Decree expanding the scope of its chemical controls to cover dual-use chemicals not previously controlled by China's existing laws but which are covered in the guidelines of the Australia Group, of which China is not a member;[18]
- October 2002 regulations, with corresponding control lists, on chemical related exports, which includes extensive licensing and registration procedures for CBW-related materials, equipment and technologies;[19]
- September 2006 Provisions on the Management of the Import and Export of Precursor Chemicals.[20]
With the 2002 regulations and 2006 provisions, China's export controls fully cover requirements under the CWC, as well as the control lists of the Australia Group. China also maintains an on-going dialogue with the Australia Group.[21]
For chemical weapons-related export controls, the export of most dual-use chemicals is regulated by the Ministry of Commerce, in coordination with other ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [22] For CWC scheduled chemicals however, export licensing is handled by the National CWC Implementation Office which is currently under the National Reform and Development Commission. Although Beijing has improved its export control system it remains difficult to fully assess China's ability to enforce its controls in the chemical field since Chinese authorities have been hesitant to discuss cases of export violations. The limited number of cases that Chinese authorities have made public show that Beijing still has problems with the activities of small and medium sized enterprises and with the domestic gathering of useful intelligence on possible violations. (See export section below)
China has acknowledged that its export control system remains a work in progress. In its 2005 white paper on nonproliferation, Chinese authorities admit that building a system is a "long-term task" and that Beijing "will keep on improving its legislation in this regard, enhancing the capacity-building of law enforcement, setting up and optimizing internal mechanisms, and reinforcing publicity of legislation as well as education and training for enterprises, in a bid to make due contributions to the international nonproliferation endeavor."[23]
Although strengthening its nonproliferation-related trade controls is a clearly stated goal for China, Beijing has also long advocated for nondiscriminatory international exchange of science and technology. The concurrent support for nonproliferation and open exchange has complicated China's chemical and biological export control policies. For example, China has supported efforts of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in issuing a series of statements during OPCW conferences highlighting the importance of international cooperation and exchange in the field of chemical activities, as signified by Article XI of the CWC.
In November 2009, during a meeting of the Conference of the State Parties, NAM and China "reiterate[d] that the promotion of international cooperation in the exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technological information in the field of chemical activities, aimed at facilitating economic and social development, is fundamental for the achievement of the objectives of the Convention." They then called "for removal of unwarranted restrictions in the field of trade in chemicals, equipment, and related technologies for peaceful purposes amongst States Parties."[24]
While Article XI of the CWC does commit the States Parties to "the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention," the statements by the NAM and China may invite some degree of suspicion on the part of the developed nations, as the NAM includes participation by putative proliferators, such as Iran.
Continued Concerns about China's CW-related Exports
Since the early 1990's, China has been repeatedly accused, primarily by the United States, of exporting dual-use chemical weapons-related materials and technology-such as dual-use chemical precursors, vaccines, and production equipment-to countries of concern in the developing world, including Iran, Libya, and Iraq. Chinese chemical and biological weapon-related exports to Iran have raised particular concerns.
One of the earliest and most controversial incidents involved the 1993 search of the Chinese ship Yinhe (Galaxy). The search came as a result of U.S. intelligence reports, which charged that the ship was carrying chemical precursors to Iran. The search of the ship, however, revealed no such items.
Between 1997 and 2007 the United States imposed several rounds of sanctions on Chinese entities for exporting dual-use chemical precursors and chemical production equipment to Iran in support of Tehran's suspected chemical weapons program. [25] Sanctions were imposed under the auspices of the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, and the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2005.[26] While the nature of the transferred goods has been frequently undisclosed, many of the entities-such as Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corporation, Q.C. Chen, Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company, and Zibo Chemet Equipment Plant-engage primarily in the trade of chemical materials and equipment, prompting speculation that many of the sanctions were for violations of the parameters of the AG or the CWC.
China has vigorously disputed U.S. assertions that it engages in and fails to stop WMD proliferation, and has protested the sanctions imposed by the U.S. government on its companies.[27] In January 2007, in response to sanctions imposed on three Chinese companies under the 2005 Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, including the Zibo Chemet Equipment Plant, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated Chinese opposition to the Bush Administration's frequent implementation of sanctions: "It is unreasonable for the American government to invoke its domestic law to sanction Chinese companies without providing any evidence. We express resolute opposition and strongly urge the U.S. to correct its wrong practice."[28]
Since 2006 Chinese authorities have publicly punished three private firms that violated Beijing's CW-related export controls. These companies were Jilin Tumen Chemical Light Manufacturing Company (punished in 2006), Shanghai Smart Chemical Company Ltd (punished in 2006), and Zibo Chemet Equipment Company, Ltd (punished in 2008).[29] Of these three, Zibo Chemet had previously been sanctioned by the U.S. government.
According to a January 2009 Congressional Research Service report, approximately half of Chinese entities that have been sanctioned by the United States have been sanctioned more than once, raising questions about the effectiveness of sanctions against these entities in deterring future proliferation activities.[30]
Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China
At the end of World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army abandoned a large amount of chemical weapons on Chinese territory. Current estimates place the number of shells still on Chinese soil at about 350,000.[31] Under the CWC, Japan is responsible for the proper destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs), and both China and Japan were tasked with negotiating the arrangements for destruction. However, the destruction of Japanese ACWs still has not begun, and China has incessantly called on Japan to rectify this situation.
After many years of negotiation, the two governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding in July 1999 that established a basic framework for ACW destruction in China.[32] Under the agreement, Japan is to provide the necessary facilities, experts, expertise, and funds to complete the destruction of the munitions. It had been intended that the clean-up would commence in 2000 and, according to CWC guidelines, should have been completed by 2007, 10 years after the convention's entry into force. Due to the immense scale of the operation and problems with agreeing upon disposal methods, China and Japan jointly filed a request with the OPCW for five more years to complete the removal and destruction of the weapons, which was granted.
Japan estimates that clean-up costs will be around $1.6 billion dollars (200 billion yen). In September 2000, in Bei'an, China, scientists and workmen from both Japan and China conducted the first large-scale joint operation for the excavation and recovery of abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs).[33] Cooperative efforts have also included joint site investigations, studies on weapon destruction, as well as research on security systems protecting both humans and the environment.
In December 2006, China and Japan agreed to create a joint body, centered in China's Jilin province, to recover and dispose of Japanese ACWs. In April 2007, China and Japan reached a final agreement on the primary ACW destruction site, which will be located in Ha'erbaling, Jilin. (Approximately 90 percent of the ACW munitions in China are located in Jilin.)[34] The Ha'erbaling facility, not yet constructed, is intended to dispose of 330,000 munitions. Japan and China also agreed on the use of a mobile destruction facility for disposal of munitions that cannot be safely transported to Ha'erbaling. In December 2008, a Japanese team under Chinese supervision began test removal of some ACW at Ha'erbaling.[35]
Despite progress, China has shown displeasure in the slow speed of the ACW destruction. As of March 2010, the construction by Japan of destruction facilities is still incomplete, and the elimination of ACWs has yet to begun.
Cleanup efforts have also been slowed by allegations of corruption on the part of Japanese companies involved in ACW removal.[36] In October 2007, Japanese investigators raided the offices of two companies, Abandoned Chemical Weapons Disposal Corporation and Pacific Consultants International (PCI). In April 2008, four executives of PCI were officially arrested and accused of misusing 300 million yen, allocated by the Japanese government for ACW cleanup and disposal. [37] The sustained presence of Japanese ACWs on Chinese soil continues to be a sore point in bilateral relations, and China repeatedly reiterates its calls for accelerated progress on destruction of these munitions. In a position paper submitted during the Second Review Conference in 2008, China demanded that "Japan earnestly fulfill its obligations under the Convention" to destroy all ACWs and provide "all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other resources" that are required to do so safely.[38] During an October 2009 OPCW Executive Council meeting in The Hague, Chinese Permanent Representative Ambassador Zhang Jun reiterated China's calls for Japan to honor its obligation to the "early and complete elimination of the threat caused by Japanese ACWs."[39] Ambassador Zhang declared the task to be a fundamental element of the CWC and claimed the continued presence of ACWs to be threat to human and environmental safety.
Chinese citizens have sued repeatedly in Japanese courts for compensation for the injuries and associated damages caused by Japanese ACWs, despite several rulings in favor of the Japanese government. In July 2007, for example, the Tokyo High Court overturned a September 2003 lower court ruling which had awarded a $1.6 million settlement to 13 Chinese victims of Japanese ACW exposure and their families.[40] In May 2009, the Japanese Supreme Court rejected two appeals for compensation, effectively amounting to a denial by Japan of its responsibility to have prevented post-war incidents with ACWs in China.[41]
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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
