Updated September 2008
Belarus: Missile Overview

When Belarus gained independence in December 1991, there were 81 road-mobile SS-25s on its territory stationed at three missile bases, and an unknown number of tactical nuclear weapons. During the 1980s, a number of units equipped with intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) were also stationed in the Belarusian SSR; however, all of these weapons were eliminated under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by 1991.
In May 1992, Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocol, which obligated it to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state, which it did in July 1993, and to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which it ratified in February 1993. As a result of these commitments, Belarus transferred its nuclear weapons to Russia. The process of transferring tactical warheads was completed in May 1992, and the last strategic warheads and associated missiles were sent to Russia in November 1996. No nuclear forces have been stationed in Belarus since then, although the possibility of stationing Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus was broached by a number of Belarusian officials in the late 1990s.
Belarus inherited no major production or design facilities from the Soviet Union. However, a number of Belarusian firms continue cooperation with Russian missile/space enterprises. Belarus is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, though it has been considered for membership in the past. There have been speculation that Belarus would either transfer or serve as a transfer point for Russian-supplied air defense systems, including the S-300 and the S-400, to Iran and Syria. However, these claims have been refuted by both Russian and Belarusian officials and the technology transfers have not taken place. Belarusian officials have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to nonproliferation of missile technologies.
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This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
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