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Issue Brief
Jean du Preez, Director
International
Organizations and Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
April 2004
Issue Introduction
The issue of security assurances has been at the heart the NPT debate since the Treaty’s inception. Sobered by the 1960 French nuclear test, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Chinese test in 1964, negotiations began in earnest on a treaty addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, mainly as a result of fears on the part of the two nuclear superpowers at the time (the Soviet Union and the United States) that more industrialized nations would develop a nuclear weapons capability. Sensing that their security interest could be addressed in such a treaty, the non-aligned states successfully pursued this objective through UN General Assembly resolution 21/53A which called on the 18 Nation Committee on Disarmament “to consider urgently the proposal that nuclear weapons powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states without nuclear weapons on their territories.”
The International Atomic Energy
Agency flag at UN Headquarters
Source: IAEA Website
The Soviet Union first acted on this proposal mainly with West Germany’s nuclear potential in mind and in 1966 proposed a treaty clause to that end. Since this would have enabled the Soviets to threaten West Germany unless the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from German territory, the United States rejected the proposal. Unable to reach consensus that would have included negative security assurances (NSAs) as part of the Treaty, the three nuclear weapon states (NWS) at the time (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) adopted the position that the matter should be pursued “in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside the Treaty itself but in close conjunction with it.” Thus the NPT opened for signature without a non-use commitment as part of its text. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), however, were able to address their security considerations by returning to the more idealistic ban the “bomb language” found in early Cold War proposals. This resulted in the weak pledge by the NWS to end the arms race and negotiate in good faith toward eventual total nuclear disarmament—Article VI.
Action “outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty” has come to mean resolutions by the Security Council and in the context of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs)—the treaty of Tlatelolco specifically. The Security Council in 1968 adopted Resolution 255 recognizing the pledge by the three NWS that the Council would have to act immediately to provide assistance to a state victim of an act of nuclear weapons aggression or object of a threat of such aggression. Although this commitment, defined as a positive security assurance, was clearly designed to encourage NNWS to join the Treaty, it was in principle welcomed by them. Many non-aligned states, however, indicated that such a commitment fell short of their expectations and expressed the need for a negative assurance in the form of a multilateral legally binding commitment.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco included the first legally binding provision related to security assurances. Following the Cuban missile crisis, several Latin American countries, spearheaded by Mexico and Brazil, in 1967 successfully negotiated the Latin American and Caribbean Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Having had a clear interest in keeping Latin America free of nuclear weapons, the United States was supportive of the Treaty and was in fact willing to sign and eventually ratify a treaty in which it committed itself “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against contracting states.” The United States, fearing a Soviet-assisted attack in the region, qualified its support by stating that it would consider an armed attack by a contracting party assisted by a NWS to be incompatible with the contracting parties’ obligations under the NPT. Although weak, these assurances gave the non-aligned states momentum as they continued their pursuit of legally binding commitments. Subsequent NWFZ treaties also included protocols to this effect, but in several cases NWS have either not signed or ratified these accords, or they have entered reservations about the use or threat of use against members of these zones.
Issue Brief
Progress to Date
The first Review Conference in 1975 made further progress towards this goal. While giving countenance to the 1968 positive security assurances, the Conference agreed that all states—both NWS and NNWS—should refrain, in accordance with the UN Charter, from the threat or use of force in relations between states, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. Since then, the NWS, starting with the United States in 1978, have made, and in some instances, updated, unilateral pledges establishing criteria for the granting of NSAs to NNWS. Only China gave an unconditional assurance, while the declarations by the other four NWS (France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) contained various specific qualifications. The independence of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine saw further progress as security assurances were part of the deal to get them to renounce their “inherited” nuclear arsenals and join the NPT as NNWS.
These pledges combined offered the NNWS a stronger position to bargain for further guarantees at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Acting just prior to that Conference, the Security Council in Resolution 984 in 1995 acknowledged the pledges by the five NWS marking the first real politically binding commitment on NSAs, although at least two NWS—the United States and the United Kingdom—made qualifying statements following its adoption. In light of these qualifications, the non-aligned NNWS, in particular, continued to call for a multilaterally negotiated legally binding international instrument. The NWS repeated these assurances at the 1995 Conference, but offered a zero sum stratagem—it would be available to NNWS party to the NPT only if the Treaty was extended indefinitely. Although not able to agree on a Final Declaration, the Conference, as part of the package leading to the agreement on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, included language on NSAs in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, calling for further steps to be considered to assure NPT NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that these steps could take the form of an international legally binding instrument.
With the indefinite extension complete, the security assurances by the NWS—with the exception of China,which maintained its “no-first use” policy—contained three exceptions in cases of a state attacking a NWS or its allies; an attack by a NNWS with the assistance of NWS and that parties receiving such assurances must be in compliance with their obligations under the treaty. However, soon after the Conference, the United States would secretively elaborate and justify another exception—in case of a biological and chemical weapons attack. This is evident from 1995 U.S. Strategic Command documents—now partially declassified—acknowledging that “declaratory policies such as negative security assurances” were a mistake since singling out nuclear weapons from other weapons of mass destruction without making a link between damages (or potential damages) and the threat or use of those weapons would be unacceptable to the United States.
During the preparatory phase for the 2000 Review Conference, several proposals were made, most notably by Myanmar and South Africa, that included the need for a protocol to the Treaty aimed at providing comprehensive and unconditional NSAs to NPT NNWS. The South African proposal emphasized that negotiations of legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty as opposed to other forums, such as the Conference on Disarmament, would provide incentives to states outside the Treaty to join, and to states inside the Treaty to fully comply with their nonproliferation obligations. The 2000 Review Conference consequently agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five NPT NWS to the NPT NNWS would strengthen the regime. The Conference also called on the PrepCom to make recommendations to the 2005 RevCon to this effect.
Since then, the backtracking by the NWS on their existing unilateral nuclear security assurances, as well as the pledges made in 1995 and in 2000, have become a considerable concern. These concerns were triggered by statements made by senior U.S. and U.K. officials, the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and the release of the U.S. National Defense Strategy, which included the possible use of nuclear weapons against NNWS—in some cases preemptively. These policies were, however, not new at the time of their release, but were based on policies of earlier U.S. administrations—even before the indefinite extension of the NPT. What is of concern, however, is that despite the solemn pledges and agreements reached in 1995 and 2000, the United States has clearly decided to walk away from the concept of NSAs that have for more than 30 years been central to the deal embodied in the NPT. Less than two months after the release of the NPR, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security State John Bolton made it clear that the United States no longer felt bound by any NSAs when he observed that “we are not just into theoretical assertions that other administrations have made” and that the “idea of fine theories of deterrence work against everybody, which is implicit in the negative security assurances, has just been disproven by September 11.” This statement, further enhanced by the U.S. Congress approval of funding for studies on the development of “robust nuclear earth penetrators” and its withdrawal of the “Spratt-Fuse” ban on low yield nuclear weapons by approving funding for possible development of mini-nukes, gave further rise to the concerns among NNWS, especially those in the non-aligned movement (NAM), about the future of NSAs—both legally and politically binding.
The NAM heads of state at their 2003 Summit in Kuala Lumpur subsequently reacted by expressing serious concern over the consideration of new types of nuclear weapons and reiterated that the provision for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS is in contravention of the NSAs that have been provided by the NWS. They also decided that “pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances should be pursued as a matter of urgency, and that legally binding security assurances to NNWS parties to the NPT would strengthen the regime.” To this end, they emphasized the need for the PrepCom to allocate specific time for deliberations on security assurances.
Recommendations to 2005?
Since the PrepCom process for the 2005 Review Conference has so far been based only on non-negotiated chairman’s summaries, not much progress has been made towards meeting the 2000 Review Conference agreement that it should “make recommendation to the 2005 Review Conference on legally binding security assurances by the five NWS to the NNWS party to the Treaty”. The 2002 chairman’s summary did acknowledge that NSAs were a “key basis for the 1995 extension decision,” that NSAs “should be pursued as a matter of urgency,” and that, “a view was held that the issue of security assurances was linked with the fulfillment of Treaty obligations.”
The 2003 PrepCom session saw the New Agenda Coalition submit a working paper that included a draft protocol on security assurances. Cleverly using language from the NWS’ unilateral declaration on security assurances, the draft protocol not only recognizes the significance of 1995 Security Council resolution and the statements by the NWS, but it identified the states that would provide security assurances (NWS parties to the NPT); the states that would be the beneficiaries of security assurances (NNWS parties to the Treaty); any qualifications to the security assurances (based on the qualifications in the unilateral declarations by four of the five NWS); and provisions on the mandatory actions to be undertaken by the Security Council if a beneficiary of security assurances were the subject of a threat of use or use of nuclear weapons. The draft also allowed for the cessation of security assurances in the event that a NWS was attacked by a NNWS in association or alliance with a NWS.
The 2003 chairman’s summary reflected in part the belief that “security doctrines have included the potential use of nuclear weapons” and that this doctrine and other related policies “might undermine commitments made under the respective Security Council resolutions.” It also stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances to NNWS should be pursued as a matter of priority and indicated that some states parties were of the view that this could take the form of an agreement or protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally binding security assurances already given by the five NWS in the framework of the treaties regarding NWFZs. It is interesting that the chairman included a reference to the link between security assurances and the fulfillment of the Treaty obligations. He also included a reference to a proposal made on the need to establish a subsidiary body to the Main Committee I at the 2005 Review Conference to address the issue.
Conclusion
The forthcoming PrepCom is therefore faced with a daunting task—not only must it agree on the need to address NSAs, but it also must identify and agree on the means through which progress towards this goal can be achieved at the Review Conference. In this context, and given current concerns over non-compliance with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations, it should be considered that legally binding NSAs within the context of the NPT, as opposed to another forum, would provide significant benefits to all NPT parties.
Security assurances should clearly only be granted to states that have forgone the nuclear weapons option and not to those that are still keeping their options open. They should therefore not be applicable to non-NPT parties who are aspiring to acquire or develop nuclear weapons in contravention of the Treaty. Security assurances granted to NNWS inside the Treaty will emphasize the basic principle that security is guaranteed by the nuclear nonproliferation regime and not by nuclear weapons. This would strengthen the regime and confirm the validity of the NPT and its indefinite extension. Legally binding security assurances would build confidence among NPT state parties, addressing concerns over possible scenarios in which some NWS may consider using nuclear weapons. It would also provide incentives to states outside the NPT.
When considering recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference on legally binding security assurances, the types and application of such assurances will need to be taken into account. While all NNWS to the NPT should be potential beneficiaries of NSAs, such assurances would only be applied to NPT states that are in full compliance with their Treaty obligations and could in certain circumstances be qualified. States parties would also need to consider the kinds of NSAs, i.e., absolute or qualified assurances. The first type always guarantees a NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by a NWS. This was the kind of security assurance envisaged by the non-aligned states during early treaty negotiations. Given the qualifying statements by most NWS on their unilateral declarations, the second type, or “qualified” NSA, is likely to be more acceptable to the NWS. This type of assurance would exclude cases of an invasion or attack on a nuclear weapons state’s territory, its armed forces or troops, its allies, or on a state with which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a NNWS in association or alliance with a NWS (in terms of NATO, for example). The same would apply in a scenario where a NNWS initiates an attack outside its security alliance with the support of a NWS. In such a case, the security assurances granted to such a NNWS would also no longer apply. If, however, a NNWS that is a member of a security alliance, were to attack on its own, or be attacked by a NWS while not having the support or assistance of a NWS, then that NNWS would still be covered by the security assurance provided.
Compelling reasons exist why legally binding NSAs should be granted only to NNWS parties to the NPT as an incentive not to pursue a nuclear weapons option and to fully comply with their Treaty obligations. However, the reverse logic of this argument should also be considered, especially given current concerns over non-compliance of some NPT parties, most notably North Korea. Some of the unilateral declarations, in particular those of the United States and the United Kingdom, contain additional qualifications that make it clear that that those assurances are not regarded as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own NPT nonproliferation obligations. It would, however, be a serious blow to the validity and relevance of the Treaty, if consideration were given to granting security assurances to a state party, such as North Korea, that threatens to develop nuclear weapons (or as some believe has already developed) in order to gain such assurances. This issue has been one of the most critical issues in resolving the North Korean crisis. While North Korea was seen to be clearly in non-compliance prior to the now infamous “axis of evil” speech by President Bush, Pyongyang maintains that it has the right to develop nuclear weapons to defend itself against a possible nuclear threat by the United States, stemming from its inclusion on the list of possible target countries. Since the 1994 U.S./DPRK Agreed Framework explicitly provided for security assurances for North Korea against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, it has been one of North Korea’s main objectives in its game of nuclear brinkmanship with the United States. What is of concern are indications that the United States, in conjunction with two other NWS, may offer North Korea “written” security assurances.
This sends a message to NNWS, especially those that may still be contemplating a nuclear weapons option, that the only way to extract assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, is to threaten, or develop nuclear weapons of their own. This would quickly erode the main incentive to join or comply with the NPT—security without weapons, and has the potential to unravel the pact.
It is against this backdrop that the NPT states parties at the 2005 Review Conference will need to consider how to best address the legitimate security requirement of the NNWS, especially those that have forgone nuclear weapons in good faith and that remain in full compliance with their Treaty obligations.
Relevant Resources
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Tariq Rauf, “Successes of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime,” in Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Informal Panel . |
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Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes 2002 edition NPT Website, Center for Nonproliferation Studies. |
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Statement by the Director General of the IAEA on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Road Ahead . |
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Lawrence Scheinman, “Shadow & Substance: Securing the Future of Atoms for Peace,” IAEA Bulletin, December 2003. |
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Piet de Klerk, “The Role of the IAEA in Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament,” International Workshop on the 2000 Conference o f the Strengthened NPT Review Process, November 1999. |
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Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, “After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1995). |
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George Bunn, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,” Arms Control Today (December 2003). |
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Susan Welsh, “Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 199.5). |
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Tariq Rauf, “An Unequivocal Success? Implications of the NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today (July/August 2000). |
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Tariq Rauf, “Reinforcing the Strengthened Review Process,” statement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. |
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Tariq Rauf, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference: Challenges and Prospects,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies. |
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Tariq Rauf, “Shoring Up Commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Before and After the 2000 Review Conference,” at International Seminar on Disarmament, December 1999. |
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Ambassador Abdallah Baali on the 2000 NPT Review Conference, an interview conducted by Tariq Rauf, the Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2000) . |
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Lawrence Scheinman, “Politics and Pragmatism: The Challenges for NPT 2000,” CNS Report. |
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Tariq Rauf, “Towards Nuclear Disarmament,” UNIDIR Disarmament Forum (2000 No. 1). |
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Rebecca Johnson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-won Compromise,” Disarmament Diplomacy, May 2000. |
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U.S. Ambassador Norman Wulf, “Observation from the 2000 NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today (November 2000).. |
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Mark Moher, “The Nuclear Disarmament Agenda and the Future of the NPT,” The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1999). |
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1995 Decisions and Resolution adopted at the NPT Review And Extension Conference. |
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Challenges Facing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Workshop hosted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of South Hampton, Annecy, France 14 and 15 March 2003. |
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Jean du Preez, “Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Is progress Possible at the NPT PrepCom?,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies. |
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Jean du Preez and William Potter, “North Korea’s Withdrawal from the NPT: A Reality Check,” CNS Research Story of the Week, April 9, 2003. |
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Jean du Preez and Maya Nakamura, “Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?”. |
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Nuclear Terrorism, UNIDIR Disarmament Forum 2003 No. 2. |
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Jozef Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free zones: A History and Assessment,” the Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997. |
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Janne E. Nolan, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Third World and the Africa Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty,” Chapter 4 in An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War. |
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George Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States,” the Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997. |
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Could the Non-Proliferation Treaty Collapse? The Uncertain Road Ahead (2000 No.1). |
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Tariq Rauf “Towards NPT 2005: An Action Plan for the 13 Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament,” CNS Report (2001). |
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Jean du Preez, “2003 NPT Preparatory Committee: Progress towards 2005 or business as usual?,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies. |
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Tanya Ogilvie-White and John Simpson, “The NPT and Its 2003 PrepCom Session: A Regime in Need of Intensive Care,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2003. |
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Implementing Results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, PPNN Study. |
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Interview with Laszlo Molnar, conducted by Jean du Preez, Center for Nonproliferation Studies. |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
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