Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control
The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls
Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present
The Bush Proposals: A Global Strategy for Combating the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology or a Sanctioned Nuclear Cartel?
Bush-Putin Summit, November 2001
на русском (In Russian)
China Enters the Nuclear Suppliers Group: Positive Steps in the Global Campaign against Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
на русском (In Russian)
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Cooperative Threat Reduction and Pakistan
The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
DOE's Domestic Nuclear Security Initiatives
Egypt and Saudi Arabia's Policies toward Iran's Nuclear Program
The Emerging Arab Response to Iran's Unabated Nuclear Program
Entry into Force of the CTBT: All Roads Lead to Washington A Report from the Fifth Article XIV Conference
Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic Realities of China's No-First-Use Policy
IAEA Board Deplores Iran's Failure to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?
IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?
Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS
на русском(In Russian)
Implications of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff: Why It Isn't Over Yet
The International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk: A Step Towards Assured Fuel Supply?
Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
Is Syria a Candidate for Nuclear Proliferation?
The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran-IAEA Saga
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program and the Six-party Talks
Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat
Nuclear Posture Review
на русском(In Russian)
Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends
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на русском(In Russian)
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A Pause in the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement
Practical Steps for Improving U.S. Nonproliferation Leadership
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control
на русском(In Russian)
Plutonium Disposition
на русском(In Russian)
Radiological Materials in Russia
на русском(In Russian)
Reykjavik Summit: The Legacy and a Lesson for the Future
Risks of Plutonium Programs
The Role of Security Assurances: Is Any Progress Possible?
Russian Spent Nuclear Fuel
на русском(In Russian)
Russia's Nuclear Doctrine
на русском(In Russian)
The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference: Prospects for Progress
Seven Years After the Nuclear Tests: Appraising South Asia's Nuclear Realities
Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation, Japan's Role in the NPT
Submarine Dismantlement Assistance
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)
на русском(In Russian) 
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Taiwan and Nonproliferation
The Treaty of Moscow
на русском(In Russian) 
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UN General Assembly Tackles Nonproliferation and Disarmament After Disappointing Summit
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Biological Weapons
The Anti-plague System in the Newly Independent States, 1992 and Onwards: Assessing Proliferation Risks and Potential for Enhanced Public Health in Central Asia and the Caucasus
Assessing the Threat of Mass-Casualty Bioterrorism
на русском(In Russian)
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на русском(In Russian)
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на русском(In Russian)
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на русском(In Russian)
The Fifth Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
на русском(In Russian)
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на русском(In Russian)
Is the Avian Influenza Virus a Suitable Agent for a Biological Weapon?
Lessons from Select Public Health Events Having Relevance to Bioterrorism Preparedness
на русском(In Russian)
The Next Generation of Sensor Technology for the BioWatch Program
Security and Public Health: How and Why do Public Health Emergencies Affect the Security of a Country?


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на русском(In Russian)
First Review Conference of the CWC: Coming of Age
Global CW Assistance
Industrial Chemicals as Weapons: Chlorine
The Risks and Challenges of a Cruise Missile Tipping Point
The Seventh Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
на русском(In Russian)
Vinalon, the DPRK, and Chemical Weapons Precursors
на русском(In Russian)
What to Expect at the Eighth Conference of State Parties to the CWC


Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Delivery Vehicles
A Look at National Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System
Addressing the Spread of Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)
Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise?
Future Space Security
на русском(In Russian)
Japan's Space Law Revision: the Next Step Toward Re-Militarization?
Radiological and Nuclear Detection Devices
Russia's Approach to the U.S. Missile Defense Program
на русском(In Russian)
Space Security and Bush Administration Policy: Results of the First Term
Taiwan's Response to China's Missile Buildup
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Northeast Asian Security
на русском(In Russian)
Unmanned Air Vehicles as Terror Weapons: Real or Imagined?


General Nonproliferation Topics
The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism
China's White Paper on Nonproliferation: Export Controls Hit the Big Time
Department of Homeland Security: Goals and Challenges
на русском(In Russian)
DP World and U.S. Port Security
The European Union and the Arms Ban on China
G8 10 Plus 10 Over 10
на русском(In Russian)
The Global Partnership 2004
Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and Problems
Instability in Georgia: A New Proliferation Threat?
Iraq's WMD Scientists in the Crossfire
Islamist Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region
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Kazakhstan's Proposal to Initiate Commercial Imports of Radioactive Waste
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The Mitutoyo Case: Will Japan Learn from its Mistakes or Repeat Them?
Nonproliferation Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
на русском(In Russian)
North Korea's 11th Supreme People's Assembly Elections
Nuclear Watch—Pakistan: The Sorry Affairs of the Islamic Republic
Radiological Materials in Russia
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To Comply or Not to Comply: Outline of the UN Inspections Mechanism in Iraq
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Unlocking the Impasse: Who Holds the Key to the Conference on Disarmament
Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Central Asia
на русском(In Russian)
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
на русском(In Russian)
Will Emerging Challenges Change Japanese Security Policy?

Issue Brief
redline

Russian Spent Nuclear Fuel
Cristina Chuen, Senior Research Associate
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of of International Studies
February 2003

Issue Introduction

Source: Nuclear.ru - http://old.nuclear.ru/eng/news/full/13.shtml

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy plans to commercially import, temporarily store, reprocess, and repatriate spent nuclear fuel (material that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, or SNF). Illegal until July 2001, opponents continue to protest against the project, and fight to amend Russian laws yet again. Minatom avers that it needs SNF import profits to fund domestic SNF reprocessing and environmental remediation, while arguing that the project will help it promote its other exports as well as decrease global proliferation risks. Opponents counter that Russia will be unable to handle the additional SNF safely, may store the material indefinitely instead of reprocess it, will not reap the profits it claims or spent them on the environment, and would instead increase proliferation risks. Russia’s plans hinge in large part upon U.S. decisions, as the United States controls some 80 percent of the world’s SNF. At present, the U.S. administration has stated that authorization of U.S.-origin SNF exports to Russia hinge upon the cancellation of Russian nuclear projects in Iran. Nonproliferation experts have argued that the considerable U.S. leverage in this matter should be used to insist upon several other Russian concessions as well, including some degree of control over the spending of SNF import profits.

Issue Brief

For much of the last decade, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) has promoted the idea of importing, temporarily storing, reprocessing, and repatriating spent nuclear fuel (material that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, or SNF) as a means for generating revenue. However, Article 50 of the Russian Environmental Protection Law of 1991[1] prohibited the “import for storing or burying of radioactive waste and materials from abroad....” Although Russian law allowed the import of such materials for reprocessing, Government Decree No. 773 of 29 July 1995 obligated Minatom to send back the radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of SNF to its country of origin within thirty days.[2] The only exception was the fulfillment of contracts that predated the environmental protection law for the repatriation of SNF from nuclear power plants (NPPs) that the Soviet Union helped construct, in countries such as Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. Most of these contracts expired in the mid-1990s. Minatom continued to push for amendments to legislation and promoted its spent fuel import plan, while environmentalists in particular fought against any legal changes. Spent fuel imports were finally legalized in July 2001.

Current Legislation

On 10 July 2001, President Putin signed a package of laws that would allow the import of irradiated spent fuel into Russia for “technical storage” and “reprocessing.” Article 50 (Section 3) of the Environment Protection Law was amended so as to differentiate between SNF and radioactive waste.[3] Minatom had argued that spent fuel is a valuable energy resource.[4] It also cited the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, passed in Vienna in September 1998 and signed by the Russian Federation on 27 January 1999, which distinguishes between “spent nuclear fuel” and “radioactive waste.”[5]

This legal change was much fought over, and may still be amended. Large demonstrations have been held protesting against SNF imports, most recently in November 2002.[6] In 2000, some 200 organizations gathered signatures to force a referendum on the issue. Although 2,561,000 signatures were submitted to regional election commissions on 25 October 2000, the Russian courts found that 800,000 were invalid (2 million signatures are required), many for technicalities such as “incorrect” street abbreviations.[7,8] The Yabloko political party in particular has made subsequent efforts to gather signatures and hold a referendum, but to date no referendum has been held. In addition, Yabloko deputy Sergey Mitrokhin has pushed for an investigation into the feasibility study Minatom presented to the Duma when it was considering the laws. According to Mitrokhin, reprocessing costs were understated and returns wildly overstated.[9] Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of Russia’s Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor), has pointed out other oversights in Minatom’s analysis, including “incorrect” assessments of transport problems, the failure of transport containers to meet international standards, and the unsuitability of Mayak for imported SNF storage.[10]

Some Russian papers have also suggested that the current National Security Concept, adopted in January 2000, might lead to alterations in the laws on SNF imports, since it identifies the main environmental danger to Russia as “a trend toward the use of Russian territory as a place for reprocessing and burying environmentally dangerous materials and substances.” However, there is no indication at present that a new edition of the security concept will expand upon this statement or that the Russian government intends to stop Minatom’s SNF import plans for security reasons.[11]

Minatom Arguments for Importing SNF

In its argument to the Duma in support of the legal change, Minatom laid out six benefits:

Arguments Against SNF Imports

The political party Yabloko, environmentalists, and others opposed to spent fuel imports have voiced the following concerns:


Import Plans

Although Minatom has yet to begin importing spent fuel from NPPs it did not help construct, it has been negotiating with potential customers for some time. On 17 September 1998, Minatom subsidiary Tekhsnabeksport signed its first letter of intent, with Internexco (a Tekhsnabeksport subsidiary, in Germany)[39] and the Swiss company Suisse Utilities, on the import of over 2,000 tons of SNF for reprocessing and subsequent repatriation between 2000 and 2030.[37] The following year contacts were made with the nuclear industries of Switzerland, Germany, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.[40]

However, some 80 percent of the non-Russian origin nuclear fuel in the world is of U.S. origin, and as such remains under U.S. control. Other countries cannot send U.S.-origin SNF for storage or reprocessing to third nations without U.S. consent, and under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, the United States must negotiate a Section 123 agreement for nuclear cooperation in order to give such permission. Minatom is very aware of this issue, and has been trying to persuade the U.S. Department of Energy to begin such negotiations. On 23 December 1998, Adamov sent a letter to then U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson proposing a joint study of options for the temporary storage and subsequent reprocessing of U.S. spent nuclear fuel in Russia, both with and without its eventual repatriation to the United States.[41,42] Although Richardson declined this initial proposal, he did say that the United States was looking forward to further discussions.[42]

The U.S. government has yet to agree to the Russian SNF import plan, objecting to Minatom’s reprocessing plans due to plutonium proliferation concerns as well as to Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. In April 2000, Minatom reportedly suggested that a 20-year long moratorium on reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel should be established in exchange for U.S. assistance in the construction of a dry storage facility.[43] In any event, Minatom has no plans to begin reprocessing for the first 40-60 years, as noted above.

Nevertheless, Russia has continued to construct nuclear power reactors in Iran, despite U.S. objections, and is even considering bidding for a contract to construct additional reactors after the completion of Bushehr.[44] In October 2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton said that the U.S. had proposed a deal in which “if the Russians end their sensitive cooperation with Iran...we would be prepared to favorably consider” transfers to Russia of U.S.-origin spent fuel held in third countries for long-term storage.[45] In “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,” Matthew Bunn, John Holdren and Anthony Wier point out that the United States should not use all of its considerable leverage on the Iran issue. They suggest insisting that a portion of the revenues be spent on securing and destroying WMD stockpiles. In addition, they argue that effective arrangements (including independent regulation) of the entire operation, the elimination of excess plutonium stockpiles, and a democratic process whereby those most affected by the project might have their concerns effectively addressed, should also be criteria for determining if the project contributes to international security and deserves support.[46]

The Nonproliferation Trust: SNF Imports for Nonproliferation

Tom Cochran, a physicist at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C., developed the idea of establishing a non-profit trust located outside of Russia that would control the spent fuel profits, assist in the creation of a safe geologic repository for SNF in Russia, and make sure that all additional profits are spent on securing fissile material, environmental remediation, and the provision of alternative jobs for nuclear workers as well as support for pensioners and orphans, while no funds would be spent on reprocessing plants.[47] A trust, named the Nonproliferation Trust (NPT) Inc., was then established,[48] and on 5 May 1999 Minatom and NPT signed a memorandum, according to which NPT would hold title to the fuel in storage.[47] An additional agreement, signed on 25 October 1999, also mentions the receipt and disposal of radioactive wastes. That agreement specifies that after 40 years, the spent fuel could be removed to another “duly authorized location” or transferred to Minatom for ultimate disposition, at NPT II’s sole discretion. According to the second agreement, the spent fuel would never be converted for weapons use or be reprocessed, even were its ownership transferred to Minatom. The spent fuel would be stored in accordance with Russian and IAEA safety requirements and the storage facility under Gosatomnadzor review.[49] [For more information on NPT, see the Spent Fuel Imports Overview in the NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.]

Some nuclear industry sources have reportedly questioned who will accept liability for the operations and how the money will be raised up-front. Foreign utilities, they argued, would be unlikely to commit large sums of money unless they could send their fuel for permanent disposal. At a conference in September 2002, Kurchatov Institute Deputy Director Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy voiced his opposition to the project because at the end of the project the long-term interim cask storage facility would remain the property of the trust, the foreign SNF would remain in Russia, and the project would not have paid for construction of a final repository, he said. Reportedly USEC, Inc., the managers of the U.S.-Russian “Megawatts to Megatons” program, also known as the HEU-LEU deal, have also indicated their interest in involvement in SNF imports, which might be modeled after the HEU deal.[50] Others have questioned whether Russia would agree to have all profits devoted to the purposes NPT proposed. Russian environmentalists and even the Duma Environmental Committee have worried about the plan to hold the funds earned in accounts outside Russia, and thus outside the control of both Minatom and the Russian government.[42] Environmentalists often argue that the import plan could be a Western plot to dump its waste in Russia and leave it there, and that the Russian government would have little recourse. While this objection should be dealt with, the project offers the transparency and clarity of purpose (and ability to audit funds) that the United States has the leverage to insist upon.


Conclusion

If Russia can come to an accommodation with the United States regarding Russia’s nuclear reactor projects in Iran, the United States has suggested it would conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia and authorize the export of U.S.-origin SNF to Russia. Although Minatom statements regarding the possible profits resulting from SNF import plans far exceed the revenues from constructing reactors in Iran (particularly since the construction projects are all funded from cheap loans offered by Russia itself), Russia has yet to indicate that it might consider dropping its Iran projects. However, it seems likely that an agreement will eventually be concluded. If the United States accedes to something less than cancellation of Russia’s projects in Iran, it should push for further transparency of the Iranian program, and ask Russia to demand that Iran sign the Additional Protocol that would make spot inspections by the IAEA possible.
The SNF import project has been touted as a possible source of funding for plutonium disposition and safer storage of Russian SNF. However, Minatom never agreed to use these funds for plutonium disposition, and instead expects international assistance to turn plutonium into MOX fuel. Otherwise, Minatom plans to maintain its surplus plutonium stocks. If Minatom can be persuaded to dispose of excess plutonium, it is unclear why the ministry should be required to fund plutonium disposal itself (in much of the world, the defense industry doesn’t fund itself and polluters aren’t required to fund clean-up projects by earning money handling additional waste).

On the negative side, the SNF import plans create a market for spent fuel and radioactive waste. Kazakhstan has already proposed its own SNF import plans, while Minatom is likely to argue for the import of radioactive wastes if the level of SNF imports is less than expected. In addition, the plan promotes a closed fuel cycle market and the attendant increase in materials of proliferation concern. Finally, the United States is putting itself at political risk by allowing the import of U.S.-origin fuel, even if it is able to control much of the earnings (through an arrangement such as the Non-Proliferation Trust) and assists in the construction of safe storage facilities and helps insure the safety of SNF transport. The United States is likely to be blamed in the event of any accident with U.S.-origin or other spent fuel, unless the process is opened up to local and national politicians, and there is oversight by Gosatomnadzor and Russian citizens. The Russian public will surely blame a new influx of SNF for stressing their SNF storage system to the brink of collapse, and argue that the storage of imported SNF in “safe” storage facilities takes up space that may otherwise have been used for Russian material (even if the facility might not have been built without SNF import money). While opening up the process with have no affect on legal liability, it will make a great difference in public opinion, and thus increase the likelihood that an accident would affect U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation in other areas. Without democratic involvement, it will be difficult to control Minatom, while other Russian organizations are unlikely to promote project success, help alleviate project problems, or shoulder the responsibility for dealing with Russia’s own legacy of spent nuclear fuel.

Sources:
[1] Russian Federation Law No. 2060-1, On Environmental Protection, 19 December 1991.
[2] “Ob itogakh deyantelnosti Departamenta yaderno-toplivnogo tsikla v 2002 godu,” Minatom Website, http://old.minatom.ru/about/department/dyts/3.htm, 28 July 2003.
[3] “Russia May Make $10 Bln Processing Used Nuclear Fuel,” Interfax, 23 June 1999.
[4] “Zampred komiteta Dumy po ekologii protiv popravki, razreshayushchey vvoz v Rossiyu yadernykh otkhodov,” Interfax, No.2, 10 October 2000.
[5] Yuriy Sazonov, “Minatom predlagayet alternativu kreditam MVF,” Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://www.ng.ru, 29 June 1999.
[6] Charles Digges, “Minatom and Environmentalists Square Off on Ministry Steps Over SNF Imports,” Bellona Website, http://www.bellona.no, 22 November 2002.
[7] Galina Stolyarova, “Groups Seek National Vote on Waste Import,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 August 2000.
[8] “Eko-referendum: podpisi sobrany, debaty prodolzhayutsya,” Ekologiya i prava cheloveka, 26 October 2000.
[9] TVS, Moscow, 9 August 2002; in BBC Worldwide Monitoring; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[10] Charles Digges, “Minatom’s Starry-Eyed Import Plans Defy Safety Imperatives and Business Sense,” Bellona Website, http://www.bellona.no, 25 July 2002.
[11] See Paul Webster, “The Grab for Trash,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 58, No. 5 (September-October 2002); and Leonid Ivashov, “Yest li u Rossii sistema natsionalnoy bezopasnosti?” Pravda, 14 November 2002, in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[12] Gennadiy Voskresenskiy, “Iskusheniye ‘otkhodami,’” Vek, No.13, 2-8 April 1999, p. 8.
[13] Rossiyskaya gazeta, http://www.rg.ru, 13 July 2001.
[14] “Problemy obrashcheniya s OYaT,” Duma i kontrol nad vooruzheniyami, Electronic News Bulletin, PIR-Center, http://www.pircenter.org/english/publications/duma/index.htm, November 2000.
[15] “Problemy obrashcheniya s OYaT,” Duma i kontrol nad vooruzheniyami, Electronic News Bulletin, PIR-Center, http://www.pircenter.org/english/publications/duma/index.htm, December 2000
[16] Gleb Pyanykh, “Otkhodnyy promysel Minatoma,” Kommersant-Vlast, No. 29, 27 July 1999, pp. 18-22.
[17] Ekaterina Chistyakova, “Russia Wants to Store World’s Radioactive Waste,” Environment News Service, http://www.lycos.com/ens/sep99/1999L-09-08-02.html, 8 September 1999.
[18] Nadezhda Simonova, “Pod znakom Kyuri,” Vechernyaya Moskva, 10 February 1999; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[19] “Russian Duma Votes Down Proposal to Allow Import of Spent Fuel,” Nuclear Weapons & Material Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 20, 30 August 1999.
[20] Viktor Svinin, “Oligarkhi derutsya - problema ne reshayetsya,” Tomskiy vestnik, 10 July 1999, pp. 1-2; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 26, 23 July 1999.
[21] Yevgeniy Velikhov, “Na radiatsionnuyu bezopasnost nuzhno zarabatyvat,”  Moskovskiye novosti, No. 27, 20-26 July 1999.
[22] Andrey Lukin, “Minatom khochet, chtoby nashi deti vyrosli na yadernoy pomoyke,” Komsomolskaya pravda online edition, http://home.mosinfo.ru/news/kp/99/07/data/138kk3.htm, No. 138, 29 July 1999.
[23] Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya “Obrashcheniye s obluchennym yadernym toplivom 2002: novyye initsiativy Rossii,” 8-12 September 2002, http://www.tenex.ru/digest/elbiul.html.
[24] “Ugroza bezopasnosti zhizni rossiyan iskhodit iz Minatoma i Gosdumy,” Yabloko Press Service, 27 February 1999; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[25] “Ministerstvo RF po atomnoy energii k kontsu 2004 goda planiruyet uvelichit obyom khranilishcha obluchennogo yadernogo topliva,” Ural Business Consulting, http://www.uralbusinessconsulting.ru/, 10 July 2002.
[26] “Krasnoyarsk-26/Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine,” Federation of the American Scientists Website, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/.../krasnoyarsk-26
[27] “Rossiya mozhet zarabotat $20 mlrd. za 10 let na khranenii zarubezhnogo otrabotannogo yadernogo topliva, schitayut v Minatome,” Interfax, 31 October 2000. 
[28] Aleksey Tarasov, “Radiatsionnaya zona Rossiya,” Izvestiya, 3 June 1999; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 20, 4 June 1999.
[29] Report from the Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine, NTV, 14 February 2002; in “Russia: Siberian Krasnoyarsk-26 nuclear storage to increase capacity,” FBIS Document CEP20020216000146.
[30] Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. February 2002, http://www.ymp.gov/documents/feis_a/index.htm.
[31] Yevgeniya Musikhina, “Zhdat li Uralu novykh yadernykh poyezdov?” Gudok, 16 February 1999 p. 3; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 7, 19 February 1999.
[32] Valeriy Bogdan, Viktor Murogov, Vladimir Kagramanyan, Mikhail Troyanov, “Ispolzovaniye plutoniya v Rossii,” Yadernyy kontrol, November 1995, pp. 13-17.
[33] “Zavod po regeneratsii obluchennogo yadernogo topliva (RT-1),” Minatom Website, http://www.integrum.ru.
[34] Yuriy Medvedev, “Na radioaktivnom rasputye,” Izvestiya online edition, http://www.online.ru, No. 179, 24 September 1999.
[35] “Poyasnitelnaya zapiska k proyektu federalnogo zakona ‘O promyshlennom khranenii i pererabotke otrabotavshego yadernogo topliva,’” Zelenyy mir, No. 12, 25 May 1999, p. 4.
[36] Zelenyy mir, No. 21, 20 October 1999, p. 3
[37] TVTs, 21 April 2001; in TsRPI Monitoring Teleefira; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[38] Andrey Galkin, RIA Novosti, 26 April 1999; in “Zhirinovskiy: Profit for Russia Handling Nuclear Waste,” FBIS Document FTS19990426000750.
[39] “Internexco Handels GmbH,” Anti-Atom Website, http://www.anti-atom.de/innex.htm.
[40] “Russia Seeks To Reprocess the World’s Spent Fuel,” Nuclear Weapons &  Materials Monitor, 1 February 1999, p. 3.
[41] “Richardson Tells Russia ‘No Thanks’ on Reprocessing But Offers Vague Support for Work on Storage,” SpentFuel, Vol. 6, No. 252, 19 April 1999, pp. 3-4.
[42] Letter “O nedopustimosti naznacheniya Ministrom Rossiyskoy Federatsii po atomnoy energii E.O. Adamova” to acting Prime Minister V.V.Putin from the Chairwoman of the Russian State Duma Committee on the Environment T.V.Zlotnikova, 16 August 1999.
[43] P. Brown, “Ecology and the Human Rights,” The Guardian; in “Nam vse eshche navyazyvayut chuzhiye RAO,” Zelenyy mir, No. 19-20, September 2000.
[44] Angela Charlton, “Russia Expands Nuke Ties With Iran,” Associated Press, 26 July 2002.
[45] Ann MacLachlan, “Bushehr Spent Fuel Accord Said to be Advancing as U.S. Seeks Russian Exit,” NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 22 (28 October 2002), p. 3.
[46] Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Weir, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,” Harvard University, May 2002, http://www.bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/ SevenSteps.pdf, pp. 77-78.
[47] “Russia Considers International Waste Stores,” Nuclear Engineering International, July 1999, p. 23
[48] FAQ, NPT Website, http://www.nptinternational.com/questions.htm.
[49] Non-Proliferation Trust II, Long-Term Fissile Materials Safeguards and Security Project, Unpublished Draft, 25 October 1999.
[50] Ann MacLachlan, “Moscow Conference Vets Key Hurdles to Any Russian Spent-Fuel Import Deal,” NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 19 (16 September 2002), p.1.

Back to Top 

 

Relevant Resources

Reports

Greenpeace Russia, Radioaktivnyye otkhody i problema vvoza, khraneniya i pererabotki v Rossii otrabotavshego yadernogo topliva iz-za rubezha.

Igor Kudrik, Import of Spent Nuclear Fuel to Russia,” Bellona Website, 6 December 2002.

Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, Allison Macfarlane et al, Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Safe, Flexible, and Cost-Effective Near-Term Approach to Spent Fuel Management, A Joint Report from the Harvard University Project on Managing the Atom and the University of Tokyo Project on Sociotechnics of Nuclear Energy, June 2001.

Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Weir, Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action,”  Harvard University, May 2002, pp. 77-78.

Paul Webster, “The Grab for Trash,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org, Volume 58, No. 5 (September-October 2002).

Spent Fuel Import Project Overview,” NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.

“OYAT – Syrye dlya energetiki budushchego,” Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy Website, http://www.minatom.ru/presscenter
/document/oyat/.

For information on U.S. assistance in Russia, particularly regarding plutonium disposition and the search for a geologic repository, see Preventing Nuclear Proliferation: The Post-Cold War Challenge, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Website, http://www.llnl.gov/str/Dunlop2.html.

For general information on spent fuel and information on spent fuel storage in the United States, see the “Materials in Inventory Spent Nuclear Fuel Report - Executive Summary,” Department of Energy Website, http://www.em.doe.gov/takstock/appxbi.html.

Laws (Text in Russian)

On the Insertion of Additions to the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy.

On the Insertion of Additions to Article 50 of the Russian Federation Law on Environmental Protection.

On the Special Commission on Questions of Importing Irradiated Fuel Assemblies of Foreign Manufacture onto the Territory of the Russian Federation.

On Special Environmental Programs for the Rehabilitation of Radiation-Contaminated Regions of the Territory.

Conference Presentations

Dr. Thomas Cochran, Director, Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, “The Non-Proliferation Trust: An Update,”presentation at a Proliferation Roundtable at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 November 1999, available at http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/cochran.htm.

Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Management conference, 8-12 September 2002, Moscow. Participant statements (in Russian) available at: “Obrashcheniye s obluchennym yadernym toplivom 2002: Novyye initsiativy Rossii,” http://www.tenex.ru/digest/elbiul.html.

Websites

Bellona Website, Spent Fuel Imports News, http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/
nuke_industry/waste_imports/index.html.

Greenpeace Mayak Website, http://archive.greenpeace.org/mayak/index.html.

Minatom Website, http://www.minatom.ru.

NIS Profiles Database, “Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Developments,” http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs.russia/
reactor/waste/wastedev.htm.

PIR Center Website, http://www.pircenter.org.

Russian Nuclear Nonproliferation Website, http://www.nuclearno.com.

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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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