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Overview
The Threat
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Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling
Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel
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Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise OverseasFunding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends

February2007

Readthe Full Report (1.5M PDF)

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Securing the Bomb 2006Securing the Bomb 2006
The latest report in our series, from May 2006, finds that even though the gap between the threat of nuclear terrorism and the response has narrowed in recent years, there remains an unacceptable danger that terrorists might succeed in their quest to get and use a nuclear bomb, turning a modern city into a smoking ruin. Offering concrete steps to confront that danger, the report calls for world leaders to launch a fast-paced global coalition against nuclear terrorism focused on locking down all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide as rapidly as possible.
Read the Executive Summary (379K PDF)
or the
Full Report (1.7M PDF)

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Securing the Bomb 2005Securing the Bomb 2005:
The New Global Imperatives

Our May 2005 report finds that while the United States and other countries laid important foundations for an accelerated effort to prevent nuclear terrorism in the last year, sustained presidential leadership will be needed to win the race to lock down the world's nuclear stockpiles before terrorists and thieves can get to them.
Read the Executive Summary (281 K)
or the Full Report (1.9M PDF)

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Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action
Building on the previous years' reports, this 2004 NTI-commissioned report grades current efforts and recommends new actions to more effectively prevent nuclear terrorism. It finds that programs to reduce this danger are making progress, but there remains a potentially deadly gap between the urgency of the threat and the scope and pace of efforts to address it.
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Выписки из доклада по-русски (423K PDF)

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Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials:
A Report Card and Action Plan

2003 report published by Harvard and NTI measures the progress made in keeping nuclear weapons and materials out of terrorist hands, and outlines a comprehensive plan to reduce the danger.
Download the Full Report (2.7M PDF)

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Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action
2002 report co-published by Harvard and NTI outlines seven urgent steps to reduce the threat of stolen nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists or hostile states.
Read the Full Report (516K PDF)

Blocking the Terrorist Pathway to the Bomb

Nuclear-Weapons Effects

Nuclear-Weapon Effects

photo tech6
The devastation from the Hiroshima bomb might be replicated by terrorists.

The immense energy released in a nuclear explosion does the bulk of its damage in five ways, listed here in ascending order of the distance, measured from the epicenter of a 10-kiloton explosion, to which fatal effects are likely: [1]

In what follows, we treat each of these in turn and then consider their combined effects. We give the damage distances that correspond to nuclear explosions taking place on the ground, rather than at some altitude above the target, because most of the easiest modes of delivery for a low-capability adversary—boat, truck, car—would lead to detonation at ground level. A more sophisticated adversary might detonate a weapon near the "optimum" altitude for widespread damage (which varies with the explosive yield of the weapon) and do even greater harm.

Fireball

The fireball from a 10-kiloton explosion at ground level would reach a radius of 200 meters, hence would have a diameter of 400 meters or about a quarter of a mile. Everything within this radius would be completely destroyed. In the case of a badly designed or badly implemented bomb that yielded only 1 kiloton, the fireball would have a diameter about 2.5 times smaller, hence about 150 meters. The surface explosion of a 100 kiloton weapon, as conceivably might be stolen from the arsenal of an advanced nuclear-weapon state, would produce a fireball 1 kilometer in diameter.

Overpressure and Wind

A blast-wave overpressure of 5 pounds per square inch, which is associated with winds around 150 miles per hour, is enough to destroy wood-frame buildings and cause severe damage to brick apartment buildings; overpressure of this magnitude would be experienced at about 1,000 meters from a 10-kiloton surface explosion and 500 meters from a 1-kiloton surface explosion. A 100-kiloton surface explosion would generate this overpressure at 2,000 meters. The distance for 15 pounds per square inch overpressure – which is associated with winds around 400 miles per hour and is enough to destroy office buildings constructed of steel-reinforced concrete—is some 500 meters for a 10-kiloton surface explosion.

Prompt Ionizing Radiation

The distance from a 10-kiloton surface explosion at which a person in the open could receive a prompt dose of 500 rem from neutrons and gamma rays (the dose that will prove fatal within 30 days to about half the people receiving it) is around 1,500 meters. For a 1-kiloton surface explosion, this distance would be around 1,100 meters, and for a 100-kiloton thermonuclear explosion about 1,800 meters. Doses received by people shielded from the explosion by buildings would be lower.

Thermal Radiation

A nuclear fireball radiates energy in infrared, visible, and ultraviolet wavelengths with enough intensity to burn exposed skin and char or ignite flammable materials at substantial distances. For a 10-kiloton surface explosion, the radiant intensities on a clear day are sufficient to ignite clothing at a distance of 1,100 meters and to cause second-degree burns on exposed skin at 1,700 meters. For a 1-kiloton surface explosion, the distance for second-degree burns would be about 600 meters; for 100 kilotons it would be about 4,700 meters.[2]

Fallout

"Local" or "early" fallout occurs when a nuclear weapon explodes close enough to the ground to vaporize and entrain in the fireball much larger amounts of solid material than that from which the weapon is made. When this vaporized material later cools and condenses into liquid and solid particles, many of these end up heavy enough to fall to the ground rather than remaining suspended in the atmosphere, and they carry with them a substantial fraction of the radioactive fission products and activation products produced in the explosion.

The spatial pattern over which such fallout is deposited depends strongly on the wind patterns and atmospheric stability prevailing at the time. It is possible to make a rough estimate for the area over which a given dose from fallout will typically be equaled or exceeded, however. If the dose at the boundary of the area of interest is taken to be 500 rem within 48 hours to unprotected persons who do not leave the area, the answer comes out around 3 square kilometers per kiloton of fission energy release, hence 30 square kilometers for a 10-kiloton explosion.

Combined effects

Table 3 summarizes the damage potential of these phenomena by showing the areas over which they would be likely to cause significant numbers of fatalities. These figures are only indicative. Estimating actual casualties from a nuclear explosion requires taking many factors into account, including population density, weather, the types of buildings present, how many people are outdoors as opposed to indoors at the time of the blast, and so on.

Table 3. Areas of Potentially Lethal Effects from Surface Nuclear Explosions (square kilometers)

TYPE AND DEGREE
of EFFECT

1 KILOTON

10 KILOTONS

100 KILOTONS

Vaporization by fireball

0.02

0.13

0.79

5 psi overpressure

0.66

3.1  

15     

500 rem prompt radiation

3.8  

7.1  

10     

2nd-degree burns

1.1  

9.1  

70     

500-rem 48-hour fallout

3     

30    

150     

Notes:

Areas obtained from radii in text using A = pi * r2, except for fallout contour (which is presented as an area in the text). The fallout contour for 100 kilotons is not proportional because at this yield we assume a thermonuclear weapon, wherein only half of the energy release comes from fission. Numbers have been rounded. One square mile is 2.59 square kilometers.

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For purposes of very rough estimation, it is sometimes assumed that the radius of 5 pounds per square inch overpressure defines the circle for which the number of survivors inside would equal the number of fatalities outside, taking into account all the listed effects other than fallout. This would mean that the total number of early fatalities, other than from fallout, would be estimated as the population density multiplied by the area of this circle.

Manhattan has a population density of about 70,000 (residents) per square mile (27,000 per square kilometer), so by the indicated rule of thumb a 10-kiloton nuclear explosion in Manhattan late at night (when the residents and overnight tourists are there, but commuting workers are not) would be estimated to kill outright more than 80,000 people.[3] The toll could be increased by detonating the weapon in the heart of one of the high-rise business districts during working hours. This figure does not include fallout, nor does it include deaths from fires that could be ignited at considerable distances from the blast as a result of broken gas mains and the like, or other "indirect" effects.

Obviously, such an explosion would be a catastrophe far beyond contemporary experience, exceeding by perhaps 30-fold even the terrible attack on the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] The classic reference on nuclear weapons effects is Samuel Glasstone and Phillip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977). Ten kilotons is used here as a typical yield to be expected from a first-generation fission weapon developed by a newly proliferating country or by a highly sophisticated terrorist group. It also corresponds to the yield of a "tactical" nuclear weapon of modest size from the arsenal of one of the major nuclear powers, as might conceivably be stolen by terrorists or by agents acting for a proliferant nation. A typical strategic thermonuclear weapon from the US arsenal would have a yield 30 to 50 times greater, and the largest strategic weapons have yields 200 to 1,000 times greater. The ranking of effects according to lethal radius changes somewhat for yields much larger (or much smaller) than 10 kilotons. The epicenter is the location of an explosion on the ground, or the location on the ground directly under an explosion in the air.

[2] The deposit of 4 to 5 calories per square centimeter of exposed skin in the short time associated with the pulse of thermal radiation from a moderate-yield weapon is enough to produce second-degree burns. Third-degree burns are produced by 6-7 calories per square centimeter. Igniting common clothing fabrics takes 10-12 calories per square centimeter. The delivered intensities diminish a bit faster than the square of the distance from the explosion because of attenuation passing through the air.

[3] This is obtained by taking the 3.1 square kilometer area from Table 3 (for the 5 psi overpressure contour for a 10-kiloton surface explosion) and multiplying by the 27,000 residents per square kilometer in Manhattan. The "more than" in the result depends on the assumption that the number of tourists staying in the blast area is greater than the number of residents who are absent.



Written by John Holdren and Matthew Bunn.Last updated on November 25, 2002.

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Belfer CenterThe Securing the Bomb section of the NTI website is produced by the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) for NTI, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. MTA welcomes comments and suggestions at atom@harvard.edu. Copyright 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.