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Submarine Proliferation

The first strategic submarines (submarines capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, against shore-based targets) emerged in the mid-1950s, when the United States mounted Regulus cruise missiles and the Soviet Union (somewhat later) deployed short-range ballistic missiles on diesel submarines. Both parties eventually shifted to nuclear-powered submarines and armed them with long-range ballistic missiles to provide for a reliable second-strike capability. Unfortunately, a number of nuclear submarines suffered catastrophic accidents, some of them sinking to the bottom with both nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors aboard. Some 900 sailors and other personnel died in submarine-related incidents during the Cold War. Today, five states deploy some form of nuclear-powered strategic submarines: the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China. Several other states, including India, Pakistan, and Brazil, have declared at various times their interest in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines

Since the early 1990s, an additional concern has emerged: growing exports of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced cruise missiles. Many of these missiles can deliver WMD against land-based targets. Unlike ballistic missiles, these slow-moving, air-breathing cruise missiles are ideal platforms for biological weapons, thus posing a new threat. In addition, today's conventional submarine exporters increasingly are transferring these technologies to regions where WMD are present. Israel has apparently already mounted nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on the Dolphin-class submarines it recently acquired from Germany. India and Pakistan have both issued statements about their intentions to place nuclear weapons at sea. Regional arms races are possible in both cases, as Iran may try to counter Israel and China may react to the naval race in South Asia. Despite these emerging security concerns, current multilateral export control regimes place almost no restrictions on state sales of submarines.

In terms of national limits, states often include submarines as items for export control review. However, standards for export are flexible, given the absence of international guidelines. Internationally, states are only required to declare submarine exports under the generic "warship" category under the 1992 U.N. Arms Register. The Wassenaar Arrangement also requires reporting of submarine sales, but it too includes no actual controls, even when the submarines are bound for a state with WMD.

Unfortunately, nuclear submarine sales are permitted under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which treated nuclear propulsion as an acceptable nuclear activity due to the insistence of several European states. While none of the states that called for the exception now operate nuclear vessels, the loophole remains for possible exploitation by other states.

The lack of international export control guidelines pertaining to submarines poses the risk that additional countries may move WMD to sea (either to conventionally powered or nuclear-powered boats), thus increasing the likelihood of regional arms races and the emergence of serious new threats to land-based targets and local populations. Accidents may also be expected to increase as new submarine powers try to operate unfamiliar foreign technologies, likely with dangerous safety and environmental implications. Finally, nuclear submarine exports run the risk of assisting states in acquiring highly enriched uranium fuel that might later be diverted to nuclear weapons programs.

These web pages are intended to shed new light on these under-appreciated problems and their implications for 21st century security. Country profiles will eventually be developed for all states with major submarine holdings (whether strategic or not) or with significant submarine export activities, due to the site's focus on patterns in international submarine transfers and their regional security implications.

Other Resources:

Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and Problems, NTI Issue Brief, March 2006.

Chunyan Ma and Frank von Hippel, "Ending the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2001), available at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/81/81mahip.pdf.

James Clay Moltz, "Serious Gaps Emerging in Export Controls on Submarines," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 28 (June 2005), available at: http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/pdfs/ob_0506e.pdf.

"Russia: Naval Nuclear Reactors," NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/naval/overview.htm.

Edward C. Whitman, "Air-Independent Propulsion: AIP Technology Creates a New Undersea Threat," Undersea Warfare, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall 2001), available at: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issue_13/
propulsion.htm.
 

About this database
CNS initially developed these web pages under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The aim of this project is to educate policymakers, the media, students, and the general public on emerging issues in submarine proliferation, particularly the growing international trade in new "strategic" submarines and related technology. Specific areas of concern include conventional submarine exports to countries with WMD capability and the spread of nuclear submarine technology to any state, given fuel cycle, weapons-related, and environmental risks. Substantive contributors to this project include CNS Senior Research Associate Cristina-Astrid Chuen and CNS Deputy Director Dr. James Clay Moltz. Roman Sehling, a former CNS graduate research assistant, contributed major sections of the original country profiles. David Steiger developed the layout and design of the web pages. These materials will be updated and supplemented on a regular basis.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.