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Organizations The Russian Ministry of Defense has the second largest stockpile of nuclear materials in the Russian Federation, after the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). Moreover, nearly all of the nuclear material in the Ministry of Defense's possession is weapons-grade, making the issue of safeguarding it of paramount importance.[1] The safety and security of this stockpile is the responsibility of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, and the 6th Directorates of the individual branches of service that use nuclear weapons, including the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), the Air Force, and the Navy. The 12th Main Directorate is also responsible for conducting transfers of nuclear munitions between Minatom's nuclear weapon production and dismantlement facilities, its own storage facilities, and deployed strategic forces. Nuclear munitions usually spend 12-15 years assigned to Ministry of Defense entities prior to being returned to Minatom for remanufacturing or dismantlement.[2] Created in 1959 by the same Soviet Council of Ministers resolution the 12th Main Directorate was subordinated to the SRF until mid-1970s, when it was transferred to the Ministry of Defense and replaced in the SRF by the 6th Directorate. The 12th Main Directorate has remained subordinate to the Ministry of Defense since that time, although in the late 1990s there were plans to merge the directorate into the proposed Strategic Deterrent Forces, which were to consist of the SRF, Long Range Aviation, and the ballistic missile submarine fleet. These plans were not implemented, however.[3] The 12th Main Directorate controls military units responsible for nuclear munitions storage, accountability, safety, transport, diagnostics, and servicing; scientific research institutes; and a variety of training centers. The directorate also controls a seismic station network used for monitoring underground nuclear tests in other countries and the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site, which was partially closed following the 1992 testing moratorium, although reportedly it has been kept in a state of six-month readiness for resumption of tests.[4,5] In carrying out its functions, the 12th Main Directorate collaborates with other government agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy. In the early 1990s the responsibility for nuclear weapons safety was placed on the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor). The directorate, however, resisted Gosatomnadzor's attempts to inspect its facilities and refused to provide any information on incidents at its facilities, and in 1995 Gosatomnadzor was relieved of control over the directorate.[6] Nuclear Weapons Protection Measures The 12th Main Directorate stores its nuclear warheads in heavily protected storage facilities, with extensive physical protection measures and considerable security forces. During the early years of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, protection consisted chiefly of guarding the storage facilities with armed troops. In the early 1960s this approach was supplemented by physical protection measures. The main threat was considered to be an incursion from the outside by an armed force, and security measures were crafted mainly with the outside threat in mind.[2] Like their US counterparts, Russian nuclear weapon storage facilities implement a wide range of physical protection measures. Access to the facilities is strictly regulated, and access to any nuclear weapons storage bunker requires the presence of at least three authorized personnel. Each warhead is assigned to a specific officer responsible for its protection, and may not be moved without his presence or without an order from the unit commander responsible for the facility's protection.[2] Each storage facility also employs an accident response team trained to respond to accidents involving nuclear weapons, as well as a conscript guard force.[1] The 12th Main Directorate has prided itself on the security of its storage facilities, often comparing them favorably to the facilities used by the United States.[7] The level of protection afforded by these facilities favorably impressed US Strategic Command Chief General Eugene Habiger, who visited a number of 12th Main Directorate facilities in 1998.[8] It is not clear, however, to what extent these security measures are tested by mock attacks and infiltration attempts. Although a mock attack on a facility was demonstrated to General Habiger during his visit, such staged demonstrations are usually well rehearsed, and are not very useful as security improvement tools. When conducting nuclear warhead transfers between its storage facilities, Minatom weapon manufacturing plants, and Russian strategic nuclear forces units, the 12th Main Directorate uses specially modified trucks and railcars for transporting nuclear weapons. These vehicles protect their cargo from the effects of high-speed impact, gunfire, fire, and unauthorized access. Like the storage facilities, nuclear weapon shipments are accompanied by guard forces.[2,5] In addition to ensuring the weapons' security, the 12th Main Directorate is tasked with maintaining their accountability as well. At the storage facilities, warhead accountability is verified by announced and unannounced inspections, as well as semiannual inventories. Strict accountability measures are also practiced during weapon transfers, with great emphasis placed on assigning personal responsibility for each nuclear munition assigned to the directorate. The 12th Main Directorate also receives updates on the status of warheads that are under the jurisdiction of the individual services' 6th Directorates, ensuring continuous tracking of each warhead's location. In spite of the thorough procedures, Russian nuclear weapon accountability capabilities are not as well developed as in the United States. Since its nuclear materials protection system was to such a great extent focused on the outside threat, the Soviet Union and Russia have not developed an array of technical capabilities for verifying accountability similar to those developed in the United States, although this problem has been alleviated somewhat by post-Cold War cooperation between Russian and foreign (mostly US) experts in this field.[2] While expressing satisfaction with the state of nuclear weapon accounting in 1995, the former 12th Main Directorate Chief, General Yevgeniy Maslin, listed a number of improvements the system required, particularly in the realm of automation. Although the 12th Main Directorate's research institutes have performed theoretical work on automation systems, lack of funding has prevented it from being adopted, and has made it difficult for the directorate to purchase the required computers.[5] In addition to considerable efforts dedicated to ensuring physical safety and security, the 12th Main Directorate's nuclear weapon security strategy relies heavily on properly screened and trained personnel, and on strict procedures governing access to and responsibility for nuclear weapons. Speaking before the Duma in 1997, Lieutenant General Igor Valynkin, who at the time was the directorate's first deputy chief, stated that the most effective measures implemented to ensure nuclear weapon safety are the strict personnel accountability procedures governing the responsibility for and access to nuclear weapons. According to Valynkin, these procedures, which have been perfected over a period of several decades, have so far prevented any incidents or accidents involving nuclear weapons.[1] Due to the nature of the directorate's responsibilities, some 45% of its total force of 30,000 servicemen are officers. All directorate personnel must pass a selection process, including a psychological evaluation, a security screening by the Federal Security Service (FSB), a battery of drug tests, and polygraph interviews. The standards are high and there is considerable attrition among the applicants to this elite organization. The selection process also appears to have the effect of keeping certain non-Russian ethnic minorities (particularly from the Caucasus region) that are considered "unreliable" out of the directorate.[7,9] Even though conscripts must pass a similar selection process prior to being assigned to the directorate, they are not granted access to nuclear weapons or their storage areas.[9] Their responsibilities are limited to serving as armed guards for the storage facilities and nuclear warhead transfers. Access to nuclear weapons or their storage compartments is limited to officers and warrant officers.[7] To supplement standing guard forces at the facilities, in April 2000 the directorate began forming mobile reaction companies in its battalions, with the mission of reacting to attempts to seize nuclear weapons. Also in early 2000, the FSB created Directorate "V" for combating terrorism aimed at nuclear facilities. Directorate "V" units include the Vympel special operations group.[10] Finally, security and safety measures are also built into the weapons themselves. Russian nuclear weapon designs incorporate a number of features aimed at reducing the possibility of an unauthorized detonation. They include devices that prevent the weapon from detonating in the event of a fire or physical damage, and environmental systems which ensure the munition cannot be detonated unless it is in its proper operating environment. For example, a nuclear bomb's environmental sensors would need to perceive changes in atmospheric pressure, as well as acceleration and deceleration (caused by a parachute or ground impact) before enabling the detonation. Each nuclear munition is fitted with a coded lock preventing unauthorized use. However, there are questions about whether older types of Russian tactical nuclear weapons have also been fitted with such safeguards.[11] Russian Nuclear Weapon Security and Safety Vulnerabilities The protracted economic crisis Russia experienced in the 1990s has had a negative influence on nuclear weapons safety. Although 12th Main Directorate Chief Valynkin has prided himself on his directorate's record in preventing any incidents or accidents involving nuclear weapons, he also acknowledged that the possibility of such an event in the future could not be ruled out.[1] Inadequate maintenance has had a deleterious effect on the condition of the directorate's storage facilities. Many of the storage facilities have been in continuous use for several decades, and are in need of major repairs. This problem has been partially addressed by reducing the number of 12th Main Directorate facilities following the fall of the Soviet Union. According to Maslin the 12th Main Directorate planned to close nearly two-thirds of its storage facilities by the end of 1995, including all facilities located outside of the Russian Federation after nuclear warheads located there were transferred to Russia.[5] However, the reduction of the number of storage facilities, which took place at a faster pace than the dismantlement of warheads, may have caused additional problems. According to some reports there may have been cases of storage facilities being used to store more warheads than they were designed for, due to a combination of factors, including receipt of warheads returned from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Moreover, many of the warheads allegedly stored in this fashion were overdue for servicing.[1] During a 1999 press conference, however, 12th Main Directorate Chief Valynkin denied these reports, stating that the directorate does not permit such practices.[7] The 12th Main Directorate's nuclear weapon transport vehicle fleet has not fared much better than the storage facilities. The number of railcars withdrawn from service in the 1990s considerably outstripped new production, and as a result the directorate's rolling stock has aged considerably. The directorate withdrew 223 railcars from service between 1993 and 1996, yet it received only 38 during the same period. Lack of proper maintenance has also negatively affected the directorate's rolling stock depots and even the condition of the rail tracks and other infrastructure on the territory of the directorate's facilities. The shortage of railcars has been alleviated to some extent by foreign assistance, particularly from the United States. The condition of the directorate's truck fleet also leaves a lot to be desired. In 1997 the directorate's truck units had only 16% of the authorized number of specially modified trucks for nuclear weapon transport. The directorate's leadership is also concerned that nuclear weapon transfers are no longer protected by the same level of secrecy that shrouded them during the Soviet era. Financing problems have affected the 12th Main Directorate's ability to properly maintain the warheads entrusted to its care. In 1997, nuclear weapons maintenance personnel reportedly were short of even the special footwear required for work with nuclear munitions. Stocks of other consumable materials required for nuclear weapon maintenance were reported as nearly exhausted in January 1996. There are also concerns over the safety of deployed strategic nuclear warheads belonging to the SRF and the Russian Navy. While appearing before the Duma in 1997, General Valynkin spoke of rail- and road-mobile ICBMs' vulnerability to small arms fire, although this vulnerability was somewhat reduced by confining the mobile systems to their bases. He recommended hardening the mobile ICBM launchers against small arms and light anti-tank weapons fire, and strengthening the vehicles' guard forces.[1] Warheads on silo-based ICBMs, on the other hand, are considered much more secure, since the missile silos themselves represent formidable physical protection barriers. There are similar concerns about the Russian Navy's strategic nuclear warheads. While the Russian Navy has not lost any submarines with nuclear weapons on board, a number of such incidents occurred in the Soviet Navy. In the 1980s the Soviet Navy lost the K-219 ballistic missile submarine in the Caribbean and the Komsomolets attack submarine with two tactical nuclear weapons on board. No weapons were recovered from the sunken ships, and the depth at which they lie makes the possibility of their nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands very remote. The continued susceptibility of Russian submarines to accidents was demonstrated by the loss of the Oscar-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine K-141 Kursk, which most likely fell victim to one of its own malfunctioning conventional weapons. Although the Kursk had no nuclear weapons on board during the disaster, a similar incident could befall a ballistic missile submarine, as they carry the same types of torpedoes and other conventional weapons as the Kursk did. [For an overview of the K-219, Komsomolets and Kursk sinkings as well as other major nuclear submarine sinkings, see National Geographic's "Major Sub Disasters," at http://crater.nationalgeographic.com/k19/disasters_main.html.] The Russian Navy's personnel problems may also reflect on the security of nuclear weapons in its possession. In September 1998, a conscript sailor assigned to the Northern Fleet's nuclear-powered attack submarine Vepr killed eight servicemen and barricaded himself in the submarine's torpedo room, where he eventually committed suicide. Although this particular incident did not involve nuclear weapons, it took place on a nuclear-powered vessel and similar personnel problems may also plague Russian Navy's ballistic missile submarines.[12] The Russian Navy has also suffered from a series of other incidents, such as the theft of rare metals from its warships, including nuclear submarines, although none were as extreme in nature as the Vepr incident. [13] The issue of the security of the Russian nuclear stockpile became the center of the world's attention in 1997 when former Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Lebed announced that Russia may have lost some man-portable nuclear demonition munitions, sometimes referred to as "suitcase nukes." Russian government institutions, including the 12th Main Directorate, strongly denied the allegations, although these denials were somewhat weakened by their claims that neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation ever produced or owned such weapons. [14,15,16] (For additional information on this issue please see "Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose? The Story Behind the Controversy" by Dr. Scott Parrish.) In spite of numerous safety measures used by Russian nuclear munitions, there are concerns that Russian nuclear warheads are more susceptible to fire, shock, or gunfire damage than Western warheads due to the Soviet and Russian lag in developing insensitive conventional high explosives used in nuclear warheads. Although Russian research institutes have developed such explosives, they were never tested for use on nuclear warheads due to the 1992 moratorium on nuclear testing. An accidental explosion of the conventional high explosive due to external damage or fire could result in widespread radioactive contamination. The test moratorium reportedly delayed the introduction of other warhead safety measures.[1] In a 1995 interview, General Maslin expressed concern that even though it was possible to preserve the safety of the nuclear weapons through computer modeling and subcritical tests, these methods were less reliable than actual nuclear tests. Maslin's concerns are also shared by a number of Russian specialists involved in preserving the safety of Russia's nuclear weapons.[1,5] Solid rocket propellants used by Russian ICBMs are similarly vulnerable to damage. A test performed at the Semipalatinsk test site in which a solid-fuel Pioner IRBM [NATO designation SS-20 'Saber'] was subjected to small arms fire resulted in total destruction of the missile due to rocket propellant ignition.[1] In addition to negatively affecting Russia's nuclear weapons support infrastructure, the economic crisis has not spared the 12th Main Directorate's human resources. In spite of the elite status of the directorate, there have been a number of cases in which its personnel, including individuals directly responsible for nuclear weapons, have had their salaries delayed by months. There have even been reports, possibly exaggerated, that the economic status of officers involved in maintaining nuclear weapons has deteriorated to such an extent that there have been cases of them losing consciousness due to hunger.[1,5] The deteriorating conditions have caused significant personnel outflow (up to a third of the directorate's junior officers), endangering the directorate's personnel training programs and threatening to lower the average quality of its personnel. The directorate's leaders also worry that the fall of the Soviet Union left a number of former Soviet nuclear weapon specialists, with considerable knowledge of security measures at the storage facilities, outside of Russia's borders where their expertise may be used by terrorist organizations. The directorate is equally concerned about social tensions among its remaining personnel and over the continued loyalty of personnel who have been recently discharged. These concerns reportedly led to an increase in security measures at the directorate's facilities.[1] One potential source of social tension is the 12th Main Directorate's difficulties in providing its retired personnel with housing. In 1994 the directorate received only about 500 apartments, out of a 4,000 apartment requirement. In 1997 there were nearly 3,500 families living in 12th Main Directorate housing areas who had been separated from the military but could not be provided with housing.[1,5] The 12th Main Directorate's financial problems also meant that at times it was not able to pay its electricity and gas bills, a problem it shares with other branches of Russia's armed forces, including the Strategic Rocket Forces.[5] Personnel problems in the 12th Main Directorate have been somewhat mitigated by the government's 1998 decision to increase the pay of individuals directly involved with nuclear weapons by 50%. In addition, the directorate enjoys a considerable degree of personnel stability, which may lessen the impact of economic hardship. During his visit to 12th Main Directorate facilities in 1998, US Strategic Command Chief General Habiger, noted two Russian colonels who have been serving at the same nuclear weapon facility for at least 25 years each.[8] In spite of the mounting problems, the directorate has avoided major incidents. The only publicly known incident involving a 12th Main Directorate facility in the 1990s took place at the Novaya Zemlya test site in September 1998, shortly after the site was turned over to the directorate in May 1998 along with personnel already assigned to the site who never went through customary 12th Main Directorate screenings. The incident was attributed to a large number of Dagestani conscripts assigned to the site, who would not have been assigned there had they gone through the screening process. During the incident the mutinous soldiers killed a guard at the site, took several hostages, and demanded an airplane for transport to mainland Russia. Eventually the soldiers were disarmed with no further casualties, and there were no nuclear weapons present at the test site during the incident.[9,12] Other Russian military organizations involved with nuclear weapons have suffered similar incidents, although none actually involved nuclear weapons. In addition to the naval incidents described earlier, in September 1998 a soldier assigned to an MVD unit guarding Mayak Production Association, which is involved in nuclear weapon component manufacture, killed two of his comrades and wounded one other.[12] Although not one of these occurrences placed nuclear weapons in danger of loss or damage, the numerous incidents involving military personnel assigned to organizations entrusted with preserving the integrity of Russia's nuclear arsenal point to a potential weak spot in Russia's nuclear weapon safety system. Foreign Assistance The 12th Main Directorate has received significant foreign assistance to help it address the deficiencies in its programs. The foreign assistance to the directorate originated mainly in the United States, although other countries, including the United Kingdom and France, have also made contributions. Usually referred to as Weapons Protection, Control, and Accountability (WPC&A), these assistance programs have been funded under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. CTR assistance to the 12th Main Directorate has centered on ensuring the safety of nuclear warhead transport, improving physical protection of nuclear weapon storage facilities, improving nuclear warhead accountability procedures by providing equipment for creating an automated database, supplying equipment for the directorate's personnel reliability program, and creating a training facility for evaluating new types of equipment and training Russian personnel in its operation. The legal framework for assistance was created in 1995, with the signing of two agreements concerning cooperation on ensuring nuclear weapon security during storage and transport.[7] Through FY2000, United States allocated $59.7 million for enhancing the safety of nuclear warhead transport, and $232 million for improving the security of nuclear weapon storage facilities. Ensuring warhead transportation security was the first priority of US assistance to the 12th Main Directorate. Since 1995, the directorate has received 2,500 kevlar blankets to protect nuclear munitions against small arms fire and 250 supercontainers providing protection against more serious damage.[17] The United Kingdom supplied 150 additional supercontainers, which were delivered in time for use during the transfer of strategic nuclear warheads from Ukraine to Russia which was completed in 1996.[5] In order to arrest the deterioration of its specialized rolling stock, the 12th Directorate received equipment for adapting 100 cargo railcars for nuclear weapons transport, and 15 sentry railcars. The actual railcar conversion was done in Russia, at the Tver Railcar Factory.[9] Finally, transportation security-related assistance included a number of sets of emergency response equipment for reducing the consequences of accidents involving nuclear weapons. Emergency response assistance included five mobile emergency sets, including rail- and road-mobile cranes, portable radios, computers, protective clothing, dosimetry equipment, x-ray and gamma ray instrument kits, and air sampling kits.[18] To address potential problems in the area of nuclear weapon storage facility security, the United States provided $43.2 million worth of equipment for the security of nuclear weapon storage facilities. Assistance included 50km of sensor fences, 350 sensor alarms, and 200 microwave systems, which the 12th Main Directorate began receiving in 1997.[17] These items were used to upgrade 50 nuclear weapon storage sites belonging to the 12th Main Directorate (so-called "quick-fix" security upgrades). Beginning in 1998 similar upgrades were performed on 123 additional storage sites belonging to the SRF, Navy, and Air Force 6th Directorates. Additional US assistance to the 12th Main Directorate included 100 computers for an automated nuclear weapon inventory and tracking system. The directorate's personnel reliability programs were bolstered by the delivery of polygraph machines and drug and alcohol test kits.[19] In addition to this equipment, US assistance also included training for personnel tasked with using the supplied equipment. For that purpose the Russian Ministry of Defense created, with US assistance, the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) at a 12th Main Directorate technical support facility in Sergiyev Posad, and an emergency response analytical center for coordinating responses to incidents involving a nuclear weapon.[19] The Sergiyev Posad SATC opened in late 1999. In addition to serving as a test site for evaluating security procedures and equipment, such as interior and exterior physical protection measures, its functions include training Russian guard forces assigned to the 12th Main Directorate. SATC also has a small arms firing range and a computer center for assessing the vulnerability of nuclear weapon storage facilities.[20,21] Not all of the equipment provided originates outside of the Russian Federation. Some physical protection systems for the storage facilities were designed and manufactured at Russian scientific research associations, which competed for contracts and funding from the US Department of Defense. All assistance has been provided free of charge, and the Russian Federation is the sole owner of all equipment it has received. However, proper use and accountability of the equipment provided under the CTR program is verified by selective audits and examinations conducted by US personnel.[7,19] Foreign assistance to the 12th Main Directorate has been somewhat hindered by the Russian government's concern that accepting foreign assistance and granting foreigners access to the highly sensitive nuclear storage facilities might compromise their security and reveal Ministry of Defense secrets. The secrecy surrounding nuclear storage facilities and the understandable Russian unwillingness to discuss any problems with nuclear weapon security have also made it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the assistance programs. The directorate's leadership has also resented foreign reports that its nuclear weapons are not adequately protected.[1] Prior to being installed in sensitive areas, Western-supplied equipment is tested by the Russian Federal Agency for Government Communications & Information (FAPSI), to ensure it cannot be used to gather intelligence on nuclear storage or transport facilities.[9] One area of concern that has not been directly addressed by foreign assistance
programs are social problems affecting the directorate's personnel. In spite of
the 12th Main Directorate's
requests, US assistance programs have not budgeted any funds to provide housing
for the Directorate's personnel or for any other social needs.[7] However, the
CTR assistance may have helped alleviate the directorate's social problems
indirectly, by allowing it to reallocate funds from areas covered by foreign
assistance. Page last updated 5 July 2001 
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