NPT - Related Statements and Developments

NPT-Related Statements and Developments

This chronology includes statements and developments on issues related to China and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including Chinese pledges to comply, allegations of Chinese non-compliance, and Chinese positions on nuclear nonproliferation.

2004

6/29/2004: China formally stated that it was not in favor of India and Pakistan being accorded nuclear status in the NPT. According to Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Shen Guofang, "On principle, we oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our consistent position is for a comprehensive ban and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The NPT and as well as the UNSC resolution 1172 should be our guiding principle." ["China Not In Favor of According Nuclear Status to India, Pakistan." The Press Trust of India, 29 June 2004.]

2003

4/28/2003 - 5/9/2003: The second Preparatory Committee of the NPT was held in Geneva between April 28th and May 9th, with discussions focusing on the DPRK decision to withdraw from the NPT (the first withdrawal in the Treaty's thirty-three history), the escalating concern over Iran and its nuclear intentions, and the war in Iraq. China’s response to these issues throughout the PrepCom was primarily passive. However the Chinese delegation did speak out on some issues concerning the Chair's factual summary where pointed out the “stagnation in the arms control sphere as a whole and that the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use) needed to be promoted along with the 13 Steps,” which were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference as a means to measure progress towards disarmament. China argued that the summary was “basically balanced but not completely satisfactory chiefly with respect to the language on the DPRK,” however China “would not seek to amend the text.”

During the general debate at the PrepCom, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, head of the Chinese delegation stated that “China is committed to strengthen the universality, effectiveness and integrity of the NPT. We have steadfastly pursed a policy of not supporting, encouraging, or assisting other countries in developing nuclear weapons...[we] are willing to sign the relevant protocols to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty at an early date...and will continue to show flexibility in order that the Conference on Disarmament reach consensus on a programme of work and begin as soon as possible negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.”

According to a statement by Ambassador Hu at the last meeting of the session the Chinese side found the sense of urgency expressed by many countries about negative security assurances (NSA) justifiable and reasonable. “We agree in principle to the specific proposals of New Agenda Coalition contained in its draft instrument on NSA. It is our hope that the PrepCom will act immediately so that an international legal instrument on unconditional provision of NSA may be concluded at an early date.” [NPT PrepCom Report, Dr. Fiona Simpson, 21 May 2003, www.acronym.org.uk/npt] (See CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) for a summary of comments and list of statements)

03/13/2003: At an NPT Workshop in Annecy, France, Ambassador Sha Zukang discussed China’s policy and role toward the DPRK withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003. Sha argued that “due to the ‘uniqueness’ of the DPRK, [China] prefers a private and quiet diplomacy...we have had about 60 rounds of exchanges with both the DPRK and the United States at various levels.” Sha later touched on three key points of China’s position towards DPRK:

1)China opposes the possession and development of nuclear weapons by the DPRK and advocates for a nuclear-weapon-free Peninsular.
2)China is opposed to a war on the Korean Peninsula and believes that the nuclear issue must be solved peacefully and through diplomacy, especially in bi-lateral talks between the DPRK and the U.S.
3)China appeals for a peaceful resolution to result in a DPRK return to the NPT.

[“How to Cope with the DPRK’s Withdrawal from the NPT?”, 14 March 2003, Speech by Ambassador Sha Zukang at NPT Workshop]

1/10/2003: The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a comment on the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT, saying, "China is concerned about the declaration of the DPRK to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the possible consequences as a result of it. The NPT is of major importance for preventing the nuclear proliferation and promoting peace and security of the international community. We hope to continue to safeguard the universality of the NPT and will continue to work for the peaceful solution of the nuclear question of the DPRK." [Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Spokesperson on the Withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT (10/01/2003)."]

2002

4/2002: Like other delegations to the April 8-19 NPT Preparatory Committee, "China agreed that the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terror had become even more important and urgent. In its statements, China reiterated its familiar positions on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, no first use and its 'minimum level' arsenal. With regard to the NPT, China listed 'new negative developments' and noted that some important provisions had been breached. Saying that the documents from the NPT review process, especially from 1995 and 2000, must be 'faithfully implemented,' China stated: 'Nuclear weapon states should continue their moratoria on nuclear explosive tests, persevere with CTBT ratification and entry into force, refrain from the development of new types of nuclear weapons, and provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states unconditionally.'" [Rebecca Johnson, "NPT PrepCom Interim Report, April 15, 2002," Acronym Institute]

3/28/2002: China notified the IAEA that it had completed the domestic procedures for the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement to enter into force, making China the first Nuclear Weapon State to do so. ["China opposes any nuclear weapon proliferation--Envoy," Xinhua, 09 April 2002.]

1999

3/26/1999: Speaking to the Conference on Disarmament, Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated:

"The NPT is both the basis of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and the prerequisite for progress in the nuclear disarmament process. The NPT must be observed in full and in good faith. Otherwise, international efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation would be seriously harmed. Those countries which have not yet joined the NPT should do so at the earliest possible date so as to make the treaty truly universal."

"The prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and the complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons are mutually complementary. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the objective that we are all striving for, while the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation is an effective means and a necessary stage to that end. It was in line with this understanding that China supported the indefinite extension of the NPT. However, the indefinite extension of the NPT has by no means given nuclear-weapon states the prerogative to permanently retain their nuclear weapons. On the contrary, nuclear weapon states should faithfully fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations so as to promote, with concrete action, an early realization of complete nuclear disarmament." [Chinese President Jiang Zemin's Address at the Conference on Disarmament, "Promote Disarmament Process and Safeguard World Security, 26 March 1999.]

1998

7/27/1998: China reiterated its position on the NPT in its white paper called China's National Defense, stating:

"Regarding nuclear exports, China, a signatory to the NPT, has pursued a policy of not supporting, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and not assisting any other country to develop such weapons. It has laid down three principles regarding nuclear exports: They should serve peaceful purposes only; they should accept the safeguards of the IAEA; and they should not be retransferred to a third country without China's consent."

1997

8/1997: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"In early 1992, China joined the NPT. Prior to China's accession, the United States concluded that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. The U.S.-China dialogue over the past year has led to a better understanding by China of its NPT obligations. On 11 May 1996, China stated that it would provide no assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Our current information does not provide a basis for concluding that China has acted inconsistently with that statement. Questions remain about contacts between Chinese entities and elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear program....

"However, the information is not sufficient to reach a judgment of non-compliance with the NPT." [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," August 1997.]

1996

9/5/1996: In its "Annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," transmitted to the US Congress, the US State Department stated that "the United States continues to oppose Chinese nuclear cooperation with countries of proliferation concern such as Iran and Pakistan. Some of China's exports have raised questions about that country's compliance with NPT obligations." [Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 2.]

8/1996: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"In early 1992, China became a member of the NPT. Prior to China's NPT accession, the United States concluded that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. Since China's accession to the NPT, it appears that China may have continued to assist Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program and may have continued contacts with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons related program. In addition, China in 1995 continued providing assistance to Iran and Algeria, but this assistance appears consistent with China's obligations under the NPT." [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," August 1996.]

5/11/1996: Xinhua released a public statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry following talks with the United States. The statement read as follows:

"Beijing, May 11. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman here today answered a question raised by a reporter on the decision of the US Government not to impose sanctions on China.

Question: It is reported that the US Government has announced that it has decided not to impose sanctions on China and decided to resume normal operations of US Eximbank in China. What is your comment on this?
Answer: We have taken note of the above report. As a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China strictly observes its obligations under the treaty, and is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China pursues the policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or assisting other countries in developing such weapons...The nuclear cooperation between China and the countries concerned is exclusively for peaceful purposes. China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. China stands for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the strengthening of safeguards and export control measures."

According to a 10 May 1996 US State Department public statement, the Chinese confirmed that this pledge covers the future transfer of ring magnets and other nuclear-related items to unsafeguarded facilities. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated, "These were not winks and nods and smiles. These were express, clear assurances at the senior-most level of the Chinese government to the secretary of state." Burns said the assurances consisted of "oral commitments made to us by the government of China (and also) commitments that were conveyed through cable traffic...There is a written record of this that the historians here...will be able to talk about in ten years time or so." Burns further stated that "We and the Chinese were very clear that this general pledge the Chinese made in their written statements specifically includes ring magnets...Moreover, the United States and China together have agreed to follow up consultations at the expert level to build on these assurances." Further, "there is going to be verification of this agreement. And there's going to be a big American spotlight on some of the Chinese companies that have engaged in these practices in the past. The Chinese understand that." According to one US official, "We would have preferred greater specificity and public clarity and all of that...I cannot promise you that their definition of assistance is the same as ours, but it is clearly more extensive [than what China had maintained previously,] and it clearly includes ring magnets." [US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Statement By Nicholas Burns, Spokesman," 10 May 1996; "A Chronology: The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," Minority Staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; Carol Giacomo, Reuters, 14 May 1996; in Executive News Service, 14 May 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Silent On Nuclear Export Plans," The Washington Post, 14 May 1996, p. A9.]

4/21/1996: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that China would not violate the NPT, saying, "The Chinese position is clear...We signed a treaty on the [non] proliferation of nuclear weapons, and never will we attempt it [i.e. proliferation]." This statement came in response to US pressure over its nuclear-related sales to Pakistan. [Reuters, 21 April 1996.]

4/4/1996: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated that "China is a responsible state...China has never and will never transfer any equipment or technology that could be viable for the production of nuclear weapons." Shen stated that as an NPT signatory, China "strictly abides by its commitments" and "does not advocate, encourage or carry out nuclear proliferation." Shen also stated that "Corporations in China are not eligible to make any kind of transactions that violate China's export policies...Sanctions based on rumors are ill-advised." ["China Denies Nuclear Technology Sale To Pakistan, "United Press International, 4 April 1996; AFP (Hong Kong), 4 April 1996; in "PRC: Spokesman Warns On Imposing Sanctions Over Nuclear Row," FBIS-CHI-96-066, 4 April 1996.]

1995

11/1995: In its white paper on arms control and disarmament, the Chinese government stated that it "supports the three major goals set forth in the [NPT]: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, accelerating nuclear disarmament, and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy." China further stated that the NPT "should not be interpreted as permitting the nuclear-weapon states to retain possession of nuclear weapons forever." ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.]

11/1/1995: In a UN General Assembly session, Chinese disarmament ambassador Sha Zukang stated that China believes that the indefinite extension of the NPT should not be interpreted as allowing the perpetual possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states. [Xinhua (Beijing), 2 November 1995, in "Disarmament Envoy Explains Nuclear Arms Stand," FBIS-CHI-95-212, 2 November 1995.]

5/30/1995: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"In early 1992, China became a member of the NPT. Prior to China's NPT accession, the United States concluded that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. Based on Beijing's longstanding nuclear links with Islamabad, it is unclear whether Beijing has broken off its contact with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program." It further stated that "The United States Government has continuing concerns regarding possible continuation of China's past nuclear weapons assistance to Pakistan and Beijing's compliance with its NPT obligations. The United States Government considers China's nuclear assistance to Iran and Algeria consistent with Beijing's NPT obligations." [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," 30 May 1995.]

5/1995: In number 12 of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament," (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4), China agreed to the following text:

"New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." ["Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2), 11 May 1995; Mark Hibbs, "China Has Far To Go Before US Will Certify, Agencies Now Say," Nucleonics Week, 12 December 1996, p. 9.]

4/18/1995: In a statement to the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC), Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that China "supports the smooth extension of the NPT...If the option for indefinite extension is chosen, it is our stand that it must be made clear that such an extension should in no way be interpreted as perpetuating the nuclear-weapon States' prerogative to possess nuclear weapons."

Qian indicated that China supports either indefinite extension or extension by fixed periods of at least 25 years, and suggested "there should be continued regular reviews of the treaty." Qian also proposed the achievement of a convention "for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision."

China's intermediate objectives in the context of the NPT include legally-binding assurances from the nuclear weapon states of no-first-use of nuclear weapons or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996, and a convention prohibiting the manufacture of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (Cut-Off). ["Statement By H.E. Qian Qichen, Vice Premier And Foreign Minister And Head Of Delegation Of The People's Republic Of China At The 1995 Review And Extension Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons," 18 April 1995; Barbara Crossette, New York Times, 19 April 1995, p. A16; Xinhua (Beijing), 18 April 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-075, 18 April 1995; Zhongguo Xinwen She (Beijing), 19 April 1995, in JPRS-TAC-95-013-L, 19 April 1995; Li Jianxiong, Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-086, 2 May 1995.]

4/10/1995: China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Vice President Zhang Huazhu stated that nonproliferation policies should not be allowed to "restrict international cooperation" in the nuclear industries of developing countries. Zhang said China has "prudent" nuclear export controls which require assurance of peaceful use, IAEA safeguards, and restrictions on the re-export of Chinese technology. [Ann MacLachlan, Nucleonics Week, 13 April 1995, pp. 67.]

4/6/1995: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, China stated that "As a State party [to the NPT], China has since strictly abided by the Treaty and fulfilled in real earnest the obligations set out in the NPT...China pursues the policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in nuclear-weapon proliferation and not assisting any State in the development of such weapons, and, proceeding from this policy, has formulated a strict and effective nuclear export control regime of her own...China supports the smooth extension of the [NPT]." China also stated that it "believes that nuclear non-proliferation is not the ultimate objective by itself, but, rather, a necessary measure and step in the process of realizing the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." [Chinese plenary statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 6 April 1995.]

3/29/1995: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian stated, "China upholds the principles and goals of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty". ["China Rejects Iran Arms Charges," International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1995, p. 4.]

2/2/1995: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, China stated that it "supports the smooth extension of the [NPT] and will participate in the review and extension Conference actively and constructively, making its own contribution to the success of the Conference." [Chinese plenary statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 2 February 1995.]

1994

7/1994: In a paper to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sha Zukang, Deputy Director-General of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated that "nuclear nonproliferation by itself should not be the end, but rather a necessary step toward general and complete nuclear disarmament." [Sha Zukang, "Article VI Of The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Chinese Perspective," in Director's Series on Proliferation, No. 5, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 12 August 1994, p. 38.]

1993

12/1993: Chinese ambassador to the United States Li Daoyu wrote in an article that "China supports the smooth extension of the [NPT], and will take an active part in the preparatory work for the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the NPT." [Li Daoyu, "Foreign Policy And Arms Control: The View From China," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 10.]

1992

7/16/1992: Responding to US President George Bush's nonproliferation initiative, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, "While favoring nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such nonproliferation should be considered under the principles of fairness, reasonableness, comprehensiveness, and balance." [Xinhua (Beijing), 16 July 1992, in Proliferation Issues, 22 July 1992, p. 1.]

3/9/1992: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen deposited China's article of accession to the NPT to UK Prime Minister John Major in London, formally acceding to the NPT as a nuclear weapon state (NWS). ["China Formally Acceded To The Non-Proliferation Treaty," Nuclear News, April 1992, p. 21.]

In its formal statement of accession to the NPT, China called for the following five measures:

(1) All NWS undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and an international agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons should be concluded;

(2) All NWS undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons countries or nuclear-free zones, and an international legal instrument on the non-use or nonthreat of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons countries and nuclear-free zones should be concluded;

(3) All NWS undertake to support the proposition of establishing nuclear weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations;

(4) All states that have nuclear weapons deployed outside their boundaries withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories;

(5) The major space powers halt their arms race in outer space and ease the development of space weapons, the nuclear-related in particular. [China's Instrument of Accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 11 March 1992.]

1991

12/29/1991: During its 23rd session, China's Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) passed a resolution calling for Chinese accession to the NPT. The proposal was supported with one vote opposed. The decision was made during US Secretary of State James Baker's November 1991 visit to China. ["NPC Passes Decision On Nuclear Nonproliferation," Proliferation Issues, 14 May 1992, pp. 2-5; "China Ready To Sign NPT," Nuclear Engineering International, February 1992, p. 10.]

11/17/1991: After US Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Beijing, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated:

"The Chinese side indicated that the Chinese Government would recommend that the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (NPC) complete the legislative procedures for the examination and approval of China's accession to the NPT before the end of the year. And within three months after the Standing Committee of the NPC completes the above-mentioned legislative procedures, the Chinese Government will go through the formalities for formal accession to the NPT." [Xinhua, 17 November 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

11/1991: During US Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Beijing, Chinese leaders promised to joint the NPT by 4/92. [Zachary S. Davis, "China's Non-proliferation And Export Control Policies: Boom Or Bust For The NPT Regime?" Asian Survey, June 1995.]

10/1991: Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu proposed that China join the NPT at the 22nd Standing Committee Session of the 7th National People's Congress (NPC). ["NPC Passes Decision On Nuclear Nonproliferation," Proliferation Issues, 14 May 1992, pp. 2-5; "China Ready To Sign NPT," Nuclear Engineering International, February 1992, p. 10.]

9/25/1991: In a statement to the UN General Assembly, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:

"China is in favor of placing under fair, reasonable, and effective control the trade in arms, including various sophisticated weapons. However, this has to be decided by the international community through extensive consultations on an equal footing after full preparation."

"Effective disarmament is an important means to ease international tension [and] China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and banning research and development of any new type of weapons of mass destruction."
"China pursues a policy of not advocating, not encouraging, and not helping the development of nuclear weapons by other countries. And China has announced its decision in principle to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." [Xinhua, 25 September 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

8/10/1991: During a meeting with Japan's Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, Chinese Premier Li Peng stated:

"The Chinese Government has in principle agreed to participate in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."

"This is for the purpose of promoting comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."
"China has always stood for nuclear nonproliferation, neither encouraging nor engaging in nuclear proliferation."
"It is purely for the purpose of self-defense that China possesses a limited number of nuclear weapons. China took the lead in proclaiming not to be the first to use such weapons." [Xinhua, 10 August 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]
China also stated that it would not impose any preconditions for its accession. ["China Is Ready To Sign The Non-Proliferation Treaty," Nuclear News, September 1991, p. 27.]

6/27/1991: In an interview with reporters during a visit to Japan, Qian Qichen stated:

"China has not yet decided whether or not to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because this treaty has shortcomings. The main shortcoming is that though it imposes certain restrictions on the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is no restriction on the vertical quality upgrading of nuclear weapons. China does not practice nuclear proliferation and is opposed to it. In this sense, China's stand is not in contradiction with the purpose of this treaty." [Xinhua, 27 June 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

6/10/1991: In an interview with Chinese and Iranian journalists during a visit to Iran, Chinese Premier Li Peng stated:

"China has not yet signed the NPT; but China's position on the question remains clear-cut. China was the first country in the world to announce that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Some large countries possessing nuclear weapons have not made assurances similar to China's. The Chinese Government has made it clear that it adheres to a nuclear nonproliferation policy. This means that China does not support, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation. We said so and have done so, too. The Chinese Government is studying the question of participating in the NPT; but the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy is another matter altogether. While China will not engage in the spread of nuclear weapons, it is not against international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Of course, such cooperation should be conducted under the condition that safety will be ensured by the International Atomic Energy Agency." [Renmin Ribao, 10 June 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

6/6/1991: When asked to comment on France's decision to sign the NPT, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated: "China is now seriously studying France's initiative on global arms control and disarmament."

"China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."

"However, before these goals are achieved, China in principle endorses the adoption of fair, reasonable, comprehensive, and balanced measures to prevent the proliferation of these weapons. And China has formulated policies and measures concerning this issue."
"China pursues the policy of neither standing for, nor encouraging, nor engaging in nuclear proliferation, nor helping others in developing nuclear weapons. China participated in the fourth review conference on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the capacity of an observer last year." [Xinhua, 6 June 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

6/1991: Chinese officials informed US Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew that Beijing was considering joining the MTCR and NPT. ["China Weighs Signing 2 Pacts," New York Times, 19 June 1991, p. A6.]

4/1/1991: During a meeting with IAEA Director-General Hans Blix, Chinese Premier Li Peng stated: "China's position is clear-cut, that is, China won't practice nuclear proliferation. Meanwhile, we are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by any other country....In nuclear energy cooperation with foreign partners, we adopt a cautious and responsible attitude and have drawn up corresponding policies." [Xinhua, 1 April 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

1990

10/23/1990: In a statement to the UN General Assembly, Hou Zhitong said:

"The Chinese Government supports the three major objectives set forth in the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, that is, preventing nuclear weapon proliferation, promoting nuclear disarmament, and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy."

"China is in favor of nuclear weapon nonproliferation, but more importantly, it advocates the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Only significant progress in nuclear disarmament can truly strengthen the authority of the nonproliferation regime."
"In the 20 years since its entry into force, the NPT has produced some positive effects on the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation, contributing to a certain degree to the maintenance of world peace and stability. The treaty reflects the just aspirations of numerous nonnuclear-weapons states, particularly the developing countries, for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the birth of a nuclear-weapon-free world." [Xinhua, 24 October 1990; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

9/11/1990: Ambassador Hou Zhitong, head of the first Chinese delegation to an NPT review conference, stated: "The treaty has played some positive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons...China seeks a policy of not encouraging or engaging in nuclear proliferation and not helping any country develop the deadly weapons." [Xinhua, 12 September 1990; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

9/11/1990: In a position paper to the fourth NPT Review Conference, China stated that one criticism it has with the NPT is that "it lacks provisions banning deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon countries. This is the main flaw of the Treaty." ["Basic Position Paper Presented by China to the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 11 September 1990.]

2/27/1990: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:

"On the prevention of nuclear proliferation, China does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation. In its cooperation with other countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, China has adopted a responsible attitude, requiring the recipient countries of its nuclear export to accept [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA safeguards and ensuring that its own nuclear import is for peaceful purposes. At the same time, China is opposed to the practice of going all out for the nuclear arms race both in quantity and quality while imposing unreasonable restrictions on international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation."

"On international weapons transfer, China has always been prudent and responsible toward the export of weapons, and the volume of such export is extremely limited." [Xinhua, 27 February 1990; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

1989

9/15/1989: In an article in Renmin Ribao, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen wrote:

"Our country has resolutely opposed every kind of armaments race and advocated overall prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and outer space weapons, as well as large-scale reductions of regular weapons and military personnel. Our country thinks that both the United States and Soviet Union, possessing the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons and regular weapons in the world, have special responsibility in disarmament; they should play an exemplary role in stopping testing, producing, and deploying every kind of nuclear weapons, greatly reduce their storage on nuclear weapons, and cut their regular weapons on a large scale...."

"China does not advocate, or encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation and would only cooperate with other countries in the peaceful application of nuclear energy." [Renmin Ribao, 15 September 1989; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

1987

3/23/1987: At the UN Regional Conference of the World Disarmament Campaign in Beijing, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:

"China has consistently opposed the arms race and will never take part in it. We stand for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear, chemical, biological, and space weapons and for a drastic reduction of conventional weapons. As early as 1964, China declared explicitly on the very first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons that at no time and under no circumstances will it be the first to use nuclear weapons. China has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or nuclear-free zones."

"China does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation, nor does it help other countries develop nuclear weapons. China supports whatever actions and initiatives that are conducive to the realization of disarmament and elimination of the threat of nuclear war."
"As for the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, it has been justly pointed out that the obligations nuclear states and nonnuclear states should assume under it respectively are imbalanced and unfair. The treaty only limits horizontal proliferation and places no limits at all on the continuous expansion and improvement of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. That is why China has reservations on and is critical of this treaty." [Beijing Review, 30 March 1987; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

1984

1/10/1984: Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang stated during a White House state dinner:

"We are critical of the discriminatory treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but we do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons. We actively support all proposals that are truly helpful to realizing nuclear disarmament, terminating the nuclear arms race, and eliminating the threat of nuclear war." [Xinhua, 11 January 1984; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

1983

11/4/1983: In a statement to the UN General Assembly, Chinese Ambassador Qian Jiadong stated: "China remains critical of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons for its discriminatory nature, but it respects the desire of many nonnuclear-weapons states to prohibit testing, producing, acquiring, and using nuclear weapons." [Xinhua, 5 November 1983; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1992.]

10/11/1983: During the IAEA's 27^th conference, China was admitted as an IAEA member. Wang Shu, Chinese Ambassador to Austria and China's head of delegation to the conference stated:

"We respect the desire of a great many non-nuclear weapon states not to test, use, manufacture, produce and acquire nuclear weapons," but "we cannot go along with any attempt at arbitrary and unilateral widening of the scope of restrictions and controls in the name of strengthening the non-proliferation regime."

"We believe this practice would not be conducive to the development and worldwide peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the economic and scientific development of various countries, as well as to the peace and stability of the world."

Wang stated that although China intended to accept the IAEA statute and fulfill its obligations to the agency, it did not intend to change its critical position on the NPT, which it sees as discriminatory. ["China admitted to atomic agency," Beijing Review, 24 October 1983, p. 13.]

1982

1982: China first stated its support for the norm of nonproliferation. [Zachary S. Davis, "Theory And Practice Of China's Export Controls," in Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt, and Takehiko Yamamoto, eds., US and Japanese Nonproliferation Export Controls: Theory, Description and Analysis (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), p. 223.]

1981

8/4/1981: Yu Peiwen, the head of China's delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, stated:

"China is opposed to major power nuclear monopoly. Like many other peace-loving countries, China does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation, and we are emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear weapons by racists and expansionists such as South Africa and Israel."

"The nuclear-weapons states should recognize the fact that the nonnuclear-weapon states find themselves menaced by the danger of nuclear war and nuclear threat and that it is the strong demand of the peoples of the world that the superpowers halt the arms race and carry our nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapons states should unconditionally guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the nonnuclear-weapon states without further delay, and at the same time, they should take effective measures to carry out nuclear disarmament until the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved. China has unilaterally undertaken the unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states and suggests that, when an international convention on security assurances is elaborated, the inclusion of such commitments should be taken into consideration." [Xinhua, 4 August 1981; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

1970s:

2/14/1979: Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping stated to Indian journalists: "We stand for destroying all nuclear weapons completely. However, the nuclear powers have no right to prevent nonnuclear countries from possessing nuclear weapons unless these powers commit themselves to destroy their nuclear weapons completely or guarantee not to be the first to use them." [Xinhua, 14 February 1979; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]

1978: In a document submitted to the UN, the Chinese government stated:

"The so-called NPT is a conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the US to maintain their nuclear monopoly. By it, they not only try to restrict other countries in their efforts to develop nuclear force for self-defense, but limit their peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While the two superpowers are further intensifying the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, they seek to limit the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. They praise the NPT as a major measure in overcoming the threat of nuclear war. This does not convince others. There is no reason to impose the NPT on other countries arbitrarily." [Quoted in Mingquan Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1997, p. 43.]

1960s:

1965: Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi said that Asian and African countries would have to develop nuclear weapons without Chinese assistance. [Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "China," in Richard Dean Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 1, p. 68.]

1960s and 1970s: China reportedly supported the spread of nuclear weapons in order to break the monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons. [J. Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control In The Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy, August 1995, p. 28.]

[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]

[WHITE PAPER - CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE]

[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY]

[INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY-STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS]

Updated 02/21/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.