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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Database
Overview Regions Assistance Membership Resources
South Asia - 1540-Related Regional Activities
Updated June 2009
REGIONAL OVERVIEW
Of the eight countries in South Asia, only five countries submitted 1540 national reports, with varying degree of compliance. Although India and Pakistan have submitted reports with substantive information, the countries' implementation of UNSCR 1540 obligations and enforcement of export control laws differ. Reports from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka provide insufficient information to analyze the effective and/or full implementation of the resolution's obligations. In general, the reports from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka do not directly address national laws that safeguard WMD materials and prevent their transfer to non-state actors. However, in adherence to the 1540 Committee's request, these nations do describe their national laws pertaining to border control and export controls.
South Asia's characteristic feature is the wide disparities within various segments of its economic growth and development, societal composition, scientific capabilities, and governance. Although the region has witnessed moderate to high economic growth, widespread regional disparities shadow the recent economic progress. A major concern is the ongoing political turmoil in the region and various domestic security challenges within the countries. Foreign Policy's Instability Index categorizes the situation in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan as "critical" and that in Nepal and Sri Lanka as "in danger." Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are undergoing a period of transition in their political and security arenas, without the certainty of progress towards peace and prosperity.
NBC Capabilities
South Asia has advanced capabilities in research and production of NBC-related material. Three countries — Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan — have facilities and materials that present a proliferation risk. India has extensive expertise and facilities in research, development, and manufacture of NBC-related material. India has notable quantities of fissile material and has both enrichment and reprocessing facilities. India conducted a "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974, though it did not weaponize the nuclear device. In May 1998, India conducted two rounds of nuclear tests, declaring its nuclear weapon state status. India's nuclear weapons are deliverable by aircraft or short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. India is also developing a triad deterrent of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear forces. Reports indicate that India has produced weapons grade plutonium for 50-100 warheads,[1] and New Delhi is also strengthening its nuclear delivery systems, especially its missile forces.[2] It is estimated that India currently possesses between 50-60 nuclear warheads, and may have thermonuclear weapon capabilities. Although there is limited information pertaining to India's military chemical and biological programs, a survey of India's civilian research facilities and industries (especially chemical, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology) reveals the country's latent capabilities in these areas.
Shortly following India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998, Pakistan conducted two rounds of nuclear weapons tests of its own and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Estimates place Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the range of 24-48 warheads, with an additional HEU stockpile of 580-800 kg, enough to build between 30-50 fission bombs. The revelation of the A.Q. Kahn proliferation network in 2003-2004 has increased international scrutiny on the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Subsequently, Pakistan has made efforts to further tighten the command and control of its nuclear weapons, as well as strengthen its export control mechanisms. Another issue of critical importance in this region is the escalating nuclear-capable missile race between Pakistan and India in recent years. Pakistan has substantial research and manufacturing facilities to support its nuclear weapon and missile programs. In addition, Islamabad has a well-developed industrial base that could possibly support all activities related to WMD, including military chemical and biological programs.
Although Bangladesh does not have nuclear power reactors, it has a light-water research reactor. Bangladesh has also expressed an interest in establishing a civilian nuclear program. According to the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, future plans for nuclear energy include the addition of two medium-sized nuclear power plants by the year 2017.
There are currently 17 nuclear reactors in operation in South Asia, while another 19 are either in the planning or construction phases. Out of these reactors, eight are pressurized water reactors, 23 are pressurized heavy water reactors, two are boiling water reactors, and one fast-breeder reactor is under construction. Although uranium resources in South Asia are quite scarce, India is estimated to hold 1.3% of identified global uranium resources. India also possesses approximately 12% of identified global resources of thorium, which can also be used as a nuclear fuel resource.
Export Controls and Border Controls
In August 2008, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved the Indian safeguards agreement and on September 6, 2008, the NSG approved India's exemption from the group's ban on nuclear trade with nations outside of the NPT regime, two key steps towards finalization of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement. In October 2008, the United States Congress approved the 123 agreement, which was then signed into law by the President George W. Bush. Russia and France also concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with India, which entail the export of power reactors. Kazakhstan is expected to sign a cooperation agreement on the supply of natural uranium to India. Russian-Indian nuclear cooperation dates back to the 1970s, when India's nuclear test prompted Canada and the United States to terminate nuclear commerce with New Delhi. In 1976, Russia began supplying heavy water to India for its CANDU reactors, and in 1988 committed to the construction of two 1,000 MW reactors, though the deal was not finalized until 2001.[3] While India is not part of any export control regime and domestic enforcement of its laws and regulations governing WMD-related materials are problematic, it incorporated the entire NSG and MTCR control lists into its legislation and put in place a range of laws and regulations to strengthen domestic export controls.[4]
Following the revelation of the A.Q. Kahn nuclear proliferation network, Pakistan has made efforts to strengthen its export control laws and enforcement. For instance, Pakistan has enacted legislation aimed at ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, such as the Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Means, 2004. The act calls for the establishment of an oversight board to administer export control guidelines, licensing of controlled goods, and enforcement. Through the legislation, exporters are also now required to record and maintain details of transactions, and submit them to the appropriate government agencies.[5]
Although minimal concern exists over Bangladeshi nuclear weapons ambitions and Bangladesh is a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament, there have been several instances of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials in or around the borders of Bangladesh. In one case, Bangladeshi police officers reportedly discovered a container of uranium in the home of a former government official.[6] This has added to the concern that Bangladesh may serve as a transit point for illicit nuclear materials en route to Pakistan or India.
South Asians have long considered export controls to be of critical importance, not only because of the presence of sensitive technologies in India and Pakistan, but also because of the region's geographical proximity to major transshipment hubs and sea lines of communication stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Malacca Straits. Almost 60% of the world's sea-borne trade and energy resources are transported through these strategic bottlenecks.
In South Asia there are a number of factors that hamper the effective border and export controls required by UNSCR 1540. These difficulties include disputed international borders, lack of information sharing among countries, lackadaisical interagency coordination within nations, inadequately trained personnel, and the "developing" stage of many domestic industries, which lack technical and financial resources to implement effective export controls and end-user verifications.[7]
Terrorist/Security Threats
In recent months, Pakistan has witnessed an increase in the frequency and intensity of terrorist violence, reemergence of a separatist movement in Baluchistan, and resurgence of Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in North West Frontier and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Furthermore, Pakistan is making a changeover from a state of emergency and martial law to a new coalition government, which was elected through a popular vote. However, it is too early to declare the societal conditions as stable and peaceful in view of the growing political division within the coalition and increasing activities of extremists and terrorists groups within the society and on the borders. In September 2008, Pakistan witnessed its most devastating terrorist attack to date when roughly 1,300 pounds of explosives were detonated outside of a Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. This sort of political unrest may result in the Pakistani government's inability to sufficiently safeguard its nuclear arsenal and other WMD-related materials and technologies.
India is one of most terrorism-affected countries in the world with almost 2,300 lives lost in 2007 as a result of various terror-related incidents. The government and the security forces' efforts to curtail terrorist activities are hampered by outdated and overburdened law enforcement and legal systems. India faces threats from various groups, and in recent years, terrorist incidents have increasingly involved domestic terrorist cells and a higher degree of linkage across insurgent and militant outfits.[8] Also, despite a rise in the standard of living and relatively stable political conditions in India, the country faces significant security challenges from illegal cross-border trade and migration, terrorist attacks in major Indian cities, insurgencies in Northeastern states, and leftist extremism (Naxalites) in nearly half of the 28 Indian states. These factors have exhausted the security agencies and weakened border controls. This deterioration of domestic security may prompt non-state actors to seek access to WMD material for exploitation. Moreover, all the South Asian countries have some sort of unsettled border issue with their neighbors, hampering effective border management.
The authority of Hamid Karzai's government in Afghanistan appears to be restricted mainly to Kabul amidst increasing attacks by the Taliban and the continued influence of warlords and their militias in various provinces.[9] The governmental institutions and the national army are still in their infancy and depend on the backing of the international community, especially NATO and other international forces that number about 70,000 in total.[10] This precarious situation coupled with the resurgence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda, steady increase in drug trafficking, and inadequate border controls and weak law enforcement, make Afghanistan a safe-haven for terrorists and illicit transshipment activities. Governance is made even more difficult by the suspected involvement of Pakistan government entities, especially elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in fomenting violence in Afghanistan.[11]
REGIONAL ADHERENCE TO NONPROLIFERATION INSTRUMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS
In terms of percentage participation in international nonproliferation treaties and terrorism conventions, South Asia shows moderate success: all but one states submitted 1540 reports; 75% ratified the NPT; 100% ratified or signed the CWC and the BTWC; and the three countrieswith nuclear facilities — Bangladesh, India, Pakistan — ratified the CPPNM and the CNS. However, national reports and treaty ratifications cannot be the sole benchmarks for evaluating progress in meeting UNSCR 1540 requirements. The two major countries in the region — India and Pakistan —are still outside the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. However, on August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved a nuclear safeguards agreement with India, which calls for application of IAEA safeguards to Indian civilian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Nuclear Suppliers Group on September 6, 2008 agreed to exempt India from its guidelines that require comprehensive safeguards as a condition of nuclear commerce. Even the countries that are part of various treaties and conventions have weak domestic law enforcement agencies, limited resources, and inadequate border controls; thus jeopardizing implementation of their treaty obligations. Another serious concern is that India and Pakistan, in spite of their NBC scientific capabilities and facilities, are not members of any of the export control regimes, in particular the NSG and AG.
Regional Organizations and Co-operation
Various regional and international organizations have conducted outreach activities to facilitate the effective and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540 obligations. In the case of South Asia, the IAEA conducts regular workshops and training programs on nuclear topics. In 2006, the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons organized a training workshop for customs officials from nine states parties to the convention (Bangladesh, China, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, and Sri Lanka) and one non-state party (Myanmar). The workshop included training on the technical aspects of controlling transfers, such as identification of relevant chemicals, information on laboratory and customs related matters, as well as software for customs services, risk assessment, and monitoring transshipments. In addition, the U.S. Department of State is implementing the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program, which is an interagency program aimed at assisting foreign governments in establishing export control mechanisms that meet international standards.
1540-RELATED REGIONAL ACTIVITIES
- Industry Outreach in Bangalore and Chennai, India, organized by the U.S. Department of Energy, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry, and Center for International Trade and Security, "Promoting Technology-embedded Trade Cooperation: Explaining Indian and International Strategic Trade Regulations," May 2008
- IAEA, National Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, Islamabad, Pakistan, November 5-16, 2007
- IAEA, Response to Illicit Trafficking Incidents Involving Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, Mumbai, India, August 6-10, 2007
- IAEA, Regional Seminar on Advanced Detection Equipment, Mumbai, India, July 30-August 3, 2007
- IAEA, Regional Training on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, Mumbai, India, April 16-27, 2007
- IAEA, International Nuclear Safety Group, Mumbai, India, March 13-15, 2007
- IAEA, Regional Training Course on the Physical Protection of Radioactive Sources, Mumbai, India, October 9-13, 2006
- OPCW, Sub-regional Workshop for Customs Authorities in South Asia on Technical Aspects of the Transfers Regime, Katmandu, Nepal, August 9-10, 2006
- Interpol, 17th Asian Regional Conference, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 18-22 February 2002
STATES
All information on this database pertaining to Offers/Requests of Assistance is based upon each individual country's 1540 National Report.
1540 Reporting:
National Legislation: No applicable legislation
Offers/Requests of Assistance: None
Treaty Participation: Afghanistan is a state party to the NPT, CTBT, CWC, and BTWC. It also ratified the TFC and CPPNM, and is a signatory of the NTC. It is not a party to the CNS and JC.
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 1.8 / 10.0 (Rank 168 / 180)
1540 Reporting:
National Legislation: No applicable legislation
Offers/Requests of Assistance: None
Treaty Participation: Bangladesh is a state party to the NPT, CWC, BTWC, and CTBT. It also ratified the CPPNM, FTC, NTC, and CNS; but has yet to join the JC.
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 2.0 / 10.0 (Rank 161 / 180)
1540 Reporting: No report submitted
National Legislation: No applicable legislation
Offers/Requests of Assistance: None
Treaty Participation: Bhutan is a state party to the NPT, BTWC, CWC, and TFC.
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 5.0 / 10.0 (Rank 46 / 180)
1540 Reporting:
Initial Report
Additional Report 1
Additional Report 2
Offers/Requests of Assistance: According to the 1540 Committee, "India has conducted a training course under the IAEA aegis on physical protection of nuclear installations and is willing to offer its expertise to regularly conduct similar training courses in the future and as a regional training center. New Delhi has also offered to the OPCW legal assistance for other members to draft CWC related legislation." See the United Nations 1540 Committee Website for more information on Assistance from Member States.
Treaty Participation: India is a state party to the BTWC and CWC. It did not sign the CTBT or NPT. New Delhi has also ratified the TFC, NTC, CPPNM, and CNS, but not the JC. (Full list of India's treaty participation>>)
Additional Information: See NTI India Country Profile
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 3.5 / 10.0 (Rank 72 / 180)
1540 Reporting:
National Legislation: No applicable legislation
Offers/Requests of Assistance: None
Treaty Participation: Nepal is a state party to the NPT and CWC, and it has signed but not ratified the CTBT, and BTWC.
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 2.5 / 10.0 (Rank 131 / 180)
1540 Reporting:
National Legislation: No applicable legislation
Offers/Requests of Assistance: None
Treaty Participation: The Maldives is a state party to the NPT, CTBT, BTWC, CWC, and TFC.
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 3.3 / 10.0 (Rank 84 / 180)
1540 Reporting:
Initial Report
Additional Report
National Legislation: Under revision
Offers/Requests of Assistance: Pakistan's national report states that, "given its experience in implementing various treaties regimes including the CWC, CPPNM and BTWC and its elaborate legislative framework in the safety and security of nuclear technology and material, it is in a position to provide assistance, in response to specific requests, to the states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 1540."
According to the 1540 Committee, "Pakistan has rendered technical assistance to Member States under the auspices of the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Technical Cooperation programmes. Pakistan fully supports the IAEA's role to render assistance to member states involved in the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." See the United Nations 1540 Committee Website for more information on Assistance from Member States.
Treaty Participation: Pakistan is a state party to the BTWC and CWC. It has not signed the CTBT or NPT. Islamabad also ratified the CPPNM and CNS. It did not join the JC, TFC, or NTC. (Full list of Pakistan's treaty participation>>)
Additional information: See NTI Pakistan Country Profile
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 2.4 / 10.0 (Rank 138 / 180)
1540 Reporting:
Initial Report
Additional Report
Offers/Requests of Assistance: None
Treaty Participation: Sri Lanka is a state party to the NPT, BTWC, and CWC. It is also a state party to the CNS, and FTC, and has signed the NTC.
Corruption Perceptions Index (2007): 3.2 / 10.0 (Rank 94 / 180)
1540 National Reports
1540 Committee, National Reports, New York: United Nations Organization, http://www.un.org/sc/1540/nationalreports.shtml
National Legislation
1540 Committee, List of Legislative Documents by Submitting UN Member States, New York: United Nations Organization, http://www.un.org/sc/1540/legisdocuments.shtml
Offers/Requests for Assistance
1540 Committee, Requests for Assistance, New York: United Nations Organization, http://www.un.org/sc/1540/requestsforassistance.shtml
1540 Committee, Assistance from Member States, New York: United Nations Organization, http://www.un.org/sc/1540/memberstatesassistance.shtml
Treaty Participation
The International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program, The Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Monterey: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/index.htm
"Convention on Nuclear Safety," International Conventions & Agreements, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/nukesafety.html
"Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," International Conventions & Agreements, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html
"Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management," International Conventions & Agreements, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointconv.html
United Nations Treaty Collection, "Extract from the Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (DOC. A/62/160)," New York: United Nations Organization, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/terrorism/terrorism_table_update_Jan_2008.pdf
Information on 1540-Related Regional Activities
1540 Committee, Chairperson's Statements and Outreach Activities, New York: United Nations Organization, http://www.un.org/sc/1540/chairpersonsstatements.shtml
"IAEA Meetings and Conferences," Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/Meetings2008.asp
"Calendar of Events," The Hague: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, http://www.opcw.org/
"Regional Conferences," Lyon: The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Conferences/Default.asp
Ziad Haider and Souvik Saha, "Analysis of India and Pakistan's Export Control Laws," Stimson Center, 2005, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA20050713866
"India's System of Controls over Exports of Dual-use Goods and Technologies," Directorate General Foreign Trade, Government of India, (Revised July 2005), http://dgftcom.nic.in/exim/2000/scomet.htm
Manpreet Sethi, "Export Controls in India: Essential Confidence Building Measures for Trade and Security," South Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 2, 231-249 (2007)
General Information
BBC Monitoring, Country Profiles, London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/default.stm
"The 2008 World Factbook," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, June 19, 2008. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
"South Asia," Brussels: Crises Group, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1263&l=1
Information on NBC Capabilities
"Country Profiles," Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html
"Country Briefings," London: World Nuclear Association, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/info.html#countries
"Country Nuclear Power Profiles," Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2003, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/pages/countryprofiles.htm
"Nuclear Research Reactors in the World," Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/rrdb/
"The Model Nuclear Inventory: Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security," New York: Reaching Critical Will, 2007, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/about/pubs/Inventory07.html
David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Civil HEU Watch: Tacking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium," Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, August 2005, http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_heu_watch2005.pdf
"Civil Plutonium Produced in Power Reactors," Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2005, p. 3, http://isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/civil_pu.pdf
Information Pertaining to Terrorism
Office of Secretary for State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2008, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/index.htm
South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/
Rajesh M. Basrur & Friedrich Steinhausler, "Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats for India: Risk Potential and Countermeasures," Journal of Physical Security, Issue 1, Vol. 1, 2004, http://jps.lanl.gov/vol1_iss1/3-Threats_for_India.pdf
[1] "India's Nuclear Forces, 2007," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, pp. 74-78; "Global Fissile Material Report 2007," International Panel on Fissile Materials, pg. 10, fissilematerials.org; "Indian Nuclear Forces 2006," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/India.pdf.
[2] "DRDO Readying Design for 5,000 Km-range Agni-V," The Hindu, May 10, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/05/10/stories/2008051054681300.htm.
[3] Anya Loukianova, "Eager to Increase Nuclear Exports, Russia Awaits Nuclear Suppliers Group Exemption for India," WMD Insights, February 2008, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I22/I22_RU3_EagerToIncrease.htm.
[4] For a summary of export control legislation in India, see Manpreet Sethi, "Export Controls in India: Essential Confidence Building Measures for Trade and Security," South Asian Survey, 2007, Vol. 14, pp. 241-242.
[5] "Pakistan: Law on Export Control for Nuclear and Biological Weapons," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/2004pakistandulaw.html.
[6] "Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks," IISS Strategic Dossier, Institute for International and Strategic Studies, 2006-2008, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/ nbm/nuclear-black-market-dossier-a-net-assesment/.
[7] Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, "Curbing Proliferation from Emerging Suppliers: Export Controls in India and Pakistan," Arms Control Today, September 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_09/AnupamandGahlaut.asp.
[8] Namrata Biji Ahuja, "Naxals Have Arms, Upgrade Bases," The Asian Age, January 19, 2008, Lexis-Nexis.
[9] Jason Burke, "Taliban Win Over Locals at the Gates of Kabul," The Guardian, August 24, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/24/afghanistan.
[10] "Afghans Demand 'New Troops' Deal," BBC News, August 25, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7581270.stm.
[11] See for example, Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, "Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say," The New York Times, August 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?fta=y.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
