United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Database

Overview Regions Assistance Membership Resources

Middle East and North Africa - 1540-Related Regional Activities

Updated September 2009

REGIONAL OVERVIEW

The Middle East / North Africa is a critical region for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 as nearly one-third of the states either possess some type of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons capability or are suspected of having related research programs. The region also served as an operational hub in A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear trafficking network, and several states continue to provide financial and logistical support to terrorist organizations. Of increasing concern in the region is the ongoing investigation into Iranian and Syrian activities, which suggest that these governments, who are also known sponsors of terrorist organizations, are seeking to develop the ability to enrich uranium, potentially also for nuclear weapons purposes.

The Middle East is the nodal point of three continents - Europe, Africa and Asia - so the acquisition of NBC weapons or their delivery systems by non-state actors could have destabilizing consequences for all three continents. The region is of vital strategic importance for the global economy because of its petroleum exports, its large shipping hubs, and the Suez Canal.

NBC Capabilities

Egypt's nuclear program consists of two research reactors, a Soviet-supplied 2 MW research reactor and an Argentine-supplied 22 MW light water research reactor. In September 2006, the government unveiled a plan to construct a nuclear power station at Al-Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast. Egypt inherited stocks of mustard agent and possibly phosgene abandoned by British forces in 1954, and is one of the few countries known to have employed CW since the end of the First World War. Egypt has advanced technological and industrial capabilities and has been accused of assisting Iraq with its CW program as well as exporting CW materials to Syria. Egypt was actively involved in the negotiation phase of the CWC, although it refuses to sign the CWC until Israel joins the NPT. Several Western governments believe that Egypt continues to develop its CW capabilities. Israel has also accused Egypt of carrying out BW research, but there is little publicly available evidence to support this allegation.

Iran's nuclear program has been a subject of concern for many years. While the IAEA has on several occasions stated that it has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, concerns remain that Iran may be pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement in September 2005, and in February 2006 referred the issue to the UN Security Council.[1] The Security Council has subsequently adopted Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008), which among other measures, imposed sanctions against Iran and ordered Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Although uranium enrichment capabilities are not prohibited by the NPT, the sanctions and demand to halt enrichment are a result of Iran's failure to comply with all of the IAEA's rules and requests. Iran, however, continues to develop its uranium enrichment capabilities, claiming its nuclear program is for peaceful use only. According to an IAEA report released on February 19, 2009, Iran's uranium enrichment program is making significant progress, and the IAEA remains concerned about Iran's resistance to addressing its alleged nuclear weapons-related work. The IAEA report states that between February 2007 and November 2008, Iran fed a total of 9,956 kg of UF₆ into the cascades at Natanz and produced a total of 839 kg of low-enriched UF₆. The 2008 data on Iran's uranium enrichment program seem to indicate that, assuming continuous operation, "the centrifuges now appear to be running at approximately 85 percent of their stated target capacity," a substantial increase from 50 percent capacity as stated by the previous IAEA report.[2] In 1996, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) asserted that Iran has pursued a biological weapons capability since the 1980s under cover of its sophisticated civilian biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. However, based on publicly available information, it is impossible to validate the credibility of these assertions. Iran does possess the basic technical capability to initiate a BW program, but it would face significant challenges in weaponization and delivery. Iranian citizens were victims of CW attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, and since that time, the Islamic Republic has sought to maintain an advanced CW defense capability and actively supported the work of the OPCW. Iran maintains one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East, which includes the Scud-based Shahab 1 and Shahab 2, the Nodong-based Shahab 3, and several other medium-range ballistic missiles still under development.

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq pursued NBC weapons, violating its obligations under the NPT and the BTWC. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons, and in 1988 used CW against Kurds in the town of Halabja. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the existence of a clandestine nuclear program that had produced a complete weapon design but an insignificant amount of fissile material. After the war, the United Nations established the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to find and render harmless all WMD-related facilities and materials in Iraq. Working in concert with UNSCOM, the IAEA carried out the destruction of the components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, including buildings and equipment at the Electromagnetic Isotope Separation facilities, nuclear weapons development and production sites, reprocessing facilities, gas centrifuge materials, and any other materials useful in a nuclear weapons or uranium enrichment program.[3] In 1995, General Hussein Kamel, the former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, defected to the West and revealed that Iraq had an offensive BW program that had already successfully weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. By the time UNSCOM departed Iraq in December 1998, it had rendered harmless most of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, although some accounting discrepancies remained. The UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC) continued UNSCOM's mandate from 2002-2003 and found no further evidence of BW. Although Iraq claimed that all CW had been destroyed, UNSCOM could only verify the destruction of a portion of the remaining stocks. The U.S. Iraq Survey Group (ISG) concluded in 2004 that Saddam did not have any remaining WMD stockpiles, and that the NBC programs had not been restarted after the first Gulf War. Iraqi acceded to the CWC in January 2009.[4] Iraq did develop a sophisticated international procurement network for missile technology, and the ISG confirmed the existence of active cruise missile programs in violation of the limits imposed by the UN Security Council after the Gulf War.

Israel is quantitatively and qualitatively an advanced NWS: analysts estimate that Israel has between 100-200 advanced nuclear explosive devices. (These estimates are based on the plutonium production capacity of Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor.) Israel has not signed the NPT, and its nuclear program remains under a shroud of secrecy. The Israeli government asserts that discussions on nuclear disarmament are not possible until a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace agreement is achieved. Israel lacks a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA; therefore, NSG regulations prevent nuclear commerce between Israel and members of the NSG. However, in light of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal, Israeli officials have lobbied for a similar arrangement that would allow nuclear trade without submitting to IAEA comprehensive safeguards. These efforts have coincided with an increasing interest in nuclear energy in Israel. On August 3, 2007, the Israeli Nuclear Infrastructure Minister announced plans for construction of a 1,200-MW to 1,500-MW plant on the border with Egypt.[5] Although neighboring states allege that Israel possesses offensive CW and BW capabilities, there is no publicly available information that validates these assertions. There are concerns, both international and domestic, that offensive CW and BW programs exist at the Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) in Ness Ziona. There are also reports that Israel has employed biological or toxin weapons in special operations.[6] Israel is not a signatory to the BTWC, and has signed but not ratified the CWC.

Jordan is the third largest phosphate (an important element in nerve agent production) exporter in the world. and has a relatively advanced chemical industry. The kingdom has also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with France, under which Areva will help develop Jordan's nuclear infrastructure for power and desalination in exchange for a uranium extraction concession. There are significant uranium reserves in Jordan, from which 2,000 tons of uranium could be produced annually.[7] Jordan has also entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States under the provisions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are engaged in the development of a joint nuclear energy program with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC agreed with the IAEA in February 2007 to cooperate in early preparations for this program. The UAE is also pursuing a separate nuclear energy program. In 2008, the UAE released a nuclear energy policy, which outlined plans to establish responsible management institutions and forgo the pursuit of domestic enrichment and reprocessing. The energy policy includes plans for the construction of 14 nuclear power reactors, which would generate an additional 20 GWe by the year 2020. In January 2008, the UAE signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with France providing for the purchase of two power plants, and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on nuclear cooperation with the United States in April 2008.[8] Saudi Arabia currently has no reactors of any kind, though it does have a nuclear research institute. In 2005, it signed an IAEA Small Quantities Protocol, and its Comprehensive Safequards Agreement entered into force in January 2009. Although Saudi Arabia has an advanced chemical industry, and Saudi scientists are qualified in applied bacteriology and toxicology, there is no evidence of CW or BW programs. In the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia purchased 40-60 CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. Though the technology has become outdated, the missiles are theoretically capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Though it had been a longtime state party to the NPT and BTWC, in 2003, Libya admitted that it had been operating clandestine NBC weapons programs. In December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle its ballistic missile and WMD programs. The United States and Britain along with international officials have since destroyed key components of these programs and removed from the country equipment and materials related to these programs.[9] In 2004, Libya signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, and the agency continues to investigate A.Q. Khan's proliferation network, which supplied components of Libya's nuclear weapons program. Libya is also a state party to the CWC, and destruction of all its CW stockpiles is scheduled for completion in 2011. In 2007, Libya signed a weapons deal with European Aeronautic Defense & Space (EADS) for the purchase of advanced anti-tank missiles as well as secure radio communications systems.[10] Libya has also signed an accord with France to purchase a nuclear-powered desalination plant. Morocco is pursuing a civilian nuclear energy program but has not expressed interest in indigenously controlling the nuclear fuel cycle. A 2 MW U.S.-supplied research reactor is currently under construction, and the government is planning nuclear projects with China, Russia, and France. Morocco also has large phosphate deposits and is an exporter of fertilizers and insecticides. The facilities used to manufacture these products can be converted to produce CW agents with relative ease.[11]

Though its resources are limited, Syria has taken steps to develop WMD capabilities and is believed to possess an advanced CW program in addition to its significant missile arsenal. In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an installation near al-Kibar, which U.S. and Israeli intelligence believed to be a nearly completed nuclear reactor built with North Korean assistance; an IAEA investigation is ongoing.

Algeria is currently operating two research reactors and signed an agreement with France on the peaceful use of nuclear energy in 2007, suggesting that Algeria may seek a power reactor in the near future.[12] Algeria lacks the industrial capacity to produce biological weapons, and although Algeria's natural resources include uranium and phosphates, no uranium mines are currently active. However, an impending deal with Areva could facilitate the exploitation of those reserves in the near future. Tunisia also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with France in 2008 that includes the training of a cadre of nuclear engineers. The government is considering the nuclear option for both power and desalination. Turkey is eager to incorporate nuclear energy into its energy policy, and its first power reactor is scheduled to come online in 2014 at Akkuyu. Turkey also has plans to build as many as 12 reactors by 2020. Turkey's Incirlik airbase is Europe's single largest host of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Turkey's chemical and biological industries are well developed, though no evidence exists that Turkey possesses an offensive BW or CW program. United Arab Emirates signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in January 2009, subsequently revised in April 2009. The rvised version "explicitly prohibits the UAE from possessing enrichment and reprocessing facilities within its territory."[13]

Export and Border Controls

Although every country in the region submitted an initial report to the 1540 Committee, the reports varied dramatically in terms of quality and comprehensiveness, and each country's effort in the reporting process does not necessarily reflect its commitment to timely implementation of the resolution. Many reports did not address critical obligations, especially in regards to border control and trafficking; in fact, several of the reports were merely diplomatic statements supporting the spirit of the resolution and did not serve to build any confidence that implementation and enforcement were taking place. In general, the most substantive reporting came from Turkey and Iran, while the least substantive came from many of the Gulf countries and the rest of the region fell somewhere in between. This trend suggests that regional organizations such as the GCC and the Arab League could play a valuable role in helping their respective blocs fulfill their binding obligations under UNSCR 1540 and in promoting regional cooperation in counter proliferation efforts.

With the exception of Israel, most countries in the region have relatively weak legal institutions. Most of the countries possess at least some type of dual-use technology capability, but lack a robust export control and border security system. Even countries that are unlikely to be tapped for sensitive items could potentially be used as transit points. Illicit networks spanning much of the region facilitate the trafficking of humans, weapons, and narcotics from continent to continent, and many governments lack the capacity and the resources to deal with these problems. For example, the Iranian government battles major heroin and opium trafficking along its border with Afghanistan, and its resources for its customs and export control programs are quite limited. Iran also encounters illegal cross-border activity along its borders with Iraq and Syria. Iraq's borders with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait all remain porous, and terrorists and weapons continue to move across easily. Egypt is a major transit point for illicit drugs. Export control and border security are low priorities for the coalition government in Iraq, which continues to deal with sectarian violence and domestic terrorism on a daily basis.

The Israeli Knesset passed a new Defense Export Control Act, which entered into force in December 2007, and though it is not a member of the MTCR, Israel has pledged to abide by its export control guidelines. In terms of border security, Israel is concerned about weapons that are trafficked into the country and the occupied territories using underground tunnels and sea-lanes.

Similarly, Lebanon has had difficulty securing its borders, and allegedly, Iranian weapons are smuggled into Lebanon through Syria. Lebanon is a major drug transit point for Latin American cocaine and South Asian heroin, and some believe that extremist groups benefit financially from this illicit trafficking. Syria is also a transit point for drugs heading to Western countries and has weak money laundering regulations.

Libya continues to face many challenges in securing its long borders. It currently has territorial disputes with Algeria and Niger, and Chadian rebels reside in southern Libya. Additionally, Libya and Algeria are major transit and destination points for human trafficking. The conflict over the Western Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario Front is ongoing. The Moroccan government controls the largest part of the region; however, much of the region's borders are unregulated. Morocco is the world's largest producer of hashish and a major transit point for Latin American drugs. Persistent corruption plagues efforts to secure its border.

Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in its border security in recent years, including a concrete barricade along portions of the Yemeni border. In 2007, border guards seized significant amounts of explosives and weapons along both the Iraqi and Yemeni borders. Yemen is located at a strategic transshipment point where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean, and the country has a large container port in 'Aden. Oman's port in Salalah is a major international transshipment point for container traffic, and the kingdom's long coastline and porous border presents opportunities for illicit trafficking. Oman is a destination country for women and children trafficked from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Dubai is home to the world's eighth largest container port, and the city was a hub for illicit trafficking activities in the A.Q. Khan network. The UAE's large ports and centralized location make it a major transshipment point for drugs from Southwest Asia. The UAE is also one of the region's major financial centers, and its largely unregulated banking makes it a prime location for money laundering activities. In August 2007, the UAE enacted new export control legislation that authorizes the ban or restriction of trade in commodities for reasons that relate to "safety, public health, environment, natural resources, national security or for reasons related to the UAE's foreign policy." [14] The law also provides for the establishment of a new export control body, the National Commission for Commodities Subject to Import, Export and Re-export Control, which will provide local and national authorities with technical advice to ensure enforcement of the law's provisions.

Turkey is a critical country in the global effort to prevent trafficking in WMD materials. The country connects the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it began recording a growing number of incidents of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Accordingly, between 2003 and 2006, Turkey was the largest recipient of U.S. export control assistance, receiving over $3 million in equipment and training. The U.S. Department of Energy's International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) conducted trainings to help Turkish customs inspectors identify nuclear-related commodities in March 2004 and September 2005. Turkey is a member of all the major multilateral export control regimes, and its domestic institutions continue to improve. In January 2007, Turkey introduced a new safeguard mechanism requiring the registration of all end-use certificates with the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade. End-use certificates assure authorities of the eventual application of an actual or intended shipment and are typically needed in cases where there are political controls on exports, such as advanced military weapons and related technology and materials.

Internal Security and Terrorist Threats

There is a longstanding border dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and each country accuses the other of harboring militants and smuggling weapons. Algeria is also home to the Salafist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which claimed responsibility for half a dozen terrorist attacks in 2007, including some against international targets. Egypt's authoritarian government has been criticized for its harsh actions against suspected terrorists, but the country has not suffered a major attack since 2006. Tunisia passed a new terrorism law in 2003, and the government continues to work actively to disrupt the formation of terrorist groups. In 2007, Tunisia hosted several international and regional conferences with the goal of increasing counterterrorism cooperation.

Due to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rocket attacks from the occupied territories and terror attacks by various non-state actors continue to threaten security in Israel. The Lebanese government recognizes Hezballah as a legitimate opposition party, though it is widely considered a terrorist organization by several Western states, including the United States, Canada, Israel, and the Netherlands. The Syrian government supports terrorist organizations including Hezballah and several Palestinian groups, although it has taken action against Al-Qaeda affiliates. Syria has not reached a peace agreement with Israel since the latter began its continuing occupation of the Golan Heights during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezballah, Syria placed its military forces on alert but did not intervene directly on behalf of its ally Hezballah.

Yemen is one of the poorest Arab countries and the government struggles to cope with terror attacks from Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) and the Yemen Soldiers Brigades. Although there is no evidence of that Yemen has any WMD programs, the government has purchased a number of Scud and anti-ship cruise missiles. In Saudi Arabia, many terrorists in high profile attacks have been Saudi nationals, and a number of fundamentalist Islamic organizations receive funding that passes through Saudi Arabian bank accounts. In 2003, the kingdom initiated a strong campaign against domestic terrorism and extremism.

International Treaties and Agreements

Israel is the only country in the region that has not signed the NPT and BTWC. All states in the region have long expressed their support for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, albeit with varying degrees of interest. In addition, several countries in the region are members of the Pelindaba Treaty (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone). A number of countries have yet to sign the terrorism conventions, and some with civilian nuclear programs or interest in such programs have yet to sign the CPPNM.

REGIONAL ADHERENCE TO NONPROLIFERATION INSTRUMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Regional Organizations and Cooperation

A number of international organizations, foreign governments, and NGOs have conducted regional seminars, workshops, and training sessions to help countries better understand their obligations under UNSCR 1540, prioritize their activities, and build capacity. The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs held a high profile event in Amman, Jordan, in September 2007 that dealt solely with the implementation of the resolution. Many events have focused on the importance of export controls and border security, especially among countries that do not have any WMD programs and did not submit substantive reports to the 1540 Committee.

All countries in the region, with the exception of Israel, Iran, and Turkey, are members of the League of Arab States (Arab League), which has over the years achieved more success fostering coordination in political, cultural, and social issues than in economic issues. The League is actively involved in the Arab Peace Initiative and regularly addresses groups such as the Conference on Disarmament and the NPT Review Conference on behalf of its member countries. It is a logical vehicle for enhancing regional coordination in the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

The GCC is comprised of six oil-rich states in the Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Its primary focus is on economic coordination, although the members have also cooperated on security issues. Because these countries' 1540 reports all had common deficiencies in regards to export controls and border security, the GCC could work to harmonize national legislation and coordinate enforcement, particularly now that the countries participate in a common market and are planning to switch to a common currency.

The Arabic Maghreb Union was created to foster economic and political unity among Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, although meetings have been derailed for years because of the disagreement between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara's sovereignty.

OUTREACH ACTIVITIES:

UN Workshop on Implementing UNSCR 1540, Doha, Qatar, March 8-11, 2009 (press release)
Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS) and Verification, Research, Training, and Information Center (VERTIC), Confronting Biological Threats, Amman, Jordan, October 27-29, 2008
IAEA, Training Course on Regulatory Control of Radioactive Sources, Rabat, Morocco, June 23 - July 18, 2008
IAEA, Regional Workshop on Regulatory Control of Radiation Sources, Rabat, Morocco, June 2-27, 2008
IAEA, Workshop on Illicit Trafficking Information Management and Coordination, Doha, Qatar, May 6-8, 2008
IAEA, Protection against Nuclear Terrorism - Security of Radioactive Sources, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 26-30, 2008
European Union, Fifth Regional Meeting in Support of the Universalisation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Amman, Jordan, December 2007
OPCW, 5th Regional Meeting of National Authorities, Doha, Qatar, September 4-6, 2007
UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1540 Seminar for the Middle East, Amman, Jordan, September 4-5, 2007
Interpol 19th African Regional Conference, Arusha, Tanzania, July 11-13, 2007
Interpol, Workshop on Preventing Bioterrorism, Muscat, Oman, March 19-21, 2007
IAEA, Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, Amman, Jordan, January 22-25, 2007
U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, "Middle East Regional Technical Exchange on the Export Controls of Strategic Commodities," Amman, Jordan, December 12-14, 2006
VERTIC, Middle East Regional Workshop, "Approaches to National Legislation for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Agreements," Amman, Jordan, August 29-30, 2006
VERTIC and Gulf Research Center, "Laying the Foundations for a WMDFZ in the Gulf: Approaches to National Legislation for WMD Agreements," Dubai, United Arab Emirates, May 2-3, 2006
Interpol, 1st Heads of NCB Meeting for Gulf countries, Doha, Qatar, March 21-22, 2006
U.S. Department of Energy and IAEA, Seminar for Francophone Africa on the Control of Radioactive Sources, Rabat, Morocco, December 6-8, 2005
Interpol Bioterrorism Regional Workshop for African Countries, Cape Town, South Africa, November 21-23, 2005

STATES

All information on this database pertaining to Offers/Requests of Assistance is based upon each individual country's 1540 National Report.

Algeria

1540 Reporting:

STATES
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria Tunisia Turkey United Arab Emirates (UAE) Yemen Sources: Unless otherwise noted, the information for this section was derived from the sources listed in the References section.